Playing Russia Wisely? The Institutional Leverage of Smaller States in the EAEU

Abstract

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is a regional association comprised of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The EAEU is a highly asymmetrical entity with a single dominant power. It is also one of the most deeply integrated and densely institutionalised regional associations. This article demonstrates that although the dominant power retains the ability to disregard constraints imposed on it, smaller partners can exert more leverage in this context than most observers realise. The analysis of the dense institutional framework within the EAEU demonstrates how smaller states can exercise leverage in their asymmetrical relations with Russia and how binding commitments, voice opportunities and multilateralisation can trump material inferiority.

Notes

1 Voice opportunities emerge from the regular contacts within highly institutionalised contexts, which enable greater access to decision-making for small states (Ikenberry 2001, pp. 41, 67).

2 We collected oral or written answers from 26 respondents. For more details on the interview process, see the Appendix.

3 For a review of the existing literature, see Libman (2020).

4 Russian literature on the subject is reviewed in Libman (2012).

5 Ironically, some of the more critical publications on the EAEU follow the same neofunctionalist preconceptions, focusing on challenges in creating rather than redistributing economic gains (Knobel et al. 2019).

6 On the importance of switching costs, see Libman and Obydenkova (2013, p. 179).

7 One should note that Moscow and Minsk are also members of the Union State of Belarus and Russia, established in 1999. Therefore, the cost of adjustments for Belarus to new rules within Eurasian integration remains marginal.

8 This motive was corroborated by interview data; for example, interview with respondent 17 (see the Appendix for full details of all interviewees).

9 This motive was corroborated by interview data; for example, interview with respondent 6.

10 Kyrgyzstan is different from other EAEU member states as it cherishes strong interests in cooperation not only with Russia, but also with Kazakhstan. However, this exception does not significantly alter the overall ‘hub-and-spokes’ logic of the Eurasian integration and, therefore, is not specifically examined in the following analysis.

11 For alternative conceptualisations of asymmetry, see Womack (2016).

12 See, for example, Obydenkova (2012), Lankina et al. (2016).

13 On the application of the transaction costs argument to international institutions, see Keohane (1984), Haggard and Simmons (1987).

14 On the ability of institutional binding to restrain dominant powers and redistribute benefits from cooperation towards small states, see Ikenberry (2001), He (2008).

15 On the importance of ‘voice opportunities’ in the context of international politics, see Ikenberry (2001, pp. 41, 67).

16 On the differences in the level of hegemonic control given bilateral and multilateral institutional designs, see Cha (2016).

17 For the overview of integration efforts in the post-Soviet space, see Vymyatnina and Antonova (2014), Wirminghaus (2016).

18 Dogovor o Evraziiskom Ekonomicheskom Soyuze, 29 May 2014, available at: https://docs.eaeunion.org/Pages/DisplayDocument.aspx?s=bef9c798-3978-42f3-9ef2-d0fb3d53b75f&w=632c7868-4ee2-4b21-bc64-1995328e6ef3&l=540294ae-c3c9-4511-9bf8-aaf5d6e0d169&EntityID=3610, accessed 28 March 2020.

19 For an analysis of the regulatory and institutional achievements of the EAEU, see Vinokurov (2017, 2018).

20 Official website of the Eurasian Economic Commission, available at: http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/Pages/structure.aspx, accessed 28 March 2020.

21 Initially, there were three from each member state, reduced to two after the 2015 enlargement.

22 Official website of the EAEU Court, available at: http://courteurasian.org/en/, accessed 28 March 2020.

23 ‘O kontseptsii formirovaniya obshchego finansovogo rynka Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soyuza’, Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Decision 20, 1 October 2019, available at: http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/finpol/dofp/Documents/%d0%9a%d0%be%d0%bd%d1%86%d0%b5%d0%bf%d1%86%d0%b8%d1%8f%20%d0%9e%d0%a4%d0%a0.pdf, accessed 30 November 2019.

24 The strategy of the European Development Bank (EADB 2017) states in this regard: ‘The Bank will maintain active contacts with EAEU governing bodies and EDB member state governments with a view to assuring comprehensive involvement of the Bank in various mechanisms designed to deepen integration among EAEU economies’.

