‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being’? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism

Abstract

Despite several post-Cold War reforms which have promised far-reaching change, the Bundeswehr faces a set of deficits in force structures, capabilities, doctrines and military adaptation, which leave it in danger of slipping permanently behind its European partners. The study examines the extent to which reforms proposed by the Commission on Structural Reform of the Bundeswehr will remedy these deficiencies. It finds that the proposals of the Commission include several important measures which will accelerate German convergence with the reforms of its European partners. However, the Commission fails to address several fundamental problems which impair the Bundeswehr's capacity to adapt to ongoing operations. The article critically engages with the existing theoretical literature on German defence policy and highlights the utility of neoclassical realism in explaining the process and outcome of German defence reform. The study also points to the urgent requirement for further comparative scholarship on post-Cold War European military adaptation and civil–military relations in defence planning.

Notes

*The title of this article borrows from Karl Scheffler's quotation: ‘Berlin is a city condemned forever to becoming and never to being’.

‘The Bundeswehr Advancing Steadily into the 21st Century: Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal’, BMVg, June 2000.

White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 2006, BMVg, pt. 3.8, page 65.

On German performance in operations of rapidly varying intensity, see Janne-Haaland Matlary, European Union Security Dynamics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), p.151. On Afghanistan, see T. Noetzel and B. Schreer, ‘All the Way? The Evolution of German Military Power’, International Affairs 84/2 (2008), pp.211–21. On the impact of capability deficits on performance in Afghanistan, see ‘Bundeswehr in Afghanistan bedingt Einsatzbereit’ (Welt Online, 6 April 2010 [cited 2 December 2010]), available from http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7074557/Bundeswehr-in-Afghanistan-bedingt-einsatzbereit.html. On doctrinal deficiencies see ‘Das ist Naiv Gewesen’ (Zeit Online, 31 July 2009 [cited 2 December 2010]), available from http://www.zeit.de/2009/32/Kujat-Interview.

T. Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century’, Defence Studies, 11/2 (2011), pp.244–70.

Chaired by Frank-Juergen Weise, the Commission on the Structural Reform of the Bundeswehr was established by the Cabinet in April 2010 to develop proposals for streamlining the Bundeswehr's command and administrative structures and delivered its report in Oct. 2010. It will henceforth be referred to as the ‘Weise Commission’.

S-C. Brune et al., ‘Restructuring Europe's Armed Forces in Times of Austerity’, SWP Working Paper, November 2010, p.11.

Thomas Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1989–2003 (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p.16.

John Duffield, World Power Forsaken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.27

Duffield, World Power Forsaken, p.27; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, pp.15–8.

For a comprehensive discussion of the origins of the concept of strategic culture and of theoretical contestation within the approach, see A. Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security 19/4 (1995), pp.32–64.

Thomas Berger, ‘Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); p.328; Duffield, World Power Forsaken, pp.786–90; Hans Maull, ‘Germany's Foreign Policy post-Kosovo: Still a Civilian Power?’ in Sebastian Harnisch and Hans Maull (eds), Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp.119–20.

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p.11.

Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, pp.7–8.

Ibid., p.7.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, pp.153–5; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, p.144.

Ibid., p.11.

Ibid., p.12.

Central beliefs are ‘abstract beliefs and basic assumptions about the international system… rarely questioned and stable’; operational beliefs relate to the ‘efficacy of different policy instruments and strategies’; peripheral beliefs are ‘more transient and concern concrete issues and objects’. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement, p.13. Longhurst terms the three layers of beliefs of which strategic culture are composed ‘foundational elements’, ‘security policy standpoints’, and ‘regulatory practices’. Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, p.17.

Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, p.21.

Ibid.

T. Balzaq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context’, European Journal of International Relations 11/2 (2005), pp.171–205; H. Sritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond’, European Journal of International Relations 13/3 (2007), pp.357–83.

Realist accounts of post-Cold War German defence policy are limited to the neoclassical realist analyses. See Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence’; Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, Addison Wesley, 1979), p.127

Joao Resende-Santos, Neorealism, the State and the Modern Mass Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.72.

Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.127.

Military ‘best practice’ is identified through observation of the experiences of other states and through a state's own operational experiences. Resende-Santos, Neorealism the State and the Modern Mass Army, pp.58–61.

