A ‘Primus Inter Pares’ in EU Foreign Policy? – German Leadership in the European Council during the Libyan and Ukrainian Crises

Abstract

Drawing on the characterisation of the European Council as an arena for ‘integrative bargaining’, the paper shows the importance of two factors that influence whether a country can act as ‘first among equals’ or (‘Primus Inter Pares’) in a system designed to respect national sovereignty: alignment among the ‘Big Three’, and ‘voice opportunities’ for smaller member states. We support this argument with view of Germany's divergent role in two recent international crises - the 2011 uprisings in Libya and the violent protests in Ukraine in 2014/2015. On the basis of these findings, we conclude that the ability to create consent among all Member States is both a key prerequisite and a serious challenge for effective leadership in EU foreign policy.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Wolfgang Wessels is Director of the Centre for Turkey and European Union Studies CETEUS) at the University of Cologne, where he also holds the ‘Ad Personam’ Jean Monnet Chair for Political Science. Since 2018 he has been a part-time professor at the School of Transnational Governance (STG) at the European University Institute (EUI), and looks back at a long academic career in numerous other prestigious institutions. He has been awarded the ‘Lifetime Achievement in Contemporary European Studies’ by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) as well as the Jean Monnet Award ‘European Prize for Lifelong Learning/European Studies’ in Gold for his remarkable career.

Inez von Weitershausen is a postdoctoral researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and CARR visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science where she also obtained her PhD, working with Dr. Ulrich Sedelmeier. She was a visiting researcher at the Centre d’Etudes Européennes at Sciences Po Paris and at the Department of Political Science at Georgetown University. Her research focuses on the prerequisites for and dynamics of international collaboration and spans across a wide range of issue areas, including foreign and security policy, political economy and international development.

David Schäfer is a Policy Analyst at the Secretariat-General of the European Commission, unit President’s and Vice-Presidents’ Briefings. Previously, he was a Graduate Programme participant at the European Central Bank where he worked as a press officer in the division Global Media Relations. He holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), an MA from the College of Europe and was a visiting researcher at the Hertie School of Governance and Sciences Po Paris. His research is published in the Journal of Common Market Studies.

Notes

1 We thank the decision-makers and policy analysts in Berlin, Brussels, Paris and London who shared with us their experiences and insights regarding the dynamics in the European Council during key episodes of the Libyan and Ukrainian crisis.

2 At the European summit in The Hague in 1969 the six founding members initiated the EPC in form of loose intergovernmental policy coordination. Over time, the arrangement increasingly formalised, however, and eventually developed into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) I n the Maastricht Treaty.

3 The unanimity rule enables ach member state, independent of their relative size and capabilities, to cast a veto on foreign policy issues. While vetoes may be costly in terms of reputation and political capital, they are nonetheless issued occasionally when deemed appropriate. (Tallberg 2008).

4 In this context a distinction can be made between ‘antagonistic balancing’ of two or more powers in a rival relationship, and ‘cooperative balancing’, which despite a cooperative relationship falls short of using the constraining impact of common institutions to sustain a balanced relationship between the main powers (Link 1997).

5 Particularly influential in this regard are strategic documents such as EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS, June 2016), the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, November 2015), the Joint Report on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Review (17 May 2017) or the Joint Communication on ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action’ (7 June 2017).

6 Official military action began after UN resolution 1973 had authorised ‘all necessary means’ – short of military intervention with ground forces – to protect civilians. Initially carried out by a small international coalition, led by France, the UK and the US, NATO soon took control over the No-Fly Zone as part of Operation ‘Unified Protector’.

7 Malta accommodated thousands of foreigners who had been evacuated from Libya, and Italy became a member of the initial coalition force, consisting of the U.S., Britain, France, Italy and Canada.

8 On 1 April 2011 the EU presented a proposal for a humanitarian assistance mission in support of the UN (EUFOR Libya) which some may interpret as a cooperation effort. However, the mission was never deployed and MEP Anna Gomes soon argued that initiative itself was in itself a resulted from Member States; inability to reach agreement on a ‘full-scale Common Security and Defence (CSDP) operation’ (Gomes 2011).

9 A broad majority of Germans (88 per cent) supported the country’s non-participation in a military mission, with only 27 percent deeming the government’s decision ‘wrong’ in March 2011. Conversely, 70 per cent expressed their support for a trade embargo (Forsa 2011).

10 While there is little evidence to suggest that initial protests were indeed orchestrated by Russia, it appears more likely that they constituted a spontaneous reaction by the Russian speaking population in the East after the ‘Maidan government’ cancelled the status of Russian as an official language. Military activities by the infiltrated paramilitary and the Crimea-based Russian Black Sea fleet began as early as 27 and 28 February

11 The assets freezes were first decided in March 2014, and subsequently renewed. The measures were last extended in March 2017.

12 By February 2015, two thirds of Germans supported the sanctions (65 per cent, compared to 31 per cent against) (Infratest Dimap 2015, 7).