Political Revisionism: Old and New

The last five years or so had to convince even the most experienced observers that we have not been living in normal political times. Indeed, modern history is full of surprising moments, be it crises, unforeseen events—most recently the Covid-19 pandemic—living through unintended consequences of political actions, escalations of various types and intensity, or even all-out wars. Yet, in the post-2014 years, we witnessed a number of shifts that, on the whole, have systematically challenged the international political order. As the harmful effects of the financial crisis were finally ebbing, a number of concurrent processes threw the international order into a flux not experienced since the end of the Cold War. The worldwide rise of domestic populism, centrifugal tendencies and paralysed leadership in the European Union, coupled with the massive migration wave as a delayed boomerang effect of Western neo-colonialism (Gregory 2004), the surprising outcome of the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, the emergence of a more confrontational Russia, the Mao-Zedongisation in China under President Xi, the election of and Donald Trump’s moving to the White House with his fully weaponised and post-truth Twitter account, have all contributed to the idiosyncratic re-politicisation of not only general politics but also judicial systems, international trade, security institutions and diplomacy. Not post-politics (Wilson & Swyngedouw 2014) but revisionist, banal and maximal re-politicisation became the ‘new normal’, decidedly contributing to the debate on what comes after neo-liberal internationalism (Kissinger 2014; Duncombe & Dunne 2018; Jahn 2018).¹

The undercurrents of revisionism

The fact that liberal democracy had been fantasised about (Allison 2018) and hollowed out (Chandler 2009) even before, has only increased the possibility that the ‘new normal’ condition, resting on a multifaceted hybridisation of political processes, could perhaps even reach an alteration level of certain fundamental characteristics of the international political order. While its composite character made this order greatly resilient with built-in enduring institutionalised tensions (Olsen 2018), its constitutive institutions, regulative rules as well as customs and practices have been, after all, still human artefacts. Susceptibility to change has been manifested through rising revisionism regardless of assumed, deep sedimentation and taken-for-granted quality of the international order. In the wake of the annexation of Crimea in the early months of 2014, Vladimir Putin has clearly shown why Russia should be considered a resurging and revisionist great power trying to link its geopolitical imagination and decision-making legitimacy (if not operational codes) to its former superpower status, rather than a part of BRICS, that is, a fashionista's label with a dubious analytical clout, as many had it (Kirton & Larionova 2018). The rise in contemporary revisionism shows the oft-forgotten importance of the first image of international politics: political leaders, in other words, do indeed matter. That they matter greatly is only reinforced when they represent regional or even great powers (Byman & Pollack 2001), and especially revisionist regimes and states with the propensity to produce complex effects (Jervis 1998).

Disciplinary separatism, or ‘policing’, has obfuscated for many decades any theorisation of the connections between international and domestic politics. It claims responsibility for leaving the subject of leadership solely to political psychologists. International Relations has been slow to appreciate the impact of individual leaders on international politics as the ‘first image’ (domestic politics) (Waltz 1996)² was said not to matter for understanding the dynamics and causes of international security. While Waltz and his compatriots purified the analysis of international politics to the extreme even for realists (Molloy 2010), political science was too busy studying regularities and vagaries of ever more abstract domestic systems populated by political parties and regulated by political institutions and electoral systems, to realise that idiosyncratic leaders may quickly turn these into façade, if not farce (Krastev 2011; Blakely 2016).³ President Trump’s political moves have served as an important reminder that such prospects are not ‘reserved’ to authoritarian states only, and gave entirely new relevance to Philip Roth’s masterpiece The Plot Against America (2005). As Zakaria put it succinctly, ‘Innenpolitik is in’ (Zakaria 1992, p. 177).⁴ Regardless of Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping representing very different political regimes, modes of government and value systems, their governing styles share one feature, namely the ability to bypass stable domestic political structures as such (Michaels 2017; Buckley & Myers 2018; Haberman & Rogers 2018; Freedom House 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). The degree has gone beyond the ability to suspend norms, expectations and rules and make them elastic to fit their own objectives rather than being constrained by them (Michaels 2017; Buckley & Myers 2018; Haberman & Rogers 2018; Freedom House 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). What is more, none of them stopped within the confines of domestic politics, contributing to the rise of global populism by ‘crises performances’ (Moffitt 2015). While the focus of this introduction is the conceptualisation of revisionism and its operationalisation vis-à-vis a certain set of features against the backdrop of the contemporary political order, the above lines serve as a reminder that these objectives are not to be achieved without considerations of key leaders’ political impact and challenges they have brought to the nature of the order (Layne 2018).

