The Notion of Kosovo as a Precedent and the Impact of the Hungarian Minority Issue on Slovakia's Policy towards Kosovo's Independence

Abstract

This essay examines the importance of the Hungarian minority issue and the role of precedent in Slovakia's policy towards Kosovo. It shows that the Slovak view was not only a product of its issues with the Hungarian minority but also a response both to the activities of representatives of Hungary and of the ethnic Hungarian party in Slovakia, the SMK. On the basis of Brubaker's concept of ‘triadic nexus’ it explains relations between Slovakia and Hungary based on the minority issue. It also highlights the role of collective rights as presented in the Ahtisaari plan in 2007 and their perception by Slovak officials.

Notes

¹ The Hungarian minority issue represents an important element but one needs to acknowledge that it was not the only reason behind Slovakia's reaction. Other arguments for the Slovak non-recognition of Kosovo include the relationship to Serbia, regional stability, the issue of international law and internal domestic politics issues. Slovak officials presented respect for international law as the prime reason for the Slovak position on Kosovo. In August 2008, Serbia asked the General Assembly of the UN to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on whether the unilateral declaration of Kosovo was in accordance with international law. Countries were invited to submit their comments to the ICJ on this request and Slovakia sent a written statement to the Court explaining its view; however, it did not participate at the hearings (see International Court of Justice 2009). These arguments had different influences; however, this essay focuses only on the Hungarian minority issue and its analysis.

² Slovakia, known as Upper Hungary, was, between 1000 and 1918, ruled by the Kingdom of Hungary. From 1879, the Magyar language was compulsory in all people's schools and the teaching of Slovak was dramatically reduced which eventually led to the registration of Slovak children as Magyars. During the last census in the Kingdom, which took place in 1910, people were asked to identify their mother tongue; however, this was not considered to be the tongue one learnt from the mother but one that a person spoke best and most willingly. Considering the political situation, for many Slovaks it was dangerous to write that the Hungarian language was not dear to them (see Deák 2009, pp. 7–9).

³ For a detailed account on the 1910 census, see Jancura (2010).

⁴ See Treaty of Trianon, 1920, WWI Document Archive, Conventions and Treaties, Brigham Young University Library, available at: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Trianon, accessed 20 May 2011.

⁵ To give a full picture one needs to look beyond the year 2008 when Kosovo declared independence, but it should be stressed that the aim is not to go back in time and analyse the history of the Slovak–Hungarian relationship; rather, this contribution's main focus will be recent events, although occasionally relevant history is included.

⁶ This may to some extent also apply to other non-EU recognisers such as Spain, Romania and Cyprus, as well as countries like China, India and others with separatist challengers.

⁷ See also, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 February 2008; ‘Kosovo/EU: Pressure Eases on Anti-Independence Five’, Oxford Analytica, 4 January 2010; The Economist, 29 July 2010.

⁸ After the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, a UN administration was established in Kosovo until its status could be resolved. In 2005, the UN Security Council decided that it was time to resolve its future status. As a result, the status talks between Belgrade and Prishtina were initiated. Martti Ahtisaari was nominated to lead the talks as the UN Envoy for Kosovo. In March 2007 he presented the final status proposal which considered independence as the only option for Kosovo. For Serbia this was not acceptable. After two years of status talks, in December 2007 they ended in deadlock. This eventually led to Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008. For two different views on the Ahtisaari plan, see Ker-Lindsay (2009) and Perritt (2010).

⁹ Between 15 March 1994 and 13 December 1994 there was a temporary government led by Jozef Moravčík as a result of the collapse of the first Mečiar government. In 2000, HZDS was renamed L'udová strana—Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (People's Party—Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, L'S–HZDS).

