The Synthetic Unity of Reason and Nature in the Third Critique

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of the argumentative structure of the third Critique, which in turn clarifies the connection between its two apparently unrelated parts. I propose to read the third Critique as a response to Kant’s question of hope, which concerns the satisfaction of reason’s practical and theoretical interests. On this proposal, while the first part on aesthetics describes what we—as possessors of theoretical reason – may hope for, the second part, on teleology, describes what we – as possessors of practical reason – may hope for. The main question of the third Critique is, ‘What may we hope if we act as we should, i.e. act rationally?’ Kant’s implicit answer is, ‘to attain the ideals of reason, which leads to happiness as a consequence of it.’ This novel reconstruction of the argumentative structure of the third Critique contributes to the literature by (i) explaining how the two parts of the third Critique on aesthetics and teleology are connected, (ii) clarifying how the ideals of reason are connected to hope and happiness, and (iii) showing how the spheres of nature and freedom can be synthetically unified through the faculty of judgment.

KEYWORDS:

• Kant
• hope
• synthetic unity
• unity of the third Critique
• purposiveness

Acknowledgement

The first version of this article was written in January 2021. Thanks to the many encouraging feedback I have received since then, I was able to fill in the gabs in my argumentation. In particular, I am grateful to Bill Wringe, Christoph Horn, James Griffith, Seniye Tilev, Berk Özcangiller and the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. I will refer to Kant’s works with the following abbreviations followed by standard Academy volume, page numbers.

CPR: Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1998)

CPrR: Critique of Practical Reason (Kant 1996a)

CJ: Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kant 2000)

G: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 2011)

Rel: Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason (Kant 1996b)

UH: Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent (Kant 1983)

2. See for example, Marc-Wogau (1938, p. 34n), Beck (1969, 497).

3. While Rogerson (1981, 2009, 2008) focuses on the first part of the third Critique, on aesthetic judgment, Peter McLaughlin (1990) focuses on the second part on teleological judgment.

4. Some of the book-length works dealing with the structure and the unity of Kant’s argument in the third Critique include John Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1992); Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (2001); Paul Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays (2005); Angelica Nuzzo, Kant and the Unity of Reason (2005); Robert Wicks, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Judgment (2006); Rachel Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment (2007); Hannah Ginsborg, The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant’s Critique of Judgment (2015); Ido Geiger, Kant and the Claims of the Empirical World: A Transcendental Reading of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (2022); Kristi Sweet, Kant on Freedom, Nature, and Judgment: The Territory of The Third Critique (2023); and Lara Ostaric, The Critique of Judgment and the Unity of Kant’s Critical System (2023).

5. For Ernst Cassirer, the connecting theme of the two parts is ‘creation’ which is present both in the creation of artwork and life in nature (Cassirer 1981, 279). According to Rudolf A. Makkreel, on the other hand, that theme is Kant’s conception of life. As Makkreel puts it, ‘it is possible to interpret the overall structure of the Critique of Judgment as one whereby the idea and sense of life is gradually explicated’ (Makkreel 1990, 89). Following Makkreel, Angelica Nuzzo also argues that Kant’s conception of ‘life’ connects the two parts of the third Critique. As she puts it, ‘the idea of life and the relation that our embodied LebensgefÜhl entertains with the reflective faculty of judgment is the leading idea of Kant’s inquiry in both the critique of aesthetic and the critique of teleological judgment’ (Nuzzo 2008, 285).

6. See Henry Allison, ‘The Gulf between Nature and Freedom and Nature’s Guarantee of Perpetual Peace’ (1995), and Allison (2001). Rachel Zuckert agrees with Allison that aesthetics and teleology are connected to each other via the principle of purposiveness without a purpose. See Zuckert (2007).

7. Lara Ostaric’s recent book The Critique of Judgment and the Unity of Kant’s Critical System (2023) also focuses on the realization of the end of practical reason, namely the highest good and its postulates. Therefore her interpretation of the third Critique suffers from the same shortcoming as of Guyer’s, namely of ignoring the realization of the theoretical end of reason.

