Evolving Dynamics of Societal Security and the Potential for Conflict in Eastern Ukraine

Abstract

In this essay we argue that changes in political structures in post-Soviet Ukraine have affected the potential for conflict during transition. Relying on organisational theory to determine the potential for conflict in Ukraine, we argue that this potential is structurally determined by the changing character of societal relations within and beyond Ukraine. The potential for conflict was always present in post-Soviet Ukraine, but this essay examines the facts of when, how and why conflict happened, and how it was related to weak state institutions, centre–periphery relations and an unsettled relationship with Russia. Relying on our analytical framework, we conclude that the conditions for further conflict greatly outweigh the conditions for peace.

Notes

1 See also Milward (2000).

2 On oligarchs, see for example, Kuzio (2005) and Kudelia and Kuzio (2015).

3 See for example, Minakov (2018, p. 117): ‘the third Ukrainian republic has twice returned to the situation of its re-establishment: the first time in 2004, and the second time in 2014’. As he further explains in his video-interview: ‘[These cycles] started with the promise of political liberties and economic freedoms in 1991 and 2005. Quite soon after, the oligarchic groups and presidents forgot their promises. Among the competitive financial-political groups (FGP) that controlled all major private sector industries, state-owned companies, and core posts in government parliament and the courts, one group would usually take over the presidential post. With time, the presidents promoted the interests of their groups to the extent that they united other oligarchic groups and grassroots protesters against authoritarian rulers. These unions have twice jointly chased them down’ ('Soyuz oligarkhov s etnonatsionalistami privel Ukrainu l respublike ‘tri s polovinoi’—Minakov’, Ukrlife.tv, 2017, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bwEahsEybYg, accessed 16 November 2019).

4 According to a public opinion poll conducted in January 2014, about 50% of Ukraine's residents supported the Euromaidan, compared with 42% who did not support it. Public support differed among the various Ukrainian provinces, reaching about 80% in Western Ukraine compared with 63% in Central Ukraine, 30% in Eastern Ukraine, and 20% in Southern Ukraine and Crimea (‘Yevromaidan pidtrymuie 50% ukraintsiv, Antymaidan—27%’, Ukrainska Pravda, 21 January 2014, available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/01/21/7010495/, accessed 23 March 2019).

5 Ukrainian confidence in government was 24% in March–April 2014 (‘World-Low 9% of Ukrainians Confident in Government’, Gallup, 21 March 2019, available at: https://news.gallup.com/poll/247976/world-low-ukrainians-confident-government.aspx, accessed 16 November 2019). However, public confidence in government was significantly lower in eight eastern and southern provinces. According to a public opinion poll conducted in 8–16 April 2014, 50.8% of residents of these provinces considered then acting President Oleksander Turchinov as illegitimate, 15.1% as partly legitimate (74% and 9.9% in Donetsk and 70% and 12.2% in Luhansk oblasti), 49.6% of residents considered the government of Arsenii Yatsenyuk as illegitimate and 13.3% as partly legitimate (72.1% and 9.4% in Donetsk and 70.4% and 9.7% in Luhansk oblasti accordingly). See ‘Dumki ta poglyadi zhiteliv pivdenno-skhidnih oblastei Ukraini: kviten 2014’ Kiivskii mizhnarodnii institute sociologii, available at: https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=302&page=1, accessed 16 November 2019.

6 The rule ‘winner gets all’ is evident in the consecutive domination of regional politico-economic clans in Ukrainian politics: Dnipropetrovskie have been affiliated with President Leonid Kuchma, Donetskie with President Viktor Yanukovych and Podolskie with President Petro Poroshenko.

7 ‘Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine’, Guardian, 21 February 2014, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text, accessed 17 April 2018.

