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Abstract
Epistemic infinitism is certainly not a majority view in contemporary epistemology. While there are some examples of infinitism in the history of philosophy, more work needs to be done mining this history in order to provide a richer understanding of how infinitism might be formulated internal to different philosophical frameworks. Accordingly, we argue that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas can be read as operating according to an ‘impure’ model of epistemic infinitism. The infinite obligation inaugurated by the ‘face to face encounter’ with the Other yields an approach to the ethics of belief that accords with infinitism. This reading of Levinas brings his ethical thought into dialogue with contemporary epistemology as well as provides an historical example of infinitism within the current debates.
Notes
1 For an extended consideration of Peirce's possible infinitism, see Aikin, Citation2009.
2 It might be argued that some of Edmund Husserl's work also deploys such a view. See, for example, Husserl, Citation1970, especially the essay ‘Philosophy as Mankind's Self-Reflection', which is included as one of the appendices.
3 See Aikin and Simmons (Citation2009) for an account of the difficulties associated with self-refutation for Levinas.
4 For just a few very good introductory accounts of Levinas's philosophy, see Perpich, Citation2008; Wyschogrod, Citation2000; Hutchens, Citation2004; Peperzak, Citation1997. It is important to maintain a distinction between what Levinasian ethics and what has been understood as traditional moral philosophy. While moral philosophy has historically, for the most part, been concerned about articulating and legitimating particular norms for right action, Levinas is more interested in working through the very conditions under which something like moral philosophy could even get underway: namely, the relation to alterity as constituting responsibility itself. It is in light of this basic distinction that we should read the beginning of Levinas's major text, Totality and Infinity: ‘Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality' (TI, 21). For an excellent consideration of exactly what is going on in Levinasian ‘ethics' and how it relates to traditional moral philosophy, see Perpich, Citation2008. Despite Levinas himself not often entering the fray of what we might term ‘applied' ethics and politics, there are many scholars, however, who have attempted to move in such directions while remaining in concert with a Levinasian framework. For just a few examples, see Tahmasebi, Citation2010; Alford, Citation2004; Simmons, Citation2011; Burggraeve, Citation2002; Horowitz & Horowitz, Citation2006; W. Simmons, 2003; Minister, Citation2008. Alternatively, Perpich (Citation2012) has argued that such ‘applied' readings of Levinas often overextend his thought in ways that run counter to his basic conception of ethics.
5 See Bernasconi, Citation2012.
6 That ontology is no longer primary does not mean that ontology is abandoned. Indeed, some have argued that Levinas offers an alternative ontological account that attends to the ethical relation as constitutive of subjectivity (see Simmons, Citation2011).
7 Though Levinas certainly makes things difficult with some of his formulations that come close to indicating incomprehensibility. Consider, for example, the following from Otherwise than Being: ‘The unnarratable other loses his face as a neighbor in narration. The relationship with him is indescribable in the literal sense of the term, unconvertible into a history, irreducible to the simultaneousness of writing, the eternal present of a writing that records or presents results' (OTB, p. 166).
8 The metaphor of ‘overflowing' as applied to comprehension is one that Levinas will repeatedly use throughout his authorship. In addition to these examples given above, consider also: ‘The Other, whose exceptional presence is inscribed in the ethical impossibility of killing him in which I stand, marks the end of powers. If I can no longer have power over him it is because he overflows absolutely every idea I can have of him' (TI, p. 87; see also TI, p. 100).
9 For an excellent consideration of the stakes of such a Levinasian approach to creation, see Dalton, Citation2009.
10 Importantly, ‘truth' here is a difficult, and quite original, notion because it goes beyond mere correspondence (which Levinas reads as the dominant perspective of the philosophical tradition) and disclosure (which Levinas sees as Heidegger's alternative), and becomes a matter of ‘testimony' in relation to the Other. For Levinas's account of truth, see especially BPW, Ch. 6; TI, Section I, B, 2, and C.
11 Bernasconi (Citation2012) argues for this point at length.
12 For more extended considerations of Levinas and skepticism, see De Greef, Citation1986; Bernasconi, Citation1991; and Aikin & Simmons, Citation2009.
