‘Now that you mention it, museums probably are a target’: museums, terrorism and security in the United Kingdom

ABSTRACT

This article explores counter-terrorism security practices at museums in the United Kingdom (UK), locations that terrorists have targeted through both propaganda and operational activity. Drawing upon research that re-interprets the museum within the ‘single narrative’ of global jihadist terrorism, an outlook that justifies and legitimises the targeting of socio-cultural sites from instrumental and symbolic perspectives, this article highlights the important roles of the police Counter Terrorism Security Adviser (CTSA) and the museum security manager in counter-terrorism practice at museums in the UK. The practices of highlighting risk to the museum and managing risk in the museum environment are subsequently outlined. In doing so two key challenges facing counter-terrorism security practice in the museum are noted: the cost of implementing counter-terrorism measures and the cultural challenge of communicating and responsibly embedding such security thinking in everyday practice. The researchers also reflect upon the potential consequences of the implementation of counter-terrorism security measures at museums as a form of securitisation.

KEYWORDS:

• Museum security
• counter-terrorism
• policing
• securitisation
• communities

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Colin Atkinson is a Lecturer in Criminology at the University of the West of Scotland. Before becoming an academic Colin was employed in the Scottish police service for nine years as a member of civilian police staff.

Donna Yates is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology based at Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, University of Glasgow. She is a founding member of the Trafficking Culture research consortium (TraffickingCulture.org).

Nick Brooke is an Associate Lecturer in the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews.

Notes

1 Nemmouche is alleged to have part of an Islamic State external operations cell led by Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the leader of the November 2015 attacks in Paris (Cragin 2017, 217).

2 A comparative study of museum security in Finland and England (Grove and Thomas 2016), although recognising that museum security is under-represented in museological discourse, paid only passing attention to terrorism within a wider constellation of threats. Our more recent research (Atkinson, Yates and Brooke 2019) represents an attempt to more firmly locate counter-terrorism security within existing museum security practice in the UK.

3 Whilst the current security and scholarly gaze is understandably fixated on the issue of mass-casualty terrorism, it must be recognised that the targeting of museums is not an exclusively recent phenomenon. Museums have previously been targeted, for example, by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (see Oppenheimer 2008, 90).

4 To a certain extent, the CTSA role drew upon, at least in part, the skills, experience and outlook of the more well-established ‘crime prevention officer role’ in policing (for an overview of which see Bowers 2001).

5 In conjunction with, in some force areas, Counter Terrorism Awareness Advisors (CTAAs), whose role is to support CTSAs through the delivery of counter-terrorism security awareness briefings and presentations about the effects of terrorism.

6 The four pillars of CONTEST are ‘pursue’ (to stop terrorist attacks), ‘prevent’ (to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism), ‘protect’ (to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack) and ‘prepare’ (to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack).

7 In some rare instances, CTSAs may also engage with museums that store hazardous substances.

8 Interestingly, McIlhatton et al. (2018), in their analysis of the issues that inhibit the adoption of counter-terrorism protective security measures in real estate development, noted how their research participants considered the likelihood of a terrorist attack low, if it was considered at all, due to their view that their sites were ‘not iconic’.

9 ‘Frontline staff’ may be dedicated internal museum security staff, other museum visitor services staff, private security contractors hired by the museum as required, or any mix thereof.

10 Interestingly, it was also disclosed in research that some private security contractors employed by museums were also accredited to deliver police counter-terrorism awareness training.

11 Such perspectives were not shared by museum security managers who recognised that an attack on ‘culture’ would be attractive to terrorists, wherein the museum would be attractive for its iconic or symbolic status, as well as its ability to generate publicity (Billy).

12 Compared to the number of studies of those who experience securitisation, the cultures and practices of those who put securitisation into everyday effect remain under-represented in the research literature (see Maguire 2014).

13 Mike Maguire’s research on airport security highlights, for example, the use of the Behavioural Assessment Screening System (BASS) by practitioners to surveil passengers and identify suspicious behaviours and activities (Maguire 2014, 130).

14 In the United States, for example, Frost (2017) has remarked upon the ‘security gauntlet’ that must be overcome in order to enter the National September 11 Museum in New York, in a process very much akin to airport security.

15 Although this dichotomous position of securitisation/negative and de-securitisation/positive has been de-essentialised by Roe (2012) in an effort to enable engagement with alternative security forms and practices.