How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin

Abstract

The article examines the control system that Stalin established to enforce his orders. Historical records demonstrate that Stalin designed the system's scope, organisation and credentials to maximise its cost-effectiveness. On several occasions Stalin deliberately limited the system's size and stimulated whistle-blowing in an attempt to mitigate running costs. In contrast, distorted preferences and constraints on inspectors’ loyalty contributed to the multiplication of the number of monitoring agencies. Because his orders were incomplete, Stalin authorised his inspectors not only to monitor, but also to intervene in operational matters wherever necessary.

Notes

State archive of Russian Federation (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, hereafter GARF) fond 7511, opis 1, delo 23, l. 1.

GARF fond 8418, opis 12, delo 402, l. 131. See also GARF fond 7511, opis 1, delo 77, l. 3. (Plan Komissii partiinogo kontrolya na avgust –dekabr’ 1934); GARF fond 8300, opis 2, delo 749, l. 198 (Rukopis' monographii V.I.Gosteva ‘Gosudarstevennyi kontrol’ v sisteme sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo upravleniya’ (Vadim Gostev's manuscript on history of State Control, 1951)); Hoover/RGANI (‘Archives of the Former Soviet State and Communist Party’ from the Russian State Archives of Recent History at the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution, and Peace) fond 6, opis 1, delo 12, l. 7 (Komissiya partiinogo kontrolya (KPK) decree, March 1936); GARF fond 8300, opis 1, delo 901, l. 231 (Minister of State Control, Vasilii Zhavoronkov, 9 June 1954); see also Ikonnikov (1971). Note: references to Hoover/RGANI in this footnote and subsequently refer to copies of Soviet archive material held by the Hoover Institution which have different catalogue numbers from those of the Soviet archives.

GARF fond 7511, opis 1, delo 77, l. 5.

GARF fond 7733, opis 17, delo 1453, l. 141 (list of employees in the all-union bodies, June 1939).

Hoover/RGASPI (‘Archives of the Former Soviet State and Communist Party’ from the Russian State Archives of Social and Political History at the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution, and Peace) fond 59, opis 2, delo 1–11 (records of speeches at the congress).

Hoover/RGASPI fond 59, opis 2, delo 1, ll. 97–97a; see also Rudzutak's speech, RGASPI (Russian State Archives of Social and Political History) fond 59, opis 2, delo 1, l. 105.

Hoover/RGASPI fond 59, opis 2, delo 1, l. 94; see also Yaroslavskii's and Maria Ul'anova's—a top official at TsKK–RKI at that time and Lenin's sister—speeches (Hoover/RGASPI fond 59, opis 2, delo 1, ll. 115, 119, 178–79).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 1, delo 15, l. 134.

Hoover/RGASPI fond 17, opis 2, delo 673, l. 113.

Hoover/RGASPI fond 17, opis 122, delo 128, ll. 1, 23–24 (December 1946).

I have found an example of such explicit calculations in the late Soviet period. In December 1987 the Politburo discussed the question of the size of the Soviet system of justice. Top Party officials stated that the Soviet system of justice cost R169 million and ‘earned’ R380 million for the state budget in the previous year, arguing for the necessity of its extension (Hoover/RGANI fond 89, opis 7, delo 12, ll. 8–9).

See for example, Stalin's speeches at the XVII Party congresses in 1934 (Hoover/RGASPI fond 59, opis 2, delo 1, l. 92).

Pravda, 7 September 1940.

See, for example, the internal report of a new chief inspector of the Defence Committee in 1938 (GARF fond 8418, opis 12, delo 402, ll. 130–31, May 1938), and the speech of the head of KSK at the KSK bureau meeting in 1936 (GARF fond 7511, opis 1, delo 136, l. 123) (Antipov, December 1936).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 6, delo 44, l. 88.

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 6, delo 83, ll. 170–72; fond 6, opis 6, delo 86, ll. 110–12; Hoover/GARF (‘Archives of the Former Soviet State and Communist Party’ from the State Archive of Russian Federation at the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace) fond 8131, opis 28, delo 259, ll. 1–6.

This procedure for making lists outlived Stalin himself; see for example a decree of the Ministry of State Control issued on 6 June 1953 (GARF fond 8300, opis 2, delo 2, ll. 275–77).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 6, delo 6 (KPK report, 1952).

Hoover/GARF fond 8131, opis 15, delo 49, l. 27 (report of the prosecution service, May 1938).

Hoover/GARF fond 8131, opis 14, delo 3, ll. 11–13 (Vyshinskii, 1936).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 6, delo 1090, l. 4 (KPK report, 1952).

GARF fond 8300, opis 2, delo 189, l. 55 (December 1946).

GARF fond 8300, opis 2, delo 2, ll. 32–34 (November 1943).

GARF fond 8300, opis 2, delo 9, l. 106 (August 1948).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 2, delo 6, ll. 4–5.

