Moscow is Far Away: Peasant Communal Traditions in the Expulsion of Collective Farm Members in the Vyatka–Kirov Region 1932–1939

Abstract

This article examines how collective farmers and collective farm administrations used expulsion to police their communities. They expelled people who threatened the economic stability of the collective farm by engaging in otkhod (seasonal migrant labour), theft or absenteeism. These expulsions often ran directly counter to central directives which targeted class enemies for expulsion in the early 1930s and later sought to curtail the practice and then forbade it outright. The fact that collective farms repeatedly expelled people in defiance of central or regional guidance demonstrates the lack of control the Soviet state and Communist Party often had over the countryside in the 1930s.

Notes

1 The Gurian movement began in May 1902. Peasant unrest grew to the point that on the eve of 1905, Guria and some bordering districts were out of bounds to the tsarist authorities. By 1905, Guria was self-governing and well organised. In 1906, the Tsarist army brutally crushed the peasant republic, but the lessons learned by Gurian leaders proved essential in the 1918 Georgian revolution (Lee 2017, pp. 9–28).

2 The imperative of community survival included murdering or maiming horse thieves because the loss of a horse could mean the ruination of a household and because horse thieves threatened the security of all the horses in the community.

3 An independent guberniya under the Tsars and in the early Soviet period, in 1930 Vyatka Guberniya was amalgamated into Nizhny Novgorodskii (later Gor’ky) Krai (region). In 1934, a series of administrative reforms split the former territory of Vyatka Guberniya away from Gor’ky (Nizhny Novgorod) Krai and the newly formed region was named after the assassinated Leningrad party leader, Sergei Kirov. The region’s population was predominantly ethnically Russian, with Tatar, Udmurt and Mari ethnic minorities. In 1934, Kirov Krai occupied a territory of 144,000 square km with a population of more than 3.3 million people (Zagvozdkin 1995, p. 379).

4 From 1928 to 1934, Voronezh Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, Belgorod Oblast, Tambov Oblast, Oryol Oblast and Kursk Oblast were united into the Central Black Earth Region with its administrative capital at Voronezh.

5 The level of collectivisation in the future Kirov region varied from district to district and fluctuated greatly in the early 1930s. As of 1 March 1930, in the territory of the former Vyatkaya Guberniya, then part of Gorky Krai, roughly half of the area had been collectivised, with levels ranging from 49% to 54.5% across its three constituent okruga. Following Stalin’s ‘Dizzy with Success’ speech on 2 March 1930, the numbers plummeted. By 10 April 1930, collectivisation in the former Vyatskaya Guberniya fell to 3.5–21.5% in the constituent okruga (Lekontsev 2010, p. 82). It took several years for collectivisation levels to recover. For example, Sanchurskii district took until October 1933 to approach its pre-‘Dizzy with Success’ collectivisation levels. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii Kirovskoi Oblasti (hereafter GASPI KO) f. 931, op. 1, d. 79, l. 300.

6 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Kirovskoi Oblasti (hereafter GAKO) f. R-1001, op. 5, d. 17, l. 2.

7 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 3, l. 4.

8 Mennonites from across the Soviet Union trying to emigrate triggered these purges on Mennonite farms several years ahead of those on non-Mennonite farms (Neufeldt 2015, p. 8).

9 Soviet terminology lists four categories of peasants: landless peasants; poor peasants; middle peasants; and kulaks/rich peasants. I use the terms as used in the original sources.

10 In the Middle Volga (Sredne-Volzhskii) Krai in July 1931, the Kraikom complained that not enough was being done to remove kulaks from collective farms but kolkhozniki had violated the party line by expelling otkhodniki from the farms. In 1932, in Kastorinskii rural soviet in Kastorenskii district, RSFSR, 50 households were expelled from the collective farm, most of whom were identified as ‘lazy’ people (Danilov et al. 2001, vol. 3, pp. 274–75).

11 GASPI KO f. 1281, op. 1, d. 23, ll. 26, 87, 99, 140, 234.

12 GAKO f. R-1001, op. 5, d. 17, l. 1.

13 GAKO f. R-1001, op. 5, d. 17, l. 2.

14 GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 30, l. 5.

15 Some may view this as an act of resistance, but such practices were not uncommon. The main purpose of a cow was to provide milk and the only way for her to do so was to calve. Often, she was bred with any male bovine available and the calves, particularly bull calves, were either slaughtered early or sent to market. If there was not enough milk to feed a calf or if it had no economic value, it would often be butchered as a newborn. GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 30, l. 7.

16 All names appear as they were in the original documents.

17 GASPI KO f. 741, op. 1, d. 5, ll. 94–5.

18 The 207 expellees comprised 31 bookkeepers, 48 paymasters, 51 supply masters and 77 storeroom clerks.

19 GAKO f. R-1001, op. 5, d. 17, ll. 20–2.

20 GAKO f. R-1001, op. 5, d. 17, l. 1.

21 GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 30, l. 57.

22 Likewise, the paymaster I. P. Kraev was accused of aiding the forces of General Alexander Kolchak and working on his staff during Kolchak’s occupation of the area during the Civil War. He was also allegedly a former kulak who had disguised himself as a poor peasant. GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 30, l. 98.

