https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7782-9288
ABSTRACT
Amid the existing scientific consensus regarding anthropogenic climate change (ACC), research on political ideologies and climate change indicates varying degrees of scepticism amongst conservatives and, especially, the far right, the latter ranging from the anti-liberal radical right to the anti-democratic extreme right. We contribute to this emerging literature by drawing a comprehensive portrait of far-right articulations of climate change to date through an analysis of contributions to plenary debates and explanations of vote delivered by far-right Members of the European Parliament (parliamentary terms 6–8, 2004–19). We illustrate the need for a differentiated understanding of far-right climate-change communication, as most arguments are sceptical not towards the existence of ACC, but the ways in which it is addressed. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that extreme-right actors are slightly more ‘climate-friendly’ than radical-right ones. Therefore, this article contributes to our knowledge of and analytical framework for examining far-right climate-change communication.
Introduction
Although the existence of anthropogenic climate change (ACC) has been accepted by an overwhelming majority of scientists, scepticism remains in some circles. As a consequence, a substantial body of research on climate change communication has considered political ideology as an explanatory factor, indicating varying degrees of scepticism amongst conservatives (Carvalho Citation2007, McCright and Dunlap Citation2011, Jaspal et al. Citation2016, Painter and Gavin Citation2016, Krange et al. Citation2019). However, research on climate change communication by far-right actors, ranging from anti-liberal radical-right to anti-democratic extreme-right ones, such as the French National Rally and the Greek Golden Dawn, respectively, has only recently started to emerge (for a review, see Forchtner Citation2019a). Indeed, while the far right’s position on, for example, immigration has been extensively researched, highly influential publications (for instance: Mudde Citation2007, Citation2019, Wodak Citation2015, Rydgren Citation2018a) do not focus on far-right stances on the natural environment in general, or climate change in particular.
In response, this article contributes to research on the far right and environmental communication by offering an analysis of both climate change scepticism and acceptance in far-right climate change communication – as well as considering differences in climate change communication between variations of far-right ideology. Indeed, even though the natural environment plays a role in far-right ideology (for example, the symbiotic relationship between the nation and the homeland, see Forchtner Citation2019b, Lubarda Citation2020a), (anthropogenic) climate change is often viewed with scepticism (Fraune and Knodt Citation2018, Lockwood Citation2018, Forchtner Citation2019a, Malm and The Zetkin Collective Citation2021). However, not all far-right actors are climate change sceptics, nor is climate change scepticism today reducible to the classic threefold typology of scepticism proposed by Rahmstorf (Citation2004): scepticism towards trend (no global warming), attribution (warming exists, but humans are not responsible) and impact (warming might be harmless or even beneficial). In fact, research needs to look more closely at both far-right acceptance of ACC and forms of less outright scepticism. Concerning the latter, Capstick and Pidgeon (Citation2014) distinguish epistemic scepticism (related to the status and existence of climate change) and response scepticism (doubts concerning the actions undertaken to tackle climate change). Subsequently, Van Rensburg (Citation2015) separated Capstick and Pidgeon’s epistemic scepticism (what he calls evidence scepticism) from process and response scepticism. While the former describes scepticism towards the scientific processes behind the evidence for ACC/decision-making processes, including public opinion formation, the latter follows Capstick and Pidgeon’s lead. Importantly, both process and response scepticism can exist independently of evidence scepticism. In addition to this typology, Van Rensburg provides an extensive list of arguments through which evidence, process and response scepticisms are realised – something we develop further in our analytical framework.
It is against this background that we analyse the far right in the European Parliament (EP). We focus on the case of the EP as it provides a comparable setting to analyse an ideologically wide range of far-right parties and their diverse climate change communications, including the aforementioned types of scepticisms towards and acceptance of ACC. Thus, we consider the far right as a rather heterogenous party family characterised by an ideology composed of, at its core, exclusionary ethnonationalism and authoritarianism (Bonikowski Citation2017, Rydgren Citation2018b; see also Halikiopoulou and Vlanda, Citation2016). For instance, far-right actors, who are nowadays also often, but not necessarily populist (Mudde Citation2007), are hostile towards immigration by those viewed as (too) different and in favour of law-and-order policies. The strength of these actors’ ethnonationalism and authoritarianism, and thus the specific stances they take (for example, regarding immigration), results in such actors belonging to, on one end of the spectrum, the anti-liberal democratic radical right or, on the other end, the anti-democratic extreme right. Consequently, we analyse very different far-right parties. For instance, radical-right parties, such as National Rally, envision a more authoritarian, less plural (but still formally democratic) future. In contrast, extreme-right ones, for example, Golden Dawn, are defined by an anti-democratic, (neo)fascist programme, revolving around fundamental, revolutionary concern over ethnic purity (see and Data and method for details; see also Mudde Citation2019, p. 17 f; Rydgren Citation2018b, p. 24). This difference could be relevant for environmental politics as the extreme right at times espouses especially strong eco-centric outlooks based on an imagined symbiotic relationship between nation and homeland – something potentially affecting positions towards ACC (Forchtner Citation2019b; Lubarda Citation2020a, Voss Citation2014). Importantly, in speaking of a spectrum, we emphasise that this separation is not always clear cut; variations, as in any ideology, are present with respect to particular policy positions.
