The first climate change election? The Australian general election of 24 November 2007

Australia, under the leadership of John Howard and his Liberal-National coalition government, acquired notoriety as the only developed country other than the US to decline to ratify the Kyoto protocol.

So when the first official act of Kevin Rudd, the incoming Labor Prime Minister elected on 24 November 2007, was to sign the instrument of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, it was seen as a sea-change in Australia's policy. The announcement of the news at the UN climate talks in Bali was greeted with sustained applause: the global politics of climate change appeared to have turned a corner, the US was isolated and a new, more inclusive agreement seemed possible (Christoff 2008).

Climate change: the decisive issue?

In an election campaign in which Labor sought to reassure the electorate by avoiding promises of radical change, its commitment to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, in the face of Howard's obdurate refusal to do so, was one of the few clear differences between the major parties. Moreover, the election was preceded by a year of unprecedentedly high temperatures and persistent drought that brought critical water shortages to urban and rural areas alike; climate change was rarely out of the news, and public concern was high and rising.

Of all the populations that have been polled, Australians are the most concerned about the potential impact of climate change. In February 2005, 70% of Australians were ‘very worried’ or ‘fairly worried’ about global warming, making it second only to ‘unfriendly states developing nuclear weapons’ among their global concerns (Cook 2005). In November 2006, 71% considered climate change a ‘very serious’ problem and 63% professed willingness to ‘pay more to reduce greenhouse gases’. 1 Three months later, 76% considered it a ‘major problem’, only 5% thought it was not a problem and 77% declared they were ‘prepared to pay more … if it would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions’. 2 Moreover, over 60% declared themselves dissatisfied with the government's response to climate change. 3

At first glance, then, it might seem plausible to explain the election result in terms of climate change. After all, the economy – the rock upon which governments usually founder – was booming, unemployment was at a 33-year low and the government, for the first time in decades, enjoyed a majority in both houses of parliament.

There were, however, many reasons for discontent. The Howard government's commitment of Australian troops to Iraq was unpopular and the whiff of racism hung about its treatment of refugees and immigrants. To the dismay even of former Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, the government had increased the security service's powers of surveillance and eroded civil liberties. Howard proudly asserted his ‘economic liberalism and social conservatism’, but many complained that affluence was tainted by pervasive mean-spiritedness. These were, however, issues of concern principally to a liberal intelligentsia, most of whom had never supported Howard. It was, directly and indirectly, the way the government used the Senate majority it enjoyed from July 2005 that widened the circle of discontent. In a series of measures that led to its being accused of arrogance, the government forced through highly contentious industrial relations legislation (‘WorkChoices’) designed to liberalise labour markets and destroy trade unions by introducing workplace agreements that removed employees' protection from unfair dismissal and rights to bargain collectively. And while the GDP figures portrayed an Australia affluent as never before, newspapers headlined rising prices and lamented that housing was less affordable than ever.

Thus climate change was one issue among many. But was it perhaps the issue that tipped the balance? Polls conducted in nine marginal electorates for the Climate Institute 4 found that the proportion of voters saying that climate change would have ‘a strong influence’ on their vote increased from 62% in August, before the campaign began, to 73% three weeks before the election. However, although Labor was seen as the better party to deal with climate change, it said little about it during the campaign, and its standing on the issue declined. 5

Post-election polls suggest that, while climate change and other environmental issues were indeed prominent among voters' concerns, they were not pre-eminent and were probably not, in themselves, decisive. According to Newspoll, the environment ranked only fourth, equal with the economy, and below health, education and water planning among the issues voters identified as important in deciding their vote. 6 Although an impressive 58% of voters said the environment was very or fairly important, these were non-exclusive choices among a prepared list of prompts. Those surveys that used open questions without prompts produced similar rankings, with industrial relations above or equal to the environment/climate change, but the proportions of respondents naming any of the issues was much smaller. Thus, when the Auspoll exit poll for Sky News asked voters in marginal seats to name the two top issues that had influenced their vote, health and hospitals (12%) and the economy (11%) outranked the environment and climate change (8%), industrial relations (8%), education (7%) and cost of living (6%). An exit poll in Melbourne ranked health, education and industrial relations ahead of climate change, but found industrial relations and climate change rated more highly by Labor voters. 7 Similarly, a post-election poll in Howard's own seat, which he lost, found that climate change ranked second (after industrial relations) among Labor voters. 8

