National Role Conceptions, Domestic Constraints and the New ‘Normalcy’ in German Foreign Policy: the Eurozone Crisis, Libya and Beyond

Abstract

German foreign policy can fruitfully be analysed through the lens of a modified two-level framework which identifies three interdependent drivers behind government decision making: the expectations of Germany's international partners, domestic constraints and the national role conceptions of decision-makers. In recent years, the configuration of these three drivers has witnessed a two-fold change. First, there has been a nascent shift towards the role conception of Germany as a ‘normal ally’. Second, the domestic context of German foreign policy has become more politicised and contentious. In consequence, Germany's current foreign policy tends to attach relatively less weight to the expectations of its allies, to be more driven by domestic politics – and to be altogether less predictable. The widely criticised approaches of the Merkel government to the Eurozone crisis and to the NATO mission in Libya, in turn, accord to this pattern and stand for the new ‘normalcy’ in German foreign policy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank Klaus Brummer, Daniel Hough, William Paterson and the anonymous reviewers at German Politics for their comments and suggestions. Also, I am indebted to the participants of the workshop ‘The European Financial Crisis and German Politics and Policy’ at the University of Sussex on 24 February 2011 for their constructive feedback on an earlier draft of the paper.

Notes

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