Students of international politics looked into the synchronisms and diachronisms of great powers to learn about the nature of and prospects for a given international order. While the ‘synchronists’ have traditionally relied on analysis of the structural features of the international system, namely polarity and positionality of primary states (Waltz 1964, 1979; Gilpin 1987; Wohlforth 2009),⁵ the ‘diachronists’ have readily inquired into grand-strategic (Doyle 1986; Kennedy 1989; Posen & Ross 1996; Milevski 2016; Ferguson 2018) and diplomatic (Kissinger 1994, 2014; Mearsheimer 2001) features of those states for their thinking about the nature, driving logic and systemic direction in relation to the underlying international order. While the former largely or completely ignored the domestic sources of revisionism, the latter approaches have incorporated and considered the interconnection. Most of the above analyses, and especially those of synchronists, have separated the realms of domestic and international politics due to their different structural and institutional qualities. A notable exception has been scholars studying general and historical interconnections between hegemony, liberalism and great powers. It was in this light that Ruggie (1982) coined the term embedded liberalism, which showed how the modern US politico-economic domestic order was subsequently scaled up and institutionally entrenched at the global level (Kant 1970; Ruggie 1993; Zakaria 1998; Ikenberry 2000). Similarly, scholars have argued that US ‘special responsibilities’ emanated from the above combination, and focused on the twenty-first century strategy rendition, the ‘Offshore Balancer’, in its multiple ‘coalitional hegemonic’ forms (Ikenberry & Walt 2007; Sylvan & Majeski 2009; Clark 2011; Mearsheimer & Walt 2016) and sovereign transfers through incomplete contracts (Cooley & Spruyt 2009).

Following the theoretical pluralism and eclecticism of the wider project, we aim to study the state as both a political actor and an arena through which strategic relations evolve and extend from one scale to another. We seek to sustain the image of a system characterised by several interconnected political domains wherein great powers are not being alike, mostly due to their systemic features. Rather, as we put it, they differ due to their cultural and organisational make-ups and the diverse (r)evolutionary developments of their domestic social, political and economic conditions (Skocpol 1979; Rokkan 2009; Bukovansky 2010). Our understanding of the international political order as an institutionalised, composite, layered and resilient phenomenon with multiple co-existing temporalities is inspired by New Institutionalism and British Institutionalism (March & Olsen 1998; Linklater & Suganami 2006; Bátora & Hynek 2014). As much as British Institutionalism has been important for the theorisation of international order and its constitutive institutions such as war, balance of power among great powers, sovereignty, diplomacy and public international law, it has suffered from two cardinal omissions in relation to this project: first, its lack of attention to domestic politics goes against our emphasis on close interconnections across political levels; and second, it has paid surprisingly little attention to the oft-decisive role of political leaders. It is for these reasons that we take clues from Marx-inspired understandings of the modern state. We rely on a widened and deepened ontology of the state, namely Gramsci’s (1971) integral state and Poulantzas (1978) and Jessop’s (1982, 1990) strategic-relational conception of the state.⁶

The local dimensions of political revisionism

The essays included in this special issue elaborate on a general idea that political revisionism ought not to be considered a homogenous attack against the international order but rather a bag of tailor-made strategies to exploit opportunities found in various contexts. Compared to past revisionist ideologies, the present-day surge originates from changed socio-political and economic conditions that accentuate multiplicities of local conditions and their nonlinear interactions. In this sense, the contributions to this special issue can be brought under the aegis of ad hoc revisionism, lacking the power to change the underlying structure of the international order as a whole, however, still venturing to exploit any opportunity derived from local and regional collapses of socio-political consensuses. Needless to say, this phenomenon has an obverse side as well, manifested as idiosyncratic—ad hoc even—counterstrategies applied by states in the immediate vicinity of great powers. The effects of an essentially changed international environment then challenge the systemic actors like NATO and the European Union to actively seek not immediately apparent ways of adapting to the changed conditions. Finally, the vacuum resulting from the unfruitfulness of principled actions impedes the success of path-dependent strategies and makes room for illiberal regimes of all sorts.

Conceptually opening this special issue, Nik Hynek and Aleš Karmazin show that ad hoc revisionisms contribute to the ongoing changes to regional and world orders. Consequentially, the order becomes multifaceted in such a way that it is impossible to capture its processes in a simplified and idealised manner associated with past theorisations. Instead, we should carefully consider the nonlinear and diachronic transformations that became emblematic of ad hoc revisionisms and set them apart from the ideologically driven projects of the past. However, abandoning meticulous empirical research for abstract theorisation leads to ill-informed results. What is required is a combination of deeply penetrating theoretical reflections with sound empirical research to show that the nature of revisionism has changed and once again become a formidable enemy to the liberal-democratic international order.