8 In an interview for the documentary The World Order 2018, Vladimir Putin revealed details about his communication with official Washington during the Euromaidan. As Putin explained to a journalist, the US leadership had cheated him: Washington had asked Putin to change Viktor Yanukovych's decision to deploy Ukrainian armed forces against the protesters on the Maidan. Later, the West broke this informal agreement with Putin and supported what Putin characterised as a coup d’état. (‘Putin: SSHA Prosili Sdelat Vse Chtobi Yanukovych ne Primenil Armiyu’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 March 2018, available at: https://rg.ru/2018/03/07/putin-ssha-prosili-rf-sdelat-vse-chtoby-ianukovich-ne-primenil-armiiu.html, accessed 25 January 2019).

9 Interview 1, academic, Kharkiv Karazin National University, interviewed in Kyiv, 6 April 2016 and 10 April 2017. By way of illustration, the weakness of Ukraine's state institutions facilitated centrifugal tendencies in other provinces of Ukraine as well. Outside of Donbas and Crimea, centrifugal tendencies were manifest in Transcarpathia and Odesa oblasti. In some cases, these centrifugal forces rendered the Ukrainian government incapable of exercising effective control over certain areas or regions (‘Ukraine: Will Centre Hold?’, International Crisis Group, 15 December 2017, available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/ukraine-will-centre-hold-1, accessed 31 January 2019).

10 Interview 2, adviser, Russian Council on International Affairs, Moscow, via email, April 2017.

11 Interview 3, academic, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, via email, April 2017.

12 Interview 4, expert, Carnegie Moscow Centre, via Skype, 11 April 2017.

13 Such as, the discounted sale of Russian natural gas proposed in exchange for keeping the Russian Black Sea Fleet's base in Sevastopol until 2042 (so-called ‘Kharkiv Agreements’, 2010) ‘Kharkovskie soglasheniya’, Ukrainskaya Pravda, 29 April 2010, available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2010/04/29/4990510/, accessed 16 November 2019.

14 To our knowledge, there was no systematic research or monitoring of the sociopolitical situation in Crimea before 2014. Our conclusions in this essay rely on the Razumkov Centre and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology whose research is independent in scope, purpose and methodology.

15 The Law of Ukraine No. 1190, ‘On Cancellation of Law of Ukraine “On the Basis for a Public Language Policy”’, 23 February 2014, available at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=45291, accessed 16 November 2019.

16 The Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol was a permanent bone of contention between political parties with declared pro-Russian and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Ukraine's so-called democratic parliamentary opposition, the Yuliya Timoshenko Bloc (Blok Yulii Tymoshenko), Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina) and the All-Ukrainian Union ‘Freedom’ (Vseukrains’ke ob’iedannia ‘Svoboda’), and leaders of the Euromaidan, permanently called for the revocation of the Kharkiv Agreements signed by then president Viktor Yanukovych and then president of Russia Dmitrii Medvedev on 21 April 2010. See, for example ‘NG: Ochikuiutsia Kharkivski ugody-2’, Korrespondent, 20 June 2013, available at: https://ua.korrespondent.net/world/worldabus/1572656-ng-ochikuyutsya-harkivski-ugodi-2, accessed 2 May 2018.

17 Interview 5, former Ukrainian MP, interviewed in Kyiv, 6 April 2016 and 10 April 2017.

18 Interview 6, former public servant, Crimea, interviewed in Kyiv, 6 April 2016 and 10 April 2017; interview 7, Colonel (ret.) Ukrainian Armed Forces, interviewed in Kyiv, 10 April. In a newspaper interview and in testimony before a Ukrainian court, supported by the testimony of then Minister of Defence Mikhailo Koval, Oleksandr Turchinov, then the Acting President of Ukraine and current General Secretary of the Council for National Security and Defence, explained: ‘The first task was to conduct the presidential elections openly and transparently in order to secure the legitimacy of the newly appointed Ukrainian government … . There was widespread sabotage among public servants at all levels. Many of them did not believe we would be able to keep order and political power. They were really waiting for Russia's invasion and the return of Yanukovych’ (Ivanov 2017).

