Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics: Comparing Peru and Nepal1

 1. Revised and updated article based on the paper presented at the 19th World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Durban, South Africa, 29 June–4 July 2003, on the panel, ‘Analyzing the Terrorists: Profiles, Socialization, and Motivations’, organized by Fernando Reinares (King Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain) and Ami Pedahzur (University of Haifa, Israel). The authors are indebted to several organizations and institutions for their support for their field work, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Fulbright Commission, the Marine Corps University Foundation, the US Embassies in Peru and Nepal, and various Peruvian and Nepali government agencies. The analyses contained herein, however, are the sole responsibility of the authors and should not be considered as representing the views of any of the supporting governments or organizations.

Abstract

Terrorism is not insurgency, though the latter invariably incorporates the former in its campaign to form a counter-state. Maoist ‘people's war’ has proved such a challenge to state response precisely because it incorporates terror as a tactic within the larger voluntarist effort ‘to make a revolution’. Examining this dynamic in two cases of Maoist insurgency, Peru and Nepal, produces two conclusions of particular relevance for states and policymakers: in anticipating internal violence, voluntarism is as critical a component as objective circumstances, with deliberate action actually able to shape those circumstances in a weak state setting. Further, inappropriate state response is itself a key factor in contributing to this dynamic. The implications are sobering in an era when states worldwide are attempting the difficult transition to democracy even as they are challenged by development demands exacerbated by heightened popular expectations. In such settings, terror is able to tip the scales in situations which otherwise would hang in the balance, thus allowing voluntarist actors to engage in activity not unlike that envisaged in foco theory, where Ché Guevara posited that guerrilla action itself could produce the conditions for the revolution.

Notes

 1. Revised and updated article based on the paper presented at the 19th World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Durban, South Africa, 29 June–4 July 2003, on the panel, ‘Analyzing the Terrorists: Profiles, Socialization, and Motivations’, organized by Fernando Reinares (King Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain) and Ami Pedahzur (University of Haifa, Israel). The authors are indebted to several organizations and institutions for their support for their field work, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Fulbright Commission, the Marine Corps University Foundation, the US Embassies in Peru and Nepal, and various Peruvian and Nepali government agencies. The analyses contained herein, however, are the sole responsibility of the authors and should not be considered as representing the views of any of the supporting governments or organizations.

 2. For analytical distinction see Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and Michel Wieviorka, The Making of Terrorism, trans. David Gordon White (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993).

 3. Both authors have conducted research in the two countries under consideration and have published extensively thereon.

 4. Though the potential for Nepal to follow the Peruvian trajectory was recognized in what is possibly the single most cited essay comparing the two cases: R. Andrew Nickson, ‘Democratisation and the Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the Making?’ The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, XXX/3 (November 1992), pp. 358–86. The authors are indebted to Nickson for an elaboration upon the article's contents during a discussion with author Marks in Asuncion, Paraguay, 15 August 1993.

 5. Numerous works shed light on this phenomenon. Particularly useful is David P. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, rev. ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1999).

 6. David Scott Palmer, ‘Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso’, Comparative Politics 18: 2 (January 1986), p. 142.

 7. For discussion of the considerable scholarly effort to explore such linkages, see Tom Marks, ‘Insurgency by the Numbers II: The Search for a Quantitative Relationship Between Agrarian Revolution and Land Tenure in South and Southeast Asia’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 5:2 (Autumn 1994), pp. 218–91.

 8. See, among others, David Scott Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition (New York: Praeger, 1980); Peter Flindell Klarén, Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

 9. See, for example, Martin Hoftun, William Raeper, and John Whelpton, People, Politics, and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal (Kathamndu: Mandala Book Point, 1999), and Dhruba Kumar (ed.), Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal (Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies [CNAS], Tribhuvan University, 2000).

10. For Peru, Palmer 1980 and Klarén 2000 (see n. 8). For Nepal, see Districts of Nepal: Indicators of Development (Kathmandu: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, 1997), and Hari Bhakta Sharma, et al. (eds.), District Development Profile of Nepal (Kathmandu: Informal Sector Research and Study Center, 2001).