23 GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 30, l. 65.

24 GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 30, l. 60.

25 GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 30, l. 59. Collective farmers were supposed to be compensated according to the number of workdays that each earned during the economic year. Each workday was to be proportionate to the quantity and quality of work each collective farmer preformed and the payment per workday was determined at the end of the economic year by dividing the money and produce left over after all state obligations and kolkhoz reserve funds had been fulfilled by the total number of labour days earned by all of the collective farmers on the farm (Neufeldt 2015, p. 31).

26 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 3, l. 1.

27 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 3, l. 8.

28 GAKO f. R-1001, op. 5, d. 16, ll. 10, 21–2, 29.

29 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 19, l. 67. Assessing expelled collective farmers individual taxes and then seizing their property to pay these taxes was an ongoing problem throughout the decade. Other examples can be found in GAKO f. R-1373, op. 5, d. 17, ll. 78, 109.

30 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, l. 69; GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, l. 71.

31 GASPI KO f. 812, op. 1, d. 9, l. 55.

32 Fitzpatrick cites a report from an MTS political department in the North Caucasus that noted in 1932–1933, expulsion from a collective farm was a death sentence for the collective farmer, to the point they reported people crying and begging not to be expelled (Fitzpatrick 1994, p. 170). Neufeldt concurs with this assessment, claiming that it was virtually impossible for expelled farmers and their children to find work, housing or food (Neufeldt 2015, pp. 38–9). There was only mild crop failures in certain districts in the Kirov Region in 1932 and while 1933 did bring more widespread crop failures, these too were limited to certain districts like Chernovskii, Darovskoi, Lebiazhskii districts (Chemodanov 2015, p. 145).

33 GAKO f. R-2169, op. 1, d. 139, l. 57. There were also complaints about his wife, who had allegedly attacked a brigadier with a stick, when he came to order her to work in the flax fields.

34 In order to officially work in a factory, it was necessary either to obtain permission from the collective farm leadership or be released from membership, as factory work involved signing contracts. People who left on otkhod remained members of the collective farm. Expulsion allowed people to sever all ties to the collective farm and permanently move to urban areas and work in industry.

35 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 19, l. 244.

36 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 12, l. 57.

37 He had been previously given an administrative punishment, which did not curb his behaviour. His expulsion was upheld. GAKO f. R-1309, op. 6, d. 2, l. 193.

38 Because he had worked 400 labour days in 1935 and his sister worked 380 workdays and participated in collective farm work in 1936, the RIK restored his family’s collective farm membership. GAKO f. R-1309, op. 6, d. 2, l. 18.

39 GAKO f. R-1373, op. 5, d. 13, l. 181. Other instances of people being expelled, at least in part, for going fishing instead of working can be found in GAKO f. R-1309, op. 6, d. 2, l. 64.

40 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 2, d. 348, l. 36.

41 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 2, d. 348, l. 36.

42 The RIK noted the collective farm was correct in expelling him but in light of his mea culpa and a promise to do better decided to readmit him. GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 47, ll. 17–8.

43 Fitzpatrick notes that discrimination against otkhodniki and their families was almost always locally initiated and was strongly reminiscent of the actions against otkhodniki in pre-revolutionary villages (Fitzpatrick 1994, p. 167).

44 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 1, d. 287, l. 32.

45 More recent research has shown that the mir was not the widespread, egalitarian institution it had been thought to be (Dennison & Carus 2003, pp. 561–82).

46 While formally, collective farmers had to apply to the collective farm administration to go on otkhod and then get a passport from the rural soviet, which had to be renewed every three months, in actuality it was easy for collective farmers to leave, either by bribing collective farm and rural soviet officials or by simply heading to industrial enterprises which systematically violated passport laws because of the chronic labour shortages (Fitzpatrick 1994, p. 165).

47 GASPI KO f. 632, op. 1, d. 105, l. 67.

48 The Zyuzdinskii district RIK reversed the expulsion on appeal. GAKO f. R-1373, op. 5, d. 13, l. 181.

49 GAKO f. R-2169, op. 1, d. 320, l. 333.

50 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 2, d. 345, ll. 98–9.

51 On 17 July 1936, the Darovskoi RIK heard her appeal her expulsion, with the chairman of the collective farm, Prokof’ii Alekseevich, in attendance. The RIK reversed the decision. However, as for many of the reversals, no explanation was given in the documents as to why. The documents only list that, upon appeal, the RIK reversed the collective farm’s decision. GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 47, ll. 14–5.

52 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 1, d. 72, l. 28.

53 On 17 February 1936 Yarovikov appealed his expulsion before the Darovskoi RIK. The chairman said that he had worked well until the autumn before refusing to work. His membership was restored. GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 46, l. 65.