There is, then, at best modest evidence in support of the contention that the parties' positions on climate change significantly influenced the result. Although climate change was important to Labor voters, and to those who switched to Labor, industrial relations and economic issues appear to have been rather more important. It is, as ever, unclear to what extent voters chose Labor because of its stance on the issues of particular concern to them, or whether, having decided to vote Labor, they elaborated their issue concerns in line with Labor's policies. But Labor did not highlight climate change during the campaign, and the issue with which Labor was most closely identified before the campaign began was not climate change but its opposition to WorkChoices. 9 Given that two-thirds of voters said they decided whom to vote for at least a month before the election, 10 if there was an issue that determined party preference, it was most likely WorkChoices.

Climate change may, however, have influenced the result at least indirectly. Howard's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was clearly at odds with public opinion (and, as it later transpired, with the advice of some of his senior ministers, notably Environment Minister Malcolm Turnbull). Belatedly accepting that anthropogenic climate change was real, Howard promised action to encourage energy-saving and investment in clean coal technologies and renewables, but also commissioned an inquiry into nuclear energy and declined to set carbon reduction targets. Still siding with Bush against the Kyoto Protocol and defending the coal and mining industries, Howard's conversion appeared belated, grudging and half-hearted.

Howard thus appeared to be yesterday's man, a 68-year-old who had been in office for 11 years and whose most likely Liberal successor was apparently competent but unpopular. By contrast, the younger, fresh-faced, Mandarin-speaking ex-diplomat Rudd, by promising to ratify Kyoto and to repair Australia's reputation in the world, appeared to be the man of the future. But even this may exaggerate the contribution of climate change to Labor's victory: Labor's commitment to ratification was not new and, from the moment of Rudd's election to the leadership in 2006, Labor consistently led in the opinion polls (by roughly 10%), only to see its lead diminish (to 5%) during the election campaign.

Other environmental issues featured in the campaign but seem scarcely to have influenced the result, except, perhaps, in Tasmania. A proposed massive wood-pulp mill in Tasmania excited fears that much of the island's remaining old-growth forests would be cleared, provoked protests by conservationists and divided the Liberal Party locally. Turnbull's approval of the proposal, following contested expert advice, exposed him to vigorous campaigns by environmental activists and wealthy advocates of wilderness protection, but he retained his seat. Labor, in an attempt to avoid the debacle of 2004, in which it had lost two crucial Tasmanian seats when it was outmanoeuvred by Howard's pledge of support for the logging industry, merely said that it would accept expert advice on the pulp mill.

Elsewhere, federal Labor maintained a studied silence over the environmental impacts of state Labor governments' panic responses to the crisis in water supplies: proposed massive sea-water desalination plants near Perth, Sydney and Melbourne, and a controversial dam in an environmentally sensitive part of southern Queensland.

The Greens

Some seasoned observers expected the Greens to win a Senate seat in every state and to top 10% of the vote. It was not to be. For most of the campaign, the Greens were bystanders to the main story. They had made progress in most state elections since 2004, 11 but Labor's surge of popularity, particularly among the young, had reduced the Greens' standing in the polls below the level they achieved in 2004. During the campaign, however, their support firmed. Labor's acceptance of the Tasmanian pulp-mill decision pushed some voters toward the Greens, but perhaps more influential was Labor's decision to exchange preferences with the Greens, even in Victoria where animosity between Labor and Greens was acute. Although the Greens are generally positioned to the left of Labor (Manning and Rootes 2005), and were never likely to preference the Liberals, Labor could not hope to gain a Senate majority in its own right. With the Democrats out of contention, Labor's best hope of achieving a workable Senate was by developing cooperation with the Greens. Moreover, if the election were close, Labor would need Greens preferences to win sufficient House of Representatives seats to form a government.