11. See, for example, the articles by Christine Hunefeldt, Carmen Rosa Balbi, and Francisco Durand in Part II of Maxwell A. Cameron and Philip Mauceri, (eds.), The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society, Economy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 107–75.

12. This phenomenon is examined in David Seddon, Jagannath Adhikari, and Ganesh Gurung, The New Lahures: Foreign Employment and Remittance Economy of Nepal (Kathmandu: Nepal Institute of Development Studies [NIDS], 2001).

13. David Scott Palmer, ‘The Revolutionary Terrorism of Peru's Shining Path’, in Martha Crenshaw (ed.) Terrorism in Context (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 278–79.

14. Particularly good for the situation in the Nepali hills generally is J.P. Cross, The Call of Nepal, Series II/Vol. 17 of Bibliotecha Himalayica (Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point, 1998; 1996 original).

15. Among others, Claudio Véliz, The Centralist Tradition in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), and David Scott Palmer, ‘The Authoritarian Tradition in Spanish America’, in James Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 377–412.

16. British presentation to June 2002 Donors Meeting in UK: ‘In 2000 upper castes accounted for 35 per cent of the population, but 95 per cent of the civil service, 98 per cent of army officers, 78 per cent of political leaders, including – ironically – the Maoists’. Less dominant figures may be found in the literature, but even the most favorable see the two upper castes represented in all major areas in proportion at least double to their societal fraction. See the extensive data presented in Harka Gurung, Nepal: Social Demography and Expressions (Kathmandu: New Era, 2001), especially the tables in the appendices.

17. For Peru, among many others, Cameron and Mauceri, op.cit.; for Nepal, among others, Hoftun et al., op. cit.

18. Richard Webb and Graciela Fernández Baca, Peru en números 2000 (Lima: Cuánto, 2001), Tables in sections 1.13 and 1.16.

19. Figures range from 40–60 per cent. Interviews by the authors in Kathmandu, Nepal, June 2002.

20. For Peru, see two studies by Teófilo Altamirano, Exodo: Peruanos en el exterior (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Perú, 1992) and Liderazgo y organizaciones de peruanos en el exterior (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2000); for Nepal, independent estimates from Marks field notes, November 2002.

21. For background, among others, see Palmer, ‘Rebellion in Rural Peru’, pp. 127–46.

22. Among others, see ‘Senado del Perú, Comité Especial sobre las Causas de la Violencia y las Alternativas de Pacificación en el Perú’, Violencia y pacificación (Lima: DESCO and Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1989).

23. There are a number of excellent studies of this period. One of the best is Cynthia McClintock and Abraham Lowenthal (eds.) The Peruvian Experiment Revisited (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

24. In his book Sendero Luminoso: El movimiento subversivo más letal del mundo (Lima: Peru Reporting, 1992).

25. Particularly good for this period is Gustavo Gorriti, Sendero: Historia de la Guerra milenaria en el Perú (Lima: Editorial Apoyo, 1990). For summary details of Guzmán's life, see Gustavo Gorriti, ‘Shining Path's Stalin and Trotsky’, in David Scott Palmer (ed.), Shining Path of Peru, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 149–70.

26. This view was shared at the time by author Palmer, who served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ayacucho and taught at UNSCH in 1962 and 1963. Some of his reflections may be found in the sources cited herein.

27. Palmer, ‘Rebellion in Rural Peru;’ Carlos Iván Degregori, Ayacucho 1969–1979: El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1990).

28. These figures are the most recent estimates. They are based on the careful research and over 19,000 testimonies collected by Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2002 and 2003. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, Informe Final: Tomo I: Primera Parte: El proceso, los hechos, las víctimas (Lima: navarrete, 2003). The complete report covering all aspects of the Commission's work is contained in nine volumes. Previously, official casualty and disappearance figures had been set at 35,000.

29. Most fully developed in Gorriti, Sendero. Also see Cynthia McClintock, ‘Theories of Revolution and the Case of Peru’, in Palmer, Shining Path, esp. pp. 247–9.

30. Such interpretations come from Guzmán's own unpublished, but privately circulated musings; one published exception is his interview by Luis Arce Borja and Janet Talavera Sánchez, ‘La entrevista del siglo: El Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silencio’, El Diario, 24 July 1988, pp. 2–48.

