Muslim leaders in Russia's Volga-Urals: Self-Perceptions and Relationship with regional authorities

Abstract

Islamic politics in Russia's Volga-Urals has been affected by the self-images of some of the regional communities, such as Tatarstan as ‘the cradle of Russian Islam’, Astrakhan as ‘Russia's southern outpost’, and Perm and Buguruslan as remote peripheries of the Islamic world. Moreover, some regional authorities, such as Astrakhan and Orenburg, have tried to use Muslims to stabilise the ethnoconfessional situation of the regions and also make them a bridgehead for economic ventures on the Caspian rims and western Kazakhstan. In contrast, the authorities in highly industrialised and politically stable Saratov and Perm have not been interested in intervening in regional Muslim communities. Thus, Islamic politics in Russia may have much wider and varied political connotations than is usually conceived under the term ethnoconfessional politics.

Notes

¹Author's interviews with Mukaddas Bibarsov, mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Saratov Oblast', 23 February 2006, Saratov city; R. A. Nabiev, Chairman of the Council on Religious Affairs of the Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers, 2 March 2006, Kazan city; and Valiulla Yakupov, vice-mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan, 2 March 2006, Kazan city. According to the agreement, the North Caucasian muftiates, which already had their own coordinating centre, should be excluded from the future national centre. This decision also reflected the fact that the political situation of the region was obviously beyond the control of the TsDUM and SMR.

²For example, see Malashenko (1998), Yemelianova (1999), Yunusova (1999a, pp. 282 – 301), and Mukhametshin (2000, pp. 8 – 53, 2005, pp. 131 – 159).

³I have argued this position in Matsuzato and Ibragimov (2005).

⁴On this topic I repeated fieldwork in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan during 2004 – 06 and conducted intensive fieldwork in the other regions mentioned here from December 2005 to March 2006.

⁵On the concept of ‘regional myths’, see Magomedov (2000).

⁶Author's interview with Rasim Kuzyakhmetov, director of madrasah ‘Sheikh Said’ belonging to the Saratov muftiate, 23 February 2006, Saratov city.

⁷Significant differences between Dagestan and the Volga-Urals should be noted. The availability of placements for trained imams varies widely. While in Dagestan, 16 Islamic universities are in operation but even those who studied Islam in Islamic universities in the Near East often cannot find a post as a village imam (and this is part of the social background of the radicalisation of Dagestani Islam); in the Volga-Urals region, those who studied Islam in a local madrasah for three years are able to become not only imams but even regional mufti. Another specific of the Volga-Ural region compared to Dagestan is the contract employment of imams. In the Volga-Urals, members of the leadership of the religious community, or parish committee (prikhodskii sovet), also called aksakals or babai (elders), are usually stable, but no one among them is able to practise religious rituals. Therefore, they invite imams even from remote regions by contract.

⁸The so-called Wahhabism is a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, deriving from the Hanbali School of Law in the eighteenth century. Wahhabis advocated a return to the practices of Islam's ‘founders’ (al-Salaf). Recently, the term Wahhabism has been misused to describe radical Islamism in general in a negative way.

⁹Author's interview with Abdul Sharipov, vice-mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Orenburg Oblast', 3 January 2006, Orenburg city.

¹⁰The various subcategories of Tatars are a sensitive issue mainly from Kazan's viewpoint. The Tatars who live outside Tatarstan identify themselves just as Tatars and try to improve their position within the region they live. They feel no ethnic (mega-ethnic) loyalty to Kazan.

¹¹For example, among 53 students of the Nizhnekamsk madrasah, four are ethnically Russian and two are of mixed parentage. Author's interview with Rustam Idiyatullin, deputy imam of the Central Mosque of Nizhnekamsk (the director of the madrasah), 7 January 2006, Nizhnekamsk city, Tatarstan.

¹²When the Union Law on Freedom of Consciousness was discussed at the USSR Supreme Soviet, some deputies even proposed granting the status of judicial person only to religious communities, not to their central organisation (Patriarchate, Muftiate, etc.), but Patriarch Alexy II furiously resisted since this article might provoke endless splitting of the Orthodox Church (Endo 1996, p. 329, note 59).