By comparing Russia, China and the United States under the Trump regime, Aleš Karmazin and Nik Hynek argued that there is no single revisionist strategy in play challenging the international order. Russia’s guerrilla great power revisionism, the US Trumpian anti-doctrine revisionism, and China’s achievement and status revisionism are not comparable to the effect of showing a common driving principle. Rather, each is differently constituted and, more importantly, pursues a variety of goals neither of which can be likened to a truly global project seeking unilaterality. The crux of the change lies in forgoing the ambition to align the whole world according to a single ideological vantage point. The opportunities that are being exploited by the powers find their origin in the mostly fictitious efficacy of liberal internationalism. Although it is currently impossible to dismantle the system, the brittle nature of the institutions offers a multitude of opportunities to create revisionist disturbances. Contrary to the optimism of the 1990s, the ease with which it is possible to cause such exceptional circumstances shows the gap between the perceived and real robustness of institutional qualities appertaining to the international order. The most consequential of the shifts analysed by Hynek and Karmazin are to be found in domestic processes reflecting multifaceted efforts of ad hoc revisionism, regardless of their origin.

Relatedly, Roy Allison queries in his contribution the nature of Russian revisionism that is observable within the legal arena. The essay explains an often overlooked dimension of revisionist efforts that supposedly attack fundamental rules and norms of global order. In line with the notion of ad hoc revisionism, Allison argues that Russia lacks the power to create opportunities that would allow a radical reconstitution of legal and even normative foundations of global order. As in other areas, which are targeted by Russian revisionism, the preferred modus operandi seeks to aggressively exploit every exceptional situation where the norms seem to struggle to contain the crisis. Empirically, this Russian strategy is illustrated in the Ukrainian and Syrian contexts, two most pressing regional conflicts that spilled over into the international arena and to which the liberal institutions were unable to find an effective solution. Such a lacuna offered a ‘creative’ space for Russian revisionism to draft its own scheming and act on it to the detriment of the existing rules and norms. Allison’s contribution shows that there is no principled and sustained effort to introduce a fundamental change to global order, at least from a legal perspective. Rather, the modus operandi follows ad hoc instrumental strategies supported by the rhetoric of legal exceptionalism.

Analysing the status quo institutional context, Tomáš Karásek asks about past experiences and future prospects of strategic adaptation to the world of ad hoc revisionism. The essay focuses on NATO and its plans for strategic adaptations in the context of unprecedented Russian attacks undermining the European security architecture. The essay argues that NATO struggles to properly calibrate its response to the Russian attempts that do not always invoke appropriate responses. The current situation involving ad hoc revisionism does not offer the luxury of the Cold War bipolar confrontation, featuring two easily identifiable and incongruent ideological positions. Therefore, the strategic adaptation is more challenging in terms of finding effective strategic countermeasures. Karásek likens NATO’s adaptation to the new dynamics to a sort of eclecticism, which by sampling various options drafts a malleable strategy that seeks to match the ad hoc attempts. Such a situation is especially challenging for multilateral institutions, including NATO, and shows that the ad hoc revisionism permeates through the whole of the international order, including not only states but also institutions.

Connected to EU and NATO sheltering abilities, Neringa Bladaitė and Margarita Šešelgytė analyse the extent to which the Baltic states continue to remain resilient to the Russian revisionist efforts. Succumbing to its geopolitical disposition, the region feels the Russian menace ever so tangibly. It is then only rational to inquire about the socio-political dimensions vulnerable to the new ad hoc form of Russian revisionism. Their essay argues that military and economic challenges remain mitigated by external actors, while the revisionist efforts, targeting the inner society, are counterbalanced with internal capacities. The so-called buffers from within are designed to prevent hybrid threats, mostly comprising information operations and related phenomena. Such a bifurcation correlates with the ad hoc nature of Russian revisionism, which relentlessly seeks to expand its reach to new and often unconceived areas of influence. Once identified, the new opportunities then lend themselves to all sorts of unconventional exploitation, yielding the buffers indispensable for at least partially effective counterstrategies to the ad hoc attempts. It is to be expected that idiosyncrasies of the buffers across individual countries will create a considerable variety and prevent drafting shared strategies, thus increasing the impacts of ad hoc revisionisms.

Showing the obverse side of ad hoc revisionism is the essay by Aliya Tskhay and Filippo Costa Buranelli, who demonstrate how states in the immediate vicinities of a power find ingenious strategies to contain their influence while still allowing a degree of economic cooperation. Such an effect is demonstrated by looking at how the Central Asian countries dealt with the Soviet legacy, which allows Russia to exert a geopolitical ownership of the region. Here, once again, the authors insightfully challenge a systemic narrative of the New Great Game, which entirely omitted the option that the post-Soviet countries in Central Asia might have interests of their own that will manifest as strategies not entirely aligned with those of great powers. Similarly, with the freedom to exploit unforeseen vulnerabilities as practised by ad hoc revisionisms, the Central Asian countries express agency of their own in crafting ad hoc countermeasures to the power legacy enjoyed by Russia and China. The essay by Tskhay and Costa Buranelli identifies a host of strategies, including bridging, dovetailing or branding. The existence of such approaches not only dismantles the argument for the New Great Game but also shows that effective responses to ad hoc revisionisms might require them to adopt the very same weapons. This phenomenon vindicates the intuition about the changing dynamics of the international order from synchronic do diachronic.