13 See Aikin & Simmons, Citation2009
14 See Perpich, Citation1998.
15 For example, Simmons (Citation2011, Ch. 11) argues that Levinas is rightly considered a modest foundationalist when it comes to what Levinas terms the ‘fixed point' upon which all critique depends. We have also argued elsewhere in favor of such a modest foundationalist reading of Levinas (see Aikin & Simmons, Citation2009).
16 See, for examples of crypto-skepticism, Foley (Citation1978, p. 315), BonJour (1985, p. 87), Porter (2006, p. 53), and Cling (2008, p. 419).
17 Susan Wolf's (1982) critique of the notion of ‘moral sainthood' is something that every Levinasian should consider as a challenge to the basic impetus of Levinasian ethics. That said, there have been replies on Levinas's behalf to Wolf's general worry (see Simmons, Citation2011, Ch. 13).
18 We understand this problem to be a version of that articulated by Brand Blanshard (Citation1975) in his critique of Kierkegaard. For Blanshard, Kierkegaard is a ‘moral nihilist' insofar as he eliminates any criterion for ethical action. Whereas Blanshard locates the source of this nihilism in Kierkegaard's supposed fideism, the nihilism that might challenge Levinas finds its source in the requirement that the criterion be infinite and, accordingly, unattainable. In the end, it is unclear whether the person not having a moral criterion is any worse off than the person whose criterion is practically worthless: both seem to result in nihilism.
19 One might object, here, that it is entirely against the spirit of Levinasian ethics to try to make judgments about who is more or less ethically successful. While we certainly appreciate the motivation behind such an objection – namely, that worrying about such judgments is to miss the point of continuing to work for the betterment of others. However, we respond that even if the task is rightly understood to be ongoing (‘infinite'), it can prove to be unjust if we don't critically attend to the actions in which we engage and beliefs that we hold. As Simone de Beauvoir (1976) points out in The Ethics of Ambiguity, we must constantly ask whether what we are doing is actually working for the liberation of other people. If not, then we need to adjust our behavior. On our view, if Levinasian ethics eliminates the possibility of asking such critical questions, then this is not a reason to applaud its radicality, but to mourn its inability to make the world better off than it was previously. Yes, we should always guard against getting distracted by what we might label flights of philosophical fancy, but we should not allow the concern for others to preclude philosophical considerations of how best to care for others given the relevant alternatives with which we are faced at a given time. Justice demands both that we act and also that we reflect on how to act better in the future. To assume that reflection could be finalized or that action could be perfected is the extreme against which we should be constantly vigilant.
20 Though ethics is not identical to charity, of course.
21 As Levinas will say, the saying must be said, but then the said must be unsaid.
22 For a discussion of the stakes of such an idea, see the debate between Simon Critchley and Richard Rorty in Mouffe, Citation1996.
23 Simmons (Citation2010) has even suggested that Levinasian political theory should be viewed as similar to a sort of prophetic pragmatism in this regard.
24 For more on the relationship between justice and justification in Levinasian thought, see Batnitsky, Citation2006.
25 For more on how Levinas can be read eschatologically, but not teleologically, see Simmons & Kerr, Citation2009.
26 Such a revision is able to avoid such Hegelian worries because of the sphere in which we are considering the ‘infinite'. That is, we are concerned with the obligations that arise as a result of the encounter with the face. The ‘idea of infinity' should not be confused here with what one ought ‘infinitely' (or as we suggest, ‘neverendingly') to do in light of that idea.
27 Namely, if we are right to suggest that the ethical relation stands as a non-inferential modest foundation that operates in conjunction with the infinitist requirements of reason-backing, then expecting certain types of evidence will be problematic when applied to the relation itself. Nonetheless, the ethical relation itself is definitely a matter of debate and dialogue. Levinas's texts are full of reasons for why understanding the relation in the way he suggests is a better way forward than what has been proposed in much of the history of moral philosophy.
28 As just one example of a particular discursive relationship that might be considered, see Wirzba, 2004.