Germany’s Eastern Challenge and the Russia–Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik in the Making?

Abstract

Since the Russia–Ukraine crisis in 2014, Germany's foreign policy has been subject to international pressures to engage more actively in restoring the peace and security order in Europe. Particularly in its eastern policy, Berlin has had to redefine its traditional foreign policy, towards what could be termed a ‘hybrid Ostpolitik’. The introduction sets the context of German–Russian relations before 2014, and discusses the elements of continuity and change regarding Germany's role in Europe and transatlantic relations thereafter. It then presents an overview of the contributions to the special issue which are grouped around three themes: the question of the nature of German power and leadership; the effects of the Ukraine crisis on the Euro-Atlantic order and its impact on German foreign policy; and Germany's changing bilateral relations with the United States and its eastern neighbours in the wake of the Ukraine crisis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All the authors and the editors would like to dedicate this Special Issue to the memory of Anne Marie Le Gloannec, a renowned expert on German foreign policy who, having agreed to contribute an article, sadly passed away much too early. She will be missed as a brilliant academic and dear colleague.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID

Patricia Daehnhardt http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0267-4394

Vladimir Handl http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4179-2513

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Patricia Daehnhardt is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Lusíada University and a Researcher at the IPRI-NOVA – Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. She has published on German foreign and security policy and is the author (with Maria Raquel Freire) of the book Russian Foreign Policy in the Euro-Atlantic Area: Dynamics of Cooperation and Competition (Coimbra University Press, 2014), and more recently of the articles ‘Euro-Atlantic Security after Trump: Relations between the European Union/CSDP and NATO’, (National Defence Institute, 2017), and ‘The Foreign Policies of Germany and Great Britain after Brexit’ (National Defence Institute, 2017), all in Portuguese. Her latest publication is ‘Tectonic Shifts in the Party Landscape? Mapping Germany’s Party System Changes’, in Marco Lisi (ed.), Party System Change, the Crisis and the State of Democracy in Europe (Routledge, forthcoming).

Vladimír Handl is Assistant Professor in the Department for German and Austrian Studies of the Institute of international Studies at the Faculty of Social Studies, Charles University Prague and associate of the Institute of International Relations, Prague. He has published on German relations with the Central-East European countries (for example Vladimír Handl and William Paterson, ‘The Continuing Relevance of Germany’s Engine for Central Europe and the EU’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46/3 (2013), pp.327–337) and on attitudes to Russia (most recently Jakub Eberle and Handl Vladimír, ‘Völkerrecht statt Einflusszonen! Der “Plurale Frieden” fällt in altes Denken zurück’, Osteuropa 67/3–4 (2017), pp.121–127, available from https://www.zeitschrift-osteuropa.de/hefte/2017/3-4/voelkerrecht-statt-einflusszonen/.

Notes

1 Regarding the notion of a hybrid policy, we are inspired by Christian Mölling and Claudia Major, A Hybrid Security Policy for Europe (Berlin: SWP Comments, April 2015).

2 The ‘Review 2014’ process, initiated by the Auswärtige Amt, in 2014, was a response led by then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to engage German and foreign think tanks and civil society in the tasks of advancing ideas on how German foreign policy could be redefined. ‘Review 2014. Aussenpolitik weiter denken’, available from http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/de/themen.html (accessed 26 Nov. 2016).

3 On Germany's role in the Libya intervention, see Alister Miskimmon, ‘German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis’, German Politics 21/4 (2012), pp.392–410.

4 See, for example, Pawel Swieboda, ‘Weg von der Verteidigung des Status Quo!’, 11 June 2014, Review 2014, available from http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/de/aussensicht/show/article/weg-von-der-verteidigung-des-status-quo.html (accessed 26 Nov. 2016); Jan Techau, ‘The Servant Leader’, Berlin Policy Journal, 6 July 2016, available from http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/one-star-down/ (accessed 14 July 2016).

5 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Populists are Out to Divide Us. They must be Stopped’, The Guardian, 11 Nov. 2016, available from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/11/populists-us (accessed 3 Dec. 2016).

