The Civic Culture and Unified Germany: An Overview

Abstract

In this article we attempt to examine what has happened to the Civic Culture paradigm in the past 50 years with particular focus on Germany. We first discuss the impact of the research and its core findings for the Federal Republic. Second, we focus on the issue of ‘inner unity’. Third, we present data on the development of unified Germany's political culture since the 1990 unification. We examine the influence over time of the major explanatory variables that have been central to post-unification culture research: socialisation or the effect of the socialist past, the contrasting economic experiences of both regions during the early decades of their democratic existence and the role of identity politics in shaping each region's view of each other. Finally, this article contends that in spite of the cultural differences there is a consensus on the institutions, processes and values of political democracy in the unified Republic.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

David P. Conradt has been a Professor of Political Science at East Carolina University since 1993. From 1968 to 1993 he was at the University of Florida (Gainesville). He has also held joint appointments at universities in Konstanz, Mannheim, Cologne and Dresden. Among his recent publications are Politics in Europe (co-author, 2015); The German Polity (10th edition, co-author, 2013), A Precarious Victory: Schröder and the German elections of 2002 (editor, 2005) and Power Shift in Germany: The1998 Election and the End of the Kohl Era (editor, 2000). He has also published a variety of articles and monographs on German political culture, parties and elections including ‘The Shrinking Elephants: The 2009 Election and the Changing Party System’ (German Politics and Society, 2010).

ORCID

David P. Conradt http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6175-690X

Notes

1. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1963); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donal E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960).

2. David P. Conradt, ‘Changing German Political Culture’, in G.A. Almond and S. Verba (eds), The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989), pp.214–15.

3. Sidney Verba, ‘Remaking German Political Culture', in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), p.137.

4. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p.496.

5. David P. Conradt and Erich Langenbacher, The German Polity (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), ch.10.

6. The seminal effort of this school was Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1963).

7. Verba, ‘Remaking German Political Culture’, p.131.

8. Harry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).

9. In Mexico, the high level of system affect was coupled with ‘an almost total rejection of political output'. Italy, however, lacked both the ‘passive output satisfaction of the Germans and the aspirational input satisfaction of the Mexicans'. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p.697.

10. Ibid., p.496.

11. Richard L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).

12. D.P. Conradt, ‘Political Culture, Legitimacy and Participation’, West European Politics 4/2 (1981), p.19.

13. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp.428–29.

14. Frederick D. Weil, ‘The Effects of Diffusion, Legitimation, and Performance on Democratic Legitimation in Unified Germany', European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), May, 2000, p.14.

15. Dieter Fuchs, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and Carolin Schöbel, ‘Perspektiven der politischen Kultur im vereinigten Deutschland’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 32 (1991), pp.35–41.

16. H.D. Klingemann and R.I. Hofferbert, ‘Germany: A New “Wall in the Mind”?’, Journal of Democracy 5/1 (1994), p.33.

17. Petra Bauer-Kaase and Max Kaase, ‘Five Years of Unification: The Germans on the Path to Inner Unity?’, German Politics 5/1 (1996), p.23.

18. Cited in Weil, ‘The Effects of Diffusion’, p.16. For Rohrschneider's larger argument see Robert Rohrschneider, ‘Cultural Transmission versus Perceptions of the Economy: The Sources of Political Elites’ Economic Values in the United Germany', Comparative Political Studies 21/1 (1996), pp.78–104; Rohrschneider, ‘Institutional Learning versus Value Diffusion: The Evolution of Democratic Values among Parliamentarians in Eastern and Western Germany', Journal of Politics 58/2 (May 1996), pp.422–46; Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy: Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

19. K. Arzheimer and M. Klein, ‘Gesellschaftspolitische Wertorientierungen und Staatszielvorstellungen im Ost-West Vergleich', in Jürgen Falter, Oscar Gabriel and Hans Rattinger, Wirklich ein Volk? Die politischen Orientierungen von Ost- und Westdeutschen im Vergleich (Opladen: Leske+Opladen, 2000), pp.363–402. Economic security was also more important than freedom for West Germans in the post-war (1947–49) period. Merritt, Democracy Imposed, p.339.

20. Bettina Westle, ‘Demokratie und Sozialismus. Politische Ordnungsvorstellungen im vereinten Deutschland zwischen Ideologie, Protest und Nostalgie', Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 46/4 (1994), pp.571–96.

21. Oscar Gabriel, ‘Bürger und Demokratie im vereinigten Deutschland’, Politische Vierteljahreschrift 48/3 (2007), p.204.

22. Oscar Gabriel, ‘Demokratische Einstellungen in einem Land ohne demokratische Traditionen? Die Unterstützung der Demokratie in den neuen Bundesländern im Ost-West-Vergleich’, in Falter et al. (eds), Wirklich ein Volk?, p.68.