8. See Geiger (2022).

9. As Geiger admits, however, such a reading falls short of explaining how the text unifies the theoretical and practical aspects of reason and the distinct realms of nature and freedom.

10. Like Geiger, who reads the third Critique in relation to satisfying the theoretical interest of reason and attaining empirical cognition of nature, Karl Shafer’s recent book, Kant’s Reason: The Unity of Reason and the Limits of Comprehension in Kant (2023), focuses on the theoretical aspect of reason and argues that the power of judgment serves to satisfy reason’s distinctive interest in understanding or ‘comprehension’ (Schafer 2023, 25f). He describes the faculty of reason as the capacity for both theoretical and practical understanding. By focusing on reason’s theoretical interest in finding the unconditioned for the conditioned or seeking sufficient explanations for things in the world and making sense of things both theoretically and practically, Shafer ignores reason’s practical interest in making us act in accordance with principles (G, 4:412). While the end of theoretical reason is to attain complete and systematic knowledge of things, unlike what Schafer suggests the end of practical reason cannot be reduced to mere comprehension or understanding of practical matters. When Kant argues for the practical aspect of reason, he focuses on reason’s ability to make us act (as opposed to comprehend) in accordance with practical principles.

11. In this respect, we can read Kant’s arguments in the third Critique as an attempt to demonstrate that ‘what is rational can become actual.’ In a sense, Kant’s third Critique presents us with arguments for a precursor of Hegel’s famous motto in the Introduction of The Philosophy of Right, ‘What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational’ (Hegel 1991, 20) I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for recommending me to think of the ways in which the third Critique has influenced the German Idealists and the Romantics.

12. While the happiness of the individual depends on the satisfaction of that individual’s needs and wishes, collective happiness depends on the satisfaction of the needs and morally permissible wishes of the human species, which include the needs for food, security, and shelter and the wish for a peaceful life. Even though collective happiness ultimately rests on individuals being happy, it also requires certain institutions and laws to be in place. Thus, collective happiness cannot be reduced to individuals’ happiness.

13. I am not alone in claiming that Kant responds to the question of hope in the third Critique. Both Chignell (2021) and Sweet (2023) argue that the third Critique answers this question. Chignell introduces different kinds of hopes, depending on their objects. However, as will be clear in the following sections of this paper, I disagree with their accounts about the object and the subject of hope. Contra Chignell and Sweet, I will argue that the subject of hope in the third Critique is not individual human beings, but the human species. I also disagree with them on the object of hope. On my reading, this object is the realization of the ends of reason in nature, which may be attained as a result of the collective use of our theoretical and practical reason and would bring us collective happiness in return.

14. In Kant and the Interest of Reason, Sebastian Raedler argues that two of the most important interests of reason include ‘imposing systematic unity on our knowledge (in its theoretical application) and our actions (in its practical application)’ (Raedler 2015, p. 258). By contrast, I think that theoretical reason imposes unity on our empirical cognitions (not on our knowledge) in order to attain knowledge of nature. In other words, knowledge is acquired only after the employment of regulative ideas of reason. Similarly, practical reason, on my reading, imposes unity on our maxims (as opposed to our actions) in order to produce moral action.

15. For a detailed discussion of Kant’s account of the interests and needs of reason, see section 7.1 of Daniel Breazeal, ‘Reason’s Changing Needs: From Kant to Reinhold’ (2010).

16. As Kant writes on the Second Thesis of his 1784 essay, ‘Idea for Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View’: In man [Menschen] (as the only rational creature on earth) those natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason are to be fully developed only in the species [Gattung], not in the individual” (UH, 8: 18, p. 30).

17. In Book II of the second Critique, on the other hand, Kant focuses on the possible consequence of the complete conformity of an individual’s will to the moral law and argues that, ‘If I do as I should, I may hope for the highest good in an afterlife with the assistance of God.’ I present a detailed defense of this claim in Vatansever (2021).

