Suicide Bombing: Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Martyrdom

Abstract

This essay analyses Chechen-related suicide attacks, locating them within the historical and political context of the anti-Russian insurgency in the North Caucasus and the different factions of the anti-Russian armed resistance movement in the period between the first and second Russo-Chechen wars. The core of the essay is an analysis of the different character of two waves of suicide operations, (2000–2002) and (2002–2004). The first wave was linked to nominally Islamist groups, whereas the second set of attacks were linked to Operation Boomerang devised by Shamil Basaev. Finally, the essay considers other attacks that do not fit into either of these two waves of terrorism.

Notes

I would like to thank the British Academy who funded fieldwork in Russia and the Caucasus in 2004, as part of an ongoing project analysing the insurgency in the North Caucasus. Versions of the essay were presented at, amongst other places, BISA in December 2004, as part of an ESRC workshop in January 2005, and finally at BASEES in 2009, in a panel session chaired by Galina Yemelianova. I would like to thank the panel organisers and audiences at these and other sessions, the reviewers, Beverley Brown, Matthew Frear, NK, KA, JK and VK for their comments and support, and finally Madina, Zarina and Volodya for their help in the field.

¹I use the terms ‘suicide attacks’, ‘suicide operations’ and ‘suicide missions’ interchangeably, following Gambetta (2005) and Moghadam (2008). In addition, the phrase ‘Chechen-related’ is used to illustrate that some of the attacks between 2000 and 2004 were not conducted by Chechens.

² Jama’at is an Arabic term, which literally means group or community. It has taken on a particular meaning in a military context, being used to refer to various clandestine anti-Russian groups (i.e. Ingush jama’at; Jama’at Shariat in Dagestan).

³I recognise the problems associated with labelling different actors as separatists, insurgents or terrorists. These terms are used descriptively throughout, and no value should be attached to their usage herein.

⁴I use the terms ‘Chechnya’ and the ‘North Caucasus’ throughout the essay. The first war focused on Chechnya alone, while the second conflict always had a regional character, effectively beginning in Dagestan in the summer of 1999.

⁵See Cronin (2003) for a useful review of the literature.

⁶For example, Arab volunteers are often mistakenly viewed as al-Qaeda operatives, while factions or groups in the insurgency are frequently lumped together as ‘Wahhabi’, which the federal authorities use as a derogatory catch-all label to refer to anti-Russian units. The term is also often used to refer to Islamists which are not Sufi. Of course, Wahhabism does have a specific meaning outside of its usage by federal groups in Russia.

⁷It is beyond the scope of this essay to engage with or present the range of debates either about suicide attacks in general, or even themes such as female suicide operations, Islamism and the spread of martyrdom attacks in Chechnya, although these themes are touched on.

⁸The Arabic word shahid (noun shahed) is often transliterated from Russian as shaheed. A shahid is both a martyr and witness. Although not part of Chechen culture, terminology of this kind was increasingly used by some groups so as to give particular attacks a meaning within an anti-Russian and Islamist narrative. I expand on arguments about the role of Salafism, constituent parts of the foreign fighter movement, and jihad in Chechnya, in a research paper entitled ‘Beyond Jihad in Chechnya: Foreign Fighters and the insurgency in the North Caucasus’ (Moore 2012).

⁹The Riyad-us-Saliheyn was an informal network of supporters from across the North Caucasus, led by Shamil Basaev. The network was also frequently cited as the Riyad-us-Saliheyn Reconnaissance and Sabotage Martyr Brigade. The Arabic name is transliterated into English as the Gardens of the Righteous. Despite being formed around 2000, the Riyad-us-Saliheyn was barely heard of until Nord Ost in October 2002, and only became active later that year. It undertook operations on an ad hoc basis, drawing support from various jama’ats (Vedeno; Ingush; Stavropol': Shelkovskii) across the region in the period from late 2002.

¹⁰With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Checheno–Ingushetia Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was split into the Ingushetian Federal Republic and the Chechen Federal Republic, i.e. part of the Russian Federation. In November of the same year, President Jokhar Dudayev announced the independence of the (renamed) ChRI, which was not recognised by the Russian federal government. With the end of the first Russo-Chechen war, the ChRI gained de facto, although still not formally recognised, independence, with Jokhar Dudayev as its first president.

¹¹Salafiyya is a theological term that refers to a movement in which Muslims should strive to follow the pious fathers, or first three generations of Islam. The Salafi movement includes both militant groups, including some which are pan-Islamist and Umma-orientated, as well as peaceful branches of thought. Salafism—and more specifically the adoption and use of jihad by particular Islamist groups—is often shaped by local political dynamics, hence the need to provide a detailed reading of statements by key commanders and the context which shape the use of holy war.

¹²See the interview with Yandarbiyev for references to his adoption of radical Islam in Vremya Novosti, 27 December 2001.

¹³The local Islamist irredentists (Udugov, Yandarbiyev and their paramilitary allies), as well as local and foreign fighters (Basaev and Khattab) operated within a pan-Islamist current, which itself, was enveloped in a larger Salafi jihadi movement. However, it is not feasible to identify how different elements of these groups formed alliances, partly because the actions of these groups changed over time, blurring the distinction between them. Importantly though, their actions were not shaped by the popular usage of Wahhabism.

¹⁴ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 August 1998.