¹⁰ For an English translation of the treaty see Treaty on Good-neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic, available at: http://www.regione.taa.it/biblioteca/normativa/bilaterali/slovak-magyar%20english.pdf, accessed 21 June 2011. Miroslav Lajčák (2010), the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009–2010), reflected on the treaty on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of its signature: ‘(…) both countries defined their jointly acceptable principles and standards of mutual behaviour (…). Apart from reflecting the time in which it was adopted, the Basic Treaty also mirrors all the sensitivities and asymmetries of the Slovak–Hungarian relationship. (…) The treaty has proven its worth throughout the fifteen years of its existence as a basic framework of reference in our bilateral relations’.

¹¹ ‘SMER Suspended from PES Political Family’, PES News & Media, 12 October 2006, available at: http://www.pes.org/en/news/smer-suspended-pes-political-family, accessed 10 June 2011.

¹² ‘Protests over Slovak Language Law’, BBC News, 2 September 2009, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8232878.stm, accessed 2 June 2011.

¹³ This is particularly reflected in the new Hungarian constitution adopted in 2011 and the contested term ‘united Hungarian nation’ that will be discussed later in this essay.

¹⁴ Prime Minister Antall died before the end of his term. He was succeeded by Péter Boross who held the office from December 1993 to July 1994.

¹⁵ Rupnik (2002, p. 68) considered Orbán's activities as ‘an upsurge in pre-electoral nationalist fever that does not hesitate to compromise future cooperation in the name of settling past scores’.

¹⁶ For a variety of perspectives and an in-depth analysis of the Status Law, see Kántor et al. (2004).

¹⁷ The privileges for ethnic Hungarians abroad included areas such as education, culture, travel expenses, health care services, access to the labour market and financial support. For a detailed account on the privileges, see Küpper (2004, pp. 317–19).

¹⁸ This term will be discussed in depth below.

¹⁹ See ‘“Obstacle” Hungary PM to Resign’, BBC News, 21 March 2009, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7956610.stm, accessed 23 June 2011; and Balasz and Forelle (2009). In 2010 Viktor Orbán was appointed Prime Minister after his party, FIDESZ–Hungarian Civic Union (FIDESZ–Magyar Polgári Szövetség) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt) (FIDESZ–KDNP), won a two-thirds majority in the latest parliamentary elections. Importantly, for the first time, the controversial far-right party Jobbik—The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom)—entered the parliament. For more on the latest Hungarian parliamentary elections, see Sitter (2011, pp. 249–68). The situation after Orbán's election will be debated later in this contribution.

²⁰ Hungarian Civic Party (Mad'arská občianska strana/Magyar Polgári Párt—MOS), Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (Mad'arské krest'anskodemokratické hnutie/Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Mozgalom—MKDH) and Coexistence (Spolužitie/Együttélés Politikai Mozgalom). Two other Hungarian minority parties existed, Hungarian People's Party (Mad'arskál'udová strana/Magyar Néppárt) and Hungarian People's Movement for Reconciliation and Prosperity (Mad'arské ludové hnutie za zmierenie a prosperitu/Magyar Népi Mozgalom a Megbékélésért és a Jólétért), but these were not considered as ‘relevant’ due to the low percentage of votes they received in each of the elections they participated in (see Öllös 2008, p. 64).

²¹ The term Most/Híd means ‘bridge’ in the Slovak and Hungarian languages, respectively. In addition, the party has in its subtitle ‘party of cooperation’. This indicates its aim to connect the Slovak majority and the ethnic Hungarians. With the formation of the moderate Most–Híd the ethnic identity of SMK strengthened. After the elections it was clear that the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia opted for Most–Híd rather than SMK. For a detailed analysis and comparison of both ethnic Hungarian parties, see Gyarfášová (2011, pp. 65–84).

²² This result was perceived as a surprise. It was argued that the disagreement between the two politicians was not political but personal and that Csáky's victory was ‘bad news’ for political parties (Daniš 2007b).

