Taking the Longer View: A Neoclassical Realist Account of Russia’s Neighbourhood Policy

Abstract

This essay complements the other contributions to this special issue by placing Russia’s neighbourhood policy into a broader temporal and theoretical perspective. It shows that Russia’s political elite during the last three decades has been largely united behind the goal of establishing a Moscow-centred regional security order. Yet, despite this broad-based consensus, Russia’s policy in the former Soviet area has varied markedly across time and space. To account for this pattern, the essay develops and tests a neoclassical realist approach that explains why, how and when major powers such as Russia pursue regional primacy.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 I use the terms ‘regional primacy’ and ‘regional sphere of influence’ interchangeably. Following Keal (1986, p. 124), I define a sphere of influence as ‘a definite region within which a single … power exerts a predominant influence, which limits the freedom of action of states within it’. On the notion of regional primacy, see Tracey German’s contribution to this special issue.

2 On neoclassical realism, see, amongst others, Rose (1998), Ripsman et al. (2016), Meibauer (2019).

3 Offensive realism, as formulated by Mearsheimer (2001), seeks to explain why states pursue regional hegemony. For Mearsheimer, however, the pursuit of regional hegemony is primarily about gaining relative material power within a geographically confined area; it is not about the behaviour of a great power vis-à-vis weaker neighbours. Furthermore, and partly as a consequence of this, he does not specify how major powers translate their material capabilities into actual influence on the regional level.

4 An earlier version of the theory developed in this section was introduced in Götz (2016, 2019).

5 See, for example, Webb (2007), Porter (2015).

6 Status-seeking can also take more benign forms; hosting the Olympics or starting a space programme, for example. However, regional primacy is a key marker of great powerhood because, as Murray (2019, p. 63) astutely points out, ‘it relies on asymmetrical recognition’. This means that other states implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the major power’s dominant regional position. In this sense, the pursuit of regional primacy is an important way of asserting one’s great power credentials.

7 Note that neoclassical realism is a broad research programme that includes a range of theories emphasising diverse unit-level intervening variables apart from state capacity, such as decision-makers’ perceptions, national ideas and regime types (Ripsman et al. 2016, pp. 58–79). To keep the number of variables manageable, the approach presented here consciously limits itself to the factor ‘state capacity’. Future studies may add other unit-level intervening variables, but when doing so, one needs to consider whether the loss in theoretical parsimony that arises from the inclusion of additional factors is outweighed by gains in explanatory power.

8 I have computed the power-ratios based on data from the Military Balance report, produced annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and the CIA’s World Factbook database. The archive of IISS’s Military Balance reports is available at: https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/archive, accessed 20 August 2022. The CIA’s World Factbook database is available at: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/, accessed 20 August 2022.

9 The fact that Russian politicians debated their country’s role in the world rather than robotically pursuing regional primacy does not invalidate the argument that strategic and status-based incentives were behind Russia’s emerging ‘near abroad’ consensus. After all, politicians are not information-processing super computers but human beings who need to perceive, assess and manage new geopolitical situations. Hence, there is often a short time-lag between changing external circumstances and changes in state behaviour (Brooks & Wohlforth 2000/2001, p. 27).

10 Diplomaticheskii vestnik, 1–2 January 1993. See also Matz (2001, pp. 179–80).

11 Itar-Tass, 1 March 1993. The quote is also found in Almond (1995, p. 43).

12 For the full text of the decree (updated version), see: ‘Strategic Course of Russia with the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States’, Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma, 12 August 2018, available at: http://interkomitet.com/foreign-policy/basic-documents/strategic-course-of-russia-with-the-member-states-of-the-commonwealth-of-independent-states/, accessed 20 August 2022. For the original version, see Ambrosio (2005, p. 103).

13 ‘Memcon, Morning Meeting with President Yeltsin’, 21 March 1997, Clinton Digital Library, available at: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569, accessed 20 August 2022.

14 ‘Memcon, Morning Meeting with President Yeltsin’, 21 March 1997, Clinton Digital Library, available at: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569, accessed 20 August 2022. See also ‘Telcon with Russian President Yeltsin’, 5 July 1994, Clinton Digital Library, available at: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57568, accessed 20 August 2022.

15 ‘Problemy Zashchity Interesov Rossiiskogo Orientirovannogo Naseleniya V Blizhnem Zarubezhe’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, 15–30 November 1992.

16 For overviews, see Hill and Jewett (1994), Porter and Saivetz (1994), Drezner (1997).

17 ‘Concept of the National Security of the Russian Federation’, 17 December 1997, available at: https://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/snconold.htm, accessed 20 August 2022.

18 Russian Petroleum Investor, quoted in Balmaceda (1998, p. 266).

19 Interview by Egon Bahr, on the television station Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), 13 May 1997. The quote is taken from Mörike (1998, p. 21).

20 Measured by national defence expenditures and GDP, the power discrepancy between Russia and the other post-Soviet republics actually declined: from 8.5:1 in 1997 to 4.5:1 in 2007.

