If not by tanks, then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy

Abstract

This article considers the benefits of the recently developed concept of ‘soft power’ in understanding Russia's foreign policy. It argues that claims that Moscow is exercising a form of soft power imperialism in the former Soviet region cannot be fully supported by the existing evidence. To differentiate between the imperialist and stabilising objectives of Russian foreign policy the article analyses the Russian domestic discourse on exploiting soft power in foreign policy. It then compares the views of different schools of thought with Vladimir Putin's philosophy and foreign policy record. Finally, it selects for closer investigation Russia's policy in the Caucasus.

Notes

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 29th Annual Berkeley – Stanford Conference ‘The Caucasus: Culture, History, Politics’, UC Berkeley, 4 March 2005 and appeared under the title ‘Russia's Strategy in the Caucasus: Is Soft Power Part of the Game?’ in Caucasus and Central Asia Program Newsletter, 8, 2005, pp. 3 – 9. The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewers of Europe-Asia Studies for their critique and suggestions. Final responsibility for the article's conclusions lies with the author.

¹V. Putin (2004) ‘Address at the Plenary Session of the Russian Federation Ambassadors’, Moscow, Foreign Ministry, 12 July, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru, accessed 12 July 2004.

²The concept of soft power was first introduced by Joseph Nye (2004) as a means of understanding America's influence in the world. Among scholars of Russia, Fiona Hill (2004) has built on Nye's work.

³U. Ahlin, M. K. Albright, G. Amato, et al. (2004) ‘An Open Letter to the Heads of State and Government of the European Union and NATO’, 28 September, Johnson's Russia List, #24 JRL-8385, available at: http://www.cdi.org, accessed 10 October 2004. See also Russia's Wrong Direction (2006).

⁴See V. Socor (2005) ‘Georgia Under Growing Russian Pressure Ahead of Bush – Putin Summit’, Russian and Eurasia Review, 15 February, available at: www.jamestown.org,accessed 15 February 2005.

⁵See P. Baev (2002) ‘Useful War’, Russian and Eurasia Review, 17 September, available at: www.jamestown.org, accessed 20 September 2002.

⁶Analysts often speak of the Caucasus as the Eurasian Balkans referring to a highly volatile mixture of ethnic and clan loyalties; see for example, Brzezinski (1998, p. 123).

⁷This definition is broader than that of Joseph Nye (2004, p. 7).

⁸ Interfax, 24 March 2006, available at http://www.interfax.com, accessed 26 March 2006.

⁹For development of this comparison, see Tsygankov (2005).

¹⁰ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 February 2001.

¹¹See V. Putin (2004) ‘Address at the Plenary Session of the Russian Federation Ambassadors’, Moscow, Foreign Ministry, 12 July, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru, accessed 12 July 2004.

¹² Izvestiya, 6 April 2006.

¹³R. McDermott (2005) ‘Putin Pledges to Back up Karimov in a Crisis’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 16 November, available at: http://www.jamestown.com, accessed 16 November 2005.

¹⁴ Kommersant, 9 November 2005.

¹⁵F. Hill (2004) ‘Eurasia on the Move’, presentation at the Kennan Institute, 27 September; Kommersant, 22 November 2005. For higher figures, see Legoida (2003, p. 64).

¹⁶ Izvestiya, 30 June 2005.

¹⁷ RFE/RL Newsline, 11 April 2003.

¹⁸ Kommersant, 7 April 2006.

¹⁹F. Hill (2004) ‘Eurasia on the Move’, presentation at the Kennan Institute, 27 September. These trends continue to embolden officials to press for granting of official-language status to Russian in all CIS countries (RFE/RL Newsline, 26 September 2003).

²⁰In May 2005, the Kremlin also announced the establishment of an international television network to broadcast in English to ‘improve Russia's image in the world’ (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 June 2005, available at: http://www.rferl.org, accessed 8 June 2005).

