‘With a Little Help from my Friends’: Russia’s Modernisation and the Visa Regime with the European Union

Abstract

This essay examines Russian argumentation on its visa-free regime with the EU within the context of discussions about modernisation. It examines arguments within the Russian foreign policy establishment about modernisation, Russia’s modernisation partnership with the EU and visa-free travel, and how these issues are linked. First, the essay outlines two models of Russian modernisation, comprehensive and selective. Then the Russia–EU modernisation partnership is examined focusing on Russia’s view of the nature of the partnership. Finally, the essay analyses Russian argumentation on visa-free regime and liberalisation. The essay concludes that in the Russian modernisation debate, be it comprehensive or selective, inclusion into the Western community is understood as an important prerequisite for modernisation.

For centuries Russian leaders have viewed modernisation as an essential element of strategies by which Russia might catch up with the West, and become and remain a great power. However, the process of modernisation has proven to be a complex issue. ‘Neither the Russian leadership nor Russian society are confident that they know how to do this [modernisation], or if the strategy will come at the expense of Russian identity or even territorial integrity as a state’ (Rutland 2015, p. 7).

As noted in the introductory essay of this special issue, Russian modernisation remains an enigma and multiple modernities often coexist at the same time. While the academic debate and literature has mostly focused on economic and societal aspects of modernisation, Russia’s modernisation cannot be understood without looking also at its relations with other countries and its position in the international system. On the one hand foreign partnerships and cooperation with key international actors are seen as conducive to Russian modernisation and essential for its international status, but on the other hand, Russia’s great power identity may also complicate its relationship with foreign partners and become an obstacle to the country’s successful modernisation (Smith 2014).

Europe in general and other European great powers in particular have traditionally been the most important source and key partners for Russia in its modernisation projects. Most recently this tendency was manifested in various modernisation partnerships with Russia, the EU and EU member states concluded during the Medvedev presidency. Because of the Ukrainian crisis and the new confrontation in Russia’s relations with the West, the modernisation partnership with the EU is frozen in practice and virtually dead even if it has not been formally terminated.

The research literature on Russia’s modernisation partnerships with the EU and its member states was already rather sceptical before the Ukrainian crisis. A number of scholars contended that the modernisation partnership with the EU did not achieve what it was meant to achieve (Burkhardt 2013; David & Romanova 2015; Freire & Simão 2015; Larionova 2015; Makarychev & Meister 2015). For example, Romanova and Pavlova argued that the concept of modernisation had become ‘an empty signifier’, in other words, it could mean anything and nothing (Romanova & Pavlova 2014, p. 500).

The focus of this essay is on the Russian debate on the visa regime with the EU, particularly as part of the broader issue of the modernisation debate. Visa issues were formally incorporated into the modernisation agenda when the already existing dialogue on visa-free short-time travel and visa facilitation was included in one of the spheres of activities in the Work Plan for Activities within the EU–Russia Partnership for Modernisation—promoting people-to-people links and enhancing dialogue with civil society.¹ This Work Plan also listed four other spheres of activities with their tasks, executives and instruments for their implementation, and a description of their activities or projects and their expected results. The four other spheres were the following: the creation of a diversified, competitive and sustainable low-carbon economy; the facilitating and liberalising of trade in the global economy, and the enhancing and deepening of bilateral trade and economic relations; the enhancing of cooperation in innovation and research and development, including space and nuclear research; and the rule of law, strengthening the legal environment, improving investment and the social climate. Research dealing with the visa issue in EU–Russia relations is surprisingly thin, but the key arguments of the EU side and the dynamics of the negotiations with Russia have been explored by Hernández i Sagrera and Potemkina (2013), van Elsuwege et al. (2013) and Hernández i Sagrera (2014). Hernández i Sagrera and Potemkina, for example, argued that the lack of progress was the result of the strategic use of political conditionality by the EU; however, at the time they wrote their report they saw some hope in creating trust and support for the shared values by means of ‘socialisation’, including visa liberalisation and increasing youth exchanges as the policy instrument, instead of conditionality, which has focused on human rights issues (Hernández i Sagrera & Potemkina 2013, pp. 5, 33). This essay examines how the Russian foreign policy establishment has argued about modernisation, its modernisation partnership and visa-free travel, and how these issues are connected with each other.

The primary data used in this essay consist of the Russian foreign policy establishment’s official discourse. Our research has gathered systematic data focusing on the issues of Mezhdunarodnaya zhizh’, a journal published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between 1998 and 2014, the issues of Russia in Global Affairs, published by Foreign Policy Research Foundation, between 2002 and 2012, as well as presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly between 1994 and 2014, and press conference materials from the EU–Russia summits between 2008 and 2014. These data were complemented by statements of the foreign minister and deputy foreign minister from other sources, such as the foreign ministry website and the newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta. Since the purpose was to acquire a broad and nuanced understanding of Russian discussions on modernisation and visa-free travel, the data gathering was not limited to the period of the formal modernisation partnership, that is, the period of Medvedev’s presidency and Putin’s third presidency, or to the statements of the president, prime minister and foreign minister only.