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.95–106.

K. Reynolds, ‘Building the Future Force’, Contemporary Security Policy 27/3 (2006), p.458.

E. Dahl, ‘NCW and the Death of Operational Art’, Defence Studies 2/1 (2002), p.5.

T. Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, International Affairs 84/4 (2008), p.779.

Ibid.

B Hauser, ‘The Cultural Revolution in COIN’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30/1 (2006), p.167.

‘Military Budget Reflects a Shift in Strategy’ (New York Times, 6 April 2009 [cited 30 November 2010]), available from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/us/politics/07defense.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&hp

Jointness refers to the principle of inter-service cooperation in the conduct and planning of operations, capability procurement, doctrinal development and concept development and experimentation (CD&E).

On the European Great Powers' selective emulation of the RMA see Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.28–60.

Ibid, pp.122–13.

B. Irondelle, ‘Civil–Military Relations and the End of Conscription in France’, Security Studies 12/3 (2003), p.162; C. McInnes, ‘Labour's Strategic Defence Review’, International Affairs 74/4 (1998), pp.833–6.

McInnes, ‘Labour's Strategic Defence Review’, p.837.

G. Bloch, ‘French Military Reform: Lessons for America's Army?’, Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly 30/2 (2000), p.36.

White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr', BMVg, 2006, pt.3.9, p.69.

Ibid., pt.3.8, p.67.

Ibid., pt. 7.2, p.116.

Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, p.64.

Brune et al., ‘The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) 5/May (2010) p.2.

‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The SDSR’, HMSO, 2010, pt. 2.15, p.19.

Ibid.

‘The French White Paper on National Security’, Odilie Jacob, 2008, p.11.

‘Defence Policy Guidelines’, BMVg, 2003, pt. 15, section 2.

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, p.53.

H. Matzken, ‘German Army Stabilisation Forces’, Doctrine 12 (2007), pp.71–4.

Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence’.

Interviews, BMVg, Bonn, 12 October 2009.

‘Bundeswehr Reviews its Entire Structure’, Defence News, 20 September 2010, available from http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4784184

Brune et al., ‘The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis’, p.3.

Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 24 November 2009.

In 2008 British defence spending totalled $60,499 billion; French defence spending totalled $66,180 billion, and German defence spending was $46,241 billion. ‘Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, February 2009. On German capability acquisition see Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence’.

‘Bundeswehr Reviews its Entire Structure’, p.18.

On British EBAO, see T. Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, International Affairs 84/4 (2008), pp.790–8; On French EBAO, see Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), pp.41–7 and S. Rynning, ‘Transformation and Counter-Transformation in the French Army’, Paper Presented at the ISA Conference, San Francisco, March 26–29 2008.

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.204–5.

Konzeptionelle Grundvorstellung der Luftwaffe zum EBAO', BMVg, 13 May 2007.

Interview, Leadership Academy, Hamburg, 22 October 2009.

Interviews, Transformation Centre, Strausberg, 26 November 2009.

Interview, BMVg, Bonn, 12 October, 2009; interview, BMVg, Bonn, 19 October, 2009.

On British and French Stabilisation/COIN doctrine, see Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds), Understanding Counterinsurgency (London: Routledge, 2010) and Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.34–7; 44–7.

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.34–7; 44–7.

Interview, Leadership Academy, Hamburg, 22 October 2009.

‘Einsatzkonzept Operationen gegen Irregulaere Kraefte’, BMVg, 2005.

Interview, Leadership Academy, Hamburg, 22 October 2009; Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’, RUSI Journal 154/1 (2009), pp.16–22.

Ibid.

Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 10 November 2009.

Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 10 November 2009; interviews, BTC, Strausberg, 26 November 2009.

Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 10 November 2009.

Ibid.

Interview, Leadership Academy, Hamburg, 22 October 2009.

Ibid.

Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 16 November 2010.

H. Aust and M. Vashakmadze, ‘Parliamentary Consent to the Use of German Armed Forces Abroad’, German Law Journal 9/12 (2008): pp.2223–36; Hans Born and Heiner Haenggi, ‘Governing the Use of Force under International Auspices’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.206.

Born and Haenggi, ‘Governing the Use of Force under International Auspices’, p.206.

