Competing Interpretations of Buddhism's Revival in the Russian Republic of Kalmykia

Abstract

This article uses a multiple methods framework to interrogate notions of religious revival among Buddhists in the Russian republic of Kalmykia. Survey results indicate high levels of self-identification among Kalmyks as Buddhists, as well as general support for the notion that the religion has re-established its place in the public sphere in the post-Soviet period. This straightforward interpretation of religious revival is contested, however, in interviews with religious elites and focus group conversations. Interlocutors in these forums were more critical and more nuanced in their understanding of Buddhism's role in contemporary Kalmykia.

Notes

¹ The Dalai Lama's first visit to the republic was in August 1991, and he returned to Kalmykia in September of the following year. Since his 2004 visit, Kalmykia's Buddhist leadership has tried in vain to secure a visa for the Dalai Lama's return (see also Holland 2014b).

² This quote comes from the introduction to press coverage of the third visit compiled at Khurul.ru, the official Russian-language site for Kalmykia's Buddhist community, available at: http://khurul.ru/?p = 720, accessed 26 April 2013.

³ In absolute numbers, the number of converts was rather small. Shterin (2001) estimates that new religious movements—such as the Aum Supreme Truth Sect and the Great White Brotherhood—had, roughly, 40,000 members, while more traditional groups like the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Mormons had 300,000 members at their height during the 1990s.

⁴ The Helsinki Final Act, also referred to as the Helsinki Declaration, was concluded in 1975 and signed by 35 different countries; it can be broadly characterised as an attempt to improve relations between the West and the Communist bloc.

⁵ These four religions are commonly termed ‘traditional’; however, this term is not found in the Law's preamble or elsewhere in the legislation. Fagan (2013) has interrogated the use of the term ‘traditional’ in describing these religions. Following Fagan's critique, I place ‘traditional’ in quotes throughout this article.

⁶ Dashi-Dorzho Itigelov, the twelfth Khambo Lama (the supreme leader in Buryatia's Buddhist tradition), died in 1927 and was buried. In 2002, the current Khambo Lama, Damba Ayusheev, disinterred Itigelov; his undecayed body has since been on display at Ivolginsky Datsan outside of Ulan-Ude (Quijada 2012). The body has become a major draw for pilgrims from Siberia and other parts of Russia.

⁷ See Lehmann (1998) for an exception.

⁸ A more nuanced reading of Soviet policy towards religion should acknowledge Stalin's appropriation of religion during the Great Patriotic War [World War II], to serve as a focal point for the revival of Russian nationalism to aid the war effort (Walters 1986; Sidorov 2006).

⁹ Kalmykia was initially incorporated into the Soviet Union as an autonomous oblast’. It was upgraded to an autonomous republic in 1935 (Grin 2001).

¹⁰ The accuracy of any such survey conducted in the Soviet Union is, however, questionable.

¹¹ In making this point, Bakaeva (2008) cites the same 1985 survey mentioned just above.

¹² The temple's official name is the Golden Abode of the Buddha Shakyamuni. I will refer to it here as the Golden Temple. It was built in roughly one year, following the consecration of the temple site by the Dalai Lama during his November 2004 visit.

¹³ Telo Tulku Rinpoche related this history to the author during an interview conducted in Boulder, Colorado in April 2012 (the Rinpoche's family resides in nearby Erie, and he splits his time between Kalmykia and Colorado). The Rinpoche himself is representative of the role that the Kalmyk diaspora has played in Buddhism's revival in the republic proper. Born outside of Philadelphia to immigrants from Kalmykia, Telo Tulku Rinpoche was appointed the post of head lama (Shadjin Lama) of Kalmykia's Buddhists at the age of 20. See McGirk (2012) for further background on the Rinpoche.

¹⁴ See, ‘Vserossiiskaya Perepis’ Naseleniya 2010’, available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm, accessed 14 May 2015.

¹⁵ See, ‘Vserossiiskaya Perepis’ Naseleniya 2002 goda’, available at: http://www.perepis2002.ru, accessed 14 May 2015.

¹⁶ The census results reported here are available at: http://www.perepis-2010.ru/results_of_the_census/results-inform.php, accessed 29 April 2013.

¹⁷ This project, titled ‘Geography and Identity Among Russia's Buddhist Populations’, was funded by the US National Science Foundation, Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Award No. 0928871 from September 2009 to February 2011.

¹⁸ The most notable divergence in the 2010 Kalmykia sample is the high levels of education among the respondents, a figure that differs substantially from both the republic and national averages.

¹⁹ Author's interview with Telo Tulku Rinpoche, Boulder, Colorado, 3 April 2012.

²⁰ This question was drawn from the Levada Centre's 2008 Public Opinion Yearbook to allow for comparison between the Kalmyk sample and national-level responses (Levada Centre 2008). See the article's conclusion for an interpretation of the value of comparing such responses.

²¹ Author's interview with monk, Elista, Kalmykia, 16 February 2010. All informants, with the exception of publically known figures, remain anonymous in accordance with the human subjects’ protocol drafted for this project.

²² The Dharma refers to the teachings of Buddha as concerned with the nature of human suffering and the underlying laws of reality. The Sangha is the Buddhist spiritual community, including the monastic orders and the laity (Gethin 1998).

²³ Author's interview with monk, Elista, Kalmykia, 16 February 2010.

²⁴ In our April 2012 conversation, Telo Tulku Rinpoche noted that the lack of clergymen who are trained to serve as the head lamas of temples has hindered the development of Buddhism, particularly in rural areas in Kalmykia. This programme is one way to address this shortage. Moreover, the Rinpoche himself is representative of religious leaders who received substantial training abroad and in turn fill the gap in leadership resulting from the Soviet Union's anti-religious policies.

²⁵ Author's interview with Telo Tulku Rinpoche, Boulder, Colorado, 3 April 2012.

²⁶ Author's interview with Telo Tulku Rinpoche, Elista, Kalmykia, 3 March 2010.

²⁷ This position, held by the Rinpoche and other religious actors with whom I spoke, is countered by some of the academic experts on Buddhism in Kalmykia. Badmaev and Ulanov (2010, pp. 76–7) write: ‘Buddhist identity has become an ethnic marker and has taken on a dual-layered cultural–religious character’ of specific importance to ethnic Kalmyks.

²⁸ I draw here from three focus groups conducted in the Kalmykia in February–March 2010 (see Appendix). These focus groups were small in size, ranging from three to five participants; participants were recruited with the help of contacts—both students and faculty—at Kalmyk State University. I thought that smaller groups would be more likely to provoke inclusive conversations and make respondents more comfortable in voicing their opinions. This choice was also influenced, in part, by reviewing the experiences of previous researchers. For example, in his project on young Muslim males in Scotland, Hopkins (2007) conducted focus groups with 3 to 12 participants. Different researchers place differing lower and upper thresholds on the size of focus groups; some say four to six is a minimum, while ten is frequently cited as a maximum (Hopkins 2007).

²⁹ This is a religious curriculum that was introduced nationally during the 2012–2013 school year. Long advocated for by the Russian Orthodox Church, the programme targets fourth graders and introduces a religious component into public school (Basil 2007).

³⁰ On the former two religions, see Holland and Todd (2015); on the latter religion, see Sidorov (2000).

³¹ See also Holland (2014a).