¹³Author's interviews with Gali Mukhamadullin, Imam-muhtasib of the TsDUM in south-western Bashkortostan, 12 August 2004, Kandry village, Tuimazinsky Raion, Bashkortostan; and Sharipov, 3 January 2006.

¹⁴Valiulla Yakupov, vice-mufti of Tatarstan, argues that the split of the Russian Muslim community began after 1980 when T. Tadzhuddin was elected as mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia (DUMES) and, before long, began to purge older Muslim leaders, such as Abbas Bibarsov (b. 1937, now Penza mufti, the father of visible Muslim leaders of contemporary Russia, including Mukaddas and Ayub, referred to in this article) and Faizrakhman Sattarov (Yakupov 2005, pp. 44 – 45). According to Yakupov, what happened in 1992 was only a continuation of this process (see http://www.islam.ru/lib/warning/sekty/?print_page, accessed 6 February 2007).

¹⁵Author's interview with Idiyatullin, 7 January 2006.

¹⁶Also available at: http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/07.yunosova.shtml.

¹⁷Author's interview with M. Bibarsov, 23 February 2006.

¹⁸Author's interviews with Abdurashid Galiullin, imam of the Mosque ‘Lyalya-Tyuripan’ of Ufa, 11 August 2004, Ufa city; and Saifulla Bikmukhametov, vice-mufti of the Astrakhan Regional Spiritual Board of Muslims (ARDUM), director of the Islamic Institute ‘Khadzhi-Tarkhan’ belonging to the ARDUM, 20 and 22 February 2006, Astrakhan city.

¹⁹Author's interview with Mukhamet Gallyamov, imam of the Mosque ‘Ikhlas’ in Ufa city, 11 August 2004, Ufa city.

²⁰Despite his belonging to the TsDUM camp, Rustam Safin, imam of the Friday Mosque of Ul'yanovsk city, predicted that the split of Russia's umma would be overcome in a natural way by Tadzhuddin's gradual retirement (interview with the author, 9 January 2006).

²¹At that time, a huge territory of the lower Volga (Saratov, Penza, and Volgograd Oblasts) was guided by the anti-Tadzhuddin Bibarsov family. After that, however, the TsDUM restored its influence over the whole Volgograd and a significant part of the Penza Muslim communities.

²²V. Yakupov, interviewed on 4 April 2005, Kazan city. On the state-sponsored reunification see also Matsuzato (2006, p. 451). According to V. Yakupov, even during 1992 – 98, there were few splits of Muslims at the community level and it was therefore easy to reunify religious communities. Moreover, the creation of the new muftiate created no fewer posts than under the former coexistence of two muftiates, so every religious leader was satisfied with his post under the new regime.

²³Hanafi is one of the four judicial schools of Sunni. This school is dominant in most Muslim territories of the former USSR, except for Dagestan and Chechnya, which practise the Shafii School. Although the SMR chairman, Ravil' Gainutdin, asserts that the Hanafi School is ‘the most liberal interpretation of Islam’ (Gainutdin 2004, p. 5), this assertion does not always sound positive to Muslim leaders of this school. ‘Liberal’ is not an adjective for praise in religions.

²⁴Jadidism is Islamic reformism as practised in pre-revolutionary Russia. This trend was influential in the Kazan, Ufa, and Orenburg Provinces. Recently, the idea of Euroislam became famous through the publication of a brochure written by Rafael' Khakimov and provocatively entitled ‘Where Is Our Mecca? A Manifesto of Euroislam’. Khakimov argues that Muslims should fundamentally reinterpret Islam modelled to the environmental and social conditions of the seventh century. By adhering to rituals and taboos, Muslims often dismiss spiritual values and the internal creed (Khakim 2003). Considering Khakimov's status as Shaimiev's advisor, several analysts thought that he was proposing a new state ideology of Tatarstan. However, Khakimov himself denies this interpretation. According to him, no one suggested that he write the brochure ‘Where Is Our Mecca?’ which conveys his purely personal conviction. Khakimov emphasised that he wished to have dialogue with Europeans (interview with author, 6 January 2006), which actually took place because of the extravagant title of the brochure. On the other hand, the brochure's contents near implication that Muslims are allowed to drink and eat pork and that it is unnecessary to practise prayers disgusted the religious activists of Tatarstan. In particular, deputy mufti V. Yakupov harshly criticised the brochure (Mukharyamov 2007, pp. 61 – 63). It seems impossible to impose Euroislam on the Muslim leaders of Tatarstan. Remarkably, dispute between Khakimov and Yakupov is limited to the issues around Euroislam, while both of them are ardent supporters of state patronage of Islam.