GARF fond 7511, opis 1, delo 77, l. 5.

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 6, delo 40, ll. 1–2 (Shkiryatov to Malenkov, May 1949); fond 6, opis 6, delo 1, l. 20 (the Party Control Commission report, July 1952).

Beyond the central control agencies, various intra-branch inspectorates existed. Usually they had rather wide authority but only within their ‘branches’, which were ministries, main administrations or factories. They executed external control over lower levels, subordinating them directly to a branch boss, like a minister, or a director of chief administration etc.

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 1, delo 43, l. 258.

Hoover/GARF fond 8131, opis 14, delo 3, l. 6.

See for example, Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 1, delo 32, l. 134 (KPK decision, August 1934); fond 6, opis 2, delo 259, l. 19 (KPK decision, June 1950); Hoover/GARF fond 8131, opis 28, delo 720, l. 2 (the prosecution service decision, 1950).

GARF fond 8300, opis 2, delo 749, l. 224 (Kisilev's comments on Gostev's manuscript on the history of state control, March 1952).

The question of political loyalty of agents is beyond the scope of this article. For analysis of Stalin's relations with the NKVD and his strategy for monitoring his agents' political loyalty, see Gregory (1990); for theoretical analyses of loyalty under dictatorship see Wintrobe (1998, 2001).

Hoover/GARF fond 8131, opis 9, delo 5a, ll. 1–38.

See for example reports about such investigations in 1939 and 1943 (Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 6, delo 2, ll. 20–21; GARF fond 8300, opis 2, delo 71, l. 39).

Hoover/GARF fond 8131, opis 11, delo 11, ll. 11–12 (report of the prosecution service, November 1934).

Hoover/GARF fond 8131, opis 23, delo 103, ll. 11–17 (KPK charter, February 1934).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 1, delo 77, ll. 87–90, 107–108; fond 6, opis 1, delo 78, ll. 135–38; fond 6, opis 1, delo 95, ll. 110–13.

Hoover/RGASPI fond 17, opis 2, delo 649, ll. 125–58 (Malenkov at the meeting of the Party Central Committee, May 1939).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 6, delo 1, l. 2 (the KPK report, July 1952).

GARF fond 8300, opis 4, delo 1, l. 1 (SNK decree, October 1940).

The term was suggested by Wheatcroft (2004, p. 79).

In this case the state prosecution service acted not as a control organisation but as an investigation agency that presented criminal cases to the court (different branches of the state prosecution service were responsible for these two tasks). Normally, control agencies did not have the right to start up criminal proceedings. The only exception was the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which could investigate criminal cases by itself and even judge citizens in an extrajudicial manner, i.e. not in ordinary courts (Solomon 1996). In 1946 the Ministry of State Control asked for the right to conduct formal criminal investigations and to pass cases directly to the courts, but Stalin refused it (Hoover/GARF, 8131/23/103: 11–17 June 1946).

GARF fond 7511, opis 1, delo 23, 1.1 (KSK charter, February 1934).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 1, delo 1, l. 7 (KPK charter, Febrary 1934); fond 6, opis 6, delo 1, l. 2 (the Party Control Commission report, July 1952).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 1, delo 1, l. 8 (KPK charter, February 1934).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 1, delo 4, l. 22 (June 1934).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 1, delo 92, ll. 27, 34–35.

GARF fond 7511, opis 1, delo 204, l. 32 (additional materials for KSK report to the government, July 1939).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 2, delo, 253, ll. 168–69.

GARF 7511/1/204 f. 129.

Hoover/GARF fond 8131, opis 9, delo 5a, ll. 10–11 (1931–1932 report of the prosecution service).

GARF fond 7511, opis 1, delo 204, l. 25 (additional materials for KSK report to the government, July 1939).

GARF fond 7511, opis 1, delo 204, ll. 281–82 (report by an Inspector Sergeev, December 1939).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 2, delo 32, l. 62 (KPK memo, October 1940).

GARF fond 7511, opis 1, delo 201, l. 1 (State Control Commission decree, February 1938).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 1, delo 73, l. 113 (April 1937).

Hoover/RGANI fond 6, opis 6, delo 44, ll. 7–8, 78 (minutes of KPK meeting, July 1940).

GARF fond 8300, opis 2, delo 260, l. 103; fond 8300, opis 17, delo 369, ll. 9, 16.

GARF fond 8300, opis 2, delo 1, l. 58 (Instruction by the Ministry of State Control, August 1952).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andrei Markevich

The author thanks the European commission for funding his Marie Curie Fellowship at the University of Warwick and the New Economic School (Moscow, Russia), and the project, ‘Dictatorship, Hierarchies and the Stalinist Economy: The Soviet Defence Industry 1929–1953’ (MIF1-CT-2005-021656), under which this article was written. The author is grateful to Paul Gregory, Sergei Guriev, Mark Harrison and Geoff Renshaw for advice and comments.