Table 1. Numbers of parliamentary speeches and explanations of vote concerning climate change given by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) of the far right, plus the numbers of texts accepting anthropogenic climate change:being sceptical towards (anthropogenic) climate change:unclear. Percentages are rounded (to one number after the decimal place); consequently, percentages do not always add up to 100.
Therefore, this article raises two research questions: ‘To what extent are different forms of scepticism (evidence, process and response) and acceptance present in climate change communication by the far right in the EP?’ and ‘Are there differences in climate change communication between variations of far-right ideology, that is, rather radical and extreme-right actors in the EP?’
To answer these questions, we analyse the full spectrum of far-right parties within the EP via a content analysis of 792 contributions to plenary debates and written explanations of vote by members of far-right parties, covering parliamentary terms 6, 7 and 8 (2004–9, 2009–14, 2014–19, respectively; see for a list of analysed parties).
Our findings contribute to the emerging study of far-right climate change communication in three ways. First, we create a differentiated analytical framework capable of analysing the complexities of this communication. Here, we apply it to what we believe to be the most extensive corpus of climate change communication by the far right yet; equally, this framework should also be applicable to analysis of other cases. Second, we illustrate that only a minority of analysed texts outright deny ACC and that, instead of evidence-sceptic arguments, the investigated actors largely voice scepticism towards existing scientific/decision-making processes and, especially, policy responses. Furthermore, we find that far-right representatives voice various pro-environment/climate arguments. This does not only call for more comprehensive approaches to the analysis of climate change communication by the far right but should have implications for counterstrategies developed in response to such communication. In fact, our analysis shows that acceptance of ACC can be consistent with far-right ideology. Third, our analysis provides a systematic consideration of the difference between radical- and extreme-right climate change communication. Here, findings are less conclusive, though extreme-right parties appear to be slightly less climate change sceptic.
In the next section, we review research on far-right climate change communication. The subsequent section discusses the data and how they are approached. Then, we introduce our findings. We close with a summary of the far right’s climate change communication.
The environment(s) of the far right: acceptance of and scepticism(s) towards anthropogenic climate change
The link between the far right and the natural environment is a profound, ideologically driven one with a long historical tally (Forchtner Citation2019b) – even though it is not regularly discussed in detail, as environmentalism has increasingly ‘migrated’ towards the political left and been viewed in inclusive, universalist terms since the 1970s.Footnote1 However, scholars of nationalism have rightly argued that nature has been viewed as providing an authentic reservoir of meaning (Kedourie Citation1966, p. 57); and that the nation is not simply living on the land but is interwoven with the homeland (Smith Citation2009, p. 50). While this neither implies that every far-right actor is an environmentalist nor that the far right’s relationship with the natural environment is limited to ecofascism (Lubarda Citation2020a), concerns over the natural environment have indeed long been present in Western far-right thought.
If the far right shares an ideological affinity to environmental protection, coalescing in the link between land and people (be it biological or cultural, concerned with soil or landscape), this concern should also cover climate change. After all, the latter is likely to have severe consequences for a national community’s ecosystem. However, recent analyses have painted a different picture: while a uniform position does not exist, forms of scepticism (evidence, process and response) appear to dominate (Forchtner Citation2019a; see Tosun and Debus Citation2020 for a recent take on the environmental-/climate-protection divide). It is in light of this diffuse picture that we respond to two research questions on, first, different forms of climate change scepticism within the far-right spectrum (and climate change communication more broadly) and, second, differences between the radical and extreme right.
Contributions highlighting the congruence between ‘right-wing populism’ and climate change scepticism include Lockwood (Citation2018) and Fraune and Knodt (Citation2018) who, however, do not provide further clues regarding our two questions. In what is perhaps the first closer empirical look at stances by European far-right parties on climate change, Gemenis et al. (Citation2012) point to the presence of evidence scepticism, but their analysis of seven far-right European parties’ stances towards ‘Global warming is man-made’ does not elaborate on differences between radical and extreme right. Similarly, Voss (Citation2014, pp. 163–5) codes far-right parties’ stance on ACC, arguing that only a minority are sceptical of ACC. Yet, this extensive study neither systematically differentiates scepticism nor systematically elaborates on differences between the radical- and the extreme right when it comes to climate change (although he argues that the more extreme a far-right party, the more ecologically minded; Voss Citation2014, pp. 266–7). Reviewing party statements, Hess and Renner (Citation2019) find that climate science is rejected by some, but not all of the radical-right parties investigated. More widely shared, however, is opposition to policies on cost grounds.
