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Abstract
The recognition of Kosovo did not go unnoticed in other aspiring states, but did it necessarily lead to renewed hopes for independence? Drawing on interviews with key actors, this essay analyses its effect in Nagorno-Karabakh. It finds that separatist demands are shaped by a complex interplay of external and internal forces, including international norms and practices. This explains the rather surprising finding that the Karabakh leaders in response to the recognitions of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia gave up on recognition, at least temporarily, and instead started championing non-recognition as an attractive, sustainable status.
Notes
Research for this essay was funded by a scholarship from the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-000-22-2728). The author would like to thank Annemarie Peen Rodt, Stefan Wolff and the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and suggestions.
1 See also Ker-Lindsay's contribution to this collection.
2 ‘Russia Lifts Sanctions from Abkhazia’, Kommersant'', 8 March 2008, available at: http://www.kommersant.com/p864557/r_500/unrecognized_states/, accessed 14 April 2011.
3 For another view of the war see Cornell and Starr (Citation2009).
4 Kosovo was formally an autonomous province of Serbia, while Abkhazia was an autonomous republic of Georgia and South Ossetia was an autonomous region.
5 These three cases differ significantly in terms of the number of states that have recognised their independence, but they are all cases of formerly autonomous provinces that have previously been denied recognition but have now achieved it (to varying degrees). This has reignited debates over national self-determination and has been observed with great interest by other unrecognised entities. In this sense the three recognitions will therefore be treated as comparable.
6 In 1979, the year of the last reliable census for the region, the population was estimated to be 162,000, including 123,000 Armenians and 37,000 Azerbaijanis (De Waal Citation2003, pp. 284–85).
7 See also Wolff and Rodt's introduction to this collection.
8 ‘Actor transformations’ refers to internal changes in parties and movements, and the appearance of new parties and movements. For further discussion of different types of transformation, see Miall (Citation2004, p. 168).
9 For definitions of unrecognised states, see for example Caspersen (Citation2012).
10 Author's interview with Veljko Džakula, former minister in RSK government, Zagreb, 23 March 2009.
11 Only at the eleventh hour did they agree to negotiate and by then it was too late.
12 Author's interview with Rajko Ležajić, former speaker of the Krajina parliament, Belgrade, 17 September 2004.
13 For ‘earned sovereignty’ see, for example, Scharf (Citation2004) and Williams and Pecci (Citation2004).
14 Author's interview with Paata Zakareishvili, political analyst, Tbilisi, 31 August 2006.
15 Author's interview with Naira Ayrumyan, journalist, Stepanakert, 2 November 2008.
16 Author's interview with Karabakh official, Stepanakert, 11 September 2006.
17 Stated at a press conference held following the Karabakh constitutional referendum, attended by the author, Stepanakert, 11 December 2006.
18 Council of the European Union, 2851st Council Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, Press Release, 18 February 2008, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/98818.pdf, accessed 1 March 2008.
19 For further analysis of the EU's position on Kosovo, see Tannam's contribution to this collection.
20 Author's interview with David Babayan, adviser to the NKR president, Stepanakert, 28 October 2008.
21 Author's interviews with Gegham Baghdasaryan, opposition MP, Stepanakert, 27 October 2008 and Karine Ohanyan, journalist, Stepanakert, 3 November 2008.
22 Author's interview with Tevan Poghosyan, political analyst, Yerevan, 24 October 2008.
23 Author's interview with Tevan Poghosyan, political analyst, Yerevan, 24 October 2008.
24 Author's interviews with Vahram Atanesyan, chairman of the NKR Foreign Relations Committee, Stepanakert, 29 October 2008, and Ashot Ghulyan, speaker of the NKR parliament, Stepanakert, 27 October 2008.
25 Author's interview with Vahram Atanesyan, chairman of the NKR Foreign Relations Committee, Stepanakert, 29 October 2008.
26 Author's interview with Georgy Petrosyan, NKR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stepanakert, 31 October 2008.
27 Author's interviews with Arkady Ghukasyan, former NKR president, Stepanakert, 3 November 2008, Hrachya Arzoumanyan, expert in the NKR Foreign Ministry, Stepanakert, 1 November 2008, and Vahram Atanesyan, chairman of the NKR Foreign Relations Committee, Stepanakert, 29 October 2008.
28 Author's interview with David Babayan, adviser to the NKR president, Stepanakert, 28 October 2008.
29 Author's interview with Hrachya Arzoumanyan, expert in the NKR Foreign Ministry, Stepanakert, 1 November 2008.
30 Author's interview with David Babayan, adviser to the NKR president, Stepanakert, 28 October 2008.
31 Author's interview with David Babayan, adviser to the NKR president, Stepanakert, 28 October 2008. See also Ohanian (Citation2008a).
32 ‘New Karabakh Parliament Convenes, Elects Leadership’, RFE/RL, 11 June 2010.
33 Author's interviews with Naira Ayrumyan, journalist, Stepanakert, 2 November 2008, and Karine Ohanyan, journalist, Stepanakert, 3 November 2008.
34 The violence experienced in Kosovo in both 2008 and 2011 meanwhile demonstrated that not even widespread recognition guarantees security and stability.
35 Author's interview with Gegham Baghdasaryan, opposition MP, Stepanakert, 27 October 2008.
36 For the demographic challenges facing Nagorno-Karabakh, see for example Ohanian (Citation2008b).
37 Author's interview with Araik Harutyunyan, NKR prime minister, Stepanakert, 30 October 2008.
38 This does not mean that recognised sovereignty excludes disorder and insecurity, as clearly evidenced by, for example, Afghanistan and Somalia.
39 The document has not been made public. See, for example, De Waal (Citation2009).
40 It is also worth noting that the Azerbaijani authorities are categorically opposed to an agreement that could lead to independence. Author's interview with Rasim Musabekov, political analyst, Baku, 12 June 2009.
41 Author's interviews with Hrachya Arzoumanyan, expert in the NKR Foreign Ministry, Stepanakert, 1 November 2008, and David Babayan, adviser to the NKR president, Stepanakert, 28 October 2008.
42 For an unofficial translation of the agreement, see http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/keytexts15.php, accessed 5 June 2013.
43 Author's interview with Vahram Atanesyan, chairman of the NKR Foreign Relations Committee, Stepanakert, 29 October 2008.
44 Author's interview with Naira Ayrumyan, journalist, Stepanakert, 2 November 2008.
45 Author's interview with Eldar Namazov, former chief adviser to the President of Azerbaijan, Baku, 16 June 2009.
