Strengthening Friendship and Fraternal Solidarity: Soviet Youth Tourism to Eastern Europe under Khrushchev and Brezhnev

Abstract

The three decades following Stalin’s death in 1953 witnessed a dramatic expansion in Soviet tourism to the other countries of the European socialist bloc. Youth tourism in particular was an important feature of efforts to build friendlier and more durable links with the satellite states at the grassroots level. However, the prospects for long-term success in this endeavour were continually hampered by Soviet concerns about the dangers of interaction, and as the years passed, the economic benefits of tourist travel rather than the initial goal of building solidarity were accorded priority.

Notes

1 As discussed below, three notable exceptions to this trend are Applebaum (2015), Wojnowski (2015) and Gorsuch (2006). On wider exchange within the socialist camp, see also Babiracki and Jersild (2016).

2 For example, for every US or British student in a Soviet university dormitory in the early 1960s, there were more than ten Bulgarians, East Germans and Czechoslovaks. See Krasovitskaya (2013, p. 159).

3 On this theme, see, for example, Babiracki (2014). See also Volokitina et al. (2008).

4 This initial decree envisioned only travel to Eastern Europe, though trips to the capitalist West soon followed. On the theme of adult tourism from the USSR to Eastern Europe, see in particular Gorsuch (2006).

5 As Orlov and Popov (2016) note, Soviet definitions of who and what constituted ‘tourists’ and ‘tourism’ could be rather fluid and vague at times, meaning such figures have to be regarded somewhat cautiously.

6 Gorsuch (2011, p. 87), for example, draws the parallel between Soviet tourism to Eastern Europe and British travel to India during the days of the Raj.

7 See, for example, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no Politicheskoi Istorii, hereafter RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 30, d. 419, ll. 27–8, in which Komsomol officials argue that older generations of Poles were to blame for anti-Soviet Polish nationalism, and that young Poles were the victims of their elders’ prejudices.

8 On Soviet aims at the youth festival, see Koivunen (2016, pp. 235–38).

9 See, for example, Khoneker (1953, p. 3), in which a young Erich Honecker, as head of the Free German Youth, commiserated on the death of the ‘great Stalin’ and called for stronger links between the Free German Youth and Komsomol.

10 ‘On strengthening links with youth organisations in the People’s Democracies’, Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 22 August 1956.

11 On domestic tourism as a way of bonding Soviet peoples together, see, for example, Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas, Vilnius, hereafter LYA, f. 4421, op. 26, d. 95, l. 5. Large-scale domestic tourist operations such as Moya Rodina–SSSR were quite explicit in their aim of strengthening friendship among different Soviet peoples. See, for example, Metodicheskie rekomendatsii po organizatsii molodezhnogo turizma (Leningrad, 1983, p. 9). On the importance of tourism in regard to links within the bloc, see, for example, RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 30, d. 276, l. 3.

12 On ‘citizen diplomacy’ in Soviet internationalism, see in particular Gilburd (2013).

13 See in particular Bernstein (2017).

14 RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 3, l. 23. Quote taken from a 1958 review of BMMT’s first year of activity.

15 Tsentral’nii Derzhavnii Arkhiv Gromads’kikh Ob’ednan’ Ukraini, Kyiv, hereafter TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 15, d. 503, l. 3.

16 RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 27–9.

17 At the XVII Congress BMMT announced a planned target of 513,000 Soviet youth going abroad with BMMT for the period 1971–1975. Such targets were consistently met and exceeded.

18 RGASPI, f. m-6, op. 17, d. 571, l. 15.

19 LYA, f. 4421, op. 33, d. 98, l. 3. Approximately 40,000 Komsomol members participated in construction exchanges during 1966–1974, with the pattern one of clear growth across the period. On friendship trains, see RGASPI, f. m-6, op. 17, d. 571, l. 7.

20 The Anti-fascist Committee of Soviet Youth (Antifashistskii Komitet Sovetskoi Molodezhi) and its successor, the Committee for Youth Organisations (Komitet Molodezhnykh Organizatsii—KMO), for example, filtered contacts by overseeing processes such as matching up penfriends.

21 As the Ukrainian Komsomol report noted, this delegation was in large part sent as a response to a trip of 400 Bulgarian communist youth who came to Odessa in May of that year. TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 576, ll. 3–10.

