German Foreign Policy, the Ukraine Crisis and the Euro-Atlantic Order: Assessing the Dynamics of Change

Abstract

More than any other country in Europe, Germany has been the main beneficiary of the post-cold war order in the Euro-Atlantic area, becoming Europe’s main status quo power. But with Russia’s foreign policy revisionism, the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ turn and Brexit, pressure on Germany to maintain or reshape the existing order is likely to increase. Ever since the role it exerted as a leader in the management of the eurozone crisis, Germany has been under growing pressure to become also a more effective foreign policy actor and security provider. The article discusses these changing dynamics in Germany’s foreign and security policy and assesses the extent to which a transformation of Germany’s role as a shaper of the Euro-Atlantic order has occurred since Berlin’s political elite jointly addressed the issue in early 2014. It makes the argument that in the wake of the end of the post-war Euro-Atlantic peace and security order, Germany’s foreign and security policy is undergoing an unprecedented and substantial change. Germany seems to be on a path as Europe’s emerging strategic leader since the Ukraine crisis. This change will be closely examined in Germany’s changing bilateral relationships with Russia and the United States and the possible implications for the Euro-Atlantic order.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This article is an output of the project ‘Germany’s Eastern Challenge and the Russia–Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik in the Making?’ of the Institute of International Relations Prague and it was supported by institutional funding provided by the Government of the Czech Republic.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Patricia Daehnhardt is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Lusíada University and a Researcher at the IPRI-NOVA – Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. She has published on German foreign and security policy and is the author (with Maria Raquel Freire) of the book Russian Foreign Policy in the Euro-Atlantic Area: Dynamics of Cooperation and Competition (Coimbra University Press, 2014), and more recently of the articles ‘Euro-Atlantic Security after Trump: Relations between the European Union/CSDP and NATO’ (National Defence Institute, 2017), and ‘The Foreign Policies of Germany and Great Britain after Brexit’ (National Defence Institute, 2017), all in Portuguese. Her latest publication is ‘Tectonic Shifts in the Party Landscape? Mapping Germany’s Party System Changes’, in Marco Lisi (ed.), Party System Change, the Crisis and the State of Democracy in Europe (Routledge, forthcoming).

ORCID

Patricia Daehnhardt http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0267-4394

Notes

1 Hans-Peter Schwarz coined Germany as Europe’s central power. See (Schwarz 1994). See also (Daehnhardt 2007).

2 See, for example, “Turkey Blocks some Cooperation with NATO Partners as EU Row Escalates.” Reuters, 15 March 2017. Accessed 21 March 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-referendum-nato-idUSKBN16M2OR.

3 “The Marshall Plan at 70: What We Must Remember and What We Must Do for the Future”, Speech by the German Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 18 May 2017. Accessed 24 May 2017. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/170518-bm-marshall-plan-70/290064.

4 This definition of assertiveness comes from Dorland’s Medical Dictionary. Accessed 7 June 2016. http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/assertiveness.

5 Munich Security Conference (MSC) speeches 2014. Accessed 9 May 2016. https://www.securityconference.de/: http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Joachim-Gauck/Reden/2014/01/140131-Muenchner--Sicherheitskonferenz.html; http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2014/140201-BM_MüSiKo.html; https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MSC_/2014/Reden/2014-01-31-Speech-MinDef_von_der_Leyen-MuSeCo.pdf See also ‘Einmischen statt zurückhalten’, Frank-Walter Steinmeier interview, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 Jan. 2014. Accessed 9 May 2016. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/steinmeier-ueber-deutsche-aussenpolitik-einmischen-statt-zurueckhalten-1.1875444.

6 Ursula von der Leyen, MSC speech 2014. Accessed 14 June 2016. https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MSC_/2014/Reden/2014-01-31-Speech-MinDef_von_der_Leyen-MuSeCo.pdf.