The essay first takes a look at the modernisation models in the Russian political context, focusing on the public debate especially during Medvedev’s presidency. Then the Russia–EU modernisation partnership is examined with the emphasis on Russia’s view of the purposes and nature of the partnership. Finally, the essay analyses discussions on the visa-free regime and visa liberalisation between Russia and the EU, paying particular attention to the Russian argumentation.

The essay concludes by arguing that for Russia the visa regime has been an important part of the Russian argumentation on modernisation, in particular within the comprehensive modernisation model but also in the selective modernisation model. Therefore the idea of a visa regime was also an important part of the Russia–EU modernisation partnership. The abolition of the visa regime is not generally interpreted as only a supporting step towards modernisation in Russia but as a symbolic act that would integrate Russia and Russians into Europe.

Comprehensive or selective modernisation?

Modernisation is a recurring theme in Russian politics. In the past calls for ‘modernisation’ were often made after military losses or diplomatic humiliations such as after the Crimean War (1853–1856) or the Russo–Japanese war (1905), after big political changes like the 1917 revolution and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as under reforming leaders who were ready to push or pull Russia towards Europe and the West, such as Peter the Great in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century or Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s (Gatrell 2006; Kangaspuro 2006; Jonson & White 2012).

Despite many attempts during Russia’s long history, the modernisation process has never reached its potential even if each attempt has moved Russia forward in terms of economic development, societal processes or foreign policy positions. The modernisation process has always clashed with those forces in Russian politics that resist change. For example, it has been argued that modernisation campaigns have always been replaced by ‘periods of restoration’ (Jonson & White 2012, p. 2). An important aspect of modernisation is that both the liberal side of the Russian political elite and society and the more conservative side agree that modernisation is important. However, these two camps differ in their views as to what type of modernisation Russia should have, why Russia should modernise and how it should be done.

Modernisation entered into the core of Russian public debate and the political agenda once again during Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency between 2008 and 2012. Medvedev belonged to the rare category of Russian leader who did not take over as leader after a war or major political turmoil. The first eight years of the 2000s were years of solid economic growth for Russia. In this way he is somewhat comparable to Khrushchev.

During Medvedev’s presidency two competing modernisation models became visible. They reflect the continuing battles on different views of Russia’s development paths within society at large, including of Russia’s identity. The question is whether Russia should choose a modernisation model that partly borrows from the Western model, and would include democratic reform of the political system (or at least some liberalisation) and encourage bottom up initiatives—a comprehensive or liberal modernisation model—or whether Russia should rely on the state-led modernisation model with the focus mostly on the economy, but often including administration and the army. This latter thinking has been labelled as the sectoral, conservative or authoritarian modernisation model, or sometimes the Chinese or Eastern model. Here the terms comprehensive modernisation to represent the more liberal ideas relating to modernisation and selective modernisation for the more conservative line will be used.

Before Medvedev’s presidency the term modernisation had appeared in both Yel’tsin’s and Putin’s political agenda. Often the concept of modernisation was used as a synonym for any reform: ‘reform has been deterministically linked to the idea of modernisation and more generally to a belief in the linear progress of civilization’ (Glinski & Reddaway 1998, p. 518). Some initiatives for a broad ‘integrated modernization project’ were made (Denisov 2002), but mostly references to modernisation reflected a selective understanding of it with a focus on Russia’s economy and technology in particular.²

Administrative reform was also discussed in terms of modernisation (Yel’tsin 1998). In his first annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2000, Putin (2000) stated that modernisation of the state and bringing order to institutions of power (poryadok v organakh vlasti) are the first phase of modernisation. In 2002 Putin advocated modernisation of the system of executive power, the legal system and the health care system (Putin 2002). An administrative reform was indeed implemented during Putin’s first and second terms as president. Changes were made in the regional administrative structure, election rules and rules relating to political parties, but these were strictly controlled by the state, and represented a very selective top-down model of reform.

Moreover, modernisation was also linked to military reform. Already under Yel’tsin steps towards the modernisation of the Russian armed forces were taken (Renz & Thornton 2012), but it was during Putin’s first eight years as president that military modernisation became the top item on the agenda (Putin 2003, 2004, 2006).

It was, however, President Medvedev who really lifted the comprehensive modernisation agenda back to the forefront in Russian politics. His article Go Russia! and his Address to the Federal Assembly in 2009 formulated the key items that became known as Medvedev’s modernisation programme (Medvedev 2009a, 2009b). Medvedev argued that Russia could not achieve great power status by relying only on the achievements of the past; instead Russia should carry out comprehensive modernisation based on democratic values and institutions. Russia should transform itself from a resource-based economy into a democratic society. Medvedev’s plan, as presented in public, was comprehensive in the sense that it advocated the modernisation of the economy and production, state administration, research and science, and what could be called socio-cultural modernisation. That is, strategic goals could not be achieved without changes taking place in society and on the level of individuals. As Nikolai Zlobin, President of the Centre on Global Interest in Washington, DC, explained in the Moscow Times:

Modernization is a highly complex process of making the country competitive in the global community. It entails creating an attractive model of national development that could become an example for others to emulate. Real modernization would mean staging a ‘revolution’ of sorts against Russia’s own backwardness. It would involve a real sacrifice that the country must consciously make for the sake of a modern, developed and prosperous Russia in the future. A ‘modernization revolution’ cannot be executed from the top-down through force or tyranny in a Stalin-like manner. If modernization is, in fact, attainable in Russia, it can only be done through individual innovation and initiative. (Zlobin 2009)

When modernisation is understood in this way, only in cooperation and on good terms with other countries and in particularly the economically most advanced nations, Russia would be able to attract foreign investments and gain access to new technologies and ideas. Furthermore, it is also clear that the comprehensive approach requires a real change, lifting state control and relying more on individual efforts.