25 Data of the EEC Department for Internal Market Defence, available at: http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/act/trade/podm/mery/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 28 March 2020.

26 However, some interviews (respondents 22 and 23) indicated that Russian nationals are underrepresented in the EAEU bureaucracy in accordance with the established quota.

27 For more detailed analysis of EEU economic statistics, see Podbiralina (2018).

28 Interview with respondent 8.

29 Belarus faced much smaller adjustments than other member states as its tariffs were already closely linked to those of Russia.

30 The equality of member states has been repeatedly emphasised by EAEU officials. See, for example, Sarkisyan (2019).

31 Dogovor o Komissii Tamozhennogo soyuza, 6 October 2007, available at: http://www.tsouz.ru/aboutkts/pages/37.aspx, accessed 28 March 2020.

32 Dogovor o Evraziiskoi Ekonomicheskoi Komissii, 18 November 2011, available at: http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/trade/Documents/Договор%20о%20ЕЭК.pdf, accessed 28 March 2020.

33 The magnitude of this change was noted by several current and former officials of the EEC, who witnessed it first-hand; interviews with respondents 20 and 22. Ironically, this issue seems more salient for lower-level officials than to ministers of the EEC, who are usually political heavyweights.

34 On the Russian advocacy, see Latukhina (2015). See also notes on national positions in the Draft Declaration on the Formation of the EAEU: Deklaratsiya o formirovanii Evraziiskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza. Proekt, 15 September 2011, available at: http://www.tsouz.ru/MGS/MGS-15/Documents/P_88.pdf, accessed 28 March 2020. On Kazakhstan’s opposition, see Mamyrkhanova (2019).

35 Interviews with respondents 19, 1 and 18.

36 Protokol ob otdel’nykh vremennykh iz”yatiyakh iz rezhima funktsionirovaniya edinoi tamozhennoi territorii Tamozhennogo soyuza, 5 July 2010, available at: http://www.tsouz.ru/DOCS/INTAGRMNTS/Pages/Protocol_izyat.aspx, accessed 28 March 2020.

37 Some complaints are issued by more than one stakeholder and/or against more than one member state. Therefore, the column ‘Number of complaints (overall)’ provides data on complaints against a specific defender regardless of how many stakeholders jointly issued a complaint. Other columns provide the number of applications from a single country, covering national authorities and businesses. It should be noted that companies actively use EAEU to place pressure on their own governments.

38 Repeated actions by Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance remain an essential instrument; see Rossel’khoznadzor (2015).

39 In all the interviews, national experts and officials started their assessment of Eurasian integration by stating the additional benefits for their relations with Russia.

40 Interviews with respondents 10 and 14.

41 This is the main motive for Eurasian integration identified by national experts in all the interviews.

42 ‘The law of the EAEU provides its Member States with specific instruments: that of consensus in decision-making in the Council of the EEC and the right to veto the Board of the EEC decisions. These two restrictive measures are constantly used and make it possible to guarantee national interests (interview with respondent 19).

43 Interviews with respondents 15, 12 and 2.

44 Interviews with respondents 8, 14, 1 and 17.

45 Interviews with respondents 20 and 24.

46 According to one national expert, ‘the impression is that, unlike Russia, which can afford to put aside its self-seeking interests, all the other national bureaucrats working within the EAEU institutions are very much focused on achieving national interests rather than promoting common goals’ (interview with respondent 9).

47 Interviews with respondents 10 and 16.

48 Kyrgyzstan plays the leading role in lobbying for the free movement of people within the Eurasian institutions. Interview with respondent 19.

49 On the ambitious agenda for his tenure, see Myasnikovich (2020a).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Irina V. Bolgova

Irina V. Bolgova, Research Fellow, MGIMO University, 76, Vernadskogo prosp., Moscow 119434, Russian Federation. Email: [email protected]

Igor A. Istomin

Igor A. Istomin, Associate Professor, MGIMO University, 76, Vernadskogo prosp., Moscow 119434, Russian Federation. Email: [email protected]