Speaking European: Conditionality, Public Attitudes and Pro-European Party Rhetoric in the Western Balkans

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Notes

Recognising that the parties under examination varied in their critical attitudes towards the EU, the term EU-sceptic/anti-EU will be used throughout this essay. The Tuđman era HDZ was never outwardly anti-EU (although certain members perhaps were), but openly pursued policies which put it at odds with the European Union and occasionally made it clear that national interests, as defined by the HDZ, would always take precedence. Serbia's SPS and SRS showed a rather higher degree of EU-scepticism. While the SPS made occasional mention of support for eventual EU membership, its policies towards The Hague and occasional anti-EU statements placed it squarely in the EU-sceptic, or even anti-EU, camp. The SRS frequently made openly anti-EU statements while advocating closer ties with Russia as an alternative to closer relations with the Union. Party Assistant General Secretary Dejan Mirović also published two monographs presenting arguments against EU membership while supporting closer ties with Russia.

Two notable exceptions to this generalisation are studies focused on the HDZ, by Pickering and Baskin (2008), which focuses primarily on the HDZ as a post-communist successor party (thus concentrating more on the development of the party before 2000), and by Longo (2006) which focuses mostly on the electoral challenges facing the HDZ prior to the 2007 elections. Both articles point to the importance of the EU membership process and selective international intervention in driving Sanader's reform of the party.

Party transformation has been dealt with in a number of Serbian-language works on party politics (Goati 2004, 2006; Stojilković 2008).

It should be noted that a shift in public mood against the conditionality-wielding organisation will have the opposite effect of raising the risk for cooperative parties or at least lowering the risk of non-cooperation.

As suggested by the example of the Serbian Socialist Party following the 2003 elections, bans only apply to actual participation in the government. DSS's Vojislav Koštunica cooperated with the SPS in the aftermath of the December 2003 elections without suffering stronger international repercussions by arranging the socialists' support for his minority government without actually including them in it.

Nationally representative survey conducted by the International Republican Institute and PULS research agency in November 1999 (IRI, National Public Opinion Survey, PowerPoint Presentation, February 2001, author's personal collection).

Nationally representative poll conducted by the Faculty of Political Science Research Group, University of Zagreb in December 2000 (Faculty of Political Science Research Group, University of Zagreb, Elections 2000, author's personal collection. This is a 1,126-respondent, nationally representative survey that was carried out in the second half of December 2000).

Paula Pickering and Mark Baskin's (2008) study of the heirs to the League of Communists of Croatia once again provides an exception with its focus on the HDZ's transformation and the international community's impact on the changes within the party.

Interviews with Goran Čular, Zagreb, 18 June 2009; and Ivić Pašalić, Zagreb, 22 June 2009.

Throughout its existence, the HDZ presented a rather broad tent which included both moderate and extremist wings. Factions and splinters had also occurred during the 1990s—perhaps the most notable being future Croatian President Stipe Mesić's departure to form the Croatian Independent Democrats party (HND) in 1994.

Interview with Ivić Pašalić, Zagreb, 22 June 2009.

Interviews with Miomir Žužul, Zagreb, 29 June 2009; Goran Čular, Zagreb, 18 June 2009; and Ivić Pašalić, Zagreb, 22 June 2009.

The fate of Pašalić's Croatian Bloc and even Granić's centre-right Democratic Centre provided examples of the poor prospects for a new right-of-centre party on Croatia's HDZ-dominated right.

Interviews with Ivić Pašalić, Zagreb 22 June 2009; Goran Čular, Zagreb, 18 June 2009; and Miomir Žužul, Zagreb, 29 June 2009. It should also be noted that this account differs from Longo's (2006) study which incorrectly identifies the vote at the 2002 General Congress as the one that invested Sanader in the HDZ presidency.

On 11 February, a massive rally in Split attracted somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 people. Participation in rallies and protests in other cities varied widely usually in relation to the HDZ's local strength (‘Bobetko: u ovoj zemlji mi odlučujemo’, Jutarnji List, 2 February 2001).

As indicated by polls conducted by the Croatian Office for European Integration and the Centre for Market Research, public support for the European Union during the period from July 2000 through to June 2003 ranged from a maximum of 79.4% to a minimum of 73.6%. Survey details available at: http://www.mvpei.hr/ei/default.asp?ru=219&sid=&akcija=&jezik=2, accessed 23 July 2011.

It should also be noted that this article presented a subset of responses from veterans which found that the breakdown of responses to these options was nearly identical to the general population. As the article's title indicated, 70% of veterans supported either unconditional or individual cooperation.

In a 15 February article, the head of the Association of Croatian Volunteers of the Homeland War (Udruga hrvatskih dragovoljaca Domovinskog rata, UHDDR) complained that the HDZ was using veterans' organisations for its own political gain and was not really concerned with their plight (Despot 2001).

A total of 1,005 delegates voted for Sanader, 912 for Pašalić and 40 for nationalist ideologue Maja Freundlich (Đuretek 2002).

