Bernard Mandeville's heir: Adam Smith or Jean Jacques Rousseau on the possibility of economic analysis

Abstract

In this paper I argue that Bernard Mandeville, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith are confronted to the same question: how to explain values from a naturalistic origin of morality. An in-depth analysis of their theories of human nature and market society will show that Rousseau is further from Mandeville's analysis than Smith acknowledged, and it is Smith who will in fact take important elements from Mandeville to build his own theoretical system and, thereby, follow the path of economic analysis beyond moral considerations.

Keywords:

• Bernard Mandeville
• Adam Smith
• Jean Jacques Rousseau
• economic agent
• moral philosophy

Notes

I wish to thank Professor Arnaud Berthoud, Raphaël Dépinoy and Sara Garbagnoli as well as all the participants to the PHARE Doctoral Seminar for their comments and questions. A first version of this paper was presented at the Ph. D. Seminar held at the sixteenth Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought, University of Crete, Rethymno, Crete, 14 March, 2002. My thanks go to Professor Gianni Vaggi, my discussant, and Professor Erich B. Streissler for their insightful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to the two referees for their suggestions. All responsibility for remaining errors is mine. The author is a Ph.D. student at the University of Paris X Nanterre working on the origin of the concept of “economic agent” through the work of Adam Smith, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham.

Spencer J. Pack (2000) retraces and develops West's arguments showing how both authors believe in progress as the result of unintended human actions.

For a brief account of this literature see Défalvard (1990) 504 – 5.

For an account of the brief existence of the Edinburgh Review and Smith's engagement with the project see J. Rae 1990 [1895]: 120 – 23.

Rousseau will give even stronger arguments against arts and sciences. To quote one of them: ‘The mind has its needs, just as the body. The latter are the foundations of society, the former make its charm. While the government and the laws provide the safety and the well-being of assembled men, sciences, letters and arts, less despotic and more powerful maybe, lay flower garlands over the iron chains they are charged with, suffocate in them the feeling of this original freedom for which they seem to be born, make them love their slavery and form what are called policed peoples' (Rousseau 1998 [1750]: 17). See also Rousseau 1990 [1755]: 190.

The link between both authors could be rendered stronger if Mandeville's Fable is read as a denunciation of commercial society in views of transforming it. However, this does not seem to be his intention. Mandeville intended rather to bring to light the choice human beings are confronted with in following the path of commercial expansion, or in Kaye's words ‘a contradiction in current opinion which had escaped his contemporaries’ (Mandeville 1988: i.xcviii). ‘For the main Design of the Fable, (as is briefly explain'd in the Moral) is to shew the Impossibility of enjoying all the most elegant Comforts of Life that are to be met with in an industrious, wealthy and powerful Nation, and at the same time be bless'd with all the Virtue and Innocence that can be wish'd for in a Golden Age’ (Mandeville, 1988 [1714]: i.6 – 7).

At the time Rousseau had also published Narcisse and its Preface (1753) where he explicitly condemns those who as Mandeville had produced absurd systems but Smith does not mention this work. There is evidence showing that Smith read at least the Social Contract published in 1762, but no registered analysis or comment Smith could have made has been kept. There is no way of knowing for certain if Smith changed his mind concerning Rousseau's work. As to Rousseau's person a change can be perceived from the way Smith refers to him in his letters to Hume, at the time of the dispute between Hume and Rousseau (1766), to his wishing for better days for the author of the Social Contract.

But the Seeds of every Passion are innate to us and no body comes into the World without them’ (Mandeville 1988 [1723]: i.281).

Knowledge both enlarges and multiplies our Desires, and the fewer thing a Man wishes for, the more easily his Necessities may be supply'd’ (Mandeville 1988 [1723]: i.288).

Language, according to Rousseau, is the first social institution (Rousseau 1993 [1781]: 55).

Mandeville opposes his system directly to Shaftesbury's (Mandeville 1988 [1723]: i.324) and states that ‘the good and amiable Qualities of Man are not those that make him beyond other Animals a sociable Creature; but moreover that it would be utterly impossible, either to raise any Multitudes into a Populous, Rich and Flourishing Nation, or when so rais'd, to keep and maintain them in that Condition, without the assistance what we call Evil both Natural and Moral’ (Mandeville 1988 [1723]: i.325).