23. Ibid., p.52

24. Ibid., p.46.

25. Ibid., p.53. A few years earlier, however, Gabriel was ‘cautiously optimistic’ (verhaltener Optimismus) about the prospects for inner unity, that is, congruence between political institutions and values. Oscar Gabriel, ‘Einleitung: Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im Transitionsprozeß’, in Oscar Gabriel (ed.), Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im vereinigten Deutschland (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1997), p.33; Gabriel, ‘Demokratische Einstellungen', p.68.

26. Oskar Niedermayer, ‘Bevölkerungseinstellungen zur Demokratie: Kein konsens zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschen', Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 40/2 (2009), p.390.

27. Ibid., p.392.

28. Russell J. Dalton and Steven Weldon, ‘Germans Divided? Political Culture in a United Germany’, German Politics 19/1 (2010), p.20.

29. B. Eichengreen and A. Ritschl, ‘Understanding West German Economic Growth in the 1950s’, Cliometrica 3/1 (2009), pp.191–219.

30. Jennifer Hunt, ‘Why Do People Still Live in East Germany?’, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaft (DIW), Discussion Paper No. 201, Berlin, 2000.

31. David P. Conradt, ‘Political Culture and Identity: The Post-Unification Search for Inner Unity', in Stephen Padgett, William E. Paterson and Gordon Smith (eds), Developments in German Politics Vol.3 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), p.277.

32. David P. Conradt, ‘Political Culture in Unified Germany’, German Politics and Society 20/2 (2002), pp.43–74.

33. Der Sozialismus ist im Grunde eine gute Idee, die nur schlecht ausgeführt wurde [Socialism was basically a good idea that was just poorly executed].

•    1. Stimme voll zu [Agree completely].

•    2. Stimme eher zu [Agree somewhat].

•    3. Stimme eher nicht zu [Disagree somewhat].

•    4. Stimme überhaupt nicht zu [Completely disagree].

•    8. Weiß nicht [Don't know].

•    9. Keine Angabe [No response].

34. Ross Campbell, ‘The Sources of Institutional Trust in East and West Germany: Civic Culture or Economic Performance?’, German Politics 13/3 (2004), pp.401–18; Campbell, ‘Socialist Values and Political Participation in Germany: A Barrier to “Inner Unity”?’, West European Politics 34/1 (2011), pp.362–83.

35. Campbell, ‘Socialist Values', p.376.

36. A three-wave panel study in Leipzig conducted between 1993 and 1998 found that as ‘individuals acquire more experience with the democratic system, they appear to assess the system less in terms of its relation to socialism … and more in terms of economic and politi dropped from 56 to 47 per cent.). S. Finkel, S. Humphries and K.D. Opp, ‘Socialist Values and the Development of Democratic Support in the Former East Germany', International Political Science Review 22/4 (2001), pp.339–61. A three-wave panel study in Leipzig conducted between 1993 and 1998 found that as ‘individuals acquire more experience with the democratic system, they appear to assess the system less in terms of its relation to socialism…and more in terms of economic and political performance’. Steven E. Finkel, Stan Humphries, and Karl-Dieter Opp ‘Socialist Values and the Development of Democratic Support in the Former East Germany’, International Political Science Review 22/4 (2001), p.339. They also found that by 1998 there were few direct effects of socialist values on system support. (Support for socialism dropped from 56 to 47 per cent).

37. G.R. Boynton and G. Loewenberg, ‘The Decay of Support for Monarchy and the Hitler Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany’, British Journal of Political Science 4/4 (1974), p.465.

38. D. Pollack, ‘Das geteilte Bewußtsein', in Roland Czada and Hellmut Wollmann (eds), Von der Bonner zur Berliner Republik (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), pp.281–307; Pollack, ‘Wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und mentaler Wandel in Ostdeutschland', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 40 (2000), pp.13–21; D. Pollack, ‘Support for Democracy in Eastern and Western Germany: An Attempt to Explain the Differences', European Journal of Sociology 45/2 (2004), pp.257–72; Pollack, ‘Wie ist es um die innere Einheit bestellt?’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 30–31 (2006), pp.3–7.

39. Pollack, ‘Support for Democracy', p.269.

40. Ibid., p.272.

41. Institut für Demoskopie, Die gegenwärtige Wahrnehmung Ost- und Westdeutscher (Allensbach: Institut für Demoskopie, 2012), p.22.

42. Ibid., p.23.

43. Hans-Joachim Veen, ‘“Inner Unity” – Back to the Community Myth? A Plea for a Basic Consensus’, German Politics 6/3 (1997), p.6.

