Meaning and Use, Once Again

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Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. References to Zalabardo’s book will simply be by page number.

2. Zalabardo distinguishes between two kinds of representationalism. The first type of representationalism holds that the meaning ground of a declarative sentence is the relation between the sentence and a fact. This view was initially defended by Russell (1907), but it gives rise to some serious difficulties. The most notable difficulty is that the position cannot explain the meaning of false sentences without postulating the existence of ‘non-facts,’ which is rather implausible. The second type of representationalism holds that the meaning ground of a declarative sentence results from the relations between the terms in the sentence and the worldly items (e.g. particulars and properties) that are represented by the sentence as being combined with one another in a certain way. This view is defended by Russell (1912) after he rejected his previous theory. The second kind of representationalism is meant more as a collection of theories, rather than as one specific theory. Subtypes of this kind of representationalism can defend different accounts of the referential links between terms and items in the world (e.g. mediated through concepts or senses, causal-historical links) or different accounts of the semantic values of terms (e.g. semantic values of a predicate can be sets of particulars, properties, or concepts).

3. ‘Someone can mean by “is morally right” what we mean by it even though they take an action to satisfy “is morally right” but believe that the action doesn’t maximize overall utility, or take an action not to satisfy “is morally right” but believe that the action maximizes overall utility’ (15). To make the argument more accessible, I have changed the setting to a conflict between a utilitarian and a deontologist.

4. ‘If someone takes an action to satisfy “is morally right” but believes that the action doesn’t maximize overall utility, or takes an action not to satisfy “is morally right” but believes that the action maximizes overall utility, then “is morally right”, as understood by this speaker, doesn’t refer to the property of maximizing overall utility’ (16).

5. ‘Someone can mean by “is morally right” what we mean by it even though the predicate, as understood by them, doesn’t refer to the property of maximizing overall utility’ (16).

6. ‘Someone can’t mean by “is morally right” what we mean by it if the predicate has different referents as understood by them and as understood by us’ (16).

7. ‘“is morally right”, as we understand it, doesn’t refer to the property of maximizing overall utility’ (16).

8. Note that Zalabardo no longer writes about ‘natural properties,’ as he did in the discussion of moral predicates.

9. ‘Someone can mean by “is true” what we mean by it even though they take a sentence to satisfy “is true” but believe that the sentence won’t be accepted at the end of enquiry, or take a sentence not to satisfy “is true” but believe that the sentence will be accepted at the end of enquiry’ (39).

10. ‘If someone takes a sentence to satisfy “is true” but believes that the sentence won’t be accepted at the end of enquiry, or takes a sentence not to satisfy “is true” but believes that the sentence will be accepted at the end of enquiry, then “is true”, as understood by this speaker, doesn’t refer to the property of being accepted at the end of enquiry’ (39).

11. ‘Someone can mean by “is true” what we mean by it even though the predicate, as understood by them, doesn’t refer to the property of being accepted at the end of enquiry’ (39).

12. ‘Someone can’t mean by “is true” what we mean by it if the predicate has different referents as understood by them and as understood by us’ (39).

13. ‘“is true”, as we understand it, doesn’t refer to the property of being accepted at the end of enquiry’ (39).