22 See, for example, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow, hereafter GARF, f. 9414, op. 13, d. 132, l. 47 and Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii, Moscow, hereafter RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 108, ll. 69–71 on plans for the 40th anniversary of the Komsomol, in October 1958. Komsomol delegations were usually also present at events marking anniversaries of East European regimes’ founding, and their liberation from Nazi occupation. See, for example, Tsentral’nyi Arkhiv Obshchestvenno Politicheskoi Istorii Moskvy, Moscow, hereafter TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 1, d. 2425, l. 5.

23 See, for example, Natsional’nyi Arkhiv Respubliki Belarus’, Minsk, hereafter NARB, f. 63, op. 19, d. 13, ll. 99–101. On this theme, see also Wojnowski (2015).

24 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 94, ll. 1–2.

25 RGASPI, f. m-24, op. 1, d. 157, l. 8. Studies also included theatre and museum trips, friendship evenings, film showings and all manner of events intended to boost respect and friendship.

26 On the founding of BMMT, see in particular Orlov and Mashkova (2011).

27 LVA, f. 201, op. 3, d. 16, ll. 145–47.

28 Tsentr Dokumentatsii Obshchestvennykh Organizatsii Sverdlovskoi Oblasti, Ekaterinburg, hereafter TsDOOSO, f. 61, op. 16, d. 59, l. 6.

29 During the years 1978–1980, for example, the number of BMMT visitors to Finland (a little over 54,000 in total across the three years) was comfortably more than double that of any other capitalist country on the continent. RGASPI, f. m-6, op. 19, d. 286, l. 59.

30 RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 410, l. 86.

31 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 590, l. 2.

32 RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 30, d. 240, l. 4.

33 RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 30, d. 276, l. 2. Sadly, for the Soviet side, they soon reached the conclusion that the Romanians had no interest in increasing tourism at that time. It was noted, somewhat tartly, that while no Romanian communist youth had visited the USSR in 1964, they had gone to China, North Korea, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom and France.

34 RGASPI, f. m-6, op. 17, d. 571, l. 38.

35 RGASPI, f. m-6, op. 17, d. 571, l. 38. See also Applebaum (2013).

36 On the events in Bulgaria, see TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 576, ll. 3–10.

37 RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 30, d. 63, ll. 36–42.

38 Applebaum (2015, p. 500) has made the point that, as the Soviet Union showed ever greater interest in Eastern Europe, the people of that region were in turn increasingly casting their eyes westwards, to the other side of the Iron Curtain.

39 See, for example, TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 607, ll. 1–98.

40 On Soviet complaints see in particular Junes (2015, p. 73). Here Junes notes an episode in which Komsomol visitors’ complaints about a student discussion club’s ‘clerical influence’ ultimately prompted the Polish regime to close the club in question. See also Babiracki (2016).

41 NARB, f. 63, op. 19, d. 13, ll. 182–88.

42 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 598, l. 9. The individual in question estimated the rock to be about 700g.

43 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 598, l. 9.

44 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 607, l. 13.

45 RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 30, d. 61a, l. 51.

46 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 598, l. 11. The group leader’s report summed this matter up by stating that ‘some people do not have the moral right to travel abroad’.

47 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 20, d. 390, l. 13.

48 RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 574, l. 4.

49 RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 54, l. 13.

50 On this, see Hornsby (2016b).

51 Travellers to capitalist countries were, for example, warned that they would be secretly observed and compromised or provoked by foreign agents in the guise of tour guides, hairdressers, doctors, taxi drivers and waiters.

52 RGANI, f. 89, op. 31, d. 7, ll. 10–25.

53 LYA, f. k-1, op. 3, d. 709, l. 21.

54 On the Yugoslav border regime and tourism, see Tchoukarine (2015).

55 LYA, f. k-1, op. 3, d. 709, ll. 28–34. On the labyrinthine and at times comically obtuse process of approving candidates for travel, see in particular Orlov and Popov (2016, pp. 21–57).

56 LYA, f. 1-k, op. 10, d. 405, ll. 62 and 159.

57 One interviewee in Donald Raleigh’s book Russia’s Sputnik Generation, for example, recalled that she had been turned down for a trip to the GDR because local Komsomol officials did not want her head turned by witnessing higher living standards there (Raleigh 2006, p. 175).

58 See, for example, RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 3, d. 990, l. 303.

59 Archive of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Tbilisi, hereafter MIA, f. 96, op. 20, d. 34, l. 38.

60 See, for example, Eesti Riigiarhiivi Filiaal, Tallinn, hereafter ERAF, f. 31, op. 74, d. 44, ll. 1–38.

61 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 20, d. 150, ll. 1–5.

