Lessons Learned? German Security Policy and the War in Afghanistan

Abstract

The mission in Afghanistan revealed fundamental shortcomings, inconsistencies and contradictions of core elements of German security policy. In an effort to contribute to the debate about the factors that account for the idiosyncrasies of German security policy, the purpose of this study is to assess how far Germany learned lessons from its policy failures in Afghanistan. The study introduces a typology of learning, which is mainly based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF); delineates the German security policy belief system; and explores two prominent cases of policy failure: the deployment of the Bundeswehr and leadership of the international police training mission. Utilising different sources of data, the study confirms assumptions of the ACF about the stability of core beliefs and shows that the lack of precise policy objectives was a significant barrier to learning. Instead of clarifying Germany's strategic viewpoint, Afghanistan has further enhanced its disorientation in security policy.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Arne Schröer is a lecturer and PhD candidate at the Chair for Political Science at the University of Passau. His research interests include European energy policy, German and US foreign policy and international peace and security.

Notes

1. See e.g. John Vinocur, ‘Schroeder Urges Europe to Stand Against Foes’, The New York Times, 20 Sept. 2001; Gregor Schöllgen, Der Auftritt: Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne (Berlin: Propyläen, 2003); Egon Bahr, Der deutsche Weg: Selbstverständlich und normal (München: Blessing 2003); Kai Oppermann, ‘Normalisierung der deutschen Außenpolitik: Schocktherapie’, The European, 30 Sept. 2011.

2. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (Berlin, 27 May 2011), p.10.

3. Learning does not necessarily lead to policy change. Lessons might not be implemented or learning may confirm existing ideas and thereby reinforce implemented policies. Thus, it is crucial to analytically distinguish learning from policy change itself. See Jack S. Levy, ‘Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield’, International Organization 48/2 (1994), p.289f; Colin J. Bennett and Michael Howlett, ‘The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change’, Policy Sciences 25/3 (1992), p.290.

4. See Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), p.318.

5. Ibid., p.306.

6. See Peter A. Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy-Making in Britain’, Comparative Politics 25/3 (1993), p.279.

7. Ibid., p.289.

8. Ibid., p.278.

9. For an overview see Christopher M. Weible, Paul A. Sabatier and Kelly McQueen, ‘Themes and Variations: Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework’, The Policy Studies Journal 37/1 (2009), pp.121–40.

10. See Paul A. Sabatier, ‘An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein’, Policy Sciences 21/2–3 (1988), pp.131–4; Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier, ‘Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework’, Journal of Public Policy 14/2 (1994), pp.178–80; Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment’, in Paul A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), pp.130–32; Christopher M. Weible and Paul A. Sabatier, ‘A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework’, in Frank Fischer et al. (eds.), Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods (New York: CRC, 2006), pp.126–8.

11. Sabatier, ‘An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change’, p.133.

12. See on the following Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Assessment, Revisions, and Implications for Scholars and Practitioners’, in Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.), Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), p.221; Paul A. Sabatier, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 5/1 (1998), p.113; Matthew Zafonte and Paul A. Sabatier, ‘Shared Beliefs and Imposed Interdependencies as Determinants of Ally Networks in Overlapping Subsystems’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 10/4 (1998), pp.477–9; Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications’, in Paul A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2007), pp.194–6.

13. Sabatier and Weible, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework’, p.204f.

14. See Peter J. May, ‘Policy Learning and Failure’, Journal of Public Policy 12/4 (1992), pp.331–54. Cf. José Real-Dato, ‘Mechanisms of Policy Change: A Proposal for a Synthetic Explanatory Framework’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 11/1 (2009), pp.126–30.

15. See Grace Skogstad, ‘Policy Failure, Policy Learning and Policy Development in a Context of Internationalization’, Paper Presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Saskatoon, 30 May. 2007.

16. See Thomas A. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change After Catastrophic Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), p.20.

