‘Rising Power’ Status and the Evolution of International Order: Conceptualising Russia’s Syria Policies

Abstract

Taking Syria’s armed conflict as a case study to illustrate the processes of normative contestation in international relations, this article is interested in re-examining the typology of Russia as a ‘rising power’ to account for ‘rise’ in a non-material dimension. The article integrates the concept of ‘rising power’ with the literature on international norm dynamics to reflect on the rationale for Russia’s engagement in Syria despite adverse material preconditions. It will argue that Russian norm divergence from alleged ‘Western’ norms illustrates Moscow’s ambition to co-define the conditions for legitimate transgressions of state sovereignty.

A previous version of this article was presented at the 5th Global International Studies Conference in Taipei, Taiwan, on 3 April 2017, organised by the World International Studies Committee. The author thanks Dr David Lewis for his helpful comments on the manuscript.

Notes

1 As defined first by Goldman Sachs in 2001. See ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’, Global Economics Paper No. 66, available at: http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf, accessed 7 August 2014.

2 See, Armijo (2007) and Vezirgiannidou (2013). In 2006, International Affairs devoted a special issue to the topic, ‘Perspectives on Emerging Would-Be Great Powers’ (2006, 82, 1), followed by Review of International Studies in 2010, with ‘Regional Powers and Their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership’ (2010, 36, 4).

3 For the purpose of this article, the terms ‘rising’ and ‘emerging’ power are understood to be interchangeable. The remainder of the article uses the term ‘rising’.

4 It has been argued that this shift had to do more with domestic determinants of Russian foreign policy than with an actual deterioration in Russian–Western relations in the aftermath of the 2011 Duma elections. Faced with the largest public demonstrations since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian state cohesion was deemed threatened by the ruling elite. The discursive shift towards a more assertive anti-Westernism in 2012 predated the fallout over the repercussions of the failed Association Agreement between Ukraine and Europe in late 2013, and arguably explains the linkage between domestic politics and Putin’s turn to a more vocal anti-Westernism in foreign policy (Allison 2013; Hill & Gaddy 2013, p. 343; Malinova 2014). This ‘diversionary explanation’ has been challenged on the grounds that it fails to account for the structural asymmetries in Russian–Western relations generated in a post-Cold War context (Sakwa 2017, pp. 115–21).

5 ‘Speech at the Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club’, Kremlin Transcript, 24 October 2014, available at: http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23137, accessed 26 January 2015.

6 ‘Speech at a Panel Discussion with French Prime Minister Manuel Valls’, Munich Security Conference, Full Transcript, 13 February 2016, available at: http://government.ru/en/news/21784/, accessed 15 February 2016.

7 Wunderlich (2014, p. 85) refers to this as ‘altruistic norm advocacy’. See also, Acharya (2009), Risse and Sikkink (1999).

8 See also the link between socialisation and hegemonic power in the work of Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990).

9 The Russian–Turkish trade volume exceeded US$30 billion in the years 2011–2014, dropped to some US$24 billion in 2015, and then to a total volume of US$16.7 billion in 2016, even as the shooting down of a Russian fighter jet by Turkish forces in November 2015 led to the imposition of Russian economic sanctions on Turkey. See UN trade statistics, available at: http://comtrade.un.org/data/, accessed 16 January 2019.

10 See UN trade statistics, available at: http://comtrade.un.org/data/, accessed 16 January 2019.

11 Asked about this gas pipeline project, a Russian Federation Council senator and a member of the Committee for International Affairs stated that the Iran pipeline project would be more favourable for Russia than a Qatari alternative pipeline, but that economic considerations were rendered secondary by the ongoing war. Discussion at the Federation Council, organised by the ‘Public Initiative Creative Diplomacy’ (PICREADI), a Russian NGO working on public diplomacy (http://www.picreadi.ru/meeting-russia/), Moscow, 16 February 2017.

12 PICREADI discussion at the Department for International Defence Cooperation at the Russian defence ministry (Glavnoe upravlenie mezhdunarodnogo voennogo sotrudnichestva Minoborony Rossii), Moscow, 18 February 2017.