19 ‘On Urgent Measures on Providing National Security, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’, Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2014, p. 10.

20 ‘On Urgent Measures on Providing National Security, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’, Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2014, p. 5.

21 On Urgent Measures on Providing National Security, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’, Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2014, p. 6.

22 ‘On Urgent Measures on Providing National Security, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’, Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2014. p. 5.

23 ‘On Urgent Measures on Providing National Security, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’, Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2014, p. 11.

24 See, for example ‘Ukraine's Naftogaz Seeks $5.2 billion in Damages from Russia Over Seized Crimea Assets’, Radio Free Europe, 1 August 2019, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-s-naftogaz-seeks-5-2-billion-in-damages-from-russia-over-seized-crimea-assets/30086374.html, accessed 16 November 2019.

25 Law of Ukraine 1207-VII, ‘Pro zabezpechennya prav i svobod gromadyan i pravovoi rezhim na timchasovo okupovanii teritorii Ukraini’, 15 April 2014, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18, accessed 16 November 2019.

26 ‘Yevromaidan pidtrymuie 50% ukraintsiv, Antymaidan—27%’, Ukrainska pravda, 21 January 2014, available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/01/21/7010495/, accessed 23 March 2019.

27 For example, our interlocutors representing the business community in Donbas emphasised that the frequent cases of enforced changes in property rights (sometimes involving torture, kidnap and murder) began after the institutional failure of the Ukrainian state in Donetsk and Luhansk in April–May 2014 (interview 8, businessman, Donetsk, interviewed in Kyiv, 10 April 2017; interview 9, businessman, Mariupol, interviewed in Kyiv, 11 April 2017; interview 10, businessman and former deputy of local council, IDP from Donetsk, interviewed in Kyiv, 11 April 2017).

28 ‘Akhmetov and Kolomoiskii: dve strategii v ukrainskom biznese’, Glavkom.Ua, 21 September 2014, available at: https://glavcom.ua/columns/romanenko/126420-ahmetov-i-kolomojskij-dve-strategii-v-ukrainskom-krizise.html, accessed 15 November 2019.

29 Interview 13, human rights activist, Kramatorsk, interviewed in Kyiv, 11 April 2017; interview 14, journalist, Kyiv, 11 April 2017. The Law of Ukraine ‘On Purification of Authorities’ N 1682–18, 16 September 2014 (‘Law on Lustration’) together with other legislative documents, consolidated the legitimacy of the new political regime. The Law of Ukraine N 743–18, 21 February 2014, ‘On Barring of Suit and Penalty for Individuals Participating in Peaceful Assembly’ (still in force), exempts participants of the Euromaidan protests from criminal liability for a wide spectrum of crimes they conducted during the Euromaidan, including violent change of the constitutional order or the capture of political power (article 109 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), assassination of public servants (article 112), sabotage (article 113), wilful bodily injury (article 121) and death threats (article 129) (see ‘Law of Ukraine: On Barring of Suit and Penalty for Individuals Participating in Peaceful Assembly’, N 743–18, 21 February 2014, available at: http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/743-18, accessed 31 January 2019). Article 2 of The Law ‘On Purification’ identifies then president Victor Yanukovych as a ‘usurper of political power’; thus, ‘the lustration has been conducted to prevent those who assisted Yanukovych in his governance’ (‘Law of Ukraine ‘On Purification of Authorities’, N1682–18, 16 September 2014, available at: http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1682-18, accessed 31 January 2019).

30 ‘Mneniya i Vzglyady Zhitelei Yugo—Vostoka: Aprel’ 2014’, Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, 18 April 2014, available at: https://zn.ua/UKRAINE/mneniya-i-vzglyady-zhiteley-yugo-vostoka-ukrainy-aprel-2014-143598_.html, accessed 31 January 2019.

31 ‘Stavlennia ukraintsiv do terytorialnoho ustoiu krainy’, Sociologichna grupa ‘Reiting’, 2014, available at: http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ter.ustriy_ua_032014.pdf, accessed 20 April 2018.