31. From interviews and field work by the authors in Ayacucho, July 1998, with additional information subsequently provided by one of the military officers interviewed.

32. Details, to include maps for Ayacucho, may be found in Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass, 1996), Ch. 5, ‘Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru as Maoist Conclusion, 1980–’.

33. Gabriela Tarazona Sevillana, ‘The Organization of Shining Path’, in Palmer (ed.), Shining Path, op. cit., pp. 189–208. Also see David Scott Palmer, ‘Peru, the Drug Business, and Shining Path: Between Scylla and Charybdis?’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 34:3 (1992), pp. 65–88.

34. Detailed in Palmer, ‘Revolutionary Terrorism’.

35. Among various excellent discussions of this turbulent period, see especially Steve J. Stern (ed.), Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).

36. The closest thing to ‘official’ figures for the conflict are those compiled by the Informal Sector Research and Study Centre (INSEC) and published both periodically and in an annual. The most recent of the latter (at the time this article was written) is Nepal: Human Rights Yearbook 2004 (Kathmandu: INSEC, 2004), which contains statistics for 2003. They are undoubtedly compiled in good faith and widely accepted, but it is difficult to take at face value a compilation which, for example, lists Maoists killed while engaged in insurgency as those ‘victimized by the state’ – or as ‘political workers’ who are ‘victims killed by state’. Even allowing for nuances of distinction between Nepali and American English, such phraseology, which is replicated and expanded upon throughout INSEC texts, can lead to substantial analytical confusion and misunderstanding in assessing the realities of terror and insurgency. The consequences for Nepal as a state have been severe, as the government and its security forces have increasingly found themselves the target of human rights activism, often misplaced. The National Human Rights Commission also publishes periodic and annual reports. These are more carefully worded, though not in the detail of the INSEC papers. See, for example, Human Rights in Nepal: A Status Report 2003 (Kathmandu: National Human Rights Commission, 2004).

37. The royal family was shot and killed by the elder son in a domestic dispute. He subsequently turned his weapon upon himself. For further details, see Jonathan Gregson, Massacre at the Palace: The Doomed Royal Dynasty of Nepal (New York: Hyperion, 2002).

38. This framework was developed and has been used by author Marks in his work; see for example, Marks, Insurgency in Nepal (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2003). Further discussion is available in Marks, ‘At the Frontlines of the GWOT: Insurgency in Nepal’, Counterterrorism 9:4 (2003), pp. 28–34.

39. Among several important studies of the Naxalites is S. Banerjee, India's Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising (London: Zed Press, 1984). See also Rabindra Ray, The Naxalites and their Ideology (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992).

40. To include West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashta. The most vibrant of these are the People's War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) of Bihar, both CCOMPOSA members.

41. Both were born in 1954 and entered politics in their university years. Prachanda earned an M.A. in agriculture, Bhattarai, a Ph.D. in urban planning (his wife, Hishila Yemi, is an architect/engineer and also a member of the Maoists). Both have been widely quoted as advocating social transformation through violence.

42. Impressionistic analysis of admittedly incomplete data indicates that one-tenth to one-fifth of the cadre and combatants may be women. (This is a revision of earlier work, wherein author Marks placed the proportion somewhat higher.)

43. Contesting the 12 May 1991 parliamentary elections as the United Peoples’ Front of Nepal (UPFN), the Maoists won nine of 205 seats: one from the Eastern Region (Siriha); four from the Central Region (Ramechhap, Kavrepalanchok, Lalitpur, Chitwan); and four from the Mid-Western Region (Rukkum, Rolpa, Humla), a fascinating mix of the some of the most and least educated areas of the country. By comparison, the Nepali Congress captured 110 seats and the Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist), 69.

44. The tension that does exist appears to stem from a logical source: the high proportion of hill tribe manpower in combat formations. Many of these foot soldiers see themselves as involved in self-defense rather than an ideological crusade. Thus, the leadership must deal with them carefully as it engages in the tactical maneuvering so typical of a Leninist organization.

45. Most active in the united front campaign are student and ethnic liberation groups. The latter have not proved particularly vibrant, but the former function openly and appear to execute instructions issued by the CPN(M) leadership. Prominent is the All Nepal National Independent Students' Union (Revolutionary), or ANNISU-R.