²¹Many in Russia perceived the revolution as ‘manufactured’ by the West (Herd 2005).

²²For instance, the National Security Council has closely studied the issue of Moldova's dependencies on Russia (Kommersant, 22 March 2005).

²³For a sample of criticisms regarding Russia's role in the Ukrainian revolution and the former Soviet region, see Yaz'kova (2005) and Markedonov (2005).

²⁴For some statements representing these views, see Belkovskii (2004), Butakov (2005; also available at: http://www.russ.ru/docs/75772036, accessed 10 January 2005), Rogozin (2006), and Narochnitskaya (2006).

²⁵ RFE/RL Newsline, 9 February 2005.

²⁶For cross-regional comparative data, see for example, Wilson (2000) and Molchanov (2002).

²⁷See I. Torbakov (2005) ‘Moscow Analysts Mull Proper Strategy Toward Post-Revolutionary Ukraine’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11 February, available at: http://www.jamestown.org, accessed 18 December 2005.

²⁸ RFE/RL Newsline, 9 February 2005.

²⁹Frolov 2005, also available at: http://www.russiaprofile.org, accessed 25 May 2005.

³⁰See also G. Pavlovskii, ‘O politike Rossii na postsovetskom prostranstve’, available at: http://www.america-russia.net, accessed 28 April 2005.

³¹Europe and the United States did not limit themselves to political statements about the ‘unacceptability’ of the election's results—an unprecedented step in itself in light of their previously much calmer reaction to considerably less fair elections in Central Asia and Caucasus. Through the activities of various NGOs, the West also provided considerable financial assistance for Yushchenko's campaign.

³²See I. Torbakov (2004) ‘After Ukraine Debacle, Kremlin Strategists Warn of Serious Rift with the West’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17 December, available at: http://www.jamestown.org, accessed 18 December 2004. See also Levada-Tsentr (2004) ‘Ukrainskiye sobytiya glazami rossiyan’, 16 December, available at: http://www.levada.ru/press/2004121601.html, accessed 13 January 2005.

³³See, for example, ‘Black-Belt Ambitions, Orange-Belt Throw’, Transitions Online, 10 January 2006, available at: http://www.tol.cz, accessed 1 February 2006.

³⁴See V. Putin (2005) ‘Address to the Federation Council’, 30 March, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru, accessed 31 March 2005.

³⁵See V. Putin (2005) ‘Address to the Federation Council’, March, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru, accessed 31 March 2005.

³⁶In this same speech, Putin also called for granting Russian citizenship to legal aliens from the former Soviet Union. The newly appointed head of the Kremlin's special department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Modest Kolerov, elaborated on the last point in an interview (Kolerov 2005; also available at: http://www.politklass.ru, accessed 15 December 2005).

³⁷V. Putin (2005) ‘Address to the Federation Council’, 30 March, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru, accessed 31 March 2005.

³⁸V. Putin (2003) ‘Poslaniye Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 16 May, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru, accessed 20 May 2003.

³⁹For analyses of Russia's liberal currents, see especially Fisher (1958), Walicki (1992), Petro (1995) and Wiedle (2000).

⁴⁰ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 April 2006.

⁴¹This change has been well documented; see, for example, Aron (1998) and Tsygankov (2003).

⁴²See Validata, ‘Public Opinion of the Chechen Population on the Actual Issues of the Republic. Results of Seven Representative Surveys Conducted March – August 2003’, available at http://www.validata.ru/e_e/chechnya/, accessed December 2003.

⁴³For statistical details, see Karaganov (2004), Kuznetsova (2004) and Chernyavskii (2003, pp. 49 – 50).

⁴⁴F. Hill (2004) ‘Eurasia on the Move’, presentation at the Kennan Institute, 27 September.

⁴⁵Some human rights organisations in Russia condemned the growing number of illegal immigrants, which they see as the country's ‘dependence on slave labour’[C. Bigg (2005a) ‘Russia: Rights Advocate Decries “Dependence On Slave Labour”’, Open Media Research Institute, 8 November, available at: http://www.rferl.org, accessed 8 November 2005].