21 See also Yakovlev (2006).

22 Of course, the Putin government did not transform Russia into a high-capacity state. Serious deficiencies and shortcomings, such as corruption and administrative inefficiencies, have continued to plague the country. Still, there is no question that the Putin government strengthened certain elements of statehood—in particular autonomy and extraction capacity—compared to the tumultuous 1990s. For background and discussion, see Taylor (2011), Tsygankov (2014).

23 See, for example, Ambrosio (2009), Dawisha (2011), Wilson (2014).

24 This is not to deny that Putin and his associates are a group of essentially self-serving office-seekers. Yet even on this view, one can expect that the Kremlin will pursue the state’s security interests and geopolitical aims. The reason is simple: regime security often is highly dependent on the maintenance of national security. Foreign-imposed regime or leader changes are hardly uncommon in world politics. Thus, even the most venal office-seekers have a strong incentive to advance the military-strategic interests of the state. On the interplay of national and regime security, see Gilpin (1996, pp. 7–8), Sørensen (2001, pp. 107–8), Ayoob (2002, p. 46).

25 A potential disadvantage of the selected cases is that all three are Western-oriented (Georgia and Ukraine) or Western-incorporated (the Baltic states). For a discussion of Russian policy towards Central Asia in light of China’s increased activism in the area, see Jeffrey Mankoff’s contribution to this special issue.

26 ‘Georgia Blames Russia for Gas Pipeline Explosions’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 January 2006, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1064942.html, accessed 20 September 2020.

27 Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, Paragraph 23, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm, accessed 11 February 2022.

28 ‘Moscow to Prevent Ukraine, Georgia’s NATO Admission’, RIA Novosti, 8 April 2008, available at: https://www.nato.int/multi/video/now/now080409.htm, accessed 22 August 2022.

29 For contending views, see Allison (2008), Cornell (2008), Illarionov (2009). The EU’s fact-finding mission, led by the Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, concluded that Georgian forces attacked Tskhinvali before Russian troops started to cross through the Roki Tunnel into South Ossetia; see: Report by an Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (3 vols.), Tagliavini Commission, 2009, available at: https://www.mpil.de/en/pub/publications/archive/independent_international_fact.cfm, accessed 20 August 2022.

30 ‘At Geneva Talks Russia Says Georgia’s NATO Integration Poses Security Threat to Region’, 2 July 2015, available at: https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28403, accessed 11 February 2022.

31 In parallel, Russia concluded far-reaching political and military treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Of note, despite its significant political, economic and military influence over Georgia’s breakaway regions, Moscow is not in total control. The leaderships of South Ossetia and particularly Abkhazia at times defy Moscow’s wishes and pursue their own agendas (Ambrosio & Lange 2016; Kolstø 2020).

32 For a fuller discussion of Russia’s Ukraine policy during the 1990s and early 2000s, see Götz (2016).

33 Two especially insightful accounts are Wilson (2014, pp. 68–98) and Menon and Rumer (2015, pp. 53–81).

34 For the full text of the Association Agreement, see: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155103.pdf, accessed 11 February 2022.

35 For example, in his speech on the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation, Putin stated, ‘Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day’. See ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’, 18 March 2014, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603, accessed 20 August 2022. For more on Russia’s propaganda campaign, see Yurkova (2018).

36 ‘Ukrainian Parliament Makes NATO Integration a Priority’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8 June 2017, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukriane-parliament-nato-integration-priority/28535650.html, accessed 20 September 2020.

37 ‘NATO’s Support to Ukraine’, NATO Fact Sheet, November 2018, available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_11/20181106_1811-factsheet-nato-ukraine-sup.pdf, accessed 19 August 2022.

38 Ukraine has not imported Russian gas directly since 2016, making it less vulnerable to gas price hikes and supply interruptions (Daiss 2016).

39 ‘NATO Recognizes Ukraine as Enhanced Opportunities Partner’, NATO, 12 June 2020, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_176327.htm, accessed 10 August 2022.

40 ‘Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Visit to Ukraine’, U.S. Department of Defense, 19 October 2021, available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2815096/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-visit-to-ukraine/, accessed 20 August 2022.

41 ‘Valdai Club Discussion Meeting’, 21 October 2021, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66975, accessed 20 August 2022.

42 ‘Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of The Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 17 December 2021, available at: https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en, accessed 20 August 2022. ‘Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees’, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 17 December 2021, available at: https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en, accessed 20 August 2022.

43 Consider, for instance, Putin’s infamous July 2021 essay in which he concluded that Russians and Ukrainians are historically and culturally ‘one people’. For the full text of the essay, see ‘Article by Vladimir Putin “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”’, 12 July 2021, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181, accessed 18 August 2022.

44 This section builds on Götz (2019).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elias Götz

Elias Götz, Institute for Strategy and War Studies, Royal Danish Defence College, Ryvangs Alle 1, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark. Email: [email protected]