Aust and Vashakmadze, ‘Parliamentary Consent to the Use of German Armed Forces Abroad’, p.2225.

Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, pp.66–8; Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp. 178–9.

Interviews, BMVg, Bonn, 19 October 2009.

Interview, Leadership Academy, Hamburg, 22 October 2009.

Ibid.

Interviews, BTC, Strausberg, 26 November 2009.

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, p.184.

Ibid.

Brune et al., ‘The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis’, p.3.

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, p.216.

Urgent Operational Requirements, [online], UK Ministry of Defence. Available from http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/UrgentOperationalRequirementsuor.htm (accessed 25 November 2010).

Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 24 November 2009; interviews BTC, Strausberg, 26 November 2009. On the BMVg and EADS, see: ‘German Army Angry over EADS Delays and Technical Glitches’ (Spiegel Online, 8 April 2009 [cited 30 November 2010]), available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,640426,00.html

Brune et al., ‘The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis’, pp.3–4.

Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence’.

Ibid.

Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 24 November 2009.

‘Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence’, HMSO, London, 15 October 2009, p.16.

Ibid., p.6.

‘Defence Budget facing 36 Billion Black Hole Say MPs’ (Guardian, 23 March 2010 [cited 29 November 2010]), available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/mar/23/defence-spending-36-billion-blackhole

‘MoD Forced to Hire Civilian Helicopters in Afghanistan’ (Independent, 15 October 2006 [cited 29 November 2010], available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mod-forced-to-hire-civilian-helicopters-in-afghanistan-420161.html

‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The SDSR’, HMSO, 2010, p.4.

‘Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence’, p.215,

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.158–9.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

‘Bundeswehr Reviews its Entire Structure’, p.18.

Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 23 November 2010.

‘Arbeitsstab zur Umsetzung der Strukturreform eingerichtet’, German Ministry of Defence. Available from http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3Ng50BsmB2CZu5vqRcMGglFR9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLciHJHR0VFAO0DgDU!/delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFLzZfRF80RkJL?yw_contentURL=%2FC1256F1200608B1B%2FW28B5A53890INFODE%2Fcontent.jsp (accessed 30 November 2010).

Ibid.

‘Report of the Structural Commission of the Bundeswehr’, Berlin, October, 2010, pt.4.2, p.28. Before his resignation, zu Guttenberg had endorsed these proposals for future force numbers. See ‘German Armed Forces Face Big Changes’, International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic Comments 16/64 (2011), p.1.

‘Report of the Structural Commission of the Bundeswehr’, Berlin, October 2010, pt.4.2, p.28.

Guttenberg had signalled his intention to endorse the plans of Bundeswehr Generalinspekteur General Volker Wieker by outlining the ambition to make 10,000 troops available for deployment. See ‘German Armed Forces Face Big Changes’, p.1.

‘Report of the Structural Commission of the Bundeswehr’. pt.4.3.1, p.31.

Ibid., pt.4.3.1, p.31. This proposal received the explicit support of zu Guttenberg. See ‘German Armed Forces Face Big Changes’, p.1

‘Report of the Structural Commission of the Bundeswehr’, pt.4.3.1, p.31.

Ibid., pt.4.3.4, p.35.

Ibid., pt.4.3.2, p.32.

Interview, BMVg, Berlin, 23 November 2010.

Ibid.

‘Report of the Structural Commission of the Bundeswehr’, Berlin, October, 2010, pt.4.4.1, p.37.

Ibid.

Ibid.

‘Bundeswehr Reviews its Entire Structure’, p.18.

‘German Armed Forces Face Big Changes’, p.3.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., pp. 2–3.

C. Hilpert, ‘Reform der Reformen’, e-politik.de [online], 21 April 2011. Available from http://www.e-politik.de/lesen/artikel/2011/reform-der-reformen/ (accessed 26 September 2011).

Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.123.

On ‘state power’, see Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 1998), p.8.

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.120–7.

B. Rathburn, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism’, Security Studies 17/2 (2008), pp. 294–321.

N. Ripsman, J. Taliaferro and S. Lobell, ‘Conclusion: The State of Neoclassical Realism’, in Stephen Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro (eds), Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.287–92.