18. In his article, ‘Was darf ich hoffen? Zum Problem der Vereinbarkeit von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft bei Immanuel Kant,’ (1992) Eckart Förster argues that Kant unifies the theoretical and practical realms through the question of hope. On Förster’s reading, the ideas of God and the world represent the practical and theoretical realms respectively, and the human being – as subject of both moral and natural laws – unites them (Förster 1992, 183). In contrast, I argue that what is unified in the third Critique is not the ideas of world and God, but rather the theoretical and practical aspects of reason as well as the sensible objects of nature and the supersensible objects of reason.

19. As Kant puts it, ‘the existence of rational agents under moral laws, can alone be conceived as the final end of the existence of a world’ (CJ, 5:450).

20. For a detailed argumentation of Kant’s account of hope as a feeling, see Zuckert (2018).

21. Note that the assertion, ‘X is really possible,’ is equivalent to asserting, ‘We judge that X is really possible.’ In other words, claiming that the ends of reason are really possible does not mean that those ends have some objective or mind-independent features in virtue of which X can be real. Within the transcendental idealist framework, modality is an a priori category of the understanding and modalities such as actuality, possibility, and necessity, which should be read as properties of our judgments that point out the relation between the representation of the object and the cognitive faculties of the subject. Hence, when we say, ‘The ends of reason can become real or that they are really possible,’ we simply mean that there is an agreement between the ends (or ideals) of reason and the formal conditions of sensible nature, i.e. the empirical lawfulness of nature. Only then we can judge that the former can be an object of sensible or empirical cognition for us. In other words, judging that the ends of reason can become real objects of experience requires us to judge that the empirical lawfulness of nature conforms to our rational ends. For a detailed discussion of the different types of ‘real possibility’ in Kant, see Stang (2011, 448; 2016, p.203).

22. Chignell identifies five different objects of hope and claims that the object of hope can be (i) acquiring of new cognition, (ii) generating new empirical concepts, (iii) living in a world that is cognitively and morally a home for us, (iv) understanding natural ends or objective purposiveness, and (v) the Highest Good (Chignell 2021, 144–47). While his list of the objects of hope reflect Kant’s writings, it is not clear how these apparently different objects of hope are connected to each other and to happiness.

23. Kant does not simply show that there is a formal agreement or harmony between nature and reason, but also that humans through their collective rational activity can change the world so that it satisfies their rational will and wishes. This is how Kant shows that reason can be efficacious in nature and reason has an influence on nature (CJ, 5: 195). As Yirmiyahu Yovel nicely puts it ‘Unlike the ancient Stoics and early-modern Cartesians (who were partly neo-Stoics), whose will seeks agreement with the world by shrinking itself to fit what the existing world can offer, the Kantian will as practical reason strives to expand itself so as to make the world conform to the will’s norms and ideals, that is, reshape the world in the will’s own image’ (Yovel 1998, 269).

24. This is because attainability of the ideals of reason depends on preconditions that lie outside of our control, such as the immortality of the human species and the existence of God, who creates this world in a way that conforms to our rational goals. Since we do not know if the human species is immortal and if the world is, in fact, designed to be known by us, we can only postulate these preconditions to be possible. Thus, we can understand how such an ideal may become real on earth if the postulates of the immortality of the human species and the existence of an intelligent designer, who created this world for us to know it, are valid.

25. According to Kristi Sweet, the object of hope is the fittingness of nature. As she writes, ‘What one hopes for is that nature, which appears indifferent or hostile to human ends, is, in some way, actually hospitable for human life. […] Hope, then, is about the fittingness of nature and the world for human beings’ (Sweet 2023, 2). If the object of hope is the fittingness of nature to our ends, then we must admit that we have no control over the object of hope. However, Kant formulates the question of hope as ‘If I act as I should, what may I hope?’ implying that the object of hope is a possible consequence of our rational activity, and that, we have some – even if not complete – control over that object. That is why the object of hope, on my reading, is the realization of the ideals (or ends) of reason in nature, which may (or may not) be attained as a result of the collective use of our theoretical and practical reason in this world. Like Sweet, Adam Cureton thinks that the object of hope is nature’s hospitality to our moral progress and perfection. As he writes, ‘we can hope that nature is hospitable and favorable to our moral perfection so that we can sustain and continually reaffirm our rational commitment to the moral law’ (Cureton 2018, 183).

