The Puzzle of Persistence and Power: Explaining Germany’s Normative Foreign Policy

Abstract

Germany is as powerful today as it was 100 years ago and has again stepped onto the global stage as a ‘Great Power’. The Germany of today, however, is quite unlike most great powers in historical memory. Twenty-five years after unification and the achievement of full sovereignty, Germany is using its growing material power to actively and effectively pursue the normative principles of anti-militarism and multilateralism born and nurtured under weakness and occupation after devastating loss in World War II. But as the guiding norms of foreign and security policy, they did not change or disappear but were strengthened with the achievement of sovereignty and unity after 1989. What changed was Germany’s power to actively pursue a foreign policy based on these norms. The article argues that external factors transformed Germany’s status and power position in Europe and the world, allowing it to act alone and build up its military power. But internal factors – entrenched norms, a foreign policy identity built on those norms – constrained and still constrains its willingness and the ability of successive post-unification governments to act like the ‘great power’ that it had become.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Beverly Crawford is Professor emerita of Political Science and Political Economy at UC Berkeley. Her research interests include German politics and foreign policy, migration and the refugee crisis, and identity politics and global conflict. She is the author of Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe. Her articles have appeared in German Politics and Society, World Politics, The Journal of Contemporary Security Policy, Comparative Political Studies, Business and Politics, Comparative Security Studies, and Cicero, Magazin für politische Kultur.

Kim B. Olsen is a PhD Fellow at the University of Antwerp. His research interests include German, French, and European foreign policy and geo-economic diplomacy. He has previously worked as foreign policy advisor to the Danish embassies in Berlin and Paris, and as a research assistant at the Center of German for European Studies, UC Berkeley.

Notes

1 Germany currently has 177,000 soldiers in service, compared with 487,000 in 1989.

2 Cooperative security is a concept that links classic security elements to economic, environmental, cultural, and human rights concerns. A commitment to ‘cooperative security’ means a commitment to the belief that Germany’s own security is inseparable from that of other states in an interdependent world, and it is cooperative in the belief that security is based on confidence building, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of mutually reinforcing multilateral institutions.

3 Germany’s focus on these core principles is illustrated in Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen’s speech to a security conference in Bratislava in April 2016. She spoke of security threats and the need to put forward Europe’s values as an important response. She spoke of the refugee crisis of 2015, a concern for their security, and the need for solidarity to resolve their security crisis. She discussed solutions that included diplomacy and cooperation within the EU, the OSCE, and the UN, emphasising political rather than military responses to the crisis. Available from http://www.globsec.org/upload/documents/globsec-2016-keynote-speech-by-dr-ursula-von-der-leyen/globsec-2016-ger-mod.pdf (accessed 31 May 2016).

4 For an overview of the classics and a concise statement of neo-realism see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979). See also John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future’, International Security 15/1 (1990), p.5; Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise’, International Security 17/4 (1993), p.5, especially pp.41–5.

5 For a discussion of this period see Beverly Crawford, ‘Normative Power of a Normal State: Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germany’s Post-Wall Foreign Policy’, German Politics and Society 28/2 (2010), p.165.

6 This issue spawned a cottage industry in the production of literature on German foreign policy, beginning at the turn of the twenty-first century. For summaries see the following: Volker Rittberger (ed.), German Foreign Policy since Unification: an Analysis of Foreign Policy Continuity and Change (British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press, 2001); Sebastian Harnisch, ‘Change and Continuity in Post-unification German Foreign Policy’, German Politics 10/1 (2001), p.35; Thomas Risse, ‘Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine “neue” deutsche Außenpolitik?’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 11/3 (2004), p.24; Gunther Hellmann, ‘Fatal Attraction? German Foreign Policy and IR/Foreign Policy Theory’, Journal of International Relations and Development 12/3 (2009), p.257; Eva Gross, The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing, 2009). Attempts at prediction deeply divide this literature. Many analysts have seen Germany as a free rider in multilateral institutions, raking in the benefits of cooperation without paying the costs. A good overview of the literature espousing this position can be found in Anika Leithner, Shaping German Foreign Policy: History, Memory, and National Interest (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009). But especially since the euro crisis, others fear that Germany’s interest in cooperation and reluctance to engage in power politics has faded. See, for example, Mary Sarotte, ‘Eurozone Crisis as Historical Legacy: The Enduring Impact of German Unification, 20 Years On’, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 29 Sept. 2010; Hans Kundnani, The Paradox of German Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

7 On the unilateral diplomatic recognition of Croatia in 1991, see Beverly Crawford, ‘Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Recognition of Croatia’, World Politics 48/4 (1996), p.482. On the Bundesbank’s unilateral interest rate hike of 1992–93 within the EMS see Steven Weber, ‘Nested Institutions and the European Monetary System’, in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed.), Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp.32–83.