17. See Daniel Nohrstedt, ‘Do Advocacy Coalitions Matter? Crisis and Change in Swedish Nuclear Energy Policy’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20/2 (2010), p.321ff.

18. See Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, p.306; Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State’, p.278.

19. The original version of the ACF focused on policy-oriented learning and shocks external to a subsystem to explain policy change. The latest revision of the ACF identifies two additional paths to policy change. The first alternative path is ‘internal shocks’, which occur within the subsystem and are expected to highlight failures in current subsystem practices. The second alternative path to policy change is ‘negotiated agreement’ crafted among previously warring coalitions after policy stalemate. See Sabatier, ‘An Advocacy Coalition Framework’, pp.149–57; Sabatier and Weible, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework’, pp.204–7.

20. See May, ‘Policy Learning and Failure’, p.351; Weible et al., ‘Themes and Variations’, p.214. Cf. Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘Measuring Policy Learning: Regulatory Impact Assessment in Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 16/8 (2009), pp.1145–64.

21. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/186 (Berlin, 12 Sept. 2001), p.18293.

22. Remark by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/198, p.19296. Cf. Remark by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/198 (Berlin, 8 Nov. 2001), p.19285.

23. See Rainer Baumann, ‘Multilateralismus: Die Wandlung eines vermeintlichen Kontinuitätselements der deutschen Außenpolitik’, in Thomas Jäger et al. (eds.), Deutsche Außenpolitik: Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und Normen (Wiesbaden: VS, 2007), pp.442–61; Gunther Hellmann et al. (eds.), Die Semantik der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik: Eine Analyse des außenpolitischen Vokabulars seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre (Wiesbaden: VS, 2008).

24. The term ‘civilian power’ was introduced by Francois Duchêne in 1972 (see Francois Duchêne, ‘Europe's Role in World Peace’, in Richard J. Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead (London: Fontana/Collins, 1972), pp.32–47) and refined as an ideal type of foreign policy role identity by a group of scholars at Trier University under the guidance of Hanns Maull in the 1990s. The concept was applied widely to analyse the foreign policy of Germany and the European Union after the end of the Cold War. See Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs 69/5 (2000), pp.91–106; Knut Kirste and Hanns W. Maull, ‘Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 3/2 (1996), pp.283–312; Hanns W. Maull, ‘Deutschland als Zivilmacht’, in Siegmar Schmidt et al. (eds.), Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik (Wiesbaden: VS, 2007), pp.73–84.

25. While it is debatable if Germany still fulfils the characteristics of a civilian power from an objective point of view, public discourse still predominantly depicts the country this way. This was reflected once more in the German debate over the international intervention in Libya. See Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?’, Survival 42/2 (2000), pp.56–80; Hans Kundnani, ‘Germany as a Geo-economic Power’, Washington Quarterly 34/3 (2011), pp.31–45; Jeffrey Herf, ‘Berlin Ghosts: Why Germany was Against the Libya Intervention’, The New Republic, 24 March 2011.

26. On human security see Amitav Acharya, ‘Human Security: East Versus West’, International Journal 56/3 (2001), pp.442–60; Peter Burgess and Taylor Owen, ‘What is Human Security?’, Security Dialogue 35/3 (2004), pp.345–87; Antonio Marquina and Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Human Security: European and Asian Approaches’, in Antonio Marquina (ed.), Energy Security: Visions from Asia and Europe (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.244–72.

27. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin, 25 Oct. 2006).

28. European Council: A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003).

29. See ibid., pp.19–22.

30. ‘Securitisation’ describes the process by which issues are turned into security problems. The concept is the cornerstone of the Copenhagen School of security studies, which rejects the neorealist understanding of ‘threat’ as something quasi-material and objectively given or absent. Instead, it regards the senses of threat, vulnerability and (in)security as socially constructed. An issue is only considered to be a security problem when it is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated reference object, which is in the given case the German state and its population. See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). Cf. David A. Baldwin, ‘The Concept of Security’, Review of International Studies 23/1 (1997), pp.5–26; Bernhard Stahl, ‘Who Securitized What, When, and How? A Comparative Analysis of Eight EU Member States in the Iraq Crisis’, Paper Presented at the 4th ECPR Conference, Pisa, 12–15 Sept. 2007.