In 1756 Smith could not have known the Essay on the Origin of Languages or any other books Rousseau wrote after that date. However, in the cases where Rousseau's arguments do not change from his first two Discourses to his later work references are made to the latter because it clarifies his point without transforming it.

This is the only possible definition of virtue for Mandeville: ‘The imaginary Notions that Men may be Virtuous without Self-denial are a vast Inlet to Hypocrisy’ (Mandeville 1988 [1723]: i.331, see also Mandeville 1988 [1729]: ii.108 – 109).

In his account of the origin of civil government, Smith says ‘Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all’ (WN V.i.b.13). A similar statement is to be found in LJ(A): 208.

The moment human beings recognized themselves as fellow creatures, says Rousseau, they felt the need or the desire to communicate their feelings and thoughts (Rousseau 1993 [1781]: 55).

Rousseau makes a difference between the origin of social institutions in cold and warm countries, although he seems to suggest humankind comes from warm countries. In cold countries it is needs that will give place to passions, while in warm countries passions will bring about needs (Rousseau 1993 [1781]: 98).

Precisely the first paragraph translated by Smith in his letter, one he will later reformulate in optimistic terms in the TMS (IV.1.10).

Smith will accept this hierarchical organization but he will not necessarily join Mandeville in his theory for the need of a mass of labouring poor: ‘For how excessive soever the Plenty and Luxury of a Nation may be, some Body must do the Work, Houses and Ships must be built, Merchandizes must be remov'd, and the Ground till'd.’ (Mandeville 1988 [1754]: i.120). Mandeville goes on saying that in order to keep this mass of labouring poor they should be kept ignorant and not be allowed to save. Smith has a different position and believes it is the liberal reward of labour that will encourage industry and workmanship.

Rousseau believes the pact that established commercial society is from the beginning a pact between rich and poor, proposed by the rich to preserve their wealth: ‘Lets synthesize in four words the social pact of this two states. You need me, because I am rich and you are poor; lets then make an agreement among us: I will allow you to have the honor of serving me, under the condition that you will give me the little you have left, for the distress I will take in commanding you’ (Rousseau 1990 [1755] b: 93).

This is part of the second paragraph Smith quotes in his letter.

‘Abundance of hard and dirty Labour is to be done, and coarse Living is to be complied with: Where shall we find a better Nursery for these Necessities than the Children of the Poor? none certainly are nearer to it or fitter for it’ (Mandeville 1988 [1723]: i.311; see also 1988 [1729]: ii.351). He will complete his argument by saying that international competitiveness will depend on this mass of labouring poor (Mandeville 1988 [1723]: i.316 – 17).

Talking about this attempt, Rousseau says ‘the philosophers that have examined the foundations of society have all felt the need to go back to the state of nature, but none has ever succeeded’ (Rousseau 1990 [1750]: 64). As Rousseau was acquainted with Mandeville's work, we may presume Mandeville was also included in this criticism.

Rousseau will refine his conception of pity in the Emile (1762) and in his Essay on the Origin of Languages (1781). Our social affections, says Rousseau, need our reason to develop. The combination between reason and pity will account for the establishment of permanent social relations (Carrive 1983: 223). By the time Smith wrote his letter to the Edinburgh Review these two books were still unpublished. This is the reason why we take the analysis of pity in Rousseau up to where Smith knew it at the time.