Hatakka and Välimäki (Citation2019) highlight how the radical-right Finns Party, which has never questioned the validity of climate change as a natural phenomenon on its official platform, point to alleged dangers of wind turbines so as to illustrate ‘the elite’s’ lack of concern for ‘the people’. Forchtner and Kølvraa (Citation2015) argue that ideology explains the scepticism of the Danish People’s Party (DPP) and the British National Party (BNP) due to the harmful impact of ‘the elites’ and climate change’s threatening implications for national sovereignty (for a similar theoretical argument, see Conversi Citation2020; see also Lockwood Citation2018, Fraune and Knodt Citation2018). However, while they notice the more outright scepticism of the extreme-right BNP in comparison to the radical-right DPP, this difference is neither systematically illuminating nor is there an operationalisation of forms of scepticism. Turner-Graham (Citation2019) also focuses on BNP and also the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), describing both as having ‘downplayed the extent of the issue of climate change’ (Turner-Graham Citation2019, p. 70); UKIP is mentioned as taking ‘a swipe at climate change science’ (Turner-Graham Citation2019, p. 64), while the BNP ‘is by no means [characterized by] a full acceptance of anthropogenic global warming’ (Turner-Graham Citation2019, p. 68). While focusing on evidence scepticism, the author neither differentiates types of scepticism, nor looks at the internal (radical-extreme) divisions within the far right. However, Turner-Graham indicates a softening of the BNP’s position (though the party still does not acknowledge the science as climate change is described as ‘may be man-made’, Turner-Graham Citation2019, p. 68, italics added); more clearly, however, the DPP shifted from doubting the reality of climate change towards questioning authority and policy responses (Kølvraa Citation2019). In an analysis of radical-right Sweden Democrats, Hultman et al. (Citation2019) highlight the link between climate change scepticism and gender, and more specifically climate change (policies), resulting in a perceived threat to industrial/breadwinner masculinities. Similarly, Malm and The Zetkin Collective (Citation2021, p. 175) stress the link between masculinities and climate denial within their overall claim that ‘green nationalism’, their interpretation of far-right environmentalism, is merely ‘another modality of anti-climate politics’.
Schaller and Carius’ (Citation2019) study on right-wing populism and climate change categorises seven parties as ‘Denialist/ sceptical’ (exclusively radical-right parties), eleven as ‘Disengaged/ cautious’ (predominantly comprising radical-right parties) and three as ‘Affirmative’ (the radical-right Finns Party and Latvian National Alliance, plus Hungary’s Fidesz). While this constitutes an important step towards a more differentiated perspective and shows how these parties have voted in the EP on climate (predominantly against/abstaining) and environmental protection (predominantly in favour), our study proposes a systematic approach to a wide range of specific arguments over a longer period, and explicitly aims to differentiate between the radical and extreme right.
Likewise, analyses of far-right media in Austria (Forchtner Citation2019c) and Germany (Forchtner et al. Citation2018, Forchtner and Özvatan Citation2019) point out various forms of scepticism, and while all three studies illustrate that there is more to climate change scepticism than evidence scepticism (Forchtner Citation2019c even draws upon Van Rensburg (Citation2015) to operationalise these differences in a detailed manner, though we offer a critical revision in the Data and methods section, see also ), none of them focuses systematically on differences between the radical and extreme right.
Table 2. Numbers of arguments in the investigated corpus (revised version of Van Rensburg Citation2015), including the total number of categories counted and their spread over the three investigated parliamentary terms (total; EP6-EP7-EP8). The numbers in brackets signify distribution between radical-right/extreme-right parties, respectively. Arguments that strengthen scepticism can also be held by those not evidence sceptic.
Data and methods
Given our interest in far-right climate change communication and how it (re)produces wider far-right ideology, we focus on contributions to plenary debates and written explanations of vote. These parliamentary interventions are characterised by opportunities and constraints, for example institutional settings, participant roles, and overall political goals (Van Dijk Citation2000). As Slapin and Proksch (Citation2010) have argued, parliamentary speeches are used by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to send a variety of signals to different audiences (fellow MEPs, their constituencies, etc.). Although these texts also come with limitations – including significant discrepancies between the parties in the numbers of texts () and the inability to fully contextualise them, given the high number of analysed texts – they provide ample and comparable material. That is, these types of contributions provide opportunities to identify the workings of ideology as they specify what is desired/rejected and (usually) for what reasons, especially considering alternative EP data, such as voting behaviours.
The analysed corpus comprises texts by members of far-right parties in the EP during three terms: EP6 (2004–9), EP7 (2009–14) and EP8 (2014–19). However, what counts as a far-right party and which parties thus need to be analysed? As the identification of such parties by looking at their affiliations to political groups in the EP is not a viable alternative (these parties are not restricted to one group), we departed from the established understanding of the ideological core characterising the far right (ethnonationalism and authoritarianism, see above) and consulted existing literature for classifications (see Halikiopoulou and Vlandas Citation2016 for a similar approach). While there is relative consistency concerning Western European parties, pinning down parties from Central and Eastern Europe proved more difficult, due to greater fluctuations (see Mudde Citation2007, Minkenberg Citation2015, Rydgren Citation2018a). More specifically, this study includes neither Polish Law and Justice nor Hungarian Fidesz. While these parties present some far-right policies (with respect to immigration and gender), ideologically, we did not classify them as far right prior to the beginning of EP8 in 2014, that is, prior to these parties moving further to the right (Lubarda Citation2020b; Alternative for Germany is excluded for the same reason, see Arzheimer and Berning, Citation2019). Furthermore, our classification is dynamic in that we view Jobbik as extreme right during EP7 and radical right during EP8, reflecting the moderation the party underwent (Pirro et al. Citation2021). UKIP too has been classified in various ways: while it is not listed as being radical right in Mudde (Citation2007), Driver (Citation2011, p. 148) considers it as such in the 2009 European Parliament elections. However, the party is only more widely viewed as far right since the early 2010s (Dennison and Goodwin Citation2015, Goodwin Citation2015) and we therefore only included it in EP8.