In the House of Representatives contest, the Greens increased their vote in every state except New South Wales (see Table 1). Their best result (13.5%) was in Tasmania, the only state where Labor's vote fell, and where the fallout from Labor's acquiescence over the pulp mill and the Labor state government's widely criticised handling of the issue was compounded by the momentum of Greens leader Bob Brown's resoundingly successful campaign for re-election to the Senate. Elsewhere, even though Greens polled above 15% in a number of electorates, their best results were, as before, in safe Labor inner-city seats in Melbourne (23%) and Sydney (21%). In 15 of the 25 House of Representatives seats that Labor won from the coalition, the Greens vote exceeded the difference between the votes for the major parties. In theory, then, Labor's victory depended upon Greens preferences.

Table 1. The election for Australia's House of Representatives, 2007 compared with 2004 results.

Party	% Vote	% Swing	Seats	Change
Labor	43.4	+5.7	83	+23
Liberal	36.7	−4.2	55	−20
National	5.5	−0.4	10	−3
Greens	7.8	+0.6	0	0
Family First	1.9	+0.0	0	0
Democrats	0.7	−0.5	0	0
Others	4.0	−1.2	2	0

In the election for the Senate, Greens did rather better (see Table 2). Brown attracted over 18% of votes, and won a quota for election in his own right, without the need of preferences from other candidates, the first time this had been achieved by a Green.

Table 2. The election for the Senate, 2007, compared with 2004 (and 2001) results.

Party	% Vote	% Swing	Seats	Change	Elected 2004	Total new Senate
Labor	40.3	+5.3	18	+4	14	32
Liberal/Nationals	39.9	−5.1	18	−2	19	37
Greens	9.0	+1.4	3	+1	2	5
Family First	1.6	−0.1	0	…	1	1
Democrats	1.3	−0.8	0	−4	0	0
Others	7.7	−2.5	1	+1	0	1
Note: Senators are elected to serve for two parliaments, so senators elected in 2001 were up for re-election in 2007; changes in seats are, therefore, comparisons with results for 2001. Senators elected in 2004 continue to serve until 30 June following the next general election, so the ‘New Senate’ figures refer to the composition of the Senate as from 1 July 2008. Six Senators were elected by proportional representation (single transferable vote) for each of the 6 original states, 2 from each of the 2 Territories; the House of Representatives is elected from single-member constituencies using the preferential/alternative vote system.
Sources: Australian Electoral Commission (http://vtr.aec.gov.au/); Australian Broadcasting Corporation (www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2007/), accessed 1 March 2008.

However, the Greens' gains (in South Australia and Western Australia) were partly offset by the loss, despite increasing their share of the vote, of their seat in New South Wales. The Greens' modest gain was the obverse of Labor's success. Labor did well enough to win three Senate seats in each of Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria, but not well enough to amass surpluses sufficient to secure the election of Greens by the transfer of preferences; precisely because Labor did relatively badly in the Senate contests in South and Western Australia, the Greens won seats there. Hence the paradoxical result that the Greens failed in Victoria with 10.4% and in New South Wales (8.7%), but won a seat in South Australia where their share of the vote was lowest (6.6%).

While the Greens increased their vote in competition with a resurgent Labor, the results leave them unrepresented in the federal parliament for the three most populous states. This will limit their visibility to the majority of Australians as well as their influence in the Senate. Overall, the result means that the Greens alone cannot give Labor a majority on crucial Senate votes, and, because the additional Greens Senator is more than offset by the loss of all four Democrats, the Greens are unlikely to play the brokerage role on environmental, civil liberties and social issues that the Democrats did before 2005.

The Greens appear to have benefited little from the mainstreaming of environmental concern. Labor's commitment to ratifying Kyoto removed the Greens' best card, and they were reduced to strident attacks on Labor (and especially on Labor's environment spokesman, Peter Garrett, a former president of the Australian Conservation Foundation) for the alleged insincerity of their promises to protect the environment. The discrepancy between the Greens' performance for the Senate compared with that for the House suggests that some voters may have thought it was worth voting Green to keep Labor honest, but probably rather more were merely concerned to maximise the chances of removing the Liberals from power by voting tactically. What is remarkable is not that so many did so, but that they were so few. The Greens, lacking the centrist appeal of the Democrats, did less well than the Democrats had in the defining election of 1996. Commentators compare the Greens' parliamentary performance unfavourably with that of the Democrats: the Democrats, it is said, achieved much because they were willing to negotiate; the Greens achieved little because they were not. If the commentators are right in blaming Brown for the Greens' intransigence, it seems hardly like to diminish in the wake of his impressive re-election.