²³ Some information leaked out from the SMK congress that before the elections for chairman some members sided with Csáky after he pointed out that the former chairman, Bugár, had a better relationship with the Slovaks. Vladimír Palko, Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) representative, commented on this: ‘This cannot be called otherwise; Pál Csáky played the anti-Slovak card’. See ‘Hrušovský: Palkove slová sú o súťaži v KDH’, Pravda, 3 April 2007, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/153355-hrusovsky-palkove-slova-su-o-sutazi-v-kdh/, accessed 13 July 2011.

²⁴ ‘Hrušovský: Palkove slová sú o súťaži v KDH’, Pravda, 3 April 2007, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/153355-hrusovsky-palkove-slova-su-o-sutazi-v-kdh/, accessed 13 July 2011. It is interesting to note that the initiator of this stance towards the SMK was Vladimír Palko who was about to be a candidate for the chairmanship elections in KDH. Hrušovský, who was the Chairman, considered it as a tactic from Palko's side. He argued that this was never part of the main political agenda of the party. For details, see the essay above.

²⁵ The decrees of the post-war Czechoslovak President, Edvard Beneš, legitimised the removal of the Czechoslovak citizenship of German and Hungarian minorities, and the expropriation of their property after 1945. As a result, 2.5 million Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia. See, ‘The Beneš Decrees: Implications for EU Enlargement’, Euractiv.com, 26 June 2002, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/benes-decrees-implications-eu-enlargement/article-110130, accessed 21 May 2011. For a detailed analysis of the impacts of the Beneš decrees, see Šutaj (2004).

²⁶ In September 2007 the Slovak Parliament passed a resolution on the Beneš decrees in which it declared that: ‘1. constitutional, legal and political decisions in the post-war arrangements were made as in other European countries due to World War II and the defeat of Nazism and based on the principles of international law represented by the conclusions of the conference in Potsdam; 2. post-war decisions of representative bodies of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Slovak National Council are not the cause of discriminatory practice and today, on their basis, cannot be created new legal relationships; 3. legal and property relations established by these decisions are unquestionable, untouchable and unchangeable’ (Národná Rada Slovenskej Republiky 2007b). The Czech Republic passed a similar law already in 2002. Significantly, five years after the Slovak Parliament passed the declaration and stated that the decrees were immutable, this topic was brought up again. In September 2012, Hungarian Professor of Law, Imre Juhasz, presented to the European Parliament a request (petition) to repeal the Slovak Parliament's decision about the decrees. Hungarian MEP, Zoltán Bagó, supported opening and investigation of the decrees. However, the Slovak Prime Minister Fico and Minister of Foreign Affairs Lajčák, considered the topic to be closed. See Pravda, 20 September 2012; ‘Benešove dekréty ožívajú’, TA3, 7 October 2012. For the text of the petition, see European Parliament (2012).

²⁷ See also, ‘Slovensko sa Mad'arom neospravedlní’, Pravda, 10 September 2007, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/slovensko-sa-madarom-neospravedlni-d69/sk_domace.asp?c = A070910_165617_sk_domace_p04, accessed 24 May 2011.

²⁸ ‘Kubiš: SMK vôbec nejde o zmierenie’, Pravda, 13 September 2007, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/kubis-smk-vobec-nejde-o-zmierenie-d47-/sk_domace.asp?c = A070913_163856_sk_domace_p23, accessed 21 May 2011.

²⁹ Notably, for Sólyom, the unofficial meetings served to strengthen the relationship between the Hungarian President and the Hungarian community living behind the borders of Hungary. See Pravda, 2 October 2007.

³⁰ ‘Sólyom sa stretne len s SMK’, Pravda, 1 October 2007, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/155236-solyom-sa-stretne-len-s-smk/, accessed 19 June 2011.

³¹ The case of President Sólyom's visits was also highlighted by one EU Commission official who considered the Hungarian minority problems as a probable case for the Slovak position on Kosovo, in comments to the author, 16 July 2010.

³² The Council was established in June 2004, in Oradea (Romania). Its aim is to represent and support at European forums autonomy concepts of Hungarian minorities.