‘Branimir Glavaš: Sanader mi šalje tekliće s ponudama u BiH’, Javno.hr, 25 May 2009.

It should be noted that reports on the congress actually carried no statements about the issue of returnees (Plišić 2003).

Results for major parties and coalitions were as follows: HDZ, 33.91%; SDP–IDS-Libra, 22.61%; HNS–SBHS–PGS, 8.02%; HSS, 7.15%; HSP–ZDS, 6.37%; HSLS–DC, 4.05%; HSU, 3.97% (International Foundation for Electoral Systems' searchable online electoral database (official Croatian results are disaggregated by electoral district and thus difficult to aggregate into national-level figures). The database is available at: http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=396, accessed 11 August 2011).

‘HSP Europi neprihvatljiv čak i kao parlamentarna porpora HDZ-u’, Vjesnik, 30 November 2003.

While Sanader later denied that foreign pressure was a factor in rejecting the HSP as a coalition partner, it should be noted that the new premier had earlier responded positively to the possibility of forming a coalition with what he claimed was a reformed HSP (Butković 2003).

It should also be noted that with the prospects for EU membership becoming more tangible, support for EU integration in Croatia declined sharply to the point that the Croatian public became the most EU-sceptic in the region. While the causes behind this development lie beyond the scope of the current study, a few comments are warranted. It should first be noted that this drop in support occurred after the HDZ's transformation. Therefore, such a drop does not challenge the proposition that the HDZ's transformation was driven in large part by changes in the public mood. This does, however, raise questions as to why the HDZ has not adjusted its policies to follow the post-2004 change in public opinion or why a stronger anti-EU party option has not appeared in Croatia. Pending further analysis, I would advance a few speculative responses. First, it is important to note that, regardless of how low support for the EU has fallen, polls indicate that less than 45% of the population would actually vote against Croatia's EU membership and that less than 30% believe that membership would be bad for Croatia (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2009). Furthermore, the HDZ has staked a great deal on its image as a party which will bring the country into the EU. Hence, a sudden policy change to pursue a still minority opinion would likely drive away more voters than it would attract. Finally, with Croatia well into the process of closing chapters (by April 2010, Croatia had closed 18 of 30 chapters) there are simply no political actors on the scene who are willing to reverse the process at this late stage (interview with Vesna Pusić, Zagreb, 15 July 2010; an anonymous interview with a member of the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, 14 July 2010; and interview with Goran Čular, Zagreb, 13 July 2010).

In response to Koštunica's strategy, DS and the coalition ‘For a European Serbia’ argued that there was no such dilemma—Serbia could sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and keep Kosovo. While a detailed discussion of the relationship between Kosovo's status and EU membership lies beyond the scope of this essay, it warrants mentioning that, as of February 2010, 22 of the EU's current 27 members have recognised Kosovo's independence and that a final requirement for the admission of new members to the EU is approval by the parliaments of all existing member states. Therefore, regardless of the EU's official stance (or lack thereof) on the independence issue, there remains sufficient doubt that Serbia can successfully join the European Union without losing a portion of its territory.

Interview with Mirijana Simić, Belgrade, 23 June 2008.

Belgrade Center for Human Rights, ‘Stavovi prema ratnim zlocinima, Haškom tribunalu i domaćem pravosuđu za ratne zločine’, available at: http://bgcentar.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=358:stavovi-prema-ratnim-zloinima-hakom-tribunalu-i-domaem-pravosuu-za-ratne-zloine-&catid=125, accessed 22 July 2011.

‘Većina građana ne misli da je Radovan Karadžić heroj’, Blic, 26 July 2008. It should be noted, however, that the survey indicated that 86% of respondents felt that the ICTY was anti-Serb and 54% opposed the extradition to the ICTY of Karadžić.

Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2008, available at: http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/dashboard, accessed 22 July 2011.

European Integration Office, ‘Evropska orijentacija građana Srbije trendovi’, May 2009, available at: http://seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/prezentacije/maj_09_final_srpski.pdf, accessed 22 July 2011.

‘Milošević odbio kandidaturu i predlozio Šešelja’, B92, 13 August 2002, available at: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2002&mm=08&dd=13&nav_id=62530&nav_category=11, accessed 22 July 2011. While a number of splits occurred in the immediate aftermath of the SPS's double defeats at the end of 2000 (Milorad Vučelić, Zoran Lilić and Branislav Ivković) these splinters were at times driven by questionable motives (Milorad Vučelić's could best be explained as an effort to escape the SPS label while still maintaining the worst of its policies) and consistently resulted in short-lived political projects. Furthermore, Vučelić and Lilić returned to the SPS (Konitzer 2010).

‘Marjanović oslobođen duznosti predsednika SPS-a’, B92, 25 August 2002, available at: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2002&mm=08&dd=25&nav_category=11&nav_id=68155, accessed 22 July 2011.

