![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Since the global war on terror began, the pursuit of Al Qaeda is widely considered as warfare and not the pursuit of criminals. In light of counter-terrorism being redefined as war, the criteria applied for tracking militaries of conventional enemies may also be applicable to Al Qaeda. Intelligence analysts have long used the nine order-of-battle (OB) criteria as part of the estimative process for conventional, or nation-state, enemies. Applying OB criteria to Al Qaeda may assist intelligence analysts in knowing the enemy and identifying changes that will allow for predictive analysis. Many elements of Al Qaeda's OB prior to the events of 11 September were viewed as clutter and not significant changes that might have otherwise alerted intelligence analysts to the impending attack. This essay suggests how one might go about applying the nine OB criteria to analysis of Al Qaeda. Although more difficult and requiring modification, using an analytical procedure that has been tested successfully over many years is a logical step in the war on Al Qaeda. If all OB changes are tracked and analyzed using a systematic approach as outlined in this essay, Al Qaeda attacks may be predicted and/or curtailed in the future.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks for the contributions of Lt Col. Kenneth Luikart and Sara Haeckel
Notes
1. Kenneth A. Luikart, ‘Transforming Homeland Security – Intelligence Indications and Warning’, Air and Space Power Journal (Summer 2003), pp.76–7.
2. HQ, Department of the Army, FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence (October 1973), p.7–1.
3. Correspondence with Lt Col. Ken Luikart, August 2003.
4. John P. Sullivan, ‘Networked Force Structure and C4I’, in Robert J. Bunker (ed.), Non-State Threats and Future Wars (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.150.
5. Correspondence with Lt Col. Ken Luikart, August 2003.
6. Robert J. Bunker, Five Dimensional (Cyber) Warfighting: Can the Army After Next be Defeated Through Complex Concepts and Technologies? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1998), pp.4–5.
7. Sullivan, p.150.
8. Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda, MR-1620-RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), p.18
9. Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda, MR-1620-RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), p.5.
10. Richard H. Shultz and Andreas Vogt, ‘It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a doctrine of Preemption’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.15, No.1 (Spring 2003), p.8.
11. Russian Army Order of Battle, 1996, ⟨http://www.globalsecurity.org⟩.
12. Bill Gasperini, ‘Russia Goes All Out In War on Chechnya: Victory at Any Price?’, The Christian Science Monitor, 9 January 1995.
13. Bill Gasperini, ‘Russia Goes All Out In War on Chechnya: Victory at Any Price?’, The Christian Science Monitor, 9 January 1995.
14. Ben Venske, Al Qaeda Wave Attack Assessment, v1.0, 17/18, May 2003, p.5, ⟨http://www.intelcenter.org⟩.
15. Shultz and Vogt, p.10.
16. Jenkins, p.8.
17. Correspondence with Lt Col. Ken Luikart, August 2003.
18. Robert J. Bunker, ‘Battlespace Dynamics, Information Warfare to Netwar, and Bond-Relationship Targeting’, in Robert J. Bunker (ed.), Non-State Threats and Future Wars (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp.97–107.