26. The faculty of understanding, through its a priori transcendental concepts, structures the empirical manifold of intuition given by the faculty of sensibility and thereby constitutes our experience of nature that exhibits transcendental uniformity. Reason, on the other hand, through its a priori regulative principles, orders our experiences in a systematic way and in so doing helps us formulate particular empirical laws. While the a priori concepts and principles of understanding ground the transcendental unity of nature, they underdetermine the empirical unity of nature. The latter requires not only the application of the a priori concepts of the understanding, but also the regulation of our experiences under the guidance of a principle or idea, which can systematize and unify them. For a detailed discussion of this distinction between transcendental vs. empirical uniformity please refer to Buchdahl (1965).

27. Kant compares aesthetic pleasure with interested pleasures, such as pleasure in the agreeable and pleasure in moral action. Pleasure in the agreeable, according to Kant, is pathologically conditioned because it requires the satisfaction of our desires and is combined with an interest in the existence of certain objects of desire (CJ, 5:209). Since satisfaction in the agreeable is based entirely on our animality, it can be observed in other animals as well (CJ, 5:210). Pleasure we get from moral conduct is interest-oriented because we have an interest in the existence of moral actions. According to Kant, this kind of interested moral satisfaction can be felt by other rational creatures as well (CJ 5:210).

28. Kant makes this point most clearly in the 1784 essay, ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’

29. In his article, ‘Beauty as a Symbol of Natural Systematicity,’ Andrew Chignell (2006) interprets the experience of beauty as evidence for the real possibility of systematicity in nature. While I agree with Chignell’s reading, which closely ties the experience of beauty to the systematicity of nature, I propose to consider the experience of beauty as empirical evidence for the real possibility of the systematic knowledge of nature.

30. Guyer, for example, relates aesthetics to morality and argues that our experience of beauty indicates nature’s conformity to our moral ends, as opposed to theoretical ends. For him, aesthetic pleasure is an indication of the satisfaction of the interest of pure practical reason, as opposed to theoretical reason (Guyer 2006, 426). For a similar position see Cannon’s (2011).

31. Kant’s conception of disinterested pleasure is compatible with the common-sense notion that we are interested in beautiful objects. As long as our interest does not arise from some particular interest unique to our subjective conditions or the existence of particular objects or actions, then all humans – in virtue of their rationality – have an interest in the experience of beautiful objects.

32. For a detailed account of the feeling of the promotion of life, see Vatansever (2023).

33. Commentators who acknowledge the significance of Kant’s account of the sublime usually analyze this feeling in relation to its moral significance, as opposed to its epistemic significance. See for example, Clewis (2009) and Matherne (2023).

34. I explained the necessary connection between collective moral agency and proportional collective happiness in Vatansever (2021).

35. According to Jens Timmerman, while attaining a unified system of knowledge connected with one principle is the ambition of reason “at same time, it is obvious that whereas the critical works lay the foundations for this project they certainly do not represent its completion (Timmerman 2009, p.196). Like Timmerman, Gerold Prauss argues that the problem regarding the unity of theoretical and practical reason has not been solved in Kant’s writings and can only be solved, if at all, in the future (Prauss 1981).

36. Note that the telos that the practical reason sets for individual human beings is the highest good of the individual, while the telos that it sets for the human species is the highest good of the world. Here I assume that the subject of Kant’s arguments in the third Critique is not individual human beings, but rather human species. That is why attainability of the telos that the practical reason sets for the human species does not require immortality of the individual human beings. Instead, it requires immortality of the species and the conformity of the empirical world to our rational ends.