31. Essentially, every position paper on foreign policy, by either the government or Germany's leading political parties, reflects this line of thinking. See Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU), Deutschland braucht eine kompetente Außenpolitik (16 July 2009), available from http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/090716-politik-az-aussenpolitik.pdf (accessed 23 Sept. 2012); Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), Hamburger Programm – Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Berlin: SPD-Partei-vorstand, 2007), pp.19–25; Bündnis 90 and Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion, Aktiv für Frieden und Sicherheit – Papier 16–157 (30 Oct. 2008), available from http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/publikationen/dokbin/256/256042.flyer_frieden_und_sicherheit.pdf (accessed 23 Sept. 2012); Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), Die Mitte stärken – Deutschlandprogramm 2009 (FDP: Hannover, 2009), pp.66–75; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch, p.25.

32. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch, p.19.

33. Michael Sheenan, International Security: An Analytical Survey (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p.54.

34. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/198 (Berlin, 8 Nov. 2001), p.19299.

35. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster, p.50ff.

36. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch, p.19.

37. ‘Applied political science’ is practically oriented research, mainly from institutions like think tanks, donor and development agencies, public interest groups, research staff of international organisations, policy planning units of agencies and departments, etc.

38. See Alexander Siedschlag, ‘Germany: From a Reluctant Power to a Constructive Power?’, in Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling (eds.), Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.46–68.

39. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch, p.25.

40. Hierarchical steering by the state (‘governance by government’) should be supplemented or replaced by cooperative networks of state and non-state actors (‘governance with government’) or by self- regulation of civil society (‘governance without government’). See Michael Zürn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates: Globalisierung und Denationalisierung als Chance (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998), pp.166–80. Cf. Arthur Benz et al., Handbuch Governance: Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Anwendungsfelder (Wiesbaden: VS, 2007).

41. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2006), p.25ff.

42. The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (so-called Bonn Agreement) formed the cornerstone of the political and judicial reconstruction of Afghanistan, available from http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm (accessed 15 Sept. 2012).

43. Adam Roberts ‘Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan’, Survival 51/1 (2009), p.51.

44. Germany had provided a total of $1.9 billion by the end of 2011 and is the fourth largest donor to Afghanistan's civil reconstruction after the US, the UK and Japan. German contributions are coordinated by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and focused on northern Afghanistan and Kabul. Primary fields of funding are institutional development and good governance, the energy sector, (drinking) water supply, sustainable economic development and job creation, and basic education and vocational training. The Afghanistan Compact was signed in February 2006 to regulate cooperation between donor nations and the Afghan government.

45. See Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid, ‘Germany's Options in Afghanistan’, Survival 51/5 (2010), pp.74–6.

46. The Kunduz incident was a German-ordered close air support attack that killed 142 people, many of them civilians. Colonel Klein, who ordered the air raid, had violated several ISAF command procedures and German rules of engagement to launch the attack. He had done so because an adequate number of German infantry was not available to engage the Taliban fighters, who were operating at that site. See Frank Gadinger, ‘In Search of a Serious Debate and a Clear Strategy: German Counterterrorism Responses After 9/11′, in Frank Gadinger and Dorle Hellmuth, Finding Security in an Age of Uncertainty: German and American Counterterrorism Policies – AICGS Policy Report 41 (Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2010), pp.12–15.