²⁵Author's interview with Ayub Bibarsov, vice-mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan, 11 August 2004, Ufa city.

²⁶Author's interviews with Yakupov, 5 April 2005 and 2 March 2006.

²⁷Author's interview with Khakimov, 6 January 2006.

²⁸The other two are the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan's Kremlin and the Central Mosque of Al'met'evsk city. The central mosques of Nizhnekamsk and Al'met'evsk were built by oil money, while the construction of Kul-Sharif was a state project. As mentioned before, the Nizhnekamsk Central Mosque has madrasah in which 53 students, from not only Tatarstan but also various parts of Russia, are studying.

²⁹Author's interview with Idiyatullin, 7 January 2006.

³⁰Available at: www.islam.ru/press/rus/2005-08-15, accessed July 2006.

³¹This is an organisation created by the Tatarstan authorities in 1992 to compete with Tatar radical nationalists and to attract the Tatar diaspora's investments (Mukharyamov 2000, pp. 52 – 53). As was the case with the Tatarstan muftiate, the Tatarstan authorities provided this organisation with a luxurious building in the centre of Kazan city, equipped with Internet connections so that it could make contact with groups of the Tatar diaspora in the world.

³²However, two such muftis were not invited because they were seen as being in conflict with the aims of the meeting. One was the Perm mufti Mukhammedgali Khuzin, of which more is written below. The other was Yamalo-Nenets mufti, Farid Salman, who had been the Tatarstani mufti of Tadzhuddin's TsDUM for a short time before the reunification in 1998, even after which he remained in Tatarstan as self-proclaimed mufti for several years. During this period, he ceaselessly accused the DUM RT of Wahhabist tendencies, exploiting the fact that the former students of several madrasah in Al'met'evsk and Naberezhnye Chelny participated in Chechen military detachments.

³³Author's interview with Bikmukhametov, 20 February 2006.

³⁴Astrakhanis call this ‘Red Mosque’ from the colour of its walls. This mosque was built at the beginning of the twentieth century but closed in 1938, and the building was used as a House for Sanitary Education.

³⁵Author's interview with Abdukhasan Musaev, imam of the third mosque of Astrakhan City, and the community leaders, 20 February 2006, Astrakhan city.

³⁶Author's interview with O. P. Popov, Head of the Department for the Work with Religious Organisations of the Astrakhan Oblast' Administration, 22 February 2006, Astrakhan city.

³⁷This is partly because North Caucasians densely populate around the bazaar and easily interrupt their business at time of prayer.

³⁸Author's interviews with Abdukhasan Musaev, imam of the third mosque of Astrakhan city, and the community leaders, 20 February 2006, Astrakhan city; and O. P. Popov, Head of the Department for the Work with Religious Organisations of the Astrakhan Oblast' Administration, 22 February 2006, Astrakhan city.

³⁹Author's interview with Makhmud Safarov, imam of the mosque ‘Baky’ in Astrakhan city, and the community leaders, 21 February 2006, Astrakhan city.

⁴⁰Author's interview with Bikmukhametov, 22 February 2006.

⁴¹Author's interview with Popov, 22 February 2006. On Chirkeisky, see Matsuzato and Ibragimov (2005).

⁴²This study does not focus on the famous ‘Dagestan factor’ in Astrakhan that Ayub Omarov, an Avar Wahhabi leader, had its base in Astrakhan. My sense is that outside observers overestimate Omarov's influence on the Astrakhan Muslim community.

⁴³Author's interview with M. Bibarsov, 23 February 2006.

⁴⁴In contrast to Astrakhan and Orenburg, the Saratovites' geopolitical self-images, such as being ‘the gate to the Steppe’ or ‘the capital of Volga’, do not affect Islamic politics. On Saratovites' self-image see Ryzhenkov (2000, pp. 122 – 142).

⁴⁵M. Bibarsov told me: ‘Muslims should be self-reliant, then society will not dismiss us’.

⁴⁶On these localities, see Matsuzato and Ibragimov (2005).