54 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 673, ll. 93, 97, 98–9.

55 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 673, l. 95.

56 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 673, l. 92.

57 GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 46, l. 371.

58 GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 46, l. 370.9.

59 Disabilities were categorised by degree and Demakov fell into the third, the least disabled.

60 GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 50, ll. 41–2.

61 GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 49, l. 37.

62 GASPI KO f. 741, op. 1, d. 6, l. 18.

63 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 643, l. 77.

64 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 643, l. 77.

65 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 643, ll. 77, 78.

66 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 643, l. 78.

67 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 19, l. 60.

68 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 643, l. 78.

69 Because of her repeatedly broken promises to work better her expulsion was upheld by the Darovskoi RIK. GAKO f. R-1300, op. 4, d. 49, l. 90.

70 GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 643, l. 73.

71 ‘Iskorenit' Khuliganstvo’, Kirovets, 27 June 1936, No. 126, p. 2. Other incidents of drunken misconduct, often on the part of collective farm workers, are reported in Kirovets, 9 October 1936, No. 184, p. 2 and 17 October 1936, No. 190, p. 1.

72 The Sanchurskii RIK restored the collective farmer to the collective farm. GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 1, d. 296, l. 80.

73 At the expulsion meeting, of 60 people only 29 came, and only seven voted for expulsion, so he was reinstated because the collective farm did not have the quorum needed to expel him. GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 1, d. 296, l. 123.

74 Kraikom chairman Abram Yakovlevich Stoliar reminded collective farm chairmen in 1935 that they had no right to personally expel people. This could only be done by the general meeting of collective farmers. GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 673, l. 18.

75 In Pinagin’s case, the RaiZO did not agree with his expulsion and Pinagin was restored. Other people were expelled without the consent of the general meeting. The Kraikom inspector noted that the MTS Director appointed the chairmen, who then acted unilaterally. GASPI KO f. 1255, op. 1, d. 643, l. 27.

76 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 2, d. 350, ll. 95–6.

77 GASPI KO f. 1290, оp. 2, d. 350, l. 95.

78 GAKO f. R-1373, op. 5, d. 13, l. 69. While Porubov’s attack on the sel’kor was probably the overwhelming factor in the RIK upholding his expulsion, they were cautious in upholding other cases. On 25 December 1935, the RIK heard Nikolai Semeonovich Cheranev’s complaint. He had been expelled for being a kulak, exploiting hired labour, undermining labour discipline and threatening members of the collective farm saying, ‘If you collectivise my sowing, I will cut off your head’. Rather than upholding his expulsion, the RIK instigated an investigation. The results of this are unclear. GAKO f. R-1373, op. 5, d. 13, l. 180.

79 GAKO f. R-1373, op. 5, d. 13, l. 69.

80 GAKO f. R-1373, op. 5, d. 13, l. 145.

81 It is impossible to know how common reinstatement or resistance to reinstatement was because in the 1990s most of the RIK materials containing these complaints and appeals were sent back to the individual districts from Kirov.

82 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 95, 89–90.

83 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, l. 97.

84 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, l. 90.

85 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 91–2.

86 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, l. 90.

87 Referring to people they wanted to discredit or expel as a wolf in sheep’s clothing was a common tactic. GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 19, l. 121. Later in the 1930s, ‘enemy of the people’ replaced kulak and ‘formerly deprived of voting rights’ (lishentsy) terms to discredit corrupt and despised collective farm leaders (Lomb 2016).

88 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, l. 98.

89 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 92–4. For the report, see Red Flaxworker, 19 November 1931.

90 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 85–6.

91 GASPI KO f. 2083, op. 1, d. 11, l. 86.

92 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 1, d. 296, l. 81.

93 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 1, d. 296, l. 82.

94 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 1, d. 296, l. 123.

95 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 2, d. 348, l. 24.

96 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 2, d. 348, l. 25.

97 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 2, d. 348, l. 25.

98 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 2, d. 350, l. 91.

99 On the ‘Tractor’ collective farm, 11 households were expelled in May 1938, but candidate party member Kulikov said that ‘everything is fine with them, the TsK resolution does not apply to them’. On the Kirov collective farm, 63 households were expelled at one meeting. Using bureaucratic double-speak, the leader, Comrade Shatov, stated that ‘they mechanically withdrew’ and that he considered the matter resolved. GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 2, d. 348, l. 24.

100 GASPI KO f. 1290, op. 2, d. 350, l. 95.

101 These numbers include all collective farmers who did not earn the minimum number of days here, including disabled people, women with several small children and the elderly, who had typically been expelled but restored by the RIK.

102 The procurator protested her expulsion and she was restored (Lekontsev 2016, p. 127).

103 Given that appeals could take a year or more to hear and process, and that people who were expelled were usually quickly assessed individual taxes, the threat of expulsion was still quite serious for collective farmers.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Samantha Lomb

Samantha Lomb, Vyatka State University Building 15, 198 Lenin Street, Kirov 610007, Russian Federation. Email: [email protected]