The Ubiquity and Strategic Complexity of Grand Coalition in the German Federal System

Abstract

The 2005–09 Grand Coalition under Chancellor Angela Merkel was generally seen as an exceptional response to a difficult verdict of the voters in the 2005 elections. It was also seen as a chance to overcome the legislative gridlock characteristic of much of the Kohl and Schröder chancellorships. This article demonstrates that grand coalition politics based on relatively inclusive bargaining processes runs much deeper in the German federal republic than is sometimes acknowledged. Since unification in 1990, federal–state coalitions across the national government–opposition divide in the Bundestag have become more frequent, reflecting the change from a two-bloc towards a ‘fluid five-party system’ (Niedermayer) and necessitating inclusive bargaining in the Bundesrat. The federal states have become a testing ground for new coalitions. Not only do these more fluid coalition patterns at the state level include grand coalitions of the two major parties, but also ‘Red–Green’ minority cabinets of SPD and Greens, ‘Red–Red’ coalitions of SPD and Linke, ‘Jamaica coalitions’ of CDU, FDP and Greens, and ‘traffic-light coalitions’ of SPD, FDP and Greens. Although the 2006 reform of German federalism reduced the share of bills requiring Bundesrat consent, the Grand Coalition under Merkel was tied into a comprehensive multi-level bargaining system as were its predecessors and successors. Majoritarian decision-making is close to impossible in this system, horizontal and vertical bargaining prevails.

Notes

W. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 1962).

Infratest dimap, ARD-DeutschlandTREND, September (Berlin, 2009), at p.8.

See A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 1999).

Ibid., at p.312.

See W.M. Downs, Coalition Government, Subnational Style. Multiparty Politics in Europe's Regional Parliaments (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998); F.U. Pappi, A. Becker and A. Herzog, ‘Regierungsbildung in Mehrebenensystemen: Zur Erklärung der Koalitionsbildung in den deutschen Bundesländern’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 46 (2005), pp.432–58.

See O. Niedermayer, ‘Nach der Vereinigung: Der Trend zum fluiden Fünfparteiensystem’, in O.W. Gabriel, O. Niedermayer and R. Stöss (eds), Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2001), pp.107–27.

M. Freitag and A. Vatter, Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer. Politische Institutionen im Vergleich (Opladen/Farming Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich – UTB, 2008), at p.160.

See for instance M. Friedrich, ‘Entwicklung und gegenwärtige Lage des parlamentarischen Systems in den Ländern’, in H.-P. Schneider and W. Zeh (eds), Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1989), pp.1707–18.

With empirical results see M. Haas, U. Jun and O. Niedermayer, ‘Die Parteien und Parteiensysteme der Bundesländer – Eine Einführung’, in U. Jun, M. Haas and O. Niedermayer (eds), Parteien und Parteiensysteme in den deutschen Ländern (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), pp.9–38, at p.20; M. Debus, ‘Parteienwettbewerb und Koalitionsbildung in den deutschen Bundesländern’, in U. Jun, M. Haas and O. Niedermeyer (eds), Parteien und Parteiensysteme in den deutschen Ländern, pp.57–78.

Downs, Coalition Government. Subnational Style. Up to now, all coalition sizes and combinations were tested at Land level before they were accepted at federal level.

S. Kropp, Kooperativer Föderalismus und Politikverflechtung (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), at pp.61–80.

M.G. Schmidt, ‘The Grand Coalition State’, in J.M. Colomer (ed.), Political Institutions in Europe (London/New York: Routledge, 1996), pp.62–98, at p.68.

F.W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), at p.55.

G. Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. Regelsysteme und Spannungslagen im Institutionengefüge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3rd edition (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000).

R. Sturm, ‘Party Competition and the Federal System: The Lehmbruch Hypothesis Revisited’, in C. Jeffery (ed.), Recasting German Federalism. The Legacies of Unification (London/New York: Cassell, 1999), pp.197–216; W. Renzsch, ‘Bundesstaat oder Parteienstaat: Überlegungen zu Entscheidungsprozessen im Spannungsfeld von föderaler Konsensbildung und parlamentarischem Wettbewerb in Deutschland’, in E. Holtmann and H. Voelzkow (eds), Zwischen Wettbewerbs- und Verhandlungsdemokratie (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), pp.53–78.

Haas et al., ‘Die Parteien und Parteiensysteme der Bundesländer’, at p.20.

Such as the number of parties in cabinet, a government's share of mandates, the share of votes, the inclusion of minorities, and the proportionality of governments, see Freitag and Vatter, Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer.