6 See, for example, Hanns Maull, ‘Deutschlands außenpolitische Kontinuität ist richtig’, 2 July 2014, Review 2014, available from http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/de/aussensicht/article/die-aussenpolitische-kontinuitaet-ist-richtig-muss-aber-angepasst-werden.html (accessed 26 Feb. 2016). See also Hanns Maull, Germany’'s Uncertain Power. Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006); Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, ‘Germany as the EU’'s Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints’, Journal of European Public Policy 20/10 (2013), pp.1387–405; Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, ‘Germany's Role in the Handling of the European Monetary and Refugee Crisis’, in Jahrbuch der Europaischen Integration, Nov. 2016, pp.1–10, available from http://iep-berlin.de/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/10/Simon-Bulmer-and-William-Paterson_-Germanys-role-in-the-handling-of-the-European-monetary-and-refugee-crisis.pdf (accessed 18 March 2016); Constanze Stelzenmüller, ‘Die Selbstgefesselte Republik’, Internationale Politik, Jan./Feb. 2010, pp.76–81.

7 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ‘Germany's New Global Role. Berlin Steps Up’, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 2016, pp.106–7.

8 Hannes Adomeit, ‘Germany’s Russia Policy: From Sanctions to Nord Stream 2?’, Transatlantic Academy 2015–2016 Paper Series No.3, March 2016, available from http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Adomeit-web.pdf (accessed 26 May 2017).

9 Hans-Joachim Spanger and Andrei Zagorsky, ‘Constructing a Different Europe: The Peculiarities of the German–Russian Partnership’, in R. Krumm, S. Medvedev and H.-H. Schröder (eds), Constructing Identities in Europe. German and Russian Perspectives (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), pp.221–46.

10 On the German policy on EU enlargement, see Barbara Lippert, ‘Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union’, in K. Böttger and M. Jopp (eds), Handbuch zur deutschen Europapolitik (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016), pp.393–406; and Martin Jeřábek, Deutschland und die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2011). On German NATO enlargement policy and relations with Russia, see Marco Overhaus, Die deutsche NATO-Politik. Vom Ende des Kalten Krieges bis zu dem Kampf gegen den Terrorismus (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008). Russia was perceived as a member of the Euro-Atlantic community: see, for example, a consequent argument for Russian NATO membership by Volker Rühe, Klaus Naumann, Frank Elbe and Ulrich Weisser, ‘Die Tür öffnen. Für Russlands Beitritt zur Nato’, Der Spiegel 10/2010, 8 March 2010, available from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/a-682256.html (accessed 26 May 2016).

11 By 1992 Germany was the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Russia. See Celeste Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German–Russian Cooperation after the Cold War (New York: Cornell University, 1999), p.41.

12 Patricia Daehnhardt, ‘Germany and Russia: A Changing sui generis Relationship’, in Russian Foreign Policy in the Euro-Atlantic Area: Cooperation and Competition Dynamics (Coimbra: Coimbra University Press, 2014), pp.141–75 (in Portuguese).

13 Volker Rühe, then defence minister, advocated as early as March 1993, at a conference at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic should become NATO members. See Volker Rühe, ‘Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era’, Survival 35/2 (1993), pp.129–37.

14 Mark Webber, James Sperling and Martin A. Smith, NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory: Decline Or Regeneration (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.144–5.

15 Russia ranked 11th in the German trading turnover in 2013; Poland and the Czech Republic ranked 10th and 12th respectively. See Außenhandel. Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2013 (Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, 2014), p.2.

16 During this time, German exports to Russia decreased from €35,802 billion in 2013 to €21,583 billion in 2016: in 2014 exports fell by 18.4 per cent, in 2015 by 25.9 per cent and in 2016 by 0.3 per cent from the previous year, respectively. In the same period, imports from Russia decreased from €41,234 billion in 2013 to €26,446 billion in 2016: in 2014 imports fell by 7.1 per cent, in 2015 by 21.5 per cent, in 2016 by 12.1 per cent, from the previous years, respectively (Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutschland und Internationales 2017, Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), Oct. 2017, p.423, available from https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/StatistischesJahrbuch/StatistischesJahrbuch2017.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 19 Dec. 2017)).

17 Whereas in 2011 Germany imported 35,328 tons of crude oil, the number fell to 30,026 in 2014 (33.6 per cent) but increased to 32,577 in 2015 (35.7 per cent), and 36,048 in 2016 (Deutsche Rohölimporte nach ausgewählten Exportländern in den Jahren 2011 bis 2016, Statista, available from https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/2473/umfrage/rohoelimport-hauptlieferanten-von-deutschland/ (accessed 19 Dec. 2017)).