Having identified a list of such parties, two research assistants created lists of their MEPs and searched their EP websites in the categories ‘Contributions to plenary debates’ and ‘Written explanations of vote’ for sessions which included climate, CO2, carbon dioxide, greenhouse or global warming in their title. Every contribution pertinent to climate change was collected and the corpus resulting from this process is presented in (it is worth noting that not necessarily every far-right party contributed to these debates).Footnote2
As illustrates, almost half of the analysed texts (391 out of 792) are provided by MEPs from National Front/National Rally (NF/NR) and UKIP. Given the electoral success of these two parties (especially in EP8) in countries which elect large numbers of MEPs, this is not surprising. The importance of a few parties in our corpus, namely NF/NR, UKIP (in relation to evidence scepticism) and Golden Dawn (in relation to pro-environment/climate arguments) is a limitation of the analysis () in that the findings are thus biased. However, given that we want to cover the entire spectrum of the far right, we decided against interfering in the corpusfor example, by weighting frequencies which would be problematic due to sometimes very small numbers.
Table 3. Number of pro-environment/climate categories (as perceived by the far right) in the investigated corpus (total; EP6-EP7-EP8). The numbers in brackets signify distribution between radical-right/extreme-right parties, respectively. * Presented as a reason to support pro-environment/climate legislation.
The analysis consists of two mutually informing processes: first, content analysis of basic stances on ACC (accept, reject or unclear; ) and, second, content analysis of specific arguments employed in (a) articulating evidence, process and response scepticism () and (b) pro-environment arguments, including pro-climate ones (). Coding the basic stance considers the entire text as the unit of analysis and its position vis-à-vis ACC, be it ‘accept’, ‘reject’ or ‘unclear’. The basic stance of ’accept’ includes explicit acceptance, but also texts which presuppose ACC. Explicit acceptance includes a statement by an Austrian MEP of the Freedom Party who speaks of ‘the emission of climate-damaging CO2’ (P7_CRE-REV(2013)10–24(4-243-281), while a party colleague welcomes targets, but criticises countries outside of Europe which ‘continue to not even pursue their own less ambitious CO2 targets’, thus presupposing the significance of anthropogenic emissions (P8_CRE-REV(2014)11–26(3-230-625)). The second basic stance concerns scepticism as regards ACC (which was always explicitly stated)for example, in the case of Udo Voigt, MEP of the National Democratic Party of Germany: ‘The assertion of man-made climate change (…) is an ideologically backed thesis and has not yet been proven’ (B8-0534/2017). At times, it was difficult to decide whether MEPs accepted ACC or if they, for example, opposed legislation for other reasons; in such cases, texts were classified as ‘unclear’. Examples include the Italian Mara Bizzotto’s (Northern League) statement that ‘[t]he Belet report is unclear and contains passages that I consider critical, which is why I did not intend to support it with my vote’ (P8_CRE-REV(2015)07–09(4-573-000)). Similarly, James Carver’s statement that ‘UKIP opposes the introduction of a Market Stability reserve, and the Emissions Trading Scheme’ (P8_CRE-REV(2015)07–09(4-577-500)) does not provide enough information to clearly categorise its stance towards ACC. While meaning is always contextual – depending on, for example, co-text, intertextual/discursive relationships, situational and socio-political historical context (Reisigl and Wodak Citation2001, p. 41) – the wide range of actors investigated over a considerable period of time-led coders to focus on denotation. All this fed into a relatively high number of texts coded as ‘unclear’.
Second, and to understand what actually characterised these basic stances, we analysed particular arguments put forward in the texts. Here, our analytical framework was built on Van Rensburg’s (Citation2015) typology of evidence, process and response scepticism, advancing Rahmstorf’s (Citation2004) and Capstick and Pidgeon’s (Citation2014) attempts to provide analytically precise categories. However, due to our analysis of far-right data, we revised Van Rensburg’s (Citation2015) typology. Following a pilot in which we coded 25 randomly selected texts from each of the three parliamentary terms, we (a) added arguments to Van Rensburg’s list (, in italics); (b) divided one of Van Rensburg’s arguments in two (‘Wealth redistribution, world government agendas’); (c) moved two arguments (‘Climate change is a hoax’ and ’No problem – no response needed’) from process and response scepticism, respectively, to evidence scepticism; and (d) merged scepticism towards policy instruments and styles into a single response scepticism category. A potential limitation of such modular frameworks is that, in the act of dissecting, one loses the complexity of individual arguments. However, as Van Rensburg argued (Citation2015, p. 2), the sceptic logic ‘flows’ over these categories, pointing to a spectrum rather than watertight boundaries. Furthermore, we encountered arguments which supported environmental protection or accepted ACC which can only seldomly be incorporated into this model, and thus we separated sceptical arguments () from pro-environment/climate ones, the latter emerging (largely) inductively during the coding process (; one response-sceptic argument listed by Van Rensburg, ‘Carbon pricing will not cut emissions enough’, was moved into pro-environment/climate).