In Medvedev’s argumentation foreign relations were key to Russian modernisation also in the way it should serve the idea of raising citizens’ living standards (Medvedev 2009a, 2011). Furthermore, Medvedev indicated that some type of integration with the rest of the world would also be desirable from Russia’s point of view. ‘We are very interested in the rapprochement and interpenetration of our cultures and economies’ (Medvedev 2009b), he wrote in his Go Russia! article.

There was also a clear notion that Russian foreign policy should not be based on nostalgia but on the ideas of modernisation. Medvedev linked Russian modernisation directly to international cooperation: ‘The aim of this modernisation is the development of international relations in the interests of as many peoples and countries as possible. We want to establish rules of cooperation and dispute settlement, in which priority is given to modern ideas of equality and fairness’ (Medvedev 2009b). Medvedev’s tone when discussing modernisation was rather different to that of Putin, who had used the term regularly but with a more selective meaning. The two presidents were using the same words and clearly agreeing on a framework in which to work. However the differences between the two suggest that two camps can be identified within the political elite, each with a different model of modernisation (Kryshtanovskaya 2008; Kuusi et al. 2010).

The two models of modernisation had their prominent advocates in the public debate. During Medvedev’s presidency the most noteworthy and visible people in the group whose approach was more comprehensive were President Medvedev, the presidential aide Arkadii Dvorkovich, and the chair of the Institute of Contemporary Development (Institut sovremennogo razvitiya—INSOR), Igor Yurgens. The group advocated comprehensive modernisation including political reforms (Afanas’ev 2009; Mäkinen 2011).³ According to Urnov, the advocates of comprehensive modernisation emphasise the ‘importance of cultural change for the success of economic modernisation, interdependence of economic modernisation and political democratization and the futility of a purely technological modernization’ (Urnov 2012, p. 38). This group’s ideas were very much behind the Russia–US reset policy during Medvedev’s presidency. As Freire and Simão have put it, ‘for President Medvedev, the American model held great potential for Russia’ (Freire & Simão 2015, p. 138). However even though this group included societal and political reforms in their scope, it is noteworthy that those reforms did not entail a Western democratisation approach as such (Freire & Simão 2015, p. 130).

The other, more conservative group stood for the selective modernisation model with no radical reform of the political system. Their vision of modernisation was closer to the more traditional Russian model or attempt at modernisation. Modernisation was seen as a necessity for Russia to be able to be one of the strong nations. In this vision ideas of modernisation are introduced in a controlled manner in different sectors, especially in the economy and the military. This selective modernisation model reproduced the former Russian and Soviet modernisation discourses that stress Russia’s distinctive path to modernisation, including Russia’s distinctive path to democracy which is characterised in the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ (Mäkinen 2011). Sovereign democracy itself has been understood as an authoritarian and conservative form of modernisation (Hayoz 2012, p. 20).

The selective modernisation model does not aim to reform or modernise the political system; in fact it strengthens the ruling elite’s hold on power, and therefore has also been called authoritarian modernisation based on the Chinese model (Freire & Simão 2015, p. 130). During the years from 2008 to 2012 the central names behind the Russian traditional modernisation thinking were Prime Minister Putin, Vladislav Surkov, the deputy head of the presidential administration, and Sergei Sobyanin, Mayor of Moscow, former head of the presidential and government administrations (Afanas’ev 2009; Mäkinen 2011).

According to Mark Urnov (2012, pp. 48–9), there is a strong contrast between the liberal (here labelled as comprehensive) and conservative (here as selective) approaches to modernisation, especially in foreign and security policy views. However the two camps have one common denominator: they both identify the West as providing crucial partners for Russia in any type of successful modernisation. Even if those favouring the traditional selective model view foreign investment with suspicion, in their camp there are also calls for foreign investments into the Russian economy. The comprehensive approach group welcomes outright the involvement of Western capital and support integration of the Russian economy with those of the leading European countries.

Vladislav Surkov has admitted that Russia could not ‘create an innovative economy’ or modernise without Western knowledge: Russia ‘should get access to the intellectual resources of the West’ (Surkov 2008, p. 20). Surkov spoke for cooperation in the fields of science, technology, higher education and multinational corporations in the sphere of high technology. Interestingly for him democracy in Russia had instrumental value for cooperation with the West. If Russia was not an open democratic society, then it had no access to the modern technology of the West and in consequence it would not be able to carry out modernisation (Mäkinen 2011).

The West is a concept that needs to be treated with some caution when talking about Russia and the West. In Russia there are as many ‘Wests’ as there are many ‘Russias’ in the West. The West can refer to Europe in general, to the EU, or to the USA. The EU and its member states are the partners Russia is looking toward mostly, regardless of the modernisation models. The USA and China as well as countries such as Israel and Japan are also important (Trenin 2003), and might provide some aspects of modernisation. With the EU, however, Russia feels also a European identity connection: to belong to the group of European great powers as an equal member is the ultimate proof of modernisation.