18 See, for example, Roland Götz, ‘Pipeline Popanz. Irrtümer der europäischen Energiedebatte’, Osteuropa 59/1 (2009), pp.3–18. Contrast with a critical assessment of the impact of the growing German dependence in Tom Dyson, ‘Energy Security and Germany's Response to Russian Revisionism: The Dangers of Civilian Power’, German Politics 25/4 (2016), pp.500–518.

19 On the role of historical memory on Germany's foreign policy development, see Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1997).

20 For a reflection on the historical, moral and emotional focus on Russia, see Irina Scherbakova and Karl Schlögel, Der Russlandreflex. Einsichten in eine Beziehungeskrise (Hamburg: Edition Körber Stiftung, 2015); Bruno Schoch, ‘Russische Märchenstunde. Die Schuld des Westens und Putins Kampf gegen den Faschismus’, in K. Raabe and M. Sapper (eds), Testfall Ukraine. Europa und seine Werte (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2015), pp.233–46.

21 Constanze Stelzenmüller, ‘Germany's Russia Question’, Foreign Affairs 88/2 (2009), pp.89–100.

22 On the problematic aspects of the personalised relations, see Katrin Bastian and Roland Götz, Deutsch–russische Beziehungen im Europäischen Kontext. Zwischen Interessenallianz und strategischer Partnerschaft (SWP, Berlin, Diskussionspapier FG 5, 2005/03, May 2005).

23 Gernot Erler and Peter W. Schulze (eds), Die Europäisierung Russlands. Moskau zwischen Modernisierungspartnerschaft und Großmachtrolle (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2012); Gernot Erler, Mission Weltfrieden. Deutschlands neue Rolle in Weltpolitik (Freiburg etc.: Herder Vrlg., 2009), pp.133–82.

24 For an analysis of the crisis and proposals to integrate Russia, see Matthias Dembinski, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Bruno Schoch and Hans-Joachim Spanger, Nach dem Kaukasus-Krieg: Einbindung statt Eindämmung Russlands (HSFK, Frankfurt a.M., HSFK Report 2008, No.6).

25 For the first see, for example, the declaration of the German–Russian Forum (institution backed by German–Russian business), ‘Russlandpolitik: Weniger klagen, mehr verhandeln’, Deutsch/Russisches Forum, Pressemitteilung 04/2013 or Eberhard Sandschneider, ‘Raus aus der Moralecke. Die deutsche Außenpolitik sollte der Welt nicht ihre Werte diktieren’, Die Zeit, 20 Feb. 2013, available from http://www.zeit.de/2013/10/Aussenpolitik-Diskussion-Moral/komplettansicht?print (accessed 19 May 2016). For the latter position see Jörg Lau, ‘Das bisschen Unterdrückung. Genscher, Mißfelder und der regierungsnahe Thinktank DGAP – Deutschlands Außenpolitiker arrangieren sich mit Diktatoren und Halbdemokraten’, Die Zeit, 21 Feb. 2013, available from http://www.zeit.de/2013/09/Aussenpolitik-Werte-Diktatoren/komplettansicht (accessed 19 May 2016); Wolfgang Eichwede, ‘Einmischung tut not! Wider den Selbstbetrug der Putin-Freunde’, Osteuropa 63/4 (2013), pp.91–100; or New Power, New Responsibility. Elements of German Foreign and Security Policy for a Changing World (Berlin and Washington, DC: SWP and GMF, 2013).

26 Joachim Gauck, ‘Germany's Role in the World: Reflections on Responsibility, Norms and Alliances’. Speech at the opening of the Munich Security Conference, 31 Jan. 2014, Munich, available from https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2014/01/140131-Muenchner-Sicherheitskonferenz-Englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 22 April 2016).

27 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Review. Krise. Ordnung. Europa (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt, 2014), p.9, available from https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/269656/d26e1e50cd5acb847b4b9eb4a757e438/review2014-abschlussbericht-data.pdf (accessed 5 Feb. 2016).