Continuing to unpack the effect that ad hoc revisionisms has on individual actors, Hans-Joachim Spanger contributes a view on German foreign policy and its troubles of adapting to the new normal of venturing revisionists. The essay identifies the sources of German foreign policy towards revisionist powers, and especially Russia, by emphasising civilian power and good trading relations. Faced with the novel challenges brought about by the new exploitation dimensions utilised by Russian revisionism, the legacy strategy of business as usual becomes confronted with difficulties in navigating the changed political landscape. More specifically, the combination of civilian power and trading state foreign policy proved to be not easily sustainable when the ground shifts so radically, as in the case of conflict in Ukraine. After the first shock, the features informing German foreign policies manifested themselves again in a rapprochement, marking the period of seeking a middle ground. Spanger argues that the government in Berlin adopted a two-headed strategy bringing together a new conciliatory version of Ostpolitik with a moderate deterrence. Here, the effects of ad hoc revisionism emerge as the flexibility of the dual strategy and the restraint as to whether to pursue a grand project and risk spoiling the peace.

Last but not least, Jan Zielonka and Jacques Rupnik take the opportunity to utter a diagnosis on the anti-liberal surge that has recently afflicted Central and Eastern Europe. The almost millennial feeling of chaos propped up the nationalist nostalgia and its proponents to the position of power once again. The essay identifies the origins of this political change in false promises of illiberal leaders that offer fictitious solutions to the present-day challenges. Such a nostalgia for a past that has never been provides a springboard for illiberal parties to reach a position of power and manipulate the political competition to the detriment of liberal opposition. Interestingly, the shape of illiberalism differs across the East and Central European countries, demonstrating the piecemeal nature of ad hoc revisionism. Following in its wake is a political vacuum which, however, does not necessarily mean leaving the European Union. Rather, these countries must find their place between illiberal Russia and the liberal European Union. As the contributions argue, the dialectics do not necessarily lead to a Brexit-like scenario but to a more hopeful future where the countries learn from historical lessons and realise that the notion of ‘lands in between’ was always in the past associated with unfortunate fates.

In one way or another, all the contributions to this special issue illustrate the crucial distinction between the past ideologically-driven revisionism and ad hoc revisionism that seeks to undermine the present-day International Order. During the bipolar confrontation, individual episodes became rather predictable as both sides converged to their own respective dogmatic doctrine of how to subvert each other. Today, however, this clarity is no longer available as there is little need for an overarching ideological framework because the revisionist ends can be met by simply exploiting the available vulnerabilities in an ad hoc manner. It is important to emphasise that the vulnerabilities are found not only at the systemic level but also within individual societies and their constituting domestic milieux. These multifaceted vulnerabilities create in turn a novel and chaotic environment that requires a fitting conceptual understanding.

Conclusions

As a whole, the contributions to this special issue seek to remedy how we think about contemporary political revisionism. Like in the case of the liberal order, which overtime became a hollowed-out fantasy, political revisionism evolved into a highly amorphous category. Instead of the past revisionisms, spawned by distinct ideologies, the contemporary one escapes a uniform description, as it exists only as long as it is able to adapt to local conditions. The contributions to this special issue succeed in capturing this fugitive phenomenon. Such an outcome was achieved due to careful empirical analyses, which utilised the traditional perspective of area studies.

Although among the essays featured in this special collection we can find cautious attempts to capture the fugitiveness, the majority of these contributions depend on careful interrogations of local contexts to show how the new revisionism differs from its past instances. It might be argued that the world order emerging from nonlinearity and diachronic changes cannot support the monolithic kind of revisionism and forces it to mutate into a population of local strategies. Although it might be hard to recognise that those strategies share a common aim and thus should be analysed together, this special issue demonstrates that such recognition is indeed possible and, more importantly, necessary if we seek to understand the future evolution of world order.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nik Hynek

Nik Hynek, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Dubecska 10, 100 31 Prague, Czech Republic. Email: [email protected]

Vít Střítecký

Vít Střítecký, Department of Security Studies, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Email: [email protected]

Notes

1 For an alternative perspective, see Dalby (2016).

2 For a different view, see Rose (1998) and Fearon (1998).

3 For notable exceptions, see Katzenstein (1976) and Putnam (1988).

4 For an opposite argument, see Gourevitch (1978).

5 For an ontological critique, see Walker (1989).

6 For more recent renderings, see Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff (2016), and Chacko and Jayasuriya (2018).