46. This was not only an administrative blow but also a key step in establishing Maoist political dominance. For VDC candidates were affiliated with the major political parties. The result was that the legal left bore the brunt of the Maoist assault, since some 2,600 VDC chairmen were UML members.

47. CPN(M) steadfastly maintains no inspiration from (or knowledge of) the Khmer Rouge case – even while claiming reports of Khmer Rouge crimes to be Western-inspired propaganda.

48. The force was rapidly expanding and likely has already reached its anticipated strength of 25,000.

49. Figures provided by the Royal Nepalese Embassy, Washington, D.C., February 2003.

50. This is in contrast to Nepalese performance, both of individuals and units, in Gurkha and United Nations service. What is crucial, of course, is that these experiences occur outside the Nepalese cultural matrix and societal structure.

51. David Scott Palmer, ‘“Fujipopulism” and Peru's Progress’, Current History, 95: p. 598 (February 1996), pp. 70–75.

52. Comisión de Juristas Internacionales, Informe sobre la administración de justicia en el Perú (Washington, D.C.: International Jurists Commission, 30 November 1993), Typescript.

53. Benedicto Jiménez Bacca, Inicio, desarrollo y ocaso del terrorismo en el Peru (Lima: SANKI, 2000), three volumes, provides a comprehensive summary and analysis. Jiménez was the deputy chief of GEIN.

54. Carlos Tapia, Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso: Dos estratégias y un final (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1997), esp. pp. 43–55. Also Orin Starn, ‘Sendero, soldados y ronderos en el Mantaro’, Quehacer 74, November–December 1991, pp. 64–65.

55. Interviews by the authors with military personnel in Ayacucho, July 1998.

56. Starn, ‘Sendero, soldados y ronderos’, 64; Tapia, Las Fuerzas Armadas, pp. 47–48.

57. Lewis Taylor, ‘La estratégia contrainsurgente: El PCP-SL y la guerra civil en el Perú, 1980–1996’, Debate Agrario, 26, July 1997, pp. 105–106. Based also on Palmer's observations in Ayacucho rural areas, June–August 1998.

58. Objections were overridden, and in 1991, 10,000 Winchester Model 1300 shotguns were distributed, as well as a larger number of pistols. Officials conducted ceremonies where priests blessed the arms. A 1992 change in the law recognized the people's right to self-defense. (Field work by both authors, Ayacucho, July 1998.) For an overview of the impact of the rondas campesinas, see Orin Starn (ed.), Hablan los ronderos: La Búsqueda por la paz en los Andes, Documento de Trabajo 45 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1993).

59. The force-multiplication effect is evident in the figures for the key departments of Ayacucho and Huancavalica, which together were the area of operations for the army's 2nd Division. In mid-1998, while the division had but 2,500 of its own personnel, the militiamen, or ronderos, numbered 142,000. This figure, by early 2000, had increased to some 200,000. Field work in Ayacucho by both authors, July 1998, and by Palmer, July 2000.

60. Data collected by Palmer between June and September 1998 for a study of government agencies' local activities in general and the National Social Development Fund (FONCODES), in particular, in Ayacucho, sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Follow-ups in July–August 2000 and 2002 suggested the impressive gains of the mid-1990s were being jeopardized by the introduction of partisan political considerations (beginning in late 1998) into the organizations' decision-making processes. David Scott Palmer, ‘FONCODES y su impacto en la pacificación en el Perú: Observaciones generales y el caso de Ayacucho’, in Concertando para el desarrollo: Lecciones aprendidas del FONCODES en sus estratégias de intervención (Lima: Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social – FONCODES, 2001), pp. 147–80.

61. As presented in internal documents of FONCODES and in the annual statistical compendium prepared by Richard Webb and Graciela Fernández Baca, Perú en números.

62. David Scott Palmer, ‘Citizen Responses to Crisis and Political Conflict in Peru: Informal Politics in Ayacucho’, in Susan Eckstein and Timothy Wickham-Crowley, (eds.), What Justice? Whose Justice? The Latin American Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 233–54.

63. Palmer, ‘Revolutionary Terrorism’, pp. 301–05.

64. As articulated in his long interview in El Diario.