44. Gabriel, ‘Bürger und Demokratie, pp.540–50.

45. R.I. Hofferbert and H.D. Klingemann, ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany', Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (Oct. 2000).

46. Ibid., p.17.

47. Pippa Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.19–37.

48. Ralf Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Freiheit (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1961), pp.300–20.

49. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, Band 11 (Berlin: De Gruyter Saur, 2002), p.530. Of course the GDR flag was also black–red–gold with the hammer and sickle in the centre.

50. See especially Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, ch.10, pp.261–99.

51. Ibid., Question 8, p.527.

52. Conradt, ‘Changing German Political Culture', p.254.

53. For an overview and analysis see Kenneth Newton, ‘Social and Political Trust' (ESS EduNet, 2013), available from http://essedunet.hsd.uib.ho/cms/topics/2 (accessed 2 May 2013).

54. R. Rohrschneider and R. Schmitt-Beck, ‘Trust in Democratic Institutions in Germany: Theory and Evidence Ten Years after Unification', German Politics 11/3 (2002), pp.35–58. More recent Eurobarometer surveys show a similar pattern. In the spring of 2012, the eastern level of trust in the national government, parliament and the political parties as a proportion of the western level was 79 per cent, 70 per cent and 71 per cent respectively. Among the youngest age cohort (15–24) the eastern levels are even higher, for example, 93 per cent for trust in the national government. The sample size, however, is small. Source: Eurobarometer 77.3, Spring 2012.

55. Gabriel, ‘Demokratische Einstellungen', p.53.

56. Rohrschneider and Beck, ‘Trust in Democratic Institutions', pp.53–4.

57. David P. Conradt, Survey No. 3061 (Allensbach : Institut für Demoskopie, 1980). The contemporary image or conception of democracy held by the West German public was explored in this 1978 nation-wide survey. In this study the respondents were asked with the aid of a list containing 22 items to describe the ‘ideal democracy': what was needed for a society to be fully democratic? Later in the interview the respondents were asked to judge the extent to which these same characteristics or requisites of an ‘ideal democracy' were actually present in the Federal Republic. The two questions enabled us to compare a more abstract conception of democracy with the present political order in the Federal Republic. The divergence between the ‘ideal democracy' and the actual democracy in the Federal Republic was greatest in two related areas: citizen participation and ‘socio-economic democracy'. Those West Germans who conceived of democracy as a system with frequent, extensive and direct citizen involvement in decision making saw the Federal Republic as falling short in this area. Likewise, the 55 per cent of the adult population who identify democracy with increasing economic equality and worker or employee involvement in the industrial enterprise (co-determination) is not satisfied that this has been realised in West Germany. ‘Procedural Democrats' were quite content with the accomplishments of the Bonn Republic. Those who wanted democracy expanded (Substantive Democrats), however, were far from satisfied. This gap between the ideal and the real affords one explanation for the emergence of ‘citizen action group' movements in the late 1970s and 1980s.

58. Four items: ‘Obedience of the law by all; a Federal Army for internal security; Non-discrimination against extremists and a Federal President who is Head of State', were discarded after an exploratory factor analysis found no significant relationship between them and the other items.

59. Edeltraud Roller, ‘Einstellungen zur Demokratie im vereingten Deutschland. Gibt es Anzeichen für eine abnehmende Differenz?’, in Peter Krause and Ilona Ostner (eds) Leben in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Eine sozial wissenschaftliche Bilanz der deutschen Einheit 1990–2010 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2010), p.600.

60. A. Alesina and N. Fuchs-Schündeln, ‘Good-Bye Lenin (or Not): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences', American Economic Review 97/4 (2007), p.1507.

61. Peter Krause et al., ‘20 Jahre Wiedervereinigung: Wie weit Ost- und Westdeutschland zusammengerückt sind', Wochenbericht 44, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaft, Berlin, 2010, p.8.

62. Ibid.

63. S. Svallfors, ‘Policy Feedback, Generational Replacement, and Attitudes to State Intervention: Eastern and Western Germany, 1990–2006’, European Political Science Review 2/1 (2010), p.128.

64. Ibid. For recent additional data supporting the convergence through institutional learning theory see Benjamin C. Sack, ‘Understanding of Democracy in Unified Germany: Is There Convergence of Democratic Values between East and West through Institutional Learning?’ Paper Prepared for the Fifth ECPR Graduate Student Conference, University of Innsbruck, 3–5 July 2014.

65. Conradt, ‘Changing German Political Culture’, pp.256–9.

66. Dalton and Weldon, ‘Germans Divided?’, p.21.

67. Michael C. Burda, ‘Wirtschaft in Ostdeutschland im 21. Jahrhundert', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte nos. 30–31 (2010), pp.26–33.