Sometimes, (almost) identical texts were provided by MEPs of the same party. Due to our focus on basic stances and salient arguments, such ‘duplicates’ were included in the corpus. The two authors and a research assistant coded both basic stances and specific arguments separately; differences were discussed before a decision was made. At times, problems arose regarding the language of these texts: while most of them were available in languages covered by the authors, the latter relied on their networks to obtain translations whenever this was not the case.
In the analysis below, we include illustrative examples of arguments which occur relatively often (arguments which are present in at least 50 texts), to enable an understanding of the ways in which stances are performed.
Analysing climate change communication by the far right: sovereignty, deindustrialisation and the fight against climate change
provides an overview of the numbers of texts produced by actors and whether these are accepting, sceptical or unclear, beginning with the party delivering the highest number of contributions to plenary debates and written explanations of vote. Interestingly, in none of the three parliamentary terms, there are a majority of evidence-sceptic texts and ‘only’ 95 out of a total of 792 texts outright reject ACC (433 ‘accept’, 264 are ‘unclear’). Of those 95, slightly more than half come from UKIP MEPs, in line with existing research illustrating UKIP’s climate-sceptic stance (Forchtner Citation2019a). There are only a few other actors which contribute a recognizable number of evidence-sceptic texts: League of Polish Families (LPF), its former members and its split-off Forward Poland (FP) in EP6, BNP in EP7 and Party for Freedom (PVV) in EP7 and EP8. In turn, the number of texts that (explicitly and implicitly) accept the thesis of ACC indicates that evidence scepticism does not prevail in the EP. To this finding, we add the observation that the far right has seemingly shifted towards ‘acceptance’, from about 44 (EP6) to 56% (EP8) (while ‘scepticism’ slumped from 38% to 9%, see ). Finally, there is hardly any difference between radical and extreme right concerning their basic stances towards ACC (with evidence scepticism at 12% and 11%, respectively; see – putting these numbers into perspective: if, for example, UKIP, the party’s related independents and the BP are excluded from the data set, the radical right becomes slightly more accepting of ACC than the extreme right).
While coding basic stances, it became clear that even those accepting ACC regularly did not support existing climate change action, but all too often utilised process/response-sceptic arguments. Therefore, we furthermore examined specific arguments (): much like the basic stance of the analysed texts, arguments concerning evidence scepticism are only present in a limited number of cases. While 150 out of 1,123 ‘sceptic’ codings (there are furthermore 582 pro-environment/climate codings, see ) fall into the category of evidence scepticism, which is substantive, it is clearly not the dominant mode in which climate change is articulated. In fact, the share of evidence-sceptic within climate-sceptic arguments shrinks from 36 (EP6) to 22 (EP7) and 9% (EP8). These arguments concern, for example, the apparently unexceptional character of observed warming and, being the most frequent arguments in this category, scepticism towards climate change being ‘man-made’, something we code as ‘Entirely ‘natural’ causes’ (53 times). Two examples are introduced below:
How much longer can the fascistic EU impose ever more punitive taxes and controls on ordinary citizens on the pretext of man-made global warming, when an ever-increasing number of real scientists are rejecting the theory as unfounded and demolished? AGW [anthropogenic global warming] is baseless propaganda, a Josef Goebbels-scale big lie from the green industrial complex because they favour massive transfers of wealth from the little people to carbon-trading crooks, such as Al Gore and Goldman Sachs.
The first example is taken from a contribution by the then party chairman of the extreme-right BNP, Nick Griffin (P7_CRE(2010)11–24(3-322)). This contribution does not only illustrate evidence scepticism, but it is furthermore interesting as it gives voice to outright conspiracy theories, which overall do not feature prominently in our corpus (for a discussion of climate change communication and conspiracy theories, see Uscinski et al., Citation2017). Less colourful, although no less sceptical, Julia Reid (UKIP) states that ‘UKIP denies man-made climate change and believes that CO2 is not a pollutant. New legislation in this field would only bring further bureaucracy and economic damages to this sector’ (A8-0262/2017 – Norbert Lins).
The comparably weak presence of evidence scepticism and evidence-sceptic arguments indicates that far-right actors do now reproduce their agendas largely without recourse to outright denial. In fact, the above examples already illustrate not only how classic topics of the far right, such as opposition to the EU, are reproduced via climate change communication, but also that arguments that do not necessarily rely on evidence scepticismfor example, ‘punitive taxes’ and ‘further bureaucracy and economic damages’, can be connected to evidence scepticism.