Even if the political landscape in Europe and indeed the post-Soviet world order has been challenged by Russia with the annexation of Crimea, armed conflict in Ukraine and intervention in the Middle East, the need for Russia to achieve modernisation in a way that Russia is part of Europe and accepted by other European nations has not disappeared. It follows that the motivation to develop the partnership for modernisation with the EU is supported by a broad majority in both modernisation models. The partnership with the EU and its member states is meant to serve Russia’s interests in diversifying its economy and strengthening its technology base. It also continues the tradition of integration, supports harmonisation projects between Russia and the EU and takes significant steps closer to the free movement of people, a visa-free regime supporting the Greater Europe idea, which is part of both Russian national and state identity.

Russia and the European Union: a modernisation partnership to support Russian modernisation?

During the Yel’tsin period, Russia was strongly presented as part of Europe; there was interest in taking part in ‘building a Large Europe’ (bolshaya Evropa) (Yel’tsin 1994), and in ‘a united and flourishing Large Europe without dividing lines—old or new’, as Yel’tsin argued in his addresses to the Federal Assembly in 1994 and 1999 (Yel’tsin 1999). The EU was mostly represented in a positive light, and Russia was seen as willing to take part in the ‘mechanism of solving political and economic decisions in the European Union’ (Yel’tsin 1995).⁴ In particular, economic contacts with leading European countries were highlighted (Yel’tsin 1999).

This continued to some extent into the Putin period, although public opinion started to change in the 2000s, and the discourse on Russia as different from Europe, if not unique, was becoming stronger (Dubin 2012). Nevertheless, the EU was portrayed mainly in a positive tone until the annexation of Crimea and sanctions imposed by the EU after that (Levada 2015). In 2005 Putin emphasised the mutual path of Russia and other Europeans in recognising and broadening human rights and the emancipation of women: ‘We did this all together’ (Putin 2005). In 2006, ‘closest neighbours’ were mentioned as the main direction of Russia’s foreign policy, followed by the European Union; in this context economic relations were again emphasised. As for Russia–EU relations, the goal of free movement of capital, goods, services and labour was mentioned, however, this time not only in Europe but also in the ‘Asian continent’ (Putin 2007). Moreover, even if the main stress in EU–Russia relations has been on economic issues the value-based dimension has not been ignored either. In 2004 Putin argued that EU enlargement should make Russians and other Europeans closer not only geographically but also economically and ‘spiritually’ (dukhovno) (Putin 2004).

The Partnership for Modernisation could be seen as resonating with Medvedev’s modernisation model (Medvedev 2010). In the Russia–EU summit of 2010 when the modernisation partnership between Russia and the EU was launched Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council stated: ‘President Medvedev’s ambition to base Russia’s modernization in the twenty-first century on democratic values, by building a modern diversified and dynamic economy, and by encouraging the active involvement of civil society, is a significant development for Russia. We want to be Russia’s partner in modernization’ (Van Rompuy 2010). From the EU side the motivation for the partnership was defined as pushing for political, judicial and economic reform in Russia (Larionova 2015, p. 66). Furthermore a democratic political system, rule of law and fighting corruption were understood as ‘fundamental conditions of modernization’ (Larionova 2015, p. 67). The Russian side expected the Partnership for Modernisation to contribute to Russia’s technological modernisation and freedom of movement (Larionova 2015, p. 66). On a more general level, where Russia and the EU’s views coincided was on the view that the Partnership for Modernisation was meant to contribute to economic growth, and to ‘provide a renewed momentum’ to the EU–Russia relationship, to transform it into ‘a truly strategic relationship’ (Larionova 2015, p. 63). However, these goals were not met.

On the practical level, the Partnership for Modernisation comprised policy areas that were already integrated into the EU–Russia Common Space dialogues (Larionova 2015, p. 63). This is the case with the visa dialogue as well, and with the plan to ‘modernise’ the visa facilitation agreement, which was originally reached in 2007.⁵ Although there have been criticisms of the success of the modernisation partnership, there are also more positive accounts. For example, Romanova argues that it brought real change into EU–Russia relations, and it was able to move these relations from ‘divisive discussion about values and interests and implementation interests’ into policy-specific cooperation such as visa issues (Romanova 2015, p. 46). So despite differences in opinion about whether political modernisation could only follow economic modernisation as it is seen from the Russian side, or whether, as the EU argued, political reforms are a precondition for achieving economic success, the EU and Russia ‘managed to agree on policy-specific goals and on the means of their implementation’ (Romanova 2015, p. 57).

Even though Medvedev is usually seen as the father of the new boom in modernisation discourse in Russia, it has been argued by other ‘comprehensive modernisers’ such as Sergei Kulik and Igor Yurgens that similar ideas and objectives can be found in Russian documents such as Strategy-2020 (the Concept of Long-term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2020), the Foreign Policy Concept (2008) and Foreign Economic Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, which were adopted before Medvedev’s presidency (Kulik & Yurgens 2011, p. 13). Accordingly, the goals and tasks of the modernisation partnership corresponded to the more long-term priorities of the Kremlin. This also shows that even if Medvedev became the face of the new Russian modernisation drive, the concept of modernisation continued to be an important theme whoever was the leader of Russia, and that there has been long-term strategic thinking linked to modernisation.