See M. Laakso and R. Taagepera, ‘`Effectivé Number of Parties. A Measure with Application to West Europe’, Comparative Political Studies 12 (1979), pp.3–27.

In the 1960s, however, the National Democratic Party (NPD), a party located at the extreme right, successfully moved into eight Land parliaments, but failed to repeat this success in the following Land elections as well as at federal level.

For more detailed analysis see M. Haas, ‘Auswirkungen der Großen Koalition auf das Parteiensystem’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 35 (27 Aug. 2007).

O. Niedermayer, ‘Von der Zweiparteiendominanz zum Pluralismus: Die Entwicklung des deutschen Parteiensystems im westeuropäischen Vergleich’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 51 (2010), pp.1–13.

See R.S. Katz and P. Mair, ‘The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party Organizational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracies’, in R. Gunther, J.R. Montero and J.J. Linz (eds), Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.113–35; T. Poguntke, ‘Political Parties and Other Organizations’, in R.S. Katz and W. Crotty (eds), Handbook of Party Politics (London/Thousand Oaks, CA/New Delhi: Sage, 2006), pp.396–405.

See T. Poguntke, Parteiorganisation im Wandel. Gesellschaftliche Verankerung und organisatorische Anpassung im europäischen Vergleich (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000).

See Niedermayer, ‘Von der Zweiparteiendominanz zum Pluralismus’.

See ibid.

See M.G. Schmidt, ‘Wenn zwei Sozialstaatsparteien konkurrieren: Sozialpolitik in Deutschland’, in M.G. Schmidt and R. Zohlnhöfer (eds), Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Innen- und Außenpolitik seit 1949 (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006, pp.137–57, at p.150.

The SPD lost 1.1 million votes to the Left Party in 2009. See Infratest dimap, ‘WahlREPORT Bundestagswahl 2009’ (Berlin, 2009), at p.14.

Ibid., at p.13.; see also J. Hofrichter and M. Kunert, ‘Wählerwanderung bei der Bundestagswahl 2005: Umfang, Struktur und Motive des Wechsels’, in O.W. Gabriel, B. Weßels and J.W. Falter (eds), Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 2005 (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), pp.228–50.

The CDU/CSU lost about 1.08 million votes to the non-voters' camp. See Infratest dimap, ‘WahlREPORT 2009’, at p.13.

See R.S. Katz, ‘Party in Democratic Theory’, in Katz and Crotty (eds), Handbook of Party Politics, pp.34–46, at p.39.

Downs, Coalition Government, Subnational Style, at p.244.

For coalition formation in 2009 see T. Saalfeld, ‘Regierungsbildung 2009: Merkel II und ein höchst unvollständiger Koalitionsvertrag’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 41/1 (2010), pp.181–206, at p.189.

Debus, ‘Parteienwettbewerb und Koalitionsbildung’, at pp.69–72.

Haas et al., ‘Die Parteien und Parteiensysteme der Bundesländer’, at p.20.

See K. Völkl, K.-U.Schnapp, E. Holtmann and O.W. Gabriel, ‘Zum Einfluss der Bundespolitik auf Landtagswahlen: theoretischer Rahmen und Analysemodelle’, in K. Völkl, K.-U. Schnapp, E. Holtmann and O.W. Gabriel (eds), Wähler und Landtagswahlen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), pp.9–38.

G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

P. Mair, ‘Party System Change’, in Katz and Crotty (eds), Handbook of Party Politics, pp.63–73, at p.70.

Pappi et al., ‘Regierungsbildung in Mehrebenensystemen’.

Furthermore, the SPD formed five coalitions with the PDS (Left Party). Principally, these parties may also be counted as coalitions settling inside the centre-left camp, even though it is still contested whether the Left Party is accepted as part of it. If we consider the five red–red coalitions and the two SPD-led minority governments as centre-left ‘bloc’ coalitions, their total number rises from 36 to 43 (57 per cent instead of 47 per cent). The other four remaining governments were minority or caretaker governments.

From 1949 to 2005, their share was 36.7 per cent. Freitag and Vatter, Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer, at p.125; see also Figure 1.

For contributions attached to game theory in coalition analyses see B. Peleg, ‘Coalition Formation in Simple Games with Dominant Players’, International Journal of Game Theory 1 (1981), pp.11–33; A.M.A. van Deemen, ‘Dominant Players and Minimum Size Coalitions’, European Journal of Political Research 17 (1989), pp.313–32; P. van Roozendaal, ‘The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 17 (1992), pp.5–36.