Implications

There is no doubt that this election has raised the profile of the environment in Australian politics, but it has done so with only a modest restoration of the standing of the green parties. Although the Greens' gains exceeded the Democrats' losses in share of votes, they are far from the dizzy heights of 1990 when Greens and Democrats together accounted for over 15% of the vote (see Figure 1). With the demise of the Democrats, the parliamentary representation of green parties is reduced to its lowest relative level since 1980.

Figure 1. Greens and Democrats: trends in electoral performance, 1977–2007.

The importance of climate change to Rudd is underlined by the establishment of a new department of climate change under the umbrella of the Prime Minister's department. In his first newspaper interview as Prime Minister, Rudd said Australia had a ‘national and international responsibility to the next generation’ to do everything it could to counter climate change. He outlined his ambition to play a leading role in global initiatives, and his intention to use Australia's new position as a member of the Kyoto club to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries (Sydney Morning Herald, 5 December 2007).

Despite the symbolism of Kyoto, both international and domestic considerations inform Rudd's belief that the cause is best served by keeping the Bali road map general enough to ensure that all nations, especially the US, are kept on board. Nevertheless, at Bali Australia ended up ‘strongly supporting’ reference to the IPCC's science-backed targets of 25–40% reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by developed nations by 2020, and at least 50% globally by 2050. Although mining interests warned that Australia should not concede too much in post-Kyoto negotiations, other sections of industry welcomed ratification as opening opportunities for Australia to profit from carbon trading and abatement schemes.

The defeat of Howard clears the way for a younger generation of more pragmatic Liberal politicians. New Liberal leader Brendan Nelson, in his first speech as leader, announced support for the new government's ratification of the Kyoto protocol. His chief rival, the former environment minister, Turnbull, remains, as shadow Treasurer, a major force and is more likely to be supportive than obstructive of measures to protect the global environment and the new Liberal environment spokesman, Greg Hunt, is an articulate and committed advocate of action to mitigate climate change.

This may not have been an election in which climate change was the decisive issue, but it nevertheless marks a clear break with the climate policies of the Howard government and ushers in a new era in which Australia promises to play a leading role in global environmental politics. 12

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Haydon Manning, Peter Christoff and an anonymous reader for comments on earlier drafts; the remaining faults are mine. Thanks, too, to Clare Saunders for help with Figure 1.

Notes

 1. Herald/ACNielsen poll, The Age, 6 Nov. 2006.

 2. Newspoll, 21 Feb. 2007, available online at http://www.newspoll.com.au, accessed 1 March 2008.

 3. Herald/ACNielsen poll, 6 Nov. 2006.

 4. The Climate Institute, established in late 2005 with private foundation funding, describes itself as a ‘non-partisan, independent group that works with community, business and government to drive innovative and effective climate change solutions’. It is spending A$10million over five years to raise awareness of climate change.

 5. See http://www.climateinstitute.org.au//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=116&Itemid=40, accessed 1 March 2008

 6. Newspoll, 4 Dec. 2008. In this poll, ‘WorkChoices’ and ‘industrial relations’ (52% and 47% respectively) were inexplicably listed separately, probably depressing the scores for both.

 7. Swinburne ISR for The Age, 24 Nov. 2007.

 8. http://www.climateinstitute.org.au//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=149&Itemid=40, accessed 1 March 2008.

 9. http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/2007/4179/, accessed 1 March 2008.

10. Newspoll, 4 Dec. 2008.

11. As a result of recent electoral reforms, Greens now sit in the parliaments of all states except Queensland which, uniquely, has a unicameral legislature. In all other mainland states, the upper houses are now elected by proportional representation, as is the lower house in Tasmania and the ACT Legislative Assembly (see Crowley 2008).

12. This is not to suggest that Australia under Howard did nothing constructive about climate change. It was the Howard government, after all, who established the Australian Greenhouse Office to coordinate measures to abate greenhouse emissions. Australia was more or less on target to meet its (admittedly generous) Kyoto targets, and was active in regional initiatives, but its failure to ratify Kyoto deprived it of the authority to play a global leadership role.