Despite the fact that both Russia and the EU see common interests and mutual benefits in the modernisation framework, the road to common understanding has been rocky. Kulik and Yurgens identified in their INSOR report ‘political conditionality’ as one of the major problems in the planning and implementation of the EU–Russia partnership for modernisation. The EU emphasis on democratic development, human rights and rule of law in the framework of foreign economic policy did not please the Russian side, the report claimed (Kulik & Yurgens 2011, p. 18). In general, there seemed to be a crisis of trust between Russia and the EU, and this was manifest in the preparation of the new basic agreement (Kulik & Yurgens 2011, p. 9). This again highlights the discrepancy between different conceptualisations of modernisation: ‘For any western concept of modernization, human rights, individual freedom, and the rule of law will have to be part of an agreement’ (Dettke 2011, p. 137). However, this has not necessarily always corresponded to the Russian view (Dettke 2011, p. 137), and not always even to the comprehensive modernisation model.

The emphasis on policy level cooperation is clear in the statements of the Russian leadership on the EU–Russian modernisation partnership. They refer to concrete projects, cooperation at the level of companies or experts in spheres of research and development, and ‘people-to-people links’. In this context the bilateral modernisation partnership with EU member states is very important. For example, Foreign Minister Lavrov (2013b) presented evidence from the bilateral modernisation partnership signed with France in 2010, referring to cooperation in North Stream and South Stream construction, the Soyuz launch from French Guinea, development of the passenger airplane Sukhoi Super-jet-100, humanitarian cultural relations such as a simplified visa regime, and marketing the French language in Russia and the Russian language in France. There were 23 other bilateral partnerships for modernisation agreements signed between 2010 and 2013 with different EU countries (Romanova & Pavlova 2014, pp. 501–2). These agreements vary in the extent to which they include a political understanding of modernisation. In their agreements with Russia, Ireland, Poland, Spain, Italy and France apply the most technocratic understanding of modernisation, whereas Slovakia, Sweden and Lithuania also incorporate ‘political’ goals (Romanova & Pavlova 2014, p. 509).

The modernisation partnership with the EU signified the closeness that Russia and the EU have, not only geographically but also historically. In the Russian view, the closeness was clearly an identity question. As at the time when a key document, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia was signed in 1994, common ideas were found. In both cases the implementation was impeded almost as soon as the agreements were signed. Interestingly both agreements had the aim of integration. In the PCA the integration was comprehensive but the modernisation partnership had learned from past mistakes and focused on sectoral priorities. One of these priorities, as stated above, was the visa-free regime.

The visa-free regime as a key to Russian modernisation?

Modernisation, whatever approach is adopted as part of Russian discourse, involves a meeting of minds, and the possibility for each side to go and learn from others; people with their ideas, technologies and practices should therefore be able to freely move from one place to another. Following this logic, any act of preventing or slowing down the free movement of people can be taken as an obstacle to modernisation. Dmitry Trenin argued during the height of Medvedev’s modernisation effort that ‘potentially, Europe’s most effective instrument to help Russian modernisation is gradual abolition of the visa regime with Russia’ (Trenin 2010). For Trenin visa-free travel would help Russia in adapting to EU standards and through that to modernisation. In Trenin’s view, ‘the possibility of Russia gradually embracing the provision of Europe’s acquis communautaire creates prerequisites for carrying out Russian reforms’ (Trenin 2003).

Although the idea of modernisation was a shared objective, it has been interpreted in different ways in Russia and in the EU (Flenley 2014). In most items of the modernisation partnership, the EU has been the demander and Russia the reluctant partner. However, in relation to the visa-free regime, the roles have been the opposite. When negotiating over freedom of travel and the visa regime between the EU and Russia, the Russian representatives have constantly been in favour of a more liberal regime and a faster timetable. For example, deputy foreign minister Andrei Denisov argued in 2011: ‘we have more than once said that we are ready [for a visa-free regime], but our partners in Europe are not’ (Denisov 2011).

An important part in the formation of Russian’s main priorities in relation to visa liberalisation and visa-free travel was played by negotiations with the EU over the Kaliningrad region surrounded by Poland and Lithuania. ‘It is in this context that Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a proposal in August 2002 to abolish the visa requirement reciprocally between Russia and the EU’ (van Elsuwege et al. 2013, p. 9).⁶ The Russian side had demanded that Russians should have a right to free movement between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia through EU territory but this bid was rejected by the EU. Instead, it was agreed that the travel documents needed by Russians crossing the border would be easy to obtain. Furthermore, as a result of the Russian concern raised in relation to EU enlargement, the EU representatives gave assurances that a visa-free regime between Russia and the EU would not be an impossibility. So in effect the Kaliningrad process led in the end to a ‘compromise on facilitated transit to Kaliningrad and the formal recognition that visa-free travel is a “long-term objective” of EU–Russia cooperation’ (van Elsuwege et al. 2013, pp. 9–10). When the real prospects for visa freedom between Russia and the EU materialised as a result of the Kaliningrad negotiations, statements from both the EU and Russia kept the discussion alive. In 2003 the Commission President Romano Prodi stated that the existing system of visas for Russian citizens to enter the countries of the European Union could be eliminated ‘within the next five years’.⁷

