Kant’s Reply to the Consequence Argument

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I show that Kant’s solution to the third antinomy is a reply sui generis to the consequence argument. If sound, the consequence argument yields that we are not morally responsible for our actions because our actions are not up to us. After expounding the modal version of the consequence argument advanced by Peter van Inwagen, I show that Kant accepts the inference rules of the argument and a requirement of alternate possibilities for moral blame. Kant must therefore reject one of the premises of the consequence argument to be able to deny its conclusion. Whereas Kantian altered-past compatibilism denies the premise of the consequence argument which states the fixity of the past, Kantian altered-law compatibilism denies the premise that states the fixity of the laws of nature. My analysis shows that Kantian altered-past and altered-law compatibilism are logically consistent, yet it also reveals that they depend on strong metaphysical premises. It must be investigated whether these premises withstand textual scrutiny and whether they are credible in their own right. By way of conclusion, I draw the outlines of this investigation.

KEYWORDS:

• Kant
• free will
• consequence argument
• determinism
• compatibilism
• transcendental idealism
• transcendental freedom
• moral responsibility

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Correction Statement

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Notes

1. The argument was developed by Carl Ginet, David Wiggins, Peter van Inwagen and James Lamb. For references and an overview, see Kapitan (2002).

2. In keeping with standard notation in modal logic, ‘□’ denotes ‘it is necessary that,’ ‘◊’ means ‘it is possible that,’ ‘&’ stands for ‘and,’ ‘→’ means ‘not’ and ‘→’ is a material implication.

3. See Hobbes (1991, 145–146 [21.107–108]), Locke (1975, [II.xxi.15]) and Hume (1975, 95 [8.73]).

4. Some proponents of the conditional analysis prefer the verbs ‘chosen’ or ‘tried’ to the verb ‘wanted.’

5. For an even more explicit parallel passage in the Critique of Pure Reason, see A543/B571.

6. Note that the argument that follows and the positions reconstructed in the following two sections rely on a metaphysical reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism. There is, however, an influential alternative reading of transcendental idealism, namely the so-called epistemic or methodological two-aspect reading. On this view, Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves is a distinction not between two ontologically distinct objects (the so-called two-world view) or between ontologically distinct phenomenal and noumenal properties of one and the same object (the so-called ontological two-aspect view), but rather between two ways in which an object can be considered epistemically, namely either under or abstracted from the conditions for experiential cognition (Allison 2004). Consistent with this reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism, scholars have developed various compatibilist interpretations of Kant which do not rely on metaphysical premises. Allison (1990, 2020) defends an interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom that is arguably consistent with his views on transcendental idealism. Korsgaard (1996) and others following her give a practical interpretation of the two-standpoint view according to which one must act ‘under the idea of freedom’ and hence consider oneself as free from the practical deliberative standpoint. Meerbote (1984) and Hudson (1994) develop a compatibilist interpretation of Kant inspired by Davidson’s anomalous monism. Scholten (2016, 2020) develops a compatibilist Kantian quality of will account of excuses and exemptions inspired by P.F. Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment. This goes to show that even if I focus exclusively on Kantian altered-past and altered-law compatibilism in what follows, these are not the only interpretations of Kant’s compatibilism.

7. I understand Vilhauer as defending Kantian altered-past compatibilism, but this might not be his own self-understanding (see Vilhauer 2010, 45–46).

8. To see that DET’, TF_A and TF_B can be true at the same time, note that DET’ is true if and only if in all possible worlds in which the liar has the same empirical character and in which the same circumstances and laws of nature obtain as in the actual world, the liar tells the lie. But DET’ does not say anything about possible worlds in which the liar has a different empirical character. That is why DET’ does not rule out the truth of TF_A and TF_B, and vice versa.