7 A survey of the Koerber Foundation, published in May 2014, found that 60 per cent of Germans were for the continuity of Germany’s ‘culture of restraint’, 82 per cent against stronger military engagement and only 13 per cent in favour of it. ‘Involvement or Restraint?’, Koerber Stiftung Foundation, May 2014. Accessed 14 June 2016. http://www.koerberstiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/internationale_politik/sonderthemen/umfrage_aussenpolitik/Koerber-Stiftung_Umfrage_Aussenpolitik_Broschuere_EN.pdf.

8 “Review 2014: Crisis-Order-Europe.” Auswartige Amt. Accessed 14 June 2016. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/692042/cef1f6308ebdb0d2d7c62725089c4198/review-2014-data.pdf.

9 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, Berlin, July 2016, p.31 (in German). Accessed 2 August 2016. https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/Infomaterial/BMVg/Weissbuch_zur_Sicherheitspolitik_2016.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

10 Angela Merkel, Speech before the Bundestag on the situation in Ukraine, 13 March 2014. Accessed 2 August 2016. http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Regierungserklaerung/2014/2014-03-13-bt-merkel.html.

11 Instead of producing stability as a geo-economic power, Kundnani argues, Germany’s economic strength has produced instability: because of its close economic relations with Russia and China, Germany might feel tempted to diminish its ties to the West.

12 Speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel, at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 17 Nov. 2014. Accessed 5 October 2016. https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Reden/2014/2014-11-17-merkel-lowy-institute-sydney_en.html.

13 “Merkel übt scharfe Kritik an Putin.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 Nov. 2014. Accessed 7 October 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/international/merkel-warnt-vor-flaechenbrand-durch-ukraine-krise-1.18426411.

14 “Merkel Wants a Stable World and Is Willing to Pay a Price.” Financial Times, 11 Aug. 2014. Accessed 12 October 2016. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d2d60f24-2144-11e4-a958-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XBh4F35P.

15 Russia is not part of the US-led coalition; Germany is part of this coalition, and despite not being militarily engaged in combat operations, it participates with a frigate, reconnaissance missions and refuelling capacities.

16 Remarks by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, Belgium, 10 June 2011. Accessed 17 October 2016. http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4839.

17 “Angela Merkel’s Message to Trump.” The New York Times, 9 Nov. 2016. Accessed 10 November 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election-night-2016/angela-merkels-warning-to-trump.

18 “Merkel and Trump Can’t Hide Fundamental Differences in First Visit.” The Guardian, 18 March 2017, available from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/17/trump-merkel-white-house-trade-refugees-wiretapping; Joffe (2017).

19 On Trump’s visit to Europe, see (Karnitschnig 2017).

20 “America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone.” Wall Street Journal, 30 May 2017. Accessed 31 May 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-first-doesnt-mean-america-alone-1496187426.

21 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, Berlin, 13 July 2016, p. 6.

22 Speech by Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, German Bundestag, 23 Nov. 2016. Accessed 9 August 2017. https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/2016/11/138-3-bmvg-bt.html. See also ‘Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016’, SIPRI Factsheet, April 2017. Accessed 9 August 2017. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Trends%20in%20world%20military%20expenditure%2C%202016.pdf. Still, Germany’s defence contribution of 1.2 per cent is still a far cry from NATO’s envisaged 2 per cent goal.

23 The German Defence Minister gave security guarantees to the Baltic countries and Poland through the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) adopted in June 2014 which pledged to provide $1 billion in assistance to eastern Europe, based on a rotational presence of US forces in central Europe (exercises and deployments) and assistance to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

24 Germany is part of this coalition and, despite not being militarily engaged in combat operations, it participates with a frigate, reconnaissance missions and refuelling capacities.

25 Speech by the Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, at the 53rd Munich Security Conference, 18 Feb. 2017. Accessed 21 May 2017. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2017/170218_Rede_BM_Gabriel_Muesiko.html; ‘Schulz will Zwei-Prozent Ziel der NATO kippen’, SpiegelOnline, 1 June 2017. Accessed 11 August 2017. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/spd-martin-schulz-will-zwei-prozent-ziel-der-nato-kippen-a-1150329-druck.html.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Institute of International Relations Prague.