⁴⁶Yaz'kova (2005); I. Rybkin (2005) ‘Russia: Ivan Ruykin Discusses Prospects for Peace in Chechnya’, Open Media Research Institute, 30 August, available at: http://www.rferl.org, accessed 1 September 2005.

⁴⁷V. Yasmann (2005) ‘Russia: Immigration Likely to Increase, Mitigating Population Deficit’, Open Media Research Institute, 14 November, available at: http://www.rferl.org, accessed 15 November 2005.

⁴⁸In Abkhazia's presidential elections in October 2004, Russia forced Sergei Bagapsh to re-run the elections in tandem with Raul Khajimba, his main challenger, after the two sides failed to agree on election results. See Z. Anjaparidze (2005) ‘Former Abkhaz Presidential Rivals United Under Pressure from Moscow’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 12 January.

⁴⁹The ‘balance of power’ approach has been traditionally the strongest among Russia's foreign policy establishment. It has its roots in the European concert of powers, of which Russia was an important member.

⁵⁰In both cases, Russian minorities were sizable, concentrated, and politically mobilised in the northern part of Kazakhstan and Crimea, respectively.

⁵²See C. Bigg (2005b) ‘Russia: Moscow Contrasts Own Situation with French Migrant Unrest’, Open Media Research Institute, 8 November, available at: http://www.rferl.org, accessed 8 November 2005.

⁵¹V. Yasmann (2005) ‘Russia: Immigration Likely to Increase, Mitigating Population Deficit’, Open Media Research Institute, 14 November, available at: http://www.rferl.org, accessed 15 November 2005.

⁵³ The Daily Telegraph, 14 April 2005.

⁵⁴Such has been the explanation of Russia's behaviour advanced by Georgian politicians (see Kommersant, 17 April 2006).

⁵⁵Open Media Research Institute, 28 November 2005, available at: http:www.rferl.org, accessed 30 November 2005.

⁵⁶After the September hostage taking in North Ossetia, Russia made efforts to re-engage the West by asking for an extraordinary session of the UN Security Council. It also informed the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of its desire for active Western involvement in the economic development of the North Caucasus region (Hill et al.2005, p. 2). For various proposals of Western assistance, see Kosyrev (2005).

⁵⁷This point was also strongly underscored by the current president Alu Alkhanov during his visit to Moscow in early 2005.

⁵⁸On growing radicalisation in the Northern Caucasus, see Baev (2005) ‘The North Caucasus Slips Out of Control’, Russian and Eurasia Review, 4 April, available at http://www.jamestown.org, accessed 1 May 2006; and Fuller (2005; also available at: http://www.rfel.org, accessed 20 June 2005).

⁵⁹F. Hill (2004) ‘Eurasia on the Move’, presentation at the Kennan Institute, 27 September.

⁶⁰Just as many in the West believe that Russia wants a weak and unstable Caucasus, many in Russia argue that Western nations want the same in order to lay their hands on Caspian energy (Degoev 2004; Zhil'tsov et al.2003, p. 219; Zvyagel'skaya & Makarov 2003, p. 103). Even some pro-Western liberals in Russia are fearful that Georgia, emboldened by the US, may try to crush resistance from Abkhasia and South Ossetia by force thereby provoking a new wave of instability in the region (Yaz'kova 2004). Several publications by Western pundits, such as Zbignew Brzezinski and Richard Pipes advocating independence for Chechnya (see, for example, Pipes 2004), only reinforce these fears of the West.

⁶¹Judging from Putin's 2005 address to the Federation Council, Russia's central objective remains to revive its European identity and values, such as social market economy, religious tolerance, and respect for democracy [see V. Putin (2005) ‘Address to the Federation Council’, March, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru, accessed 31 March 2005].