Accounting for organisation and financing. A comparison of four Hungarian Parties

Abstract

This article analyses the financial and organisational profile of the major Hungarian political parties. The question investigated is whether the structure of income and expenditure and the organisational make-up of parties are related to each other, and whether these patterns are compatible with the general rules of party finance, the ideology and power position of the parties, as well as general political development. The analysis of the empirical data finds a correspondence between the regulation of party finance and the generally high level of party centralisation. The structure of expenditure was found to be most closely related to party size, but size did not explain the ratio of donations. As expected, conservative parties tended to have a small membership and were more dependent on their leaders. However, the role of members, donations and membership fees, and the status of MPs within the party hierarchy were not well predicted by membership in party families. The exact distribution of power within the organisations, and the ratio between the various sources of income and targets of expenditure seem to depend more on the individual trajectories of parties as organisations than on any of the general classificatory schemes.

Notes

¹At the 2006 election Fidesz ran on a common list with the KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party), and the latter party established its own faction in the new parliament, but the low electoral support of KDNP (below 1%) and the lack of its autonomy (KDNP politicians must coordinate all their actions with Fidesz) does not warrant the treatment of KDNP as a separate unit.

²For a more detailed profile of the parties see Ágh (1995), Körösényi (1999) and Enyedi (2006).

³The third paragraph of the Constitution acknowledges the role of parties in the expression of the public will.

⁴The money for electoral campaigns must also be added, but this value represents a relatively small sum (less than €500,000). Nevertheless, the overall support given to parties definitely exceeds the above figure, since free public media during electoral campaigns, privileges in economic activities, or cheap office space provided by local governments constitute further layers of economic assistance.

⁵There are other categories, such as investing into enterprises and ‘others’, which mainly means paying back loans, but they have less clear relevance to the organisational profile of the parties.

⁶The support for parliamentary groups goes to the leadership of the group, not to the individual MPs.

⁷Katz and Mair use the term ‘party-in public-office’ for all those party representatives who occupy public offices. If parties privilege government members versus MPs, or vice versa, the utility of the concept diminishes.

⁸See also Ilonszki (1999) and Machos (2000). Note that the dominance of extra parliamentary leadership applies not only to Hungary but also to many other post-communist countries (van Biezen 2003).