‘In the short term, the aim was to facilitate the visa application procedures as much as possible. In this respect, the EU and Russia launched negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement which entered into force in 2007, in parallel with an agreement on readmission’ (van Elsuwege et al. 2013, p. 10). The visa facilitation agreement lowered visa fees, made obtaining multiple-entry visas easier, simplified the documents required and waived visas for diplomats. Visa-free travel was also agreed on as a long-term goal between the EU and Russia in 2005 as part of the Road Map for the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, one of the common spaces launched in 2003.⁸ The 2005 Road Map referred to the aspiration towards a visa-free regime in the long term, expressed at the 2003 summit (Hernández i Sagrera & Potemkina 2013, pp. 5–9). A visa facilitation agreement with the purpose to make travelling between Russia and the EU easier was then signed in 2006 and entered into force in 2007. President Putin defined the visa facilitation agreement as ‘opening up new possibilities for our citizens. It is an important step for visa-free travel’ (Putin 2006). It was seen as an important achievement on the road to the visa dialogue.

Furthermore there was a parallel process to negotiate a Readmission Agreement (van Elsuwege et al. 2013, p. 10). Already in 2002 the Readmission Agreement was described by the European Commission as a precondition to a visa-free agreement between Russia and the EU. The agreement would enable the EU to return illegal immigrants back to Russia (White & Light 2009, p. 47). The readmission negotiation process led to the recognition that illegal migration was a problem shared by Russia and the EU (Frellesen & Rontoyanni 2009, p. 237).

However, in contrast to such trends, the EU’s Eastern enlargement of its Schengen borders had been a cause of concern for Russia ever since the idea was introduced (White & Light 2009, p. 46). The Schengen rules on immigration meant that the relatively liberal travel regimes for Russian travellers to Central and East European countries were to be replaced with more restrictive and costly arrangements. Indeed, ‘as part of their preparations for EU membership, the candidate countries were required to adopt and implement all EU legislation (the so called acquis communautaire), including the EU’s Schengen rules on external border controls and common visa requirements for nationals of non-EU Member States’ (van Elsuwege et al. 2013, p. 9). This meant that many border crossings that were easy for Russians to cross would become ‘closed’ to travellers without visas. The visa issue was named by the Russian foreign policy elite as one of the main negative consequences of EU enlargement (White & Light 2009, pp. 46–7).

One of the most vocal supporters of visa-free travel and critics of the Schengen arrangements was Russia’s permanent representative to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov. Before the 2003 Summit in St Petersburg, he argued that new visa requirements, which would enter into force with the enlargement, were difficult to justify to Russian citizens: ‘so try and explain it to a Russian citizen, who used to freely visit Karlovy Vary or Varna, for example, why he or she must now apply for a visa to these destinations’. He saw the Schengen zone as creating ‘additional barriers to free travel and people-to-people contacts on the European continent’. He even referred to visa-free travel as a simple ‘respect for human rights’. In Chizhov’s view many people in Russia had become accustomed to visa-free travel and treated it as a very important basic right (Chizhov 2003a). Indeed freedom of travel was one thing that Russians had gained after the fall of the Soviet Union. It was seen as one of the most important achievements of the democratic reforms in Russia. Therefore, the visa application process which materialised with the EU enlargement was regarded as humiliating to Russians. Chizhov accused the EU of building a ‘Schengen Wall’ that was becoming ‘higher and more insurmountable over time’ and would produce ‘uncomfortable memories of the Berlin Wall’ (Chizhov 2003a). Many other Russian high-ranking foreign policy elite members like Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, echoed Chizhov’s view (White & Light 2009, p. 47). In this respect the visa question became much more than just a practical matter in Russia–EU relations.

Both the visa facilitation agreement and readmission agreement were important parts in the overall picture and in fact opened a road towards visa-free travel in the future. This reinforced the Russian argument that all the technical parts were solved and therefore any remaining barriers were politically motivated. This is a theme that recurred in the Russian visa regime argumentation; it was argued that the visa-free regime was being made a political question by the EU, even though from the Russian point of view this should have been mainly defined as a technical question (Hernández i Sagrera & Potemkina 2013, pp. 8, 11).

By 2006 the growing impatience from the Russian side was clear. The chair of the Duma Committee for International Affairs, Konstantin Kosachev (2006) used the expression of the new Iron Curtain, and accused the EU of double standards and of preventing free movement of people in the way that the Soviet Union did. In many statements Russian representatives accused the EU of politicising the question, making excuses for not proceeding with the issue. Vladimir Pankov, a professor at the Higher Schools of Economics, argued that ‘the usual allegations by leading European politicians and high-ranking officials from Brussels and Strasbourg, which say that Russia is denied visa-free travel due to its so-called instability, are absolutely unconvincing considering Russia’s real situation’. In Pankov’s opinion, the EU offered visa-free entry to citizens of many countries that were less stable than Russia (for example, Argentina). Such discrimination contradicted in his view the very idea for creating a Russia–EU free trade area and, moreover, a Common Economic Area (Pankov 2007).

