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Acknowledgments
We acknowledge with thanks the support of the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant RES-000-22-0127.
Notes
1 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 December 2001, p. 2.
2 Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White, ‘Putin's Militocracy’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 19, 4, October – December 2004, pp. 289 – 306, at pp. 293, 294. The term itself began to be widely used in the mid-1990s: Gusan Guseinov, D. S. P.: Materialy k Russkomu Slovaryu obshchestvenno-politicheskogo yazyka kontsa XX veka (Moscow, Tri kvadrata, 2003), p. 502.
3 Authors' data. Siloviki also accounted for 44% of the national leadership (defined as the members of the Security Council), and 9% of the regional elite.
4 Searing, for instance, found that the importance of social background for elite attitudes varied considerably from one political system to another, and that recently held career positions were generally a better predictor (Donald D. Searing, ‘The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization’, Comparative Political Studies, l, 4, January 1969, pp. 471 – 500).
5 See in particular the series of studies issued under the auspices of the Centre for Political Information in Moscow, most recently A. A. Mukhin, Nevskii—Lubyanka—Kreml’. Proekt-2008 (Moscow, TsPI, 2005); A. A. Mukhin, Samurai prezidenta. Proekt-2008 (Moscow, TsPI, 2005); A. A. Mukhin, Praviteli Rossii: Staraya ploshehad’ i Belyi dom (Moscow, Algoritm, 2005); and A. A. Mukhin, Putin: blizhnii krug prezidenta (Moscow, Algoritm, 2005). Although rich in biographical detail, these studies cite unspecified ‘information’ or even ‘rumour’ in their references to informal associations among elite members.
6 We included 24 members of the Security Council, 36 top officials of the Presidential Administration (the head of the apparatus and his deputies, heads of department and their deputies, presidential advisers and counsellors, and the heads of the main departments), 72 members of the Russian government, 178 members of the Federation Council, 450 Duma deputies, 88 heads of regions and republics (taking account of the formation of a merged Perm’ territory from January 2005), 120 members of the business elite, seven presidential envoys and 82 main federal inspectors. This produces a composite elite of 1,057 as of January 2005.
7 Kommersant, 8 February 2005, p. 2.
8 Kommersant, 19 April 2005, p. 2.
9 Kommersant, 31 May 2005, p. 2.
10 Ibid.
11 See for instance Kommersant, 23 May 2005, p. 2, and 30 May 2005, p. 2.
12 A term that was popularized by the US diplomat Thomas Graham in an outspoken contribution to Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 November 1995, p. 5.
13 See for instance Izvestiya, 14 January 2005, p. 2.
14 Mukhin, Praviteli, p. 23. Our own informants suggest he did not directly oppose the actions that were taken against Yukos, or its chief executive. Medvedev's own views are taken from his interview in Ekspert, 4 April 2005, pp. 72, 75.
15 Izvestiya, 27 January 2005, p. 1.
16 A full listing appears in Mukhin, Nevskii—Lubyanka—Kreml’, pp. 16 – 18.
17 Kommersant, 1 October 2004, p. 16.
18 Izvestiya, 3 March 2005, p. 1, and 18 May 2005, p. 1.
19 Kommersant, 29 December 2004, p. 1, and 11 January 2005, p. 6 (Gref).
20 Kommersant, 11 February 2005, p. 1.
21 Izvestiya, 17 January 2005, p. 1.
22 T. Polyannikov, ‘Logika avtoritarizma’, Svobodnaya mvsl’, 2005, 1, pp. 59 – 60.
23 Komsomol'skaya pravda, 29 September 2004, p. 4.
24 Komsomol'skaya pravda, 6 November 2004, p. 11.
25 Komsomol'skaya pravda, 29 December 2004, p. 11.