J. Legro and A. Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, International Security 24/2 (1999), pp. 5–55.

Rathburn, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name’, pp.310–11; J. Sterling-Folker, ‘Realist Environment, Liberal Processes, and Domestic-Level Variables’, International Studies Quarterly 41/1 (1997), p.19; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.71.

Berger, ‘Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan’, p.328; Duffield, World Power Forsaken, pp.786–90; Maull, ‘Germany's Foreign Policy post-Kosovo: Still A Civilian Power?’, pp.119–20.

On contestation in NCR about the domestic variables which determine state power see Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.120–8.

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, p.163.

Dyson, ‘Managing Convergence’.

During the 2000s the number of Zivildienstleistende varied between a high of 136,008 (2001) and 82,966 (2006). See ‘Bestandzahlen der Zivildienstleistenden im Monat und im Jahresdurchschnitt’, Bundesamt fuer den Zivildienst, 1 November 2010. See also, Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.164–65.

Over 90 per cent of delegates at the November 2010 CDU Party Conference voted in favour of suspending conscription. See ‘CDU Verabschiedet sich von der Wehrpflicht’ (Welt Online, 15 November 2010 [cited 29 November 2010]), available from http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article10949492/CDU-verabschiedet-sich-von-der-Wehrpflicht.html. The October 2010 CSU Party Conference also voted in favour of suspending conscription. See ‘CSU Stimmt fuer Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht’ (Spiegel Online, 29 October 2010 [cited 29 November 2010]), available from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,726239,00.html. Delegates at the October 2007 SPD Party Conference voted to maintain conscription, but only with volunteers. See ‘Delegierte folgen Beck bei Wehrpflicht’ (Focus Online, 27 October 2007, cited 29 November 2010). Available from http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/spd-parteitag_aid_137327.html. The Green Party and FDP have long opposed conscription: see Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, p.95.

Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, pp.165–73.

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopp, 1966), p.103.

Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.46–7.

Ibid.

Alistair Cole, Franco–German Relations (Harlow: Pearson, 2001) , pp.6–12; Michael Sutton, France and the Construction of Europe 1944–2007: The Geopolitical Imperative (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), p.91.

Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, p.165.

Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, pp.69–71.

Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, pp.188–91; Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe, pp.165–73.

Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, p.135; Timo Noetzel, ‘Germany’, in Thomas Rid and Tom Keaney (eds), Understanding COIN: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges (Abingdon: Routledge); Interviews, Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, 8 December 2010; interviews, Bundeswehr Transformation Centre, Strausberg, 26 November 2009.

Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, pp.189–91.

Interview, Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, 22 October 2009. Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security, pp.67–8.

For a detailed exploration of the impact of executive autonomy on British, French and German defence reforms see Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in post-Cold War Europe.

T. Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), pp.568–73.

The concept of organisational capability is drawn from the literature on strategic management. It emphasises the importance of the effective use of resources and competencies by a firm to attain a sustained competitive advantage. See R. Kaplan and D. Norton, ‘Measuring the Strategic Readiness of Intangible Assets’, Harvard Business Review 82/2 (2004), pp.52–63.

Organisation theory argues that military organisations are rational and routine-bound, privilege their autonomy and stability and resist innovation in doctrine and institutional reform. The literature on organisation theory focuses on a wide range of variables endogenous to the military in determining effective ‘bottom up’ adaptation. There is, however disagreement amongst organisation theorists on which endogenous variables should take priority. Compare, for example, the emphasis of Stulberg et al. on managerial strategies of delegation and oversight and the analysis of Farrell, who points to several features of institutional design which predispose militaries to be more adaptable in conflict. See T. Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, and Adam Stulberg et al., Managing Defense Transformation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).

By civil-military relations the author is referring to the relationship between the core executive/parliament/civilian officials within defence ministries and military personnel.

David Chuter, ‘Policy Formulation and Execution’, in Laura Cleary and Terri McConville (eds), Managing Defence in a Democracy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp.– 7.

Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), p.57.

For single case studies of civil–military relations in contemporary European defence planning see S. Rynning, ‘Shaping Military Doctrine in France’, Security Studies 11/2 (2002), pp.85–116 and P. Cornish and A. Dorman, ‘Breaking the Mould’, International Affairs, 86/2 (2010), pp.395–410.