Deputy foreign minister A. V. Grushko, argued that there were no unsurpassable technical obstacles to a visa-free regime: ‘it just needs a political definition. Russia has made its choice’ (Grushko 2010a). Grushko mentioned that there was good experience of visa-free travel, for example, when the European football Champions League final took place in Moscow and Chelsea and Manchester United fans were allowed to travel to Moscow without visas. He also referred to the work done with the EU to develop a ‘new generation of biometrical passports’, which could be seen as a prospective first bloc in the Common Steps to short-term visa-free travel (Grushko 2010a). Grushko approached the question of the visa regime from the point of view of ordinary citizens. According to him, the visa regime ‘disturbs contacts between citizens of the East and the West, inhabitants of Russia and countries of the EU’. This was reinforced by the lack of knowledge that people had about each other, which in turn created ‘possibilities for manipulation’ (Grushko 2010a). In other words the lack of ‘people-to-people’ links would create an atmosphere open to manipulation and propaganda on both sides. The visa-free regime was typically regarded as beneficial to both parties and therefore also in the interests of the EU (Muradov 2008; Chizhov 2012). So again we see how visa-free travel was justified by reference to ‘ordinary citizens’ and a ‘socialisation’ approach could be read implicitly there.

For the Russians the visa-free regime represented a final outcome of EU–Russian cooperation (Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2008). The Russian side continued to stress that they had done their part of the job and it was up to the EU side to finish the process.

The visa dialogue between Russia and the EU led to the agreement on a Common Steps policy framework during the EU–Russia summit in December 2011. It identified four key fields, termed as ‘blocks’, to be implemented before negotiations on a visa-free regime between the EU Schengen area and Russia could be started. The four blocks were as follows: Block 1 on document security, including biometrics; Block 2 on illegal migration, including readmission; Block 3 on public order, security and judicial cooperation; and Block 4 on external relations that include also human rights related to the freedom of movement (Hernández i Sagrera & Potemkina 2013, p. 9; van Elsuwege et al. 2013, p. 33). Chizhov argued that negotiations for abolishing visas should have been begun right after the implementation of these Common Steps: ‘Any other scenario would ignore the logic of the whole point behind the document signed and ratified by Russia and the EU. Russia is ready for free movement of its citizens’ (Chizhov 2012).

In December 2012 after the EU–Russia summit President Putin commented:

We discussed of course the questions of having a non-visa regime for short-term visits of the citizens of the Russian Federation and the EU. I would like to point out that practically all technical questions have been solved. And now it is also about political decisions from the side of our European colleagues. … Lack of non-visa regime of course slows down the further development of economic relations. (Putin 2012b)

Later, Lavrov repeated Russia’s official position that ‘all technical and legal questions have been solved—now it is a question of political will’ (Lavrov 2013c). He also contended that ‘the issue is symbolic: it exemplifies all the differences between Russia and the EU’ (Lavrov 2013a). Russia has applied many arguments to the visa-free regime question, including points relating to economic cooperation and a free trade zone with the EU, the concept of a Greater Europe, Europe without dividing lines, and the treatment of Russians in Europe as second class citizens. The main Russian argument has been throughout the process that ‘true partnership is impossible as long as visa barriers exist for the citizens of our countries’ (Putin 2012a).

The first progress report of the Common Steps (European Commission 2013, p. 3) contended that there had been many improvements but it still identified many problems. For example, it stated that Russia had made a lot of progress in the area of document security, including ‘the introduction of the biometric passport in 2006 and its updates according to ICAO standards in 2010 and 2013’ (European Commission 2013, p. 3). The report also acknowledged developments in Block 2 on illegal migration including readmission; Russia has, for example, adopted a new migration policy concept (European Commission 2013, p. 6). The report contained many suggestions on how to improve the situation, for example, concerning irregular migrants and asylum seekers, through the training of border guards on the readmission agreement and amending the Visa Facilitation Agreement. As for Block 3 on public order, security and judicial cooperation, the report noted, for example, that ‘Russia has been active in tackling transnational crime, terrorism and corruption’; in parallel it mentions that there are many problems to do with different agencies with ‘a potential of overlapping competencies’ (European Commission 2013, p. 23). However, Block 4 on external relations, which also includes human rights issues, is the one that is less developed. The report claims that there are ‘a number of restrictions to freedom of movement’, and here it refers to ‘areas where restricted access exists both for Russian nationals and foreign nationals due to considerations of national security and public safety’ (European Commission 2013, p. 39). Furthermore, the report finds it problematic that in Russia ‘discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is not recognized as a problematic issue’ (European Commission 2013, p. 39), or that ‘Russian authorities tend to deny existence of any problems or deficiencies with law enforcement or freedom of movement in the North Caucasus, even if this is contradictory to reporting from other sources’ (European Commission 2013, p. 40). Whereas from a Russian perspective the fourth block is ‘more political in nature, and therefore, considered of less importance in comparison to the technical preparations … considerations such as respect for fundamental rights and values are crucial for many EU member states and representatives within the EU institutions’ (van Elsuwege et al. 2013, p. 37).