³³ ‘Mad'arsko: Mad'ari v Karpatskej kotline chcú podporu NATO a EÚ pre autonómiu’, TASR, 20 March 2008.

³⁴German MEP Slams Slovak Language Law, 2009, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/culture/german-mep-slams-slovak-language-law/article-183982, accessed 20 June 2011.

³⁵ ‘Protests Over Slovak Language Law’, BBC News, 2 September 2009, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8232878.stm, accessed 22 June 2011.

³⁶ As Jan Puhl (2009) put it, ‘Stephen I (969–1038) is seen as not only the founder of the Hungarian empire but also the conqueror of Great Moravia, the entity nationally conscious Slovaks consider the medieval precursor to modern-day Slovakia’.

³⁷ Furthermore, the Court noted, ‘the fact that an EU citizen performs the duties of Head of State is such as to justify a limitation, based on international law, on the exercise of the right of movement conferred on that person by EU law. The Court finds that EU law did not oblige Slovakia to guarantee access to its territory to the President of Hungary’ (Court of Justice of the European Union 2012); see also Daniš (2012) and Kostelanský (2012).

³⁸ ‘Duray: Autonómia je ciel', Vel'ké Mad'arsko iba sen’, Aktualne.sk, 5 August 2009, available at: http://aktualne.atlas.sk/duray-autonomia-je-ciel-velke-madarsko-iba-sen/slovensko/politika/, accessed 19 August 2011.

³⁹ Miklós Duray, comments to the author, 1 April 2011. Duray further added that at that moment, none of the political parties were inclined to do so and Most–Híd, in his perspective, was not succeeding in retaining the Hungarian voters.

⁴⁰ ‘Slovo autonómia počuť z SMK čoraz zretel'nejšie’, Pravda, 20 October 2009, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/slovo-autonomia-pocut-z-smk-coraz-zretelnejsie-f55-/sk_domace.asp?c = A091019_184249_sk_domace_p29, accessed 21 May 2011.

⁴¹ ‘Slovo autonómia počuť z SMK čoraz zretel'nejšie’, Pravda, 20 October 2009, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/slovo-autonomia-pocut-z-smk-coraz-zretelnejsie-f55-/sk_domace.asp?c = A091019_184249_sk_domace_p29, accessed 21 May 2011.

⁴² ‘Slovo autonómia počuť z SMK čoraz zretel'nejšie’, Pravda, 20 October 2009, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/slovo-autonomia-pocut-z-smk-coraz-zretelnejsie-f55-/sk_domace.asp?c = A091019_184249_sk_domace_p29, accessed 21 May 2011.

⁴³ ‘Slovo autonómia počuť z SMK čoraz zretel'nejšie’, Pravda, 20 October 2009, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/slovo-autonomia-pocut-z-smk-coraz-zretelnejsie-f55-/sk_domace.asp?c = A091019_184249_sk_domace_p29, accessed 21 May 2011.

⁴⁴ ‘Politika: Ministra Kubiša znepokojil obsah rozhovorov Csákyho a Tőkésa’, TASR, 2 October 2008.

⁴⁵ ‘Orbán zožal za autonómiu potlesk. Je to nebezpečné, varuje Slota’, Pravda, 17 October 2009, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/orban-zozal-za-autonomiu-potlesk-je-to-nebezpecne-varuje-slota-pvq/sk_domace.asp?c = A091017_184332_sk_domace_p29, accessed 21 May 2011.

⁴⁶ Here it is important to note that the term ‘united Hungarian nation’ was an issue in 2001 as it was also included in the earlier mentioned Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. Back then this term was not only an issue for Slovakia but also for Romania. When the Romanian Prime Minister demanded of Orbán to remove it from this Act, Orbán argued that it is based on a cultural concept of ‘nation’ and it does not involve a political bond with the kin-country. However, when Orbán presented the Act to the domestic public he used a completely different rhetoric: ‘We have been waiting for 80 years for a bond, in a legal sense as well, to be formed between the parts of the Hungarian nation torn from each other, so that links may emerge that go beyond the existing spiritual ties’ (see Kis 2004, p. 163).