47. Remark by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/22 (Berlin, 10 Feb. 2010) p.1897.

48. Ibid., p.1895.

49. Deutsche Bundesregierung, Auf dem Weg zur Übergabe in Verantwortung: Das deutsche Afghanistan-Engagement nach der Londoner Konferenz (Berlin, 25 Jan. 2010), available from http://www.bundesregierung.de/nsc_true/Content/DE/__Anlagen/2009/11/2009-11-18-dokument-afghanistan,property=publicationFile.pdf/2009-11-18-dokument-afghanistan (accessed 20 Dec. 2012). On the output of the London conference see United Kingdom HM Government, Afghanistan Conference: Communiqué (London, 28 Jan. 2010), available from http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/london-conference/communique/ (accessed 20 Dec. 2011).

50. See ISAF Headquarters, Tactical Directive ISAF/COM/08 (Kabul, 30 Dec. 2008), available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090114.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2011). Cf. Tom Koenigs, ‘Deutsche Afghanistanpolitik nach der Londoner Konferenz’, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheits-politik 3/3 (2010), pp.265–76. On the shortcomings and potential problems of the new strategy see Peter Rudolf, Barack Obamas Afghanistan/Pakistan-Strategie – SWP Studie (Berlin: Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010); Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan – Independent Task Force Report 65 (New York: CFR, 2010); Navin A. Prabat, ‘A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge’, Foreign Policy Analysis 6/3 (2010), pp.217–36.

51. See John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington, DC: Columbia University Press, 1997); Thomas A. Birkland, ‘Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting’, Journal of Public Policy 18/1 (1998), pp.53–74.

52. See Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/22, pp.1895–909.

53. Remark by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/81 (Berlin, 16 Dec. 2010), p.8908.

54. Remark by Angela Merkel, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/123 (Berlin, 7 Sept. 2011), p.14474. See also remark by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/149 (Berlin, 15 Dec. 2011), p.17763.

55. Deutsche Bundesregierung, Auf dem Weg zur Übergabe in Verantwortung, p.2.

56. White House, Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan (27 March 2009), available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan (accessed 5 Oct. 2012).

57. Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary Robert M. Gates on Afghanistan to the Senate Armed Services Committee (2 Dec. 2009), available from http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1403 (accessed 6 Oct. 2012).

58. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/37 (Berlin, 22 Apr. 2010), p.3479.

59. See Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/22 (Berlin, 10 Feb. 2010), p.1894ff.; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/37, p.3474ff.; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/47 (Berlin, 11 June 2010), p.4878ff.; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/56 (Berlin, 9 July 2010), p.5835ff.; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/81 (Berlin, 16 Dec. 2010), p.8908ff.; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/149, pp.17762ff.; Deutsche Bundesregierung, Fortschrittsbericht Afghanistan zur Unterrichtung des Deutschen Bundestags (Berlin, Dec. 2011), available from http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2011/12/2011-12-27-fortschrittsbericht-afghanistan.html (accessed 10 Oct. 2012).

60. Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr (SKdB), Bericht der SKdB: Vom Einsatz her denken – Konzentration, Flexibilitat, Effizienz (Berlin, 26 Oct. 2010); Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (Berlin, 27 May 2011).

61. See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Sachstand zur Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr (Berlin, 1 Nov. 2011), p.1.

62. Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, Bericht, p.18.

63. I am indebted to James Sperling for pointing this out to me.

64. See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, p.5.

65. Ibid., p.2.

66. From 2001 to 2012 German total military expenditure was US$484 billion, or merely 1.38 per cent of its GDP. In comparison, the United Kingdom and France, whose armed forces are capable of conducting full spectrum operations, spent US$657 billion (2.48 per cent of GDP) and US$652 billion (2.44 per cent of GDP), respectively. Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Data Portal, Military Expenditure Project, available at http://portal.sipri.org/publications/pages/expenditures/country-search (accessed 31 May 2013).

67. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, p.11.

68. See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch, pp.30–62; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, pp.4–9.

69. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, p.9.