13 ‘Speech at a Panel Discussion with French Prime Minister Manuel Valls’, Munich Security Conference, Full Transcript, 13 February 2016, available at: http://government.ru/en/news/21784/, accessed 15 February 2016.

14 See Lavrov’s interview with Rossiskaya Gazeta, ‘Interv’yu Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova “Rossiiskoi gazete”’, 19 November 2013, available at: http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/newsline/4992A5918FBBCB5D44257C280047E2D0, accessed 5 April 2016.

15 Russia and China jointly vetoed drafted UNSC resolutions on Syria in October 2011, in February and July 2012, in May 2014, in December 2016, and in February 2017. In addition, Russia alone has vetoed a draft resolution on Syria in October 2016. See UN Security Council Veto List, available at: http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick, accessed 14 May 2017.

16 ‘6627th Meeting, 4 October 2011’, Minutes of the UNSC, S/PV.6627, UN Security Council, p. 4, available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Golan%20Heights%20S%20PV%206627.pdf, accessed 26 April 2017.

17 These were UNSCR 2042 and 2043 in April 2012 authorising an observer mission to Syria, UNSCR 2118 in September 2013 requiring the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, UNSCR 2139 in February 2014 enabling aid deliveries, UNSCR 2209 in March 2015 condemning the use of chlorine gas, and UNSCR 2235 in August 2015 establishing mechanisms to identify perpetrators using chemical weapons in Syria. See ‘UN Documents for Syria: Security Council Resolutions’, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/?ctype=Syria&cbtype=syria, accessed 16 January 2019.

18 UNSCR 2254, adopted by the Security Council at its 7588th meeting, on 18 December 2015, available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2254, accessed 16 January 2019.

19 Similar points were raised by the Federation Council, PICREADI roundtable, Moscow, 16 February 2017.

20 ‘Russia Plane Crash: “Terror Act” Downed A321 over Egypt’s Sinai’, BBC Europe News, 17 November 2015, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34840943, accessed 15 February 2015.

21 ‘Address at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly’, Full Transcript, 28 September 2015, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50385, accessed 12 February 2016.

22 Federation Council, PICREADI roundtable, Moscow, 16 February 2017.

23 An official from the Russian defence ministry underlined that Russia launches strikes from ‘all platforms available to us’, including submarines in the Mediterranean and aircraft carriers. Federation Council, PICREADI roundtable, Moscow, 18 February 2017.

24 Oweis (2016, p. 4) writes that the Russian military campaign might also have benefitted from Jordanian intelligence-sharing.

25 Asked about Russia’s view of Hezbollah’s activities in Syria, a Russian defence ministry official answered elusively that Russia did not favour either Sunni or Shia forces in the region; that ‘Russian air forces only provide aerial support’; and that Sunni forces were used in the ‘liberation of Eastern Aleppo’ in December 2016 to avoid retribution on sectarian grounds. PICREADI roundtable, Moscow, 18 February 2017.

26 For an overview of the ideological and strategic differences between these Syrian insurgency groups, see International Crisis Group (2014, 2015).

27 ‘Meeting of President of Russia Vladimir Putin with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 14 March 2016, available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2141689, accessed 15 March 2016.

28 ‘Meeting of President of Russia Vladimir Putin with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 14 March 2016, available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2141689, accessed 15 March 2016.

29 Author’s interview with Fyodor Lukyanov, Moscow, 14 June 2016.

30 That this was one motivation underlying the decision to intervene was an assessment shared by a European diplomat posted to Moscow who requested anonymity, conversation with author, 15 June 2016.

31 A Russian defence ministry official noted that a Memorandum of Understanding on the Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents to ‘avoid incidents’ was signed between Russia and the US in 2015. PICREADI roundtable, Moscow, 18 February 2017. This MoU was suspended by Russia in reaction to the US air strikes on Syria on 7 April 2017, carried out in response to the use of chemical weapons in Khan Sheikhoun in Northwestern Syria on 4 April 2017. See ‘Zaiavlenie MID Rossii v sviazi s vooruzhennoi aktsiei SShA v Sirii 7 aprelia 2017 goda’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 7 April 2017, available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2717798?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB, accessed 21 April 2017.