⁴⁷ ‘Pandora's Passport’, The Economist, 3 June 2010, available at: http://www.economist.com/node/16283329, accessed 6 November 2010.

⁴⁸ SMER–SD won the elections with 34.79%, however, except for SNS there was no other party interested in building a coalition with SMER–SD. SNS just made it to the Parliament with 5.07% of the vote. HZDS and the ethnic Hungarian party, SMK, failed to get into the Parliament as they did not pass the 5% threshold and got 4.32% and 4.33%, respectively. Despite the differences in their political ideologies, the government was formed by SDKÚ–DS (15.42%), Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) (12.14%), KDH (8.52%) and Most–Híd (8.12%). See ‘Elections to the Slovak Parliament in the Year 2010’, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, Number of valid votes for political parties in SR, available at: http://app.statistics.sk/nrsr_2010/graf/graf1sr.jsp?lang = en, accessed 15 March 2011.

⁴⁹Slovakia–Hungary Row over Citizenship Law, 2011, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/central-europe/slovakia-hungary-row-citizenship-law-news-501640, accessed 23 May 2011. See also, ‘Mad'arsko odmieta slovenské riešenie dvojakého občianstva’, Aktualne.sk, 12 May 2011, available at: http://aktualne.centrum.sk/domov/politika/clanek.phtml?id = 1232976&tro5312_0_1, accessed 28 May 2011; and Jancová (2011).

⁵⁰ In fact, as of 2013, no modifications had been made to the law.

⁵¹ Ján Čarnogurský was Slovak Prime Minister (1991–1992) and Minister of Justice (1998–2002).

⁵² ‘Čarnogurský: Musíme si obhájiť štátnosť proti mad'arskej ofenzíve’, SME, 27 September 2010, available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/5565968/carnogursky-musime-si-obhajit-statnost-proti-madarskej-ofenzive.html, accessed 23 May 2011.

⁵³ ‘Hungarian Communities Call for Autonomy in Brussels’, Hungarian Autonomy Council, Press Release, 2 March 2011, available at: http://www.tokeslaszlo.eu/article/KMAT_brussels, accessed 25 May 2011.

⁵⁴ ‘Hungarian Communities Call for Autonomy in Brussels’, Hungarian Autonomy Council, Press Release, 2 March 2011, available at: http://www.tokeslaszlo.eu/article/KMAT_brussels, accessed 25 May 2011.

⁵⁵ ‘Resolution on European Stability and on Traditional National Communities’, Hungarian Autonomy Council, Press Release, 3 March 2011, available at: http://www.tokeslaszlo.eu/article/kmat_brussels_resolution2, last accessed 25 May 2011.

⁵⁶ ‘Mad'arský parlament prijal návrh novej ústavy’, SME, 18 April 2011, available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/5857162/madarsky-parlament-prijal-navrh-novej-ustavy.html, accessed 10 May 2011.

⁵⁷ ‘Prejav ministra zahraničných vecí SR Mikuláša Dzurindu v NR SR na tému slovensko—mad'arské vzťahy’, 18th Session, National Council of the Slovak Republic, 25 May 2011, available at: http://www.nrsr.sk/Default.aspx?sid = schodze%2frozprava, accessed 28 May 2011. In December 2011, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the new controversial electoral law.

⁵⁸ In June 2011, the Venice Commission issued an analysis of the new Hungarian constitution in which it supported the Slovak claim that protection of ethnic minority rights is a responsibility of the state where they live. However, Budapest did not take the non-binding comments of the Commission into account. See Pravda, 21 June 2011; ‘Komisia dala Slovákom za pravdu pre mad'arskú ústavu’, Aktualne.sk, 20 June 2011, available at: http://aktualne.centrum.sk/domov/politika/clanek.phtml?id = 1235821, accessed 22 June 2011. The Venice Commission, also known as the European Commission for Democracy, by law is the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters.