70. The five ‘pillars’ were developed in cooperation with the Afghan government at the Geneva conference on Afghanistan in 2002 and are funded by the international community. Each pillar is led by one donor nation, which coordinates the international efforts in the respective endeavour and was originally also expected to provide above-average resources. Further pillars and lead nations of security sector reform are the build-up of the Afghan National Army (US), a functioning justice system (Italy), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and illegally armed groups (Japan) and counter-narcotics (UK).

71. Germany's first contribution to an international police mission was with the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Namibia (UNTAG) from 1989 to 1990. Ever since, Germany has participated in multiple UN, EU and OSCE police missions. Currently, it contributes 337 offices to seven international operations.

72. Besides the annual budget, Germany provided an initial grant fund of €78 million. Annual financial donations have risen sharply since 2008 to currently €77 million. This excludes funds for covering the costs of deployed German police forces.

73. See Markus Feilke, ‘German Experiences in Police Building in Afghanistan’, GRIPS Discussion Paper 10–02 (Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2010); Noetzel and Rid, ‘Germany's Options in Afghanistan’, pp.71–90; Eva Gross, Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The EU's Contribution – Occasional Paper 78 (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies: 2009); Robert M. Perito, Afghanistan's Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform – United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Special Report 227 (Washington, DC: USIP, 2009).

74. The deployment target for January 2012 onwards was 260, the actual deployment in August 2012 was 216; 130 officers are contributed by various state police forces and 86 are members of the Bundespolizei (see below).

75. It is debatable if uniform laws and a unified legal system are suitable for Afghanistan. As shown elsewhere, Afghan perceptions of justice vary within the country and are in part fundamentally different from Western perceptions. Also the idea of unidirectional loyalty to one institution seems rather alien for Afghans, who choose their affiliations on numerous, oftentimes contradictory, factors. See Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), p.146ff.; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p.217ff.; Thomas Barfield, ‘Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle’, Foreign Affairs 90/5 (2011), pp.54–65; Joshua Foust, ‘Tribe and Prejudice: America's “New Hope” in Afghanistan’, available from http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/tribe-and-prejudice-americas-new-hope-in-afghanistan (accessed 7 Dec. 2012).

76. The German federal police force was founded in 1951 as Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Patrol). It was renamed Bundespolizei (Federal Police) in 2005 to reflect its transition to a multi-faceted police agency.

77. The sub-council Arbeitsgruppe International Polizeimissionen (Working Group International Police Missions) consists of representatives from the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the interior ministries of the 16 Länder and is chaired by North Rhine-Westphalia. Administrative tasks are coordinated by the Geschäftsstelle Internationale Polizeimissionen (Office for International Police Missions), which is part of department B 4 of the BMI.

78. The contribution of each Land to international police missions is calculated with the so-called Königsteiner Schlüssel. The distribution key was initially developed in 1949 when the Länder launched joint research programmes to distribute fiscal costs. Today the Königsteiner Schlüssel is widely used for burden sharing in joint undertakings of the Länder. The proportion for each state is calculated annually, using one-third of its population size and two-thirds of its tax revenue. On the distribution key for 2012 see http://www.gwk-bonn.de/fileadmin/Papers/koenigsteiner-schluessel-2012.pdf

79. On the concept of the ‘veto player’ see George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institution Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

80. Deutscher Bundestag, Prüfkriterien für Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr entwickeln – Unterrichtung und Evaluation verbessern, DIP Vorgangs-ID: 17-34131; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/102 (7 April 2011), p.11793ff.; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/105 (14 April 2011), p.12060ff.

81. Die Linke regards GPPT, EUPOL and above all NTM-A as complete failures and as part of the military intervention in Afghanistan, which it deems illegal. Therefore, Die Linke calls for an immediate withdrawal of all German police trainers from Afghanistan.

82. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/159 (Berlin, 10 Feb. 2012), p.19065ff.; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/162 (Berlin, 1 March 2012), p.19301ff.

83. Allan McConnell, ‘Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between’, Journal of Public Policy 30/3 (2010), p.351.

84. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, p.12.