32 ‘Speech at a Panel Discussion with French Prime Minister Manuel Valls’, Munich Security Conference, Full Transcript, 13 February 2016, available at: http://government.ru/en/news/21784/, accessed 15 February 2016.

33 ‘Syria Rebels “in Push to Break Aleppo Siege”’, BBC, 28 October 2016, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-37798924, accessed 17 April 2018.

34 ‘Prezident Sirii Bashar Asad posetil Rossiyu s rabochim vizitom’, 21 November 2017, available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56135, accessed 24 November 2017.

35 ‘Interview with Bashar al-Assad’, ARD, 1 March 2016, available at: http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/assadinterview-105.html, accessed 2 March 2016.

36 ‘Press Release on the Preparations for the Sixth High-level International Meeting on Syria in Astana’, Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 18 August 2017, available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/conflicts/-/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/2838557?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_xIEMTQ3OvzcA&_101_INSTANCE_xIEMTQ3OvzcA_languageId=en_GB, accessed 16 January 2019.

37 Yet, asked by the author about the two different tracks for Syria peace talks, a senator of the Russian Federation Council and a member of the Committee for International Affairs responded that these should not be seen as separate but complementary (Moscow, 16 February 2017). Similarly, the Turkish foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, said at the 2017 Munich Security Conference that Astana and Geneva ‘never excluded each other’, but that the Kazakhstan talks were a useful ‘confidence-building measure’. ‘Statement by Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey’, 19 February 2017, available at: https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-library/munich-security-conference-2017/video/statement-by-mevluet-cavusoglu/, accessed 29 November 2018.

38 ‘Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013, available at: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument, accessed 5 April 2016.

39 Paragraph 26(c), ‘Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 30 November 2016, available at: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/international/document25/, accessed 24 November 2017.

40 A senator in the Russian Federation Council, and a member of the Committee for International Affairs, thus puts it: ‘the US doesn’t like Russian airstrikes in Syria, but we were invited by the Syrian government’. Federation Council, PICREADI roundtable, Moscow, 16 February 2017.

41 PICREADI roundtable, Moscow, 18 February 2017.

42 ‘Syria’s Ambassador to Russia Urges All Countries to Join Syria and Russia Against Terrorism’, Syrian Arab News Agency, 1 October 2015, available at: http://sana.sy/en/?p=56454, accessed 12 February 2016.

43 ‘Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013, available at: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument, accessed 15 January 2014.

44 See also Haukkala (2008).

45 See also Freire and Heller (2018).

46 This was a policy that, especially during the Brezhnev era, was marred by the contradiction of supporting regimes for ostensibly ideological causes, while these very regimes made it clear that they sought to establish relations with the United States and thereby undermined Russian policies, such as Syria and Egypt (Nizameddin 2013, pp. 28, 176–79). In this sense, it was only with the advent of Evgenii Primakov (with an academic background in Middle Eastern studies) as foreign minister in 1996 that Russia formulated more nuanced, alternative policies to the US in the Middle East (Nizameddin 2013, p. 56). In his 2009 book, Russia and the Arabs, Primakov reflected on Soviet Syria policy: ‘Hafez Assad’s Syria had become the mainstay of Soviet policy in the Middle East since Egypt under Sadat had distanced itself from the Soviet Union and difficulties had arisen in Moscow’s relations with Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq’ (Primakov 2009, p. 240).

47 For a discussion of Soviet policy towards Syria under Hafiz al-Assad, see Freedman (1991). Russia had also provided significant support to Syria before the advent of Hafiz. From 1955 until 1986, Syria was the biggest non-communist buyer of Soviet weaponry (Kreutz 2007, p. 16).

48 ‘Barack Obama: Russia is a Regional Power Showing Weakness over Ukraine’, The Guardian, 25 March 2014, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/25/barack-obama-russia-regional-power-ukraine-weakness, accessed 11 February 2016.

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Moritz Pieper

Moritz Pieper, Crescent House, University of Salford, The Crescent, Room 200a, Salford, M5 4WT, UK