8 See e.g. Helga Haftendorn, ‘Deutschlands Rückkehr in die Weltpolitik’, Politische Studien 60 (2009), p.49; Günter Hellmann, ‘Konsolidierung statt machpolitische Resozialisierung: Kernelemente einer neuen deutschen Außenpolitik’, in Stefan Böckenförde (ed.), Chancen der deutschen Außenpolitik (Dresden: TUDPress, 2005), pp.54–64.

9 Sebastian Harnisch, ‘German Foreign Policy: Gulliver’s Travails in the 21st Century’, in Ryan K. Beasley et al. (eds), Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013), pp.71–93.

10 Our approach to anti-militarism in German foreign policy is informed by a body of literature focused on German political culture both before and after unification. See, in particular, Regina Karp, ‘The New German Foreign Policy Consensus’, The Washington Quarterly 29/1 (2005–06), pp.61–2; Thomas U. Berger, ‘Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.317–56; Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing the Germans, 1945–1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

11 Germany’s self-perception during and after the cold war has often been referred to as ‘post-national’, due to its strong commitment for multilateral solutions and reluctance to articulate national interests. See Leithner, Shaping German Foreign Policy. However, we hold that the idea of post-nationalism undermines the fact that Germany – just as most states – is indeed seeking to maximise its national interests on the global stage, but that those interests are embedded in its values, and it is the adherence to the exercise of a preferred type of power that sets Germany apart from other powerful nation states.

12 We borrowed the concept from Ian Manners, who used it to describe the ‘power’ of the European Union as a community of values in international relations. Although they do not generally use the term ‘normative power’, a number of scholars working within the constructivist perspective on foreign policy have examined the independent influence of social norms, such as human rights or environmental protection in the determination of foreign policy decisions. See, for example, Volker Rittberger (ed.), German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Jonas Wolff, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Hans-Juergen Puhle (eds), Zwischen Normen und Interessen: Demokratieförderung als international Politik (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2012). For the original use of the term normative power, see Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40/2 (2002), p.235. See also François Duchêne, ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’, in Max Kohnstamm and William Hager (eds), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.1–21. For a sceptical view on the concept of normative power, see Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘“Normative” Power Europe: A Realist Critique’, Journal of European Public Policy 13/2 (2006), p.217. Beverly Crawford discussed this concept in the German context in more depth in ‘Normative Power of a Normal State: Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germany’s Post-Wall Foreign Policy’, German Politics and Society 28/2 (2010), pp.165–84.

13 The term ‘civilian power’ in the German context was originally coined in Hans W. Maull, ‘Japan, Deutschland und die Zukunft der internationalen Politik’, in J. Thies and G. van Well (eds), Auf der Suche nach der Gestalt Europas, Festschrift für Wolfgang Wagner (Bonn: Verlag für Internationale Politik, 1990), pp.171–92. See also Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a “Civilian Power”?’, Survival 42/2 (2000), pp.56–80.

14 For elaboration on this distinction see Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, ‘Normative Power: The European Practice of Region Building: The Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)’, in Emanuel Adler, Federica Bicchi, Beverly Crawford, and Raffaella Del Sarto (eds), The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).

15 Sebastian Harnisch, ‘The Politics of Domestication: A New Paradigm in German Foreign Policy’, German Politics 18/4 (2009), p.457.

16 Peter Hall and David Soskice, ‘An Introduction of Varieties of Capitalism’, in Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Economic Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.1–68; Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science Review 94/2 (2000), p.251.

17 See Richard Herrmann, Marilynn Brewer, and Thomas Risse (eds), Identities in Europe and the Institutions of the European Union (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

18 Paul Pierson, ‘The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change’, Governance 13/4 (2000), p.475; James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds), Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

19 Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force’, p.56.

20 See Konrad Jarausch, ‘The Federal Republic at Sixty: Popular Myths, Actual Accomplishments, and Competing Interpretations’, in Jeffrey Anderson and Eric Langenbacher (eds), From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010).

21 As Ron Asmus writes: ‘The tight integration of Germany in the alliance was designed to prevent independent German strategic thinking from emerging.’ In German Strategy and Opinion after the Wall, 1990–1993 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994), p.11.

22 ‘Diejenigen aber, die nächstens für längere Zeit zu den Waffen gerufen werden sollen, hegen die stärkste Abneigung gegen den Gedanken, Uniform anziehen zu müssen. Die Behauptung darf gewagt werden, dass zur Zeit in keinem europäischen Land der gefühlsmäßige Widerstand gegen den Wehrdienst so stark ist wie in der Bundesrepublik.’ In Paul Sethe, ‘Der Wille der Zwanzigjährigen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 Nov. 1954.

