Abstract
The unfortunate effects of the decision of the House of Lords in Puhlhofer v. Hillingdon L.B.C.1 have already been discussed in this journal.2 With commendable speed, the Housing and Planning Act 1986 sought to deal (inter alia) with two of the most acute problems thrown up by the decision: first, the principle that accommodation need not be “appropriate” or “reasonable” in order to rank as accommodation for the purposes of section 58 of the Housing Act 1985 (so that, for example, an applicant living in unfit or overcrowded accommodation would nevertheless not generally qualify as “homeless”); and secondly, the principle (emerging from obiter dicta, which nevertheless proved very persuasive) that a council, in securing accommodation for a person who is “homeless” (and in “priority need”), does not have to offer “appropriate” or “reasonable” accommodation (so that the council would not normally be in breach of the Act even if the dwelling offered was unfit or overcrowded).