62 See, for example, ERAF, f. 31, op. 112, d. 2, l. 17.

63 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 600, l. 5.

64 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 607, ll. 18–9. Couples were not typically allowed to travel together, though it did happen from time to time.

65 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 607, l. 79.

66 RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 53, l. 57.

67 See, for example ERAF, f. 31, op. 74, d. 44, l. 269.

68 Raleigh (2012, p. 384) suggests that this was indeed the case for some of those who went to East Germany and were taken aback by the far stronger consumer sector there. See also Gorsuch (2006).

69 Chernyshova, for example, cites cases of visitors to the West all but starving themselves in order to save their meagre per diem allowances for shopping rather than eating (Chernyshova 2013, pp. 96–7).

70 ERAF, f. 31, op. 63, d. 16, ll. 81, 85.

71 ERAF, f. 31, op. 107, d. 18, l. 85.

72 See, for example, RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 53, l. 7. See also Gorsuch (2006, p. 219), on the poor impression left by the behaviour of Soviet tourists in Prague shops.

73 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 598, l. 9.

74 NARB, f. 63, op. 19, d. 13, ll. 99–101.

75 See RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 3, l. 32.

76 RGASPI, f. m-1s, op. 1s, d. 1096s, l. 24.

77 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 600, l. 30. On Soviet officials’ worries about the moral impact on young people of increasingly popular dances such as ‘the twist’ and ‘the shake’, see in particular Lebina (2015, pp. 241–48).

78 RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 30, d. 63, l. 5.

79 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 17, d. 607, l. 78.

80 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 20, d. 390, l. 99.

81 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 20, d. 390, l. 91.

82 RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 30, d. 430, l. 9.

83 Nonetheless, the group leader still had the temerity to complain that their tour guide in Prague had not taken his party to see the city’s monument to the Soviet army.

84 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 20, dd. 81–99.

85 RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 592, ll. 27–9.

86 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 20, d. 390, l. 61.

87 RGASPI, f. m-1, op. 30, d. 399, l. 2.

88 TsDAGO, f. 7, op. 20, d. 390, ll. 1–110.

89 The leader of a late 1968 trip to Norway, for example, wrote of the determined resistance he had to put up in order to stop hotel and hostel administrators there from putting Soviet guests in dormitories with young people from other countries, claiming the group was very busy and needed to rest. RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 592, l. 42.

90 See, for example, RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 1–35.

91 See, for example, ERAF, f. 31, op. 121, d. 102, ll. 75–7 which discusses the economic value of tourism for the Komsomol and calls for greater efforts at raising profitability.

92 MIA, f. 96, op. 26, d. 142, l. 6.

93 MIA, f. 96, op. 27, d. 70, l. 62.

94 RGASPI, f. m-6, op. 17, d. 571, l. 29.

95 Interview with V. T. Former member of Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee, Kyiv, 9 January 2017. On Komsomol money spent abroad, see also Hornsby (2016a).

96 Zhuk (2014) in particular has recently noted the powerful lure for Komsomol officials of boosting the organisation’s coffers through members paying entrance fees to events such as screenings of Western films and disco nights.

97 RGASPI, f. m-6, op. 17, d. 571, ll. 17–27.

98 RGASPI, f. m-6, op. 17, d. 571, l. 29.

99 See, for example, Hornsby (2016b, p. 275). As Bagdasaryan (2007) points out, the assumption that expanded tourist links offered promise in regard to friendlier international relations was sufficiently widespread to feature in a range of international agreements, including the Helsinki Final Act.

100 On this theme, see also Ironside (2014).

101 Natsional’nyi Arkhiv Respubliki Karelii, Petrozavodsk, hereafter NARK, f. 779, op. 47, d. 23, l. 12.

102 On more than one occasion, republic and oblast’ Komsomol organisations had to go begging to the Council of Ministers because they had promised cash prizes to competition winners that they subsequently could not afford to pay. See, for example, NARB, f. 63, op. 19, d. 13, ll. 7–8.

103 NARK, f. 779, op. 47, d. 23, l. 12.

104 RGASPI, f. m-6, op. 17, d. 571, l. 16.

105 RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 3, d. 67, ll. 1–245.

106 MIA, f. 96, op. 27, d. 184, ll. 41–7.

107 MIA, f. 96, op. 27, d. 70, l. 84.

108 MIA, f. 96, op. 26, d. 142, l. 3.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Leverhulme Trust.

Notes on contributors

Robert Hornsby

Robert Hornsby, School of History, University of Leeds, Michael Sadler Building, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK. Email: [email protected]