¹⁵The use of the sobriquet ‘al-Zarqi’ points to the Abdurakhman's background as part of the Chechen Jordanian diaspora in Zarqa.

¹⁶Maskhadov did have a network of supporters in foreign countries. Within the ChRI he had the support of a number of field commanders, including Akhmed Avtorkhanov and Vakha Arsanov, as well as the head of the Argun jama'at, Abdul Khalim Sadulayev. Beyond the borders, Maskhadov had support from official and unofficial ChRI representatives, such as Akhmed Zakayev, Umar Khambiyev, and informal support from others, including representatives in the diaspora.

¹⁷ Interfax, 14 June 2000, the author retains a hard copy of this newswire report.

¹⁸For example, see the interview with Akhmad Kadyrov in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 10 January 2000.

¹⁹The fatwa aimed to legitimise female martyrdom operations, linking the actions of Chechen rebels to the broader transnational Salafi movement. ‘The Islamic Ruling of the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations’, available at: http://www.religioscope.com/pdf/martyrdom.pdf, accessed 15 June 2008.

²⁰ ITAR-TASS, 12 June 2000, the author retains a hard copy of this newswire report.

²¹‘Over 300 suicide fighters join special Chechen battalion’, Kavkaz Tsentr, 13 June 2000.

²²Nokhchi Information Centre, 3 July 2000. Although this pro-rebel news centre is now discontinued, the author is in possession of a transcript of this news report, translated from Russian.

²³‘Chechenskie Komandiry Slyshat Rezul'taty Napadenii na Rossiiskie Tseli’, Kavkaz Tsentr, 4 July 2000.

²⁴ Interfax, 20 December 2000.

²⁵See, for example, Yuzik (2003).

²⁶Nokhchi Information Centre, radio broadcast 5 January 2001. The author retains a transcript of the statement.

²⁷Some female hostage-takers donned the burqa, dress usually worn in Islamic societies but which is not part of the traditional female dress in Chechnya, while banners in Arabic were displayed in the theatre.

²⁸‘Chechen Warlord Basaev Takes Responsibility for Moscow Siege’, Kavkaz Tsentr, 1 November 2002.

²⁹A nabeg is a lightening raid. It was traditionally used by different groups in the North Caucasus to capture cattle or hostages. The speed and style of these attacks generated fear and panic. Two independent raids, akin to militarised nabegs, were employed by Chechen groups in June 1995 and January 1996.

³⁰‘Female Bomber Kills 14’, Moscow Times, 15 May 2003, p. 1.

³¹‘Chechen Dies After Suicide Bombing’, The Moscow Times, 29 July 2003, p. 3.

³²‘Four Go on Trial in Mozdok Suicide Blast’, The Moscow Times, 10 August 2004, p. 3.

³³ Interfax, 20 June 2003, the author retains a transcript of this newswire report.

³⁴‘Chechen “Black Widows” Claim Responsibility for Yessentuki, Moscow Blasts’, Kavkaz Tsentr, 23 December 2003, available at: http://kavkazcentrer.com/eg/content/2003/12/25/2196.shtml, accessed 25 July 2012.

³⁵Basaev made a series of pronouncement about Operation Boomerang in an interview for Channel Four news, on 3 February 2005. The text of the interview is available at: http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2005/02/04/3500.shtml, accessed 9 July 2009.

³⁶Security sweeps following the Nazran raid did yield some results for the federal forces. Federal authorities killed Abu Queytyba, a logistical and financial expert, and an influential member of the Arab mujahedeen, who had helped organise the Nazran raid.

³⁷The Islambouli Brigades are a small militant Islamist group which had launched a handful of attacks in Pakistan. Khalid Islambouli was a junior officer in the Egyptian army who planned and participated in the assassination the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, in 1981. Members of the Egyptian al-Jihad group responsible for the attack were quickly arrested. Khalid was sentenced to death by the Egyptian authorities in 1982, and thereafter became eulogised in radical Islamist circles as one of the first modern martyrs. The group had never launched attacks in Russia and no evidence was provided to support the statement claiming responsibility.

³⁸3 February 2005. The text of the interview is available at: http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2005/02/04/3500.shtml, accessed 9 July 2009.

³⁹3 February 2005. The text of the interview is available at: http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2005/02/04/3500.shtml, accessed 9 July 2009.

⁴⁰For instance, Abu Bakr Bizambayev was killed while Rustam Ganiev was arrested. See the Ministry of Information (MOI) available at: http://eng.mvdrf.ru/news/337/?print, accessed 10 August 2010.

⁴¹The customary report on military operations published through the Kavkaz Tsentr mentioned the attack but Basaev, the Riyad-us-Saliheyn or any other group or individual did not claim responsibility. See ‘Special Operations of the Chechen Mujahideen’, Kavkaz Tsentr, 4 December 2001, available at: http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2001/12/04/71.shtml, accessed 10 August 2010.

⁴²‘Blast in Metro was revenge for Aldy?’, 8 February 2004, available at: http://kavkaz.org.uk/eng/content/2004/03/01/2470_print.html, accessed 8 July 2009. See also, ‘Unknown Rebel Group Claims Moscow Metro Blast’, Gazeta.ru, available at: http://www.gazeta.ru/2004/03/02/oa_113618.shtml.

⁴³The idea of ‘blood revenge’ being an essential component of the second conflict was raised more recently in the ethnographic work of Souleimanov and Ditrych (2008).