Thus, the analysis now moves to the more frequent types of process/response scepticism which can strengthen core scepticism, but which can also be utilised in non-sceptic texts. For example, concerning process scepticism (400 out of 1,123 ‘sceptic’ codings), climate change communication based on the established scientific consensus is regularly framed as irrational, hysterical, and alarmist (82 times). An example is Laurence Stassen’s (PVV) claim that a ‘report oozes climate hysteria and feminism. The PVV really cannot take this report seriously.’ (P7_CRE-REV(2012)04–20(5-261-625)). This code also covers uses of religion metaphors, which is familiar from conservative scepticism (Atanasova and Koteyko Citation2017, for a relationship between Christianity and climate change that goes also beyond scepticism, see, Bloomfield Citation2019). It is visible in a statement by Bogdan Pęk (FP), who initially joined the EP as a MEP from LPF, in which he stated ‘I feel as if I am at the inaugural conference of a newly-founded religion, a false religion, teeming with false prophets and ideas’ (P6_CRE(2009)02–04(3-031)). Although arguments concerning ‘Irrationalism’ can be part of an evidence-sceptic stance as they question the rationality of ‘others’ (the ‘believers’ being incapable of rationally challenging their ‘false beliefs’), such arguments do not necessarily imply the rejection of ACC. Indeed, ‘Irrationalism’ featured in 28 sceptic texts, 35 unclear texts and 19 texts which accepted ACC.
An even more common argument concerns climate policies as threats to national sovereignty (177 times), such as in talk about the EU taking competences from states. This argument points to the aforementioned, ‘floating’ logic of scepticism, especially regarding processes and responses, as it covers both current decision-making processes and policy responses affecting future processes. As we have already remarked, such concerns by far-right nationalists are hardly surprising and are visible in a claim by Franz Obermayer (Freedom Party of Austria, FPӦ): ‘new institutions will be created which further prune national competences’ (P8_CRE-REV(2015)10–14(1-501-0156)).
Yet concerns over irrationalism and the loss of national sovereignty, and process scepticism more generally, are clearly trumped by response scepticism (573 times) and, especially, the claim that the ‘Economy and jobs should not be harmed’ (314 times; see also Schaller and Carius Citation2019, p. 14). Throughout the period investigated, this is the single code most often utilised – and it is through this category that the contemporary far right can perform most effectively as the defender of the nation’s economic well-being (the danger of ‘deindustrialisation’) and the ‘little guy’. Indeed, the significance of populist attitudes (independent of the ideological spectrum) for climate change scepticism is supported by an analysis of the 2015 British Election Study by Huber (Citation2020). However, Jylhä and Hellmer’s (Citation2020) survey-based study on Sweden does not find a notable link between populist anti-establishment attitudes and climate change scepticism, but claims that the latter is most strongly predicted by an index capturing exclusionary and anti-egalitarian preferences (see also Krange et al. Citation2019 on xenophobic attitudes and climate change scepticism in Norway, Kulin et al. Citation2021 on nationalist attitudes and climate change scepticism in Europe, Huber et al. Citation2021 on climate policy in relation to varieties of populism). While our study cannot answer this question, it is clear that arguments around ‘the people’ being ignored by ‘the elite’ overlap with nationalist concerns over economic status. For example, and reminiscent of Reid’s intervention, Bruno Gollnisch (NF, P6_CRE(2008)12–17(3-223)) claims that the measures would
incur enormous financial costs, weaken the competitiveness of our industries and therefore employment in Europe, increase energy prices for private consumers and businesses, have significant consequences for national budgets (…) [leading to] the economic suicide of Europe.
This illustrates not only what the far right has identified as its main point of attack, but also emphasises the importance of a just energy transition so as to keep public support for moving away from fossil fuels high.
Another claim concerns an alleged lack of action by others as a justification for why we should not act (66 times). This usually points to the United States and China, such as in the following statement by Sophie Montel (NF, P8_CRE-REV(2015)10–14(1-500-0250)):
I believe that the French and Europeans cannot bear the burden of saving the world alone, at the expense of their well-being, and that the industrial deterrence measures demanded will contribute to accentuating the massive deindustrialisation affecting our countries (…) the biggest polluters, the United States and China, are far behind the EU, having perceived that the “climate” is a weapon of mass deindustrialization (…)
Furthermore, these two arguments are related to calls for a ‘pragmatic and measured response’ – or warnings against responses that are too radical (63 times). Thus, they accentuate the imagined standard of pragmatism existing in far-right politics. For example, Nikolaos Salavrakos (Popular Orthodox Rally) explains that ‘unless it [a report] is radically changed, the subject will need to be re-examined more realistically’ (P7_CRE(2011)07–05(2-493-500).
In summary, comparing the number of sceptic arguments per text in radical-right parliamentary interventions to those in extreme-right ones indicates two things. First, radical-right parties tend to use slightly more climate change sceptic arguments than the extreme right: there is an average of 1.43 sceptic arguments per radical-right text, whereas it is 1.31 in extreme-right ones. Second, however, there are different patterns within this scepticism. Radical-right parties are less likely to evoke evidence scepticism than extreme-right parties: whilst 29% of extreme-right arguments coded as ‘sceptic’ fall under evidence scepticism, this figure stands at 12% in the case of the radical right (again: if, for example, UKIP, the party’s related independents and the BP are excluded from the corpus, the averages of sceptic arguments become almost the same, 1.32 and 1.31 respectively).