⁴⁷Author's interview with Abdurakhman Sadykov, Chairman of the council of the Mosque ‘Khuseiniya’, 2 January 2006, Orenburg city.

⁴⁸Author's interview with Sharipov, 3 January 2006.

⁴⁹On I. Shangareev's biography and the process of the creation of the Buguruslan muftiate see Matsuzato (2007, pp. 146 – 147).

⁵⁰For detail, see Matsuzato (2006, p. 456).

⁵¹Author's interview with Askhad Shafiigulin, deputy to mufti I. Shangareev, 4 January 2006, Buguruslan city, Orenburg Oblast'.

⁵²Author's interview with Amelin, 3 January 2006.

⁵³Author's interview with Mukhamadullin, 12 August 2004.

⁵⁴Author's interview with Mavlemzyan Sibagatullin, rector of the Oktyabr'sky Branch of Ufa Islamic University, Imam-muhtasib of the TsDUM in Oktyabr'sky city, 12 August 2004.

⁵⁵A method often used was that at the time of reregistering Muslim communities, ‘village soviet chairmen’ distributed application forms of the DUM RB among villagers and asked: ‘You live in Bashkortostan. Why you don't belong to Bashkortostan's muftiate?’

⁵⁶Author's interview with Mukhamadullin, 12 August 2004.

⁵⁷On his biography see Matsuzato (2007, pp. 150 – 151), available at: http://ansar.ru/arhives/arch/right03.01.12.html, accessed 6 February 2007.

⁵⁸Author's interview with Rustem Shakirov, Imam-muhtasib of the DUM RB in Oktyabr'sky city, 12 August 2004, Oktyabr'sky city, Bashkortostan.

⁵⁹A social organisation established in 1998, composed of representatives of the four ‘traditional’ religions of Russia: Orthodox, Islam, Judaism, and Tibetian Buddhism.

⁶⁰Author's interview with Valery Vyatkin, executive secretary of the Interconfessional Consultative Committee of Perm Oblast', 30 December 2005, Perm city.

⁶¹Author's interview with S. B. Neganov, Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Perm Oblast' administration, 28 February 2005, Perm city.

⁶²Author's interview with Khamit Galyautdinov, vice-chairman of the DUMER, chairman of the DUMER in Perm Oblast', and other community leaders of the Central Mosque of Perm city, 29 December 2005, Perm city.

⁶³On Khuzin's biography see Matsuzato (2007, p. 152), available at: http://www.religio.ru/dosje/21/56_print.html, accessed 6 February 2007.

⁶⁴Author's interview with Tagil Ilkaev, Deputy-mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Perm Oblast', 30 December 2005, Perm city.

⁶⁵Since Perm is a large industrial and university city, many Muslims from Asia and Africa pray at the Central Mosque.

⁶⁶The Central Mosque opened a madrasah in 2003, but Khuzin disclosed procedural flaws in this action and won its closure. Having already secured a solid building, this madrasah is preparing for its legal opening in the near future.

⁶⁷Only 1,000 copies were printed. Its presentation was held at the Pilgrim Centre of the Moscow Patriarchate on 12 October 2005. Because of its explosive characteristics, Silant'ev's book immediately became a scarce publication, which every specialist is looking for but only a few have read. I am one of the unfortunate specialists who have not found the book despite a serious quest.

⁶⁸V. Biserov, ‘Razvitie sobytii vokrug knigi R. Silant'eva’, 2006, available at: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/wpipr/silantjev.pdf, accessed 26 March 2007. For Salman, see footnote 31.

⁶⁹Author's interview with Mukhammedgali Khuzin, mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Perm Oblast', 28 December 2005, Perm city. Khuzin was released from the post of Perm mufti on 1 February 2006.

⁷⁰Author's interview with Ilkaev, 30 December 2005.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kimitaka Matsuzato

This article is one of the outcomes of the research project ‘Islam and Politics in Russia: A Multi-Layered and Comparative Approach’ (2003 – 06) financed by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Sciences and Technology. Parts of the data discussed here are drawn from the publication of this project (Matsuzato 2007). I am grateful to its authors, Arbakhan Magomedov, Nail' Mukharyamov, and Rushan Gallyamov, discussions with whom moulded the ideas of this article.