‘Odluka o opstanku socijalista’, Politika, 15 January 2003.

‘Odluka o opstanku socijalista’, Politika, 15 January 2003.

Nationally representative surveys conducted by the International Republic Institute in November 2002 and January 2003 (IRI, November 2002 Serbian National Survey, PowerPoint Presentation, author's personal collection; IRI, January 2003 Serbian National Survey, PowerPoint Presentation, author's personal collection).

‘Kršljanin optužuje Dačića i Minića za izdaju stranke’, Danas, 9 January 2003.

‘Milošević opet predsednik SPS-a’, Glas Javnosti, 19 January 2003.

‘Ivica Dačić Predsednik Glavnog Odbora’, Politika, 19 January 2003.

‘Ivica Dačić Predsednik Glavnog Odbora’, Politika, 19 January 2003.

‘Nova obaveze’, Politika, 1 April 2003.

‘SPS poziva na ispraćaj’, Blic, 21 February 2003.

‘Opet o Hagu’, Glas javnosti, 14 March 2003.

‘Vesna Gojković štrajkuje glađu’, Večernje novosti, 22 June 2003.

‘Uhapšen na rođendan projavio ga komšija’, Glas javnosti, 14 June 2003.

‘Ne ubijajte Miloševića!’, Vecernje novosti, 21 October 2003; ‘Sloboda za Miloševića’, Politika, 21 September 2003; ‘Miting pred Tribunalom’, Večernje novosti, 28 June 2003.

‘Reagovanja na optužnice’, Blic, 22 October 2003.

‘Ako vec mora, suđenje kod kuće’, Dnevnik, 21 December 2003.

‘Oslobađanje od “Slobode”’, Politika, 13 January 2003.

‘Greška u koracima demokrata’, Kurir, 4 February 2003. It is also interesting to note that, at the time, a number of Serbian liberal democrats accused DSS of betraying the principles of 5 October 2000 by joining with the Socialists.

‘SPS preti Koštunici praznom puškom’, Balkan, 6 July 2004.

‘S Miloševićem kao “pod ručnom”’, Glas javnosti, 26 July 2005.

‘Palma’ is the nickname of Dragan Marković.

‘Blic: Dogovor DSS-SRS o novoj vladi’, B92, 11 March 2008, available at: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=03&dd=11&nav_id=288614, accessed 22 July 2011.

Nonetheless, Vojislav Koštunica was able to turn the SRS veto to his advantage in the aftermath of the 2007 parliamentary elections. His decision to support the candidacy of SRS Vice President Nikolić for parliamentary president likely forced the Democratic Party to concede to his coalition demands and allow him to maintain his post as Prime Minister in the new government.

In the aftermath of the split, it was also pointed out that Tomislav Nikolić had supposedly backed a plan to remove references to ‘Greater Serbia’ from the Radical Party's platform as early as 1996–1997, however he dropped his support for the proposal after Vojislav Šešelj threatened to leave the party over the change.

Examples of this dynamic included Šešelj drawing a parallel between Zoran Đinđic's assassin and Gavrilo Princip during the 2008 parliamentary elections, the SRS president's hunger strike on the eve of the 2007 parliamentary campaign, and his political testament released during the 2008 campaign which prohibited the party's support for European integration and cooperation with certain parties (Didanović 2008).

‘Mirčić: Svi smo uz Šešelja’, Dnevnki, 4 September 2008.

For Serbs, a kum is a witness (best man/maid of honour) at a wedding or godparent at a baptism. While the institution has perhaps weakened in more urban settings there is still an expectation of strong emotional and spiritual ties between kumovi (plural for kum).

This coincidence led some observers to casually suggest in informal interviews that the entire drama was in fact staged for this very purpose.

It is interesting to note that around this time, the Radicals also publicly reaffirmed their commitment to this largely dormant plank in their party platform. This was interpreted as an effort to distinguish themselves from the new Progressives and rally their remaining hardline supporters.

Interviews with Nebojša Stefanović Belgrade, 9 August 2009; and Belgrade, 16 March 2010; see also Vučić (2009).

Interview with Nebojša Stefanović, Belgrade, 9 August 2009.

Interview with Nebojša Stefanović, Belgrade, 16 March 2010; Vučić (2009).

‘Strašan zločin u Srebrenici’, Blic, 22 January 2010. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.

Anonymous interview with US Embassy Official, Belgrade, 3 June 2009; and interview with Nebojša Stefanović, Belgrade, 9 August 2009; see also Isailović (2009).

Citizens of countries on the white Schengen list are eligible for visa free travel in the EU Schengen zone for a period of up to 90 days. Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia were placed on the white Schengen list starting in December 2009.

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Notes on contributors

Andrew Konitzer

The author acknowledges that the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER), under the authority of a Title VIII grant from the US Department of State, supported the work leading to this report in whole or in part. Neither NCEEER nor the US government is responsible for the views expressed in this text.