⁵⁹ ‘NRSR: Poslanci prelomili veto a opätovne schválili zákon o menšinových jazykoch’, TASR, 28 June 2011. See also ‘Zákon o jazykoch menšín prešiel v oklieštenej podobe’, Pravda, 25 May 2011, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/170469-zakon-o-jazykoch-mensin-presiel-v-okliestenej-podobe/, accessed 3 June 2011.

⁶⁰Hungary Said Disappointed at Slovak Language Law Amendment, 2011, available at: http://www.politics.hu/20110601/hungary-said-disappointed-at-slovak-language-act-amendment/, accessed 30 June 2011.

⁶¹ Duray illustrated this statement with an example. He said, ‘For instance the Komárno region [which is located in South Slovakia] would have the same status inside Slovak Republic as for example, the Žilina region. SMK should elaborate this type of regional self-governance and promote it as its political program’ (Daniš 2007a). Currently, Slovakia is divided into eight regions (region = kraj)—Banskobystrický, Bratislavský, Košický, Nitriansky, Prešovský, Trenčiansky, Trnavský and Žilinský kraj. Within this administrative division, Komárno is not considered to be a separate region. In other words, Duray suggested changes to the administrative division of Slovakia. Granting Komárno status as a region would increase its territorial self-governance.

⁶² Augustin Palokaj, comments to the author, Brussels, 16 July 2010. Other interviewees who have asked to remain anonymous have also mentioned this reason.

⁶³ Since the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities and the Law of the European Union ‘applies an individual rights approach, it remains at the discretion of the states whether they introduce group rights for certain minorities and use the means of “constitutional engineering”, such as establishing autonomies in regions inhabited by minority populations for example. The Union does neither prescribe nor prevent Member State positions and policies in this regard’. G. N. Toggenburg, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Any News for the Protection of Minorities?’, Paper presented to the 55th Federal Union of European Nationalities Congress, Ljubljana, 13 May 2010, p. 5.

⁶⁴ ‘Kubiš pre srbský Dnevnik: Kolektívne práva menšín sú pre Slovensko neprijatel'né’, SME, 23 November 2008, available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/4189190/kubis-pre-srbsky-dnevnik-kolektivne-prava-mensin-su-pre-slovensko-neprijatelne.html, accessed 27 May 2011. For instance, Romania also expressed its opposition towards granting collective rights to ethno-cultural communities. See ‘A Challenge for the Future: Kosovo, an Issue Still Waiting for the Solution’, Radio Romania International, 20 April 2007.

⁶⁵ ‘SMK podporuje plán Ahtisaariho ohl'adne budúceho štatútu Kosova’, TASR, 13 February 2007.

⁶⁶ ‘SMK predloží vlastnú rezolúciu o Kosove, ak sa bude NR SR touto otázkou zaoberať’, TASR, 14 February 2007.

⁶⁷ Miklós Duray, comments to the author, Bratislava, 1 April 2011.

⁶⁸ Pál Csáky, comments to the author, Bratislava, 28 April 2010.

⁶⁹ National Council of the Slovak Republic, 5th day of proceedings, 8th session, 27 March 2007, Spoločná Česko–Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, available at: http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/, accessed 20 July 2012.

⁷⁰ ‘SMK predloží vlastnú rezolúciu o Kosove, ak sa bude NR SR touto otázkou zaoberať’, TASR, 14 February 2007.

⁷¹ ‘KDH ani SMK nenavrhnú odvolanie Kubiša’, Košický korzár, 12 February 2007.

⁷² National Council of the Slovak Republic, 6th day of proceedings, 8th session, 28 March 2007, Spoločná Česko–Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, available at: http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/, accessed 20 July 2012. See also ‘Kosovská deklarácia je kompromis’, SME, 29 March 2007, available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/3219773/kosovska-deklaracia-je-kompromis.html, accessed 13 May 2008.