32 Interview 2, adviser, Russian Council on International Affairs, Moscow, via email, April 2017; interview 11, businessman and ex-member of pro-governmental paramilitary battalion ‘Dnepr’, IDP from Donetsk, interviewed in Odesa, 18 September 2017.

33 ‘Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine from April 17: The Full Text’, Washington Post, 2014, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/joint-geneva-statement-on-ukraine-from-april-17-the-full-text/2014/04/17/89bd0ac2-c654-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html?utm_term=.b09bf5ef1876, accessed 31 January 2019.

34 ‘Full Text of the Minsk Agreement’, Financial Times, 12 February 2015, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de, accessed 21 March 2019.

35 ‘Kuchma: Pochemu Minskie Soglasheniya Ne Podpisali’, Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, 16 December 2017, available at: https://zn.ua/POLITICS/kuchma-na-yes-pochemu-minskie-soglasheniya-ne-podpisali-merkel-olland-poroshenko-i-putin-lichno-260257_.html, accessed 31 January 2019.

36 ‘Minskie soglasheniya ne ideal’ny, no blagodarya im nad Ukrainoi mirnoe nebo,—Poroshenko’, Censor.Net, 22 August 2017, available at: https://censor.net.ua/news/452678/minskie_soglasheniya_ne_idealny_no_blagodarya_im_nad_ukrainoyi_mirnoe_nebo_poroshenko, accessed 25 January 2019.

37 ‘Minskii protses mertv—Avakov’, Ukrainskaya Pravda, 7 June 2018, available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2018/06/7/7182638/, accessed 24 November 2019.

38 ‘“Poroshenko i nashi diplomaty prosto obmanuli Rossiyu s Minskimi soglasheniyami”,—Anton Gerashchenko’, Strana.ua, 29 November 2017, available at: https://strana.ua/news/108247-herashchenko-prokommentiroval-slova-avakova-o-smerti-minskikh-sohlashenij.html, accessed 25 March 2018.

39 The Law of Ukraine N7163, ‘On Particularities of the State Policy on Providing State Sovereignty of Ukraine over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast’, 18 January 2018, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2268-19, accessed 23 March 2019.

40 ‘Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)’, International Court of Justice, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/166, accessed 21 April 2018.

41 Interview 1, academic, Kharkiv Karazin National University, Kharkiv, interviewed in Kyiv, 6 April 2016 and 10 April 2017.

42 ‘Sergei Lavrov: voiny s Ukrainoi ne budet’, Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 17 December 2018, available at: https://www.crimea.kp.ru/daily/26921/3968646/, accessed 24 March 2019.

43 Law of Ukraine N638-IV, ‘On the Fight Against Terrorism’, current edition from 4 November 2018, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/638-15, accessed 24 November 2019.

44 Law of Ukraine N1669-VII, ‘On Temporary Measures for the Period of ATO’, current edition from 7 February 2019, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/1669-18, accessed 24 November 2019.

45 Law of Ukraine N1680-VII, ‘On Special Rule in Some Parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasti’, current edition from 5 October 2018, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/1680-18, accessed 24 November 2019.

46 Decree of President of Ukraine N298 ‘On Implementation of the Decision of the Council for the National Security and Defence of Ukraine of 4 November 2014’, 6 May 2015, available at: http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/documents/400.html, accessed 24 November 2019.

47 Decree of First Deputy Head of ATO Centre in Ukraine v222_950_17, ‘Temporary Order of Control over Movement of Individuals through the Frontline in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasti’, current edition from 15 December 2017, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/rada/show/ru/v222_950-17/sp:head, accessed 24 November 2019.

48 Decree of the President of Ukraine N62/2017, ‘On Urgent Additional Measures against Hybrid Threats to the National Security of Ukraine’, 15 March 2017, available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/622017-21470, accessed 24 November 2019.