23 Timothy Scott Brown, ‘Ecologism and Social Justice in Three Germanies’, a lecture presented on 17 March 2017, University of California Berkeley.

24 Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘United Germany in an Integrating Europe’, in Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power, pp.1–48.

25 Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-sovereign State (Philadelphia, PA: Temple Press, 1987).

26 See Birgit Schwelling, ‘Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik und die deutsche Vergangenheit’, in Siegmar Schmidt, Gunter Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (eds), Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), pp. 101–11.

27 The NATO leadership ruled that if the attack on a member state had been perpetrated from abroad (rather than a territorial invasion), it would be considered an act covered by Article 5 (an attack on one member is an attack on all) of its Treaty. This was the first time that Article 5 was invoked.

28 Schwelling, ‘Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik’.

29 For a realist interpretation of the German ‘no’ as balancing against American power, see Dieter Dettke, Germany Says ‘No’: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009).

30 On the role of institutions and the Bundestag’s internal process, see Sarah Brockmeier, ‘Germany and the Intervention in Libya’, Survival 55/6 (2013), p.63.

31 This will remain the case even though the German government announced a modest increase in spending on its military budgets. See ‘Von der Leyen beendet Ära der Abrüstung’, Handelsblatt, available from http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-von-der-leyen-beendet-aera-der-abruestung/13573068.html (accessed 20 May 2016). For a general discussion on the Bundeswehr’s material capabilities, see Constanze Stelzenmüller, ‘Die selbstgefesselte Republik’, Internationale Politik 11 (2010), p.76.

32 In 2008 Germans perceived the military forces to a much lesser degree as a normal part of society in international comparison (Germany: 58 per cent agreement, France: 62, GB: 66, USA: 88); they also displayed far less pride in their national force (Germany: 42 per cent, France: 53, GB: 66, US: 87), with even less feelings of gratitude towards the service provided by the national military (Germany: 30 per cent, France: 52, GB: 64, US: 87). See T. Buhlmann, Bevölkerungsbefragung 2008: Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in Deutschland (Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2008).

33 Thomas Paulsen and Dorothea Jestädt, Einmischen oder Zurückhalten? (Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung, 2014).

34 See e.g. Lothar Rühl, ‘Deutschland und der Libyenkrieg’, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 4/4 (2011), p.561.

35 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ‘Save our Trans-Atlantic Order’, The International New York Times, 12 March 2015.

36 This was in response to a long-held demand in Berlin’s foreign policy circles. See Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and German Marshall Fund of the United States, New Power, New Responsibility, Elements of a German Foreign and Security Policy for a Changing World (Berlin: SWP/GMF, 2013).

37 Auswärtiges Amt, Außenpolitik Weiter Denken – Review 2014: Krise – Ordnung – Europa (Berlin: Auswaertiges Amt, 2015). And though the review confirmed rather than challenged traditional foreign policy principles, Germany’s international partners reacted positively. They did not ask Germany to use military force in the campaign against ISIS. Instead, Germany contributed reconnaissance planes, refuelling capabilities, and a frigate without direct combat in airstrikes. See Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle, ‘The Munich Consensus and the Purpose of German Power’, Survival 58/2 (2016), p.155.

38 Germany’s arms exports have grown to make Germany the fourth largest arms exporter in the world in 2010–14. See SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

39 For geo-economic arguments on Germany, see Kundnani, The Paradox of German Power; Stephen Szabo, Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). See also Edward Luttwak, ‘From Geopolitics to Geo-economics’, The National Interest Summer (1990), p.17. For another discussion of the nuances on current German power and leadership, see Matthias Matthijs, ‘The Three Faces of German Leadership’, Survival 58/2 (2016), p.135.

40 In the ECB’s efforts to intervene in markets to buy Greek debt at the outset of the euro crisis, Germany provided the largest share of the contributions (30 per cent to France’s 20 and Italy’s 17). When the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was created in 2012 to continue that effort, Germany provided the bulk of ESM’s capital. It is not in Germany’s interest to weaken European solidarity in this case.

41 See Dorothee Heisenberg, The Mark of the Bundesbank: Germany’s Role in European Monetary Cooperation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

42 For evidence see Kim B. Olsen, ‘From Consensus to (Euro) Crisis: Germany’s Leadership of the EMU. Developing the Concept of Ideational Regime Leadership’, Master’s Thesis, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, 2012.

43 See Jason Burke, ‘The Myth of the “Lone Wolf” Terrorist’, The Guardian, 30 March 2017, available from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist (accessed 5 April 2017)