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ABSTRACT
The well-being account of sacrifice says that sacrifices are gross losses of well-being. This account is attractive because it explains the relationship between sacrifice and moral obligation. However, sacrifices made on behalf of loved ones may cause trouble for the account. Loving sacrifices occur in a context where the agent’s well-being and the beneficiary’s well-being are intertwined. They present a challenge to individualism about well-being. Drawing inspiration from feminist philosophers and bioethicists, I argue that a notion of ‘relational well-being’, analogous to ‘relational autonomy’, can help account for loving sacrifices without either undermining the well-being theory of sacrifice or minimizing the very real sacrifices made in caregiving situations.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Stephen Campbell, Amanda Roth and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I regret not having the space to incorporate more of their valuable suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. I argue for the relationship between sacrifice and supererogation in Carbonell Citation2012.
2. The remainder of this section is inspired by, though not directly borrowed from, the account of sacrifice I give in Carbonell Citation2012. In Carbonell Citation2015, I concede that this account does not do a good job handling one class of sacrifices, those I call ‘sacrifices of self’. But Tatiana Visak (Citation2015) has argued that the well-being account can handle sacrifices of self just fine.
3. Some features of the economy of sacrifice are written into the legal system. For instance, whether you have a duty to aid someone, at some cost to yourself, may depend on the relation you stand in to the beneficiary. See Alexander Citation1996.
4. Overvold (Citation1980) insists on the first two. Rosati (Citation2009) specifies the ‘self’ condition.
5. Brandt (Citation1991) was writing in response to Overvold (Citation1980), and both of them use the term ‘self-sacrifice’ rather than ‘sacrifice’. Perhaps the term ‘self-sacrifice’ connotes motivational baggage that mere ‘sacrifice’ does not.
6. Overvold (Citation1980, 112) specifies that there must be a net loss. Rosati (Citation2009) thinks gross losses suffice.
7. To be sure, her loss may feel like less of a sacrifice once she adapts to the new lifestyle. In contexts of oppression we call these ‘adaptive preferences’ (or ‘deformed desires’). See Superson Citation2014. Relatedly, when we internalize the demands of a moral theory, complying with it may become less burdensome. See Sin Citation2012.
8. For more on this worry about desire theories, see Overvold Citation1980, Brandt Citation1991 and Darwall Citation2002. For arguments that desire theories can survive this worry, see Rosati Citation2009 and Heathwood Citation2011. Perhaps what the mother most desires of her current options is to take the bullet for her son. But she also desires to live to old age, and the frustration of that desire seems quite bad for her. Similarly, the husband’s desire for a good night of sleep is frustrated even if his desire for his wife’s safety is stronger.
9. See Portmore Citation2007 for the argument that goals achieved via ‘self-sacrifice’ contribute even more to one’s well-being than those that do not involve sacrifice.
10. For a discussion of the relationship between dependency and the demandingness of morality, see Tessman Citation2015, especially chapter 7.
11. For an early statement of the view, see Nedeslky Citation1989.
12. Mackenzie and Stoljar (Citation2000, 7) claim that, while Annette Baier has convincingly refuted this version of individualism, it does not follow that we should reject the concept of autonomy.
13. I am using Mackenzie and Stoljar’s language of ‘agent’, but since we are interested in well-being rather than autonomy, we may be just as interested in ‘patients’ as ‘agents’. For now, I set this distinction aside.
14. John Christman describes two versions of what I’m calling ‘relationalism’ and what he calls the ‘social self thesis’, corresponding roughly to the denial of Mackenzie and Stoljar’s third and second versions of individualism, respectively. ‘First, the thesis in question can be understood as a metaphysical claim, such that relations with other persons, institutions, traditions, and so on are seen as essentially part of the person (either at a time or over time). Alternatively, the social self thesis can be understood as a contingent psychological claim about a person’s self-concept, value structure, emotional states, motivational set, or reflective capacities’ (Christman Citation2004, 144).
15. For more on family-centered care, see American Academy of Pediatrics Citation2012. For a skeptical view, according to which family interests are a ‘myth’, see Raho Citation2016.
16. For an earlier statement of the view from which Groll draws, see also Ross Citation1998.
17. Glorifying sacrifices might be just as harmful as eliminating them from our analysis. Ann Mongoven (Citation2003) argues that the glorification of organ donation has led to the ‘routinization’ of a major sacrifice, which she thinks is dangerous.