49 See ‘Ukraine GDP’, Trading Economics, available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/gdp, accessed 13 May 2018.

50 ‘V NBU podschitali, skol’ko poteryala Ukraina iz-za blokady na Donbasse’, Segodnya, 11 December 2017, available at: https://www.segodnya.ua/economics/enews/v-nbu-podschitali-skolko-poteryala-ukraina-iz-za-blokady-na-donbasse-1097607.html, accessed 13 May 2018.

51 Law of Ukraine N2268, ‘Pro osoblivosti derzhavnoi politiki iz zabezpechennya derzhavnogo suverenitetu Ukraini na timchasovo okupovanih territoriyah u Donetskii i Luhanskii oblastyah’, 18 January 2018, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/2268-19, accessed 24 November 2019.

52 ‘Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)’, International Court of Justice, available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/166 accessed 24 November 2019.

53 In order to get their pensions and other social benefits, citizens of Ukraine living on the territories which the Ukrainian government does not control have to apply for the status of internally-displaced person (IDP) in Ukraine. Only IDPs receive pensions on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. See, for example ‘Pensions for IDPs and Persons Living in the Areas Not Controlled by the Government in the East of Ukraine’, United Nations Ukraine, February 2019, available at: http://www.un.org.ua/images/documents/4719/Briefing%20Note%20on%20Pensions-eng.pdf, accessed 24 November 2019.

54 Interview 12, businessman, IDP from Donetsk, interviewed in Kyiv, 10 April 2017.

55 Interview 15, Major General (ret.) Ukrainian Armed Forces, interviewed in Kyiv, 11 April 2017.

56 ‘Tanki, BTRi ta vazhka artileriya: yakim krainam zagrozhue armia DNR’, TSN, 7 September 2016, available at: https://tsn.ua/ato/tanki-btri-y-vazhka-artileriya-yakim-krayinam-zagrozhuye-armiya-dnr-lnr-742240.html, accessed 24 November 2019.

57 Interview 15, Major General (ret.) Ukrainian Armed Forces, interviewed in Kyiv, 11 April 2017. In discussions around strategy for the re-integration of DNR and LNR, a ‘Croatian scenario’ means re-integration as a result of military victory of the Ukrainian armed forces over separatists, in an analogy with Operation Flash and Storm conducted by the Croatian government in 1995.

58 ‘Muzhenko ozvuchil masshtabnye poteri VSU v sluchae silovogo stsenariya na Donbasse’, 24 Kanal, 5 October 2017, available at: https://24tv.ua/ru/muzhenko_ozvuchil_masshtabnye_poteri_vsu_v_sluchae_silovogo_scenarija_na_donbasse_n873152, accessed 25 March 2018.

59 Interview 3, academic, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, via email, April 2017; interview 16, academic, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Moscow, via Skype, 11 April 2017.

60 ‘Doslidzhennya schodo znizhennya (chastkovoi vtrati) oboronnogo potencialu Ukraini’, Ukrainian Defence Review, 2015, available at: https://issuu.com/ukrainian_defense_review, accessed 24 November 2019.

61 ‘Doslidzhennya schodo znizhennya (chastkovoi vtrati) oboronnogo potencialu Ukraini’, Ukrainian Defence Review, 2015, available at: https://issuu.com/ukrainian_defense_review, accessed 24 November 2019.

62 ‘V SNBO zayavili, chto aeroport Donetska mozhet prinimat’ tyazhelie samoleti’, Glavred, 6 October 2014, available at: https://glavred.info/politics/292042-v-snbo-zayavili-chto-aeroport-donecka-mozhet-prinimat-tyazhelye-samolety.html, accessed 24 November 2019; ‘Donetskii aeroport pochti unichtozhen, no polosa pochti tselaya’, Ukrainian Pravda, 4 May 2015, available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/05/4/7066785/, accessed 24 November 2019.