With illustrative examples in Central Europe see C. Nikolenyi, ‘Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe’, Party Politics 2 (2004), pp.123–50.

G. Hirscher, ‘Die CSU als Koalitionspartner’, in R. Sturm and S. Kropp (eds), Hinter den Kulissen von Regierungsbündnissen. Koalitionspolitik in Bund, Ländern und Gemeinden (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp.96–119.

In Brandenburg, it was solely the East German ‘Bündnis 90’, but not the Green Party which acted as a coalition partner. For problems of coalition governance see S. Putz, Macht und Ohnmacht kleiner Koalitionspartner. Rolle und Einfluss der FDP als kleine Regierungspartei in vier ostdeutschen Landesregierungen (1990–1994) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008).

Due to the ‘classical’ conflict between economical and ecological interests represented by the FDP regarding the Greens, the traffic light coalition failed prior to the end of legislature in February 1995.

See F. Decker, ‘Koalitionsaussagen der Parteien vor Wahlen. Eine Forschungsskizze im Kontext des deutschen Regierungssystems’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 39/2 (2008), pp.330–45; S.N. Golder, ‘Pre-electoral Coalitions in Comparative Perspective: A Test of Existing Hypotheses’, Electoral Studies 24 (2006), pp.643–63; M. Debus, Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007).

For further details see R. Schmitt-Beck and T. Faas, ‘Die hessische Landtagswahl vom 27. Januar 2008: Wiederkehr der “hessischen Verhältnisse”’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 40/1 (2009), pp.16–34.

Grand coalitions, however, do not necessarily cover a broader spectrum of policy positions to be negotiated than small minimal winning coalitions comprising the same number of parties. The comparison of the recent federal CDU/CSU/SPD and the current CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, which are engaged in severe conflicts, can be cited as a striking example.

See also A. Krouwel, ‘Party Models’, in Katz and Crotty (eds), Handbook of Party Politics, pp.249–69.

R. Katz and P. Mair, ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics 1/3 (1995), pp.5–28.

Mair, ‘Party System Change’, p.70.

T. Poguntke, ‘A Presidentializing Party State? The Federal Republic of Germany’, in T. Poguntke and P. Webb (eds), The Presidentialization of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.63–87.

See also ibid., at p.75.

The coalition consisting of CDU, CSU, and DP could garner to 57.7 per cent of the mandates.

Schmidt, ‘The Grand Coalition State’.

Federal issues, in turn, play a certain role in the elections to state parliaments, see Völkl et al., ‘Zum Einfluss der Bundespolitik auf Landtagswahlen’.

S. Kropp, Regieren in Koalitionen (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001), pp.52–89.

H. Abromeit, Der verkappte Einheitsstaat (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992), at p.64.

See also P. Manow and S. Burkhart, ‘Legislative Self-Restraint under Divided Government in Germany, 1976–2002’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 32/1 (2007), pp.167–91.

S. Burkhart, P. Manow and D. Ziblatt, ‘A More Efficient and Accountable Federalism? An Analysis of the Consequences of Germany's 2006 Constitutional Reform’, German Politics 18 (2008), pp.522–40; M. Höreth, ‘A Successful Failure? The Contested Implications of Germany's Federal Reforms’, German Politics 18 (2008), pp.408–23.

See T. Saalfeld, ‘Parteiensystem und Kabinettsstabilität in Westeuropa 1945–1999’, in O. Niedermayer, R. Stöss and M. Haas (eds), Die Parteiensysteme Westeuropas (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), pp.477–506; see also R. Axelrod, ‘A Coalition Theory Based on Conflict of Interest’, in W.M. Evan (ed.), Interorganizational Relations. Selected Writings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), pp.44–54. Findings referring to coalition in Central and Eastern Europe, however, come to different conclusions, see S. Kropp, ‘Koalitionsregierungen’, in O.W. Gabriel and S. Kropp (eds), Die EU-Staaten im Vergleich. Strukturen, Prozesse, Politikinhalte (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher, 2008), at p.537.

Freitag and Vatter, Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer, pp.158–60.

This has logically raised the question whether federal cabinets can be better suited to the federal order. Along these lines, grand coalitions and minority governments, enforcing negotiation democracy, were recommended to overcome the ‘structural break’ which was said to mould the German political system. See R. Czada, ‘Konkordanz, Korporatismus und Politikverflechtung: Dimensionen der Verhandlungsdemokratie’, in E. Holtmann and H. Voelzkow (eds), Zwischen Wettbewerbs- und Verhandlungsdemokratie (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), pp.23–49, at p.30; Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat, at p.194.