⁷³ Zdenka Kramplová, comments to the author, Bratislava, 3 May 2010.

⁷⁴ Zdenka Kramplová, comments to the author, Bratislava, 3 May 2010. She also noted that there are no tensions among people in Southern Slovakia but that ‘these are things which the political parties have on their agenda (…)’.

⁷⁵ Senior Slovak diplomat, comments to the author, July 2010.

⁷⁶ Senior Slovak diplomat, comments to the author, July 2010.

⁷⁷ ‘Prezident: K výrokom Németha o Kosove nemôžme byť podl'a Gašparoviča l'ahostajní’, TASR, 20 February 2008.

⁷⁸ ‘Prezident: K výrokom Németha o Kosove nemôžme byť podl'a Gašparoviča l'ahostajní’, TASR, 20 February 2008.

⁷⁹ Senior European diplomat, comments to the author, 20 April 2011. As this diplomat noted there were some messages coming from Slovakia stating that Slovakia would not be the last EU member state to hold out against an independent Kosovo. He added: ‘For a while it looked kind of promising, because it suggested that Slovak instinct being that EU mainstream is still strong and that there was Slovak fear of being on its own, isolated on its own […] suggested that […] the Slovaks are looking for a way out’.

⁸⁰ Senior European diplomat, 20 April 2011. This diplomat further noted that Slovaks argued: ‘We can't do anything while Hungarians are doing this’.

⁸¹ Pavol Demeš, comments to the author, 4 May 2010. Demeš is Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States' (GMF) Bratislava office. He was foreign policy advisor to the President of Slovak Republic (1993–1997) and Minister of International Relations of Czechoslovakia (1991–1992).

⁸² The other four EU members that refused to recognise Kosovo include: Cyprus, Spain, Romania and Greece. Perritt argued that behind their positions lie their ‘own intractable ethnic problems’, specifically Spain worried about its Basque minority, Romania (similarly to Slovakia) about the Hungarian minority and Greece about Cyprus (2010, pp. 134 and 108). For Cyprus, recognition of Kosovo (without a UN resolution) was a sensitive issue due to a potential opening of the way to the eventual recognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (see Ker-Lindsay 2009, p. 121).

⁸³ Ulrike Lunacek, correspondence to the author, 27 July 2010.

⁸⁴ Slovak diplomatic representative, comments to the author, October 2009.

⁸⁵ For instance, see Ulrike Lunacek's quote in this contribution.

⁸⁶ Senior European diplomat, comments to the author, 20 April 2011. It is important to note that the government in Bratislava that this diplomat refers to (led by Prime Minister Iveta Radičová) lost a vote of confidence during the poll on the European Financial Stability Facility reform in October 2011. For more information on the vote, see Groszkowski (2011); ‘Slovak Rivals Reach Deal to Back EU Bailout Fund’, BBC News, 12 October 2011, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15271141, accessed 15 October 2011; and ‘Slovak Parliament Ratifies EFSF Expansion’, Reuters, 13 October 2011, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/13/us-eurozone-slovakia-idUSTRE79C1IY20111013, accessed 16 October 2011. As a result, in March 2012, early parliamentary elections took place in Slovakia. The results were significant. Fico's SMER–SD won the elections (with 44.41%) and for the first time in Slovak history he built a one-party government having a controlling majority in the Slovak Parliament. Importantly, the two controversial parties—the ethnic Hungarian party SMK and the SNS—failed to pass the 5% electoral threshold. In contrast, the ethnic Hungarian party Most–Híd received 6.89%. According to Valášek (2012), ‘people familiar with the prime minister-designate's thinking say that he wants the respect and recognition of his EU peers, and fears that his past record and Orban's presence across the border will taint him’. So far the indications that after March 2012 Fico would opt for a non-controversial type of politics with Hungary have been fulfilled.