63 ‘Doslidzhennya schodo znizhennya (chastkovoi vtrati) oboronnogo potencialu Ukraini’, Ukrainian Defence Review, 2015, available at: https://issuu.com/ukrainian_defense_review, accessed 24 November 2019.

64 See, for example, ‘Donetskoe visshee obshevoiskovoe komandnoe uchilische’, Donvuko.com, available at http://donvoku.com/, accessed 24 November 2019.

65 Interview 10, businessman, former deputy of local council, IDP from Donetsk, interviewed in Kyiv, 11 April 2017.

66 ‘The Economy of Donetsk People's Republics’, Institute for Economic Study, 2017, available at: http://econri.org/, accessed 31 January 2019.

67 Interview 10, businessman and former deputy of local council, IDP from Donetsk, interviewed in Kyiv, 11 April 2017; interview 11, businessman and ex-member of pro-governmental paramilitary battalion ‘Dnepr’, IDP from Donetsk, interviewed in Odesa, 18 September 2017.

68 ‘Nachal'naya voennaya podgotovka v shkolakh DNR’, Novorossia-tv.ru, available at: http://novorossia-tv.ru/news/nrus/nachalnaya-voennaya-podgotovka-v-shkolakh-dnr-/, accessed 24 November 2019.

69 ‘Doslidzhennya situatsii v media Pivdnya ta Shodu Ukraini za sichen-serpen 2019 roku—analitichnii zvit’, Institut masovoi informatsii, 24 September 2019, available at: https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/doslidzhennya-sytuatsiyi-v-media-pivdnya-ta-shodu-ukrayiny-za-sichen-serpen-2019-roku-analitychnyj-i29709?fbclid=IwAR3pfsjb7kY-8q6I-FhyFG-DX7G60BpcX5ADvPi7VFe-lE6hrC11J2j7qUA, accessed 25 November 2019.

70 For example, a so-called Declaration of Citizenship adopted by the parliament of the self-declared Luhansk People's Republic considers all citizens of Ukraine who were formally registered in the rebel-controlled territories on the date of the referendum on the independence of the LNR—11 May 2014—to be citizens of the LNR.

71 ‘Ukaz o priznanii dokumentov, vydannim grazhdanam Ukraini i litsam bez grazhdanstva, prozhivayushchim na territoriyakh otdelnikh rayonov Donetskoi i Luhanskoi oblastei Ukraini’, Kremlin.ru, 18 February 2018, available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53895, accessed 25 November 2019.

72 ‘V Minsotspolitiki nazvali kolichestvo pereselentsev’, Finance.ua, 8 January 2019, available at: https://news.finance.ua/ru/news/-/441712/v-minsotspolitiki-nazvali-kolichestvo-pereselentsev, accessed 25 January 2019.

73 ‘Liniya razgranicheniya: za 11 mesyatsev v “L-DNR” v"ezzhali bol’she, chem vyezzhali (Infografika)’, Donetskie novosti, 10 December 2018, available at: https://dnews.dn.ua/news/698394, accessed 25 January 2019.

74 ‘Gossluzhashchim vremenno zapreshchen vyezd na territoriyu Ukrainy’, 2017, available at: https://dnr-online.ru/gossluzhashhim-vremenno-zapreshhen-vyezd-na-territoriyu-ukrainy/, accessed 25 January 2019.

75 According to ex-minister of foreign affairs Pavlo Klimkin, about a million of the population left Ukraine annually; see ‘Ezhegodno okolo 1 milliona Ukraintsev pokidayut stranu’, Ukrainska Pravda, 4 September 2018, available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2018/09/4/7191010/, accessed 10 November 2019.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David J. Galbreath

David J. Galbreath, University of Bath, Bath, Somerset BA2 7AY, UK. Email: [email protected]

Tetyana Malyarenko

Tetyana Malyarenko, National University ‘Odesa Academy of Law’, Academichna Street 2, Odesa 65009, Ukraine. Email: [email protected]