28 Even German peace research pleaded for a change of policy vis-à-vis Russia and for ‘congagement’, a combination of containment and engagement of Russia. See Matthias Dembinski, Hans-Joachim Schmidt and Hans-Joachim Spanger, Einhegung: Die Ukraine, Russland und die europäische Sicherheitsordnung (HSFK, Frankfurt/M, HSFK-Report No.3/2014). The later development of the thesis arrived at a rather controversial proposal of a ‘plural peace’, see M. Dembinski and H-J Spanger, ‘Pluraler Frieden. Leitideen für eine neue Russlandpolitik’, Osteuropa 67/3–4 (2017), pp.87–96.

29 Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, ‘Germany and the Crisis: Asset or Liability?’, in D. Dinan, N. Nugent and W.E. Paterson (eds), The European Union in Crisis (London: Palgrave, 2017), pp.220–24.

30 ‘Wieder Krieg in Europa? Nicht in unserem Namen!’ (8 Dec. 2014), a petition of 60 prominent German personalities – academics, journalists, artists and former politicians, available from http://www.zeit.de/politik/2014-12/aufruf-russland-dialog (accessed 7 Feb. 2016); the petition was signed by 32,888 German citizens by its closing date on 4 Feb. 2015, available from https://www.openpetition.de/petition/online/appell-wieder-krieg-in-europa-nicht-in-unserem-namen (accessed 5 Feb. 2016).

31 Jörg Himmelreich, ‘Etwas Besseres als Europa. Deutsch–russische Seelenverwandschaft’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 31 Dec. 2014, available from https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/etwas-besseres-als-europa-1.18452897 (accessed 22 April 2016).

32 For the changing role of Germany see, for example, Stefan Meister, Reframing of Germany's Russia Policy – an Opportunity for the EU (London and Berlin: ECFR, ECFR Policy Brief April 2014), Wolfgang Seibel, ‘Ardous Learning or New Uncertainties? The Emergence of German Diplomacy in Ukrainian Crisis’, Global Policy 6/Issue Supplement S1 (2015), pp.1–17; Hannes Adomeit, German–Russian Relations. Change of Paradigm vs. ‘Business as Usual 2015’ (Paris and Brussels: IFRI, Note du Cefra 120, Feb. 2015); Liana Fix, ‘Leadership in the Ukrainian Crisis: A German Moment’, in Niklas Helwig (ed.), Europe's New Political Engine. Germany's Role in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (Helsinki: FIIA Report 44), pp.111–32. Some analysists perceived the German approach as too soft on Russia, see Hans Kundnani, ‘Leaving the West Behind. Germany Looks East’, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2015, available from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/leaving-west-behind (accessed 5 Feb. 2016). Germany's criticism of Russiás actions was met with surprise and disbelief in Moscow; an analysis by the Russian Institute of Europe subsequently focused exclusively on pragmatic areas of co-operation (economy, research, culture etc.), avoiding the issue of Ukraine and security policy, see ГЕРМАНИЯ. 2015. Часть II. (Институт Европы Российской академии наук. Доклады Института Европы No.328, 2015), pp.65–82.

33 As Giles et al. Suggest, ‘Germany's evidence-based stance – initially giving Russia the benefit of the doubt, then acting firmly – may have helped pull other European countries, most notably Norway and the UK, along in its wake, even to the detriment of their own economies’. See Keir Giles, Philip Hanson, Roderic Lyne, James Nixey, James Sherr and Andrew Wood, The Russian Challenge (London: Chatham House Report, June 2015), p.36.

34 On the concept of hybrid policy, see Mölling and Major, A Hybrid Security Policy for Europe.

35 Außenhandel. Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2016 (Statistisches Bundesamt, Destatis, 24 Oct. 2017), p.2, available from https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/Aussenhandel/Tabellen/RangfolgeHandelspartner.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 5 Nov. 2017).

36 Tuomas Forsberg, ‘The EU as a Normative Power (Once Again). A Conceptual Clarification of an Ideal Type’, Journal of Common Market Studies 49/6 (2011), pp.1183–204.

37 Hanns W. Maull (ed.), Auflösung oder Ablösung? Die internationale Ordnung im Umbruch (Berlin: SWP Studie, Dec. 2017).

Additional information

Funding

This Special issue is an output of the project ‘Germany's Eastern Challenge and the Russia–Ukraine crisis: A New Ostpolitik in the Making?’ of the Institute of International Relations Prague and it was supported from the institutional funding provided by the Government of the Czech Republic.