Climate change sceptic arguments dominate pro-environment ones, including climate-related ones, in a rough 2:1 ratio (1,123:582 codings, see ). Nonetheless, the number of pro-environment/climate arguments per text also yields comparative insights: radical-right actors make on average 0.64 pro-environment/climate arguments per text, while extreme-right ones are responsible for 1.54. In short, on average the radical right accounts for slightly more climate change sceptic arguments and fewer pro-environment arguments per text. While we acknowledge both the relatively low number of extreme-right texts/arguments and that extreme-right arguments in our corpus rely heavily on Golden Dawn, this nevertheless provides indicative empirical support for the thesis that ideologically ‘extreme’ parties are more inclined towards environmental/climate protection than the radical right. Indeed, the extreme right is overrepresented in a number of codings, such as ‘The environment is worth protecting’ and ‘Global climate change requires global responses’.Footnote3
As stated earlier, far-right actors at times promote environmental protection – though this does not necessarily extend to protection of the climate. We thus separated calls to protect the environment (aggregated under ‘The environment is worth protecting’) from those concerned with climate (various specific arguments aggregated under ‘We should be concerned about and get active concerning climate change’). The former primarily include statements along the lines of Jobbik’s Csanád Szegedi, ‘I find it essential for every responsible European politician to care deeply for environmental protection’ (P7_CRE-REV(2011)11–15(2-610-000)). One might argue that such statements are made easily as climate change and environment are often (incorrectly) perceived as valence issues (Carter Citation2013). Thus, we excluded 46 general calls to protect the environment/climate in cases where they were contradicted by the rest of the text. Yet, elements within the far right do recognize that climate change is a serious concern (118 times), at times linked to an acknowledgement that this threat requires global solutions (again, various arguments aggregated, 60 times). For example, Golden Dawn’s Lampros Fountoulis argues that ‘although the Paris Agreement on tackling global warming is not enough, we nevertheless consider it a small step in the right direction’ (P8_CRE-REV(2016)10–04(2-140-0000)). Hence, acknowledging global climate change is not connected to an acceptance of a left-wing agenda and, in turn, the rejection of some policies by these actors does not automatically imply that they do not argue on environmental grounds. Rather, it illustrates that the environmentalist imaginary these actors live by, evolving around sovereign ethno-nations, is different from contemporary universalist environmentalism (Olsen Citation1999).
The far right’s point of departure also drives their pro-climate criticism of climate policies which lead to an increase in global trade and, thus, emissions (53 times). This claim is especially employed by the NF during EP8, in line with the party’s turn towards ‘patriotic ecology’ and Europe as ‘the world’s first ecological civilisation’ based on localism (Boukala and Tountasaki Citation2019, p. 84). In accordance with far-right ideology, globalisation is attacked by stating that it is disastrous for jobs and the environment. This is visible in the following contribution by Sylvie Goddyn (NF, P8_CRE-REV(2014)09–16(2-365-000)):
That is why we advocate (…) the development of shorter supply chains and localised sourcing, because only this mode of production and distribution will significantly reduce the energy balance and the carbon footprint of freight transport. Above all, it will help to stop the haemorrhaging of jobs that you have unleashed and which Europe is experiencing today.
Not surprisingly, her alternatives (‘shorter supply chains and localised sourcing’) fit comfortably within a nationalist outlook. Yet, this outlook does not simply facilitate a populist polemic against Europe’s elite; it is also rooted in a preference for anti-liberal, anti-global capitalism. The party is not alone in this preference for localism and economic nationalism: for example, the NPD (Citation2006) argues for a ‘space-oriented national economy’. Indeed, a preference for locality in terms of production, consumption, identity and governance, while opposing the global circulation of goods and capital, uncannily overlaps with some left-wing agendas as, for example, Park (Citation2013) has elaborated in detail. As Park rightly argues, localism does not necessarily signify social justice, but is, like all politics of nature, connected to projects of inclusion and exclusion.
Finally, carbon pricing is rejected as an insufficient tool to reduce emissions (50 times), in contrast to rejections for non-environmental reasons (). For example, Andreas Mölzer (FPӦ), who has long discussed environmental issues (Forchtner Citation2019c), opposes the EU’s emissions trading scheme: ‘[i]nstead of certificate trading (…) [which] does not reduce total emissions, but at best redistributes them (…), more support is needed for renewable energies’ (P7_CRE-REV(2013)10–24(4-243-281)).
On top of the arguments passing the threshold, we point to two arguments which were not as prevalent, but are nevertheless instructive. First, we note that the far right has long identified overpopulation as a (supposed) cause of environmental degradation (see Malm and The Zetkin Collective Citation2021 for examples). However, in our corpus, this is of negligible relevance as it is only mentioned three times () – and although the topic undoubtedly remains present in far-right environmental communication, its ‘not-that-central’ role is in line with recent findings concerning Germany (Forchtner and Özvatan Citation2019, p. 223). Second, the topic most clearly associated with the far right is opposition to immigration. Within communication about climate change, this points to climate-driven migration. However, this is seemingly not yet widely present in climate change communication by the far right (Forchtner Citation2019c). Where it does feature in our corpus, this type of migration is unsurprisingly rejected (47 times). The relatively low number of references might be due to the fact that ‘climate migrants’/‘climate refugees’ has not yet become a significant subject position in the wider discourse on climate change. However, the lack of far-right agitation on the topic might change in the years to come as this discourse changes.