Russia had high hopes of concluding the visa-free travel agreement with the EU before the Sochi Olympic games in February 2014. In December 2013 the Russian side still expressed their belief that negotiations for visa-free travel could be started in 2014 (Meshkov 2013; Lavrov 2013d). But in January 2014 it became evident that the new visa facilitation agreement would not be signed at the spring EU–Russia Summit. Lavrov argued that what was required was political will from the EU, and in particular from Brussels, as according to him, member states would have been ready to move towards visa-free short-term travel (Lavrov 2014).

In March 2014 the EU suspended the talks on the visa-free regime between Russia and the EU in response to Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea. The Russian reaction was immediate and negative. Aleksander Lukashevich, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that ‘it is obviously a politicized, unconstructive and baseless approach, which goes contrary to the existing agreements between Russia and the EU on further simplification of rules for mutual citizens’ travels’ (Lukashevich 2014). Furthermore Russia has given reassurances that it is interested in restarting cooperation for the new visa facilitation agreement as well as visa-free short-time travel (Azimov 2014, 2015; Ivanov 2015).

The visa-free regime has been one of the main defining issues in the Russia–EU relationship. The whole dynamics of Russia–EU partnership changed with the EU enlargement and the Schengen regime. Instead of inclusion and integration Russians felt that they were excluded. However, even if the negotiation process was very slow and at times difficult, as well as infected with rather strong political rhetoric, there were also successes like the Visa Facilitation Agreement and the Readmission Agreement. Both processes showed that success in the visa-free regime process was possible. The whole process concerning visa dialogue, and the facilitation and readmission agreements, revealed differences in the attitudes of each side on how progress could be achieved. Russia was in a hurry and target oriented while the EU stressed the long-term perspective and process orientation.

Conclusion

The visa discussion links to the modernisation discussion in an interesting way. The main argument from the Russian side in relation to the visa-free regime is the inclusion of Russians in Europe. Visa-free travel is constructed as a meaningful process to accelerate people-to-people links. The idea of integration is also embedded in this process. The visa-free regime seems to be even more important symbolically: it would mean that Russia and Russians would no longer be treated, from the Russian perspective, as ‘second-rate Europeans’ but acknowledged as equal to Europe and to EU citizens.

The idea of a visa-free regime between the EU and Russia exemplifies both the wishes and obstacles that are related to Russia’s modernisation. This essay has examined the visa regime issue in the context of EU–Russia relations in general and in the partnership for modernisation in particular in order to ask how the Russian foreign policy establishment argues about modernisation, the modernisation partnership and visa-free travel, and how these issues are connected with each other.

The modernisation argument is not new in Russia. It is a recurring theme. During the Medvedev presidency between 2008 and 2012 the modernisation debate was very lively. The comprehensive model extended the ideas of modernisation from economy, administrative, military to civil society and political reforms. The selective model was more cautious, taking a more conservative and sectoral approach. What was common for these two approaches was recognition that Russia needs partners and the West, especially the EU, was singled out for special attention. Noteworthy is the fact that Russia does see modernisation partnerships as possible with other countries. It has one with China too. But as in many other issues Europe and the EU also poses an identity question for Russia.

The Russia–EU modernisation partnership was yet another attempt to find a framework in which Russia and the EU could work together and seek closer cooperation, or even integration. From the Russian point of view, integration with Europe, and with the EU, would be achieved when there is a visa-free regime in place. The visa issue became for Russians something more than a technical matter. The strong arguments from the Russian foreign policy elite about a new Berlin Wall, dividing lines, and double standards show how worried Russians have been that the EU member states would not include Russians in ‘Europe’.

The modernisation concept has been studied from many sides but the question of identity, and Russia finding its place as a modernised European country, has not been in the foreground recently. This essay has shown by analysing Russian argumentation on the visa-free regime, that ultimately in the Russian modernisation debate, inclusion in the Western community is understood as an important prerequisite for modernisation.

University of Tampere

Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki

University of Tampere

Notes

¹ ‘Work Plan for Activities within the EU–Russia Partnership for Modernisation’, 2010, available at: http://formodernization.economy.gov.ru/en/projects/, accessed 28 May 2014.

² See for example, Yel’tsin’s annual address of 1995 on the reform of industry, or of 1999 on technological modernisation (Yel’tsin 1995, 1999).

³ ‘Anklavnaya modernizatsiya. Rossiiskie konservatory, kazhetsya, berut verkh’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 May 2010.

⁴ See also Haukkala (2010).

⁵ ‘Work Plan for Activities within the EU–Russia Partnership for Modernisation’, 2010, available at: http://formodernization.economy.gov.ru/en/projects/, accessed 28 May 2014.

⁶ See also Sychugova (2012).

⁷ ‘Visa-free Travel between RF and EU to be Discussed, 22 March’, ITAR–TASS, 22 March 2013, available at: http://tass.ru/en/archive/691218, accessed 29 October 2015.

⁸ ‘Road Map on the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice’, approved on 10 May 2005, available at: http://www.russianmission.eu/userfiles/file/road_map_on_the_common_space_of_freedom,_security_and_justice_2005_english.pdf, accessed 16 November 2015.