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Notes
Research for this article was supported by The Russian Foundation for Humanities (Grant N 04-03-00035a).
1 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York, Wiley, 1954)
2 On mechanical and psychological effects see also Kenneth Benoit, ‘The Endogenity Problem in Electoral Studies: a Critical Re-examination of Duverger's Mechanical Effect’, Electoral Studies, 21, 1, 2002, pp. 35–46.
3 On the possibility of differentiating two levels of electoral competition and its application to Russia's case see N. Yargomskaya & A. Likhtenchtein, ‘Zakon Duverger i sistema otnositel'nogo bol'shinstva na dumskikh vyborakh’, Politicheskaya nauka, 1, 2003, pp. 103–126.
4 Melvin J. Hinich & Michael C. Munger, Analytical Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 17.
5 Gary Cox, Making Votes Count (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).
6 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, Harper and Row, 1957).
7 Steven Reed, ‘Duverger's Law is Working in Italy’, Comparative Political Studies, 34, 3, 2001, pp. 312–327 at p. 315
8 Duverger, Political Parties, p. 215.
9 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991).
10 On the difficulties of interpreting the role of independent candidates in the formation of Russia's party system see Robert Moser, ‘The Impact of the Electoral System on Post-Communist Party Development: The Case of the 1993 Russian Parliamentary Elections’, Electoral Studies, 14, 4, 1997, pp. 377–398; G. Golosov & N. Yargomskaya, ‘Izbiratel'naya sistema i mezhpartiinaya konkurentsiya na dumskikh vyborakh’, in V. Gel'man, G. Golosov & E. Meleshkina (eds), Pervyi elektoral'nyi tsikl v Rossii, 1993–1996 (Moscow, Ves' Mir, 2000), pp. 152–176 at p. 156.
11 Steven Fish, ‘The Executive Deception: Superpresidentialism and Degradation of Russian Politics’, in V. Sperling (ed.), Building the Russian State: Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance (Boulder, Westview Press, 2000), pp. 177–192.
12 V. Gelman, ‘Vtoroi elektoral'nyi tsikl i transformatsiya politicheskogo rezhima v Rossii’, in V. Gel'man, G. Golosov & E. Meleshkina (eds), Vtoroi elektoral'nyi tsikl v Rossii, 1999–2000 (Moscow, Ves' Mir, 2002), pp. 10–42 at p. 13.
13 For a detailed analysis of the types of mixed-member electoral systems see Louis Massicote & André Blais, ‘Mixed Electoral Systems: a Conceptual and Empirical Study’, Electoral Studies, 18, 3, 1999, pp. 341–366; M. Shugart & M.Wattenberg (eds), Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: the Best of Both Worlds? (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001).
14 N. Yargomskaya, ‘Effekty izbiratel'noi sistemy i elektoral'nye strategii na dumskikh vyborakh’, in Gel'man et al., (eds), Vtoroi elektoral'nyi tsikl v Rossii, 1999–2000, pp. 85–106.
15 Dieter Nohlen, Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem (Opladen, Leske & Budrich, 2000), p. 410.
16 See, for example, G. Golosov, ‘Politicheskie partii i elektoral'naya politika v 1993–1995’, in Gel'man et al., (eds), Pervyi elektoral'nyi tsikl v Rossii, 1993–1996, pp. 106–129; G. Golosov, ‘Politicheskie partii i nezavisimye kandidaty na dumskikh vyborakh’, in Gel'man et al., (eds), Vtoroi elektoral'nyi tsikl v Rossii, 1999–2000, pp. 43–64.
17 Yargomskaya & Likhtenchtein, ‘Zakon Duverger i sistema otnositel'nogo bol'shinstva na dumskikh vyborakh’, pp. 125–126.
18 Markku Laakso & Rein Taagepera, ‘The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe’, Comparative Political Studies, 12, 1, 1979, pp. 3–27.
19 Juan Molinar, ‘Counting the Number of Parties’, The American Political Science Review, 85, 4, 1991, pp. 1383–1391.
20 Gary Cox, ‘Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote’, The American Political Science Review, 88, 3, 1994, pp. 601–621; Cox, Making Votes Count.
21 The Nagayama triangle is described in Reed, ‘Duverger's Law is Working in Italy’.
22 Bernard Grofman, Alessandro Chiaramonte, Roberto D'Alimonte & Scott L. Feld, ‘Comparing and Contrasting the Uses of Two Graphical Tools for Displaying Patterns of Multiparty Competition’, Party Politics, 10, 3, 2004, pp. 273–299.
23 There are numerous ways in which the Nagayama triangle can be split into segments. Grofman and his colleagues used a free parameter that equals 20. By varying the parameter one can change the operationalisation of bipolar, monocentric or polycentric formats. For other possibilities related to the Nagayama triangle see Rein Taagepera, ‘Extension of the Nagayama Triangle for Visualization of Party Strengths’, Party Politics, 10, 3, 2004, pp. 301–306.
24 In this case we use Molinar's index (NP), rather than the effective number of parties (N). NP is a more precise indicator of the competition format, because it does not overestimate the contribution of big parties in fragmentation.
25 When constructing the figure we did not include candidates who officially did not belong to UR but nevertheless enjoyed its support, i.e. so-called ‘independent candidates’, who have no registered party affiliation. It is very difficult to assess unofficial support by the governing party, so we decided to limit ourselves to officially supported candidates.
26 In 1999 Rogozin was nominated by the Congress of Russian Communities and Bloc of Yurii Boldyrev.
27 In 1992–94 Volodin worked in Saratov's city administration, and then was elected to the regional parliament. In 1996–99 he was vice-governor of the region.