Conclusion
Analysing contributions to plenary debates and written explanations of vote concerning climate change in the EP between 2004 and 2019 (parliamentary terms 6–8), this article has provided a comprehensive portrait of the far right’s climate change communication. In its scope and depth, the article contributes in three major ways to literature on the contemporary far right and its environmental/climate communication.
First, we provide a fine-grained analytical framework for the study of such communication, revising existing proposals so as to support research on the far right’s complex responses to climate change. This detailed coding scheme affords an understanding of a wide range of arguments employed by the far right in the EP and points to possible future developments.
Second, we identify dominant discursive trends in the types of scepticism articulated by far-right actors. As our analysis illustrates, evidence scepticism is on the wane, and now rare in a political space dominated by texts accepting or presupposing ACC (). However, as our analysis of specific arguments illustrates, this does not imply an endorsement of climate policies proposed by other parties. Instead, opposition to climate policies prevails via process/response scepticism (). This suggests a shift away from evidence-sceptic arguments, as their share of the climate-sceptic argument pool has shrunk significantly – even though the main source of such evidence scepticism, UKIP, was only accounted for in EP8. We argue that this is due to the fact that process/response scepticism, too, can (a) feed a pro-sovereigntist and anti-elite desire; (b) speak to issues close to voters (especially: economic well-being); and (c) avoid potential costs associated with evidence scepticism in Europe today. At the same time, a significant proportion of our corpus is occupied by pro-environment/climate stances (). These include support for the fight against climate change (and even the acceptance of global cooperation to do so); the protection of the environment; criticism of liberal climate policies as causing pollution; and criticism of carbon pricing for not reducing emission.
Third, we indicate differences in climate change communication between variations of far-right ideology, though these findings are less conclusive. Evidence scepticism is largely restricted to the BNP, LPF and its former members and split-off (FP), PVV and, especially, UKIP. One explanation might point out that UKIP belongs to the parties with relatively diminished ethnonationalist features, which might indicate that economic liberalism and/or populism drive their scepticism. However, this group also includes the extreme-right BNP, a party at the other end of the spectrum (the extreme-right National Democratic Party of Germany, too, featured as evidence-sceptic, though only with one text). Overall, results are that radical-right parties have a minimally higher share of sceptical texts and a lower share of texts accepting (anthropogenic) climate change (), and they employ slightly more sceptic arguments per text, in comparison to extreme-right ones (). Although the extreme right voices more evidence-sceptic arguments as a percentage of its climate-sceptic arguments than the radical right, but also in light of the extreme right employing more pro-environment/climate arguments per text than the radical right (), our findings thus point to the thesis that extreme-right parties are more inclined to protect the climate, possibly due to an ideological inclination towards protection of the environment as they root the nation in its homeland. However, as numbers regarding the extreme right are low and much hinges on Golden Dawn, with the BNP taking a very different stance on the climate, caution is in order. As such, one might argue that the extreme right is polarised on ACC, one group opting for outright denial and conspiracy theories while the other takes climate change seriously and views it as a threat to its homeland.
Against this background, our analysis has clarified basic positions on climate change by far-right parties and changes over time, has illuminated the distribution of individual arguments (both related to different forms of scepticism towards and acceptance of (anthropogenic) climate change), and has shed some light on differences between the radical and the extreme right. While we caution against generalising these findings beyond Europe, it is likely that these patterns are not unique, given what is known from research on conservative climate change communication in, for example, Australia and the United States. More importantly, the detailed findings we provide can serve as a baseline for future research on far-right climate change communication in non-Western countries. Importantly, these findings speak to the way climate change is communicated in the political field as far-right parties cannot be discarded as simply denying ACC. Indeed, some of them might even champion climate protection, suggesting far-right responses to the crisis. Such developments demand more sophisticated reactions by those fighting for an inclusive and egalitarian environmental agenda. By providing insights into how climate change communication helps the far right to reproduce core ideological themes, and as neither climate change nor the far right are likely to disappear any time soon, the findings presented here will hopefully support future work in this area.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Özgür Özvatan and Inan Bostanci for invaluable research assistance and are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this article. All mistakes remain our own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Funding
Notes
1. We speak of ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecologism’ interchangeably for pragmatic reasons. See Dobson (Citation1999, p. 235 f) for a differentiation.
2. If individuals left investigated parties/founded new ones, we drew on academic literature and media reports to decide whether these should still be considered. If they contributed while not belonging to a party, we list them as independents related to their former parties in .
3. Concerning the other end of the political spectrum: excluding UKIP, the party’s related independents and the BP from the data set reduces the difference slightly to 0.79 and 1.54 respectively.
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