‘Pity or Compassion’ states Mandeville ‘which consists in a Fellow-feeling and Condolence for the Misfortunes and Calamities of others: all Mankind are more or less affected with it; but the weakest Minds generally the most. (…) It comes in either at the Eye or Ear, or both; and the nearer and more violently the Object of Compassion strikes those Senses, the greater Disturbance it causes in us, often to such a Degree as to occasion great Pain and Anxiety’ (Mandeville 1988 [1723]: i.254 – 255); ‘the Uneasiness we feel at the sight of great Misfortunes, as a Man's breaking his Legs or dashing his Brains out, is every where call'd Pity’ (Mandeville 1988 [1714]: i.82 – 83). It is to be noticed that Smith expands this definition by including in it the fellow-feeling ‘with any passion whatever’ (TMS I.i.1.5) and thereby passing from pity and compassion to sympathy as the basis of all our social and moral relations. Other similarities are to be found between Mandeville's (and Rousseau's) pity and Smith's sympathy: it requires the exercise of imagination, it touches even the most depraved human beings, it is stronger as the object is closer to us and it diminishes with distance (Mandeville 1988 [1723]: i.256 – 57; TMS I.i.1.2; II.ii.2.3; VI.ii.I.1 – 6; VI.ii.2.1).

In the Third Dialogue in the Second volume of the Fable, Mandeville makes a distinction between self-love and self-liking (Mandeville 1988 [1729]: ii.129 – 31). Self-love tends to guarantee self-preservation whereas self-liking reinforces self-love but increases as society develops. It is associated with the need for others' regard and approbation and is directly related to pride. Although it differs among species, it is present in the state of nature and grows with society. This, as will be shown below, is a first major difference with Rousseau's distinction between self-love and the love of one-self.

Smith will develop the usefulness of self-love and of our selfish passions. Let us just recall that our selfish passions are the origin of the virtue of prudence that will characterize merchants and industrious men.

This point will be resumed in the third section.

It has been argued Mandeville founded his argument in an assimilation of savings and thesaurisation (Béraud 1992: 338). Smith, following Turgot, made the difference between both because what a rich man saved, instead of spending it in unproductive labour, went directly to productive labour.

Mandeville is here arguing against those, as Rousseau, who believe luxury effeminates habits (Rousseau 1998 [1750]: 59). He will nevertheless make a similar point concerning the negative effects of Catholic religion, because Catholics' loyalty goes first to the Holy Kingdom and not to their nation (Mandeville 1988 [1729]: ii.97 – 98).

If we had no Vices, I cannot see why any Man should ever make more Suits than he has occasion for, tho’ he was never so desirous of promoting the Good of the Nation’ (Mandeville 1988 [1714]: i.126).

I do not intend to give a detailed account of Smith's theory of morality, which lays beyond the scope of this paper, but just to make the difference between his view and Mandeville's.

‘Good Politicians by dextrous Management, laying heavy Impositions on some Goods, or totally prohibiting them, and lowering the Duties on others, may always turn and divert the Course of Trade which way they please; as they'll prefer, if it be equally considerable, the Commerce with such Countries as can pay with Money as well as Goods, to those that can make no Returns for what they buy, but in Commodities of their own Growth and Manufactures, so they will always carefully prevent the Traffick with such Nations as refuse the Goods of others, and will take nothing but Money for their own. But above all, they'll keep a watchful Eye over the Balance of Trade in general, and never suffer that all the Foreign Commodities together, that are imported in one Year, shall exceed in Value what their own Growth or Manufacture is in the same exported to others. If what I urg'd last be diligently look'd after, and the Imports are never allow'd to be superior to the Exports, no Nation can ever be impoverish'd by Foreign Luxury’ (Mandeville 1988 [1714]: i.117; i.249).

The connection between Mandeville and Smith has been already acknowledged in the literature. Just to mention the most evident and systematic, see the editors' notes of the Glasgow edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith and Kaye's analysis in his edition of the Fable.

Kaye (1988[1924]: cxxx-cxxxiii; Chalk 1991 [1966]: 155n.) sees in this change the origin of utilitarianism.

Closer does not mean the same because Mandeville considers ‘natural and innate’ passions are unalterable (1988 [1729]: ii.91) therefore education only teaches to conceal them. Rousseau, as has been underlined several times already, believes the commercial society generates new passions within the human being.

One of the ways to prevent accumulation was to reduce the use of money to its very least, money being the means to acquire unnecessary goods. In his unfinished Project for Corsica (1861) Rousseau proposes the creation of clearing houses where people could bring their surplus products and get what they needed without the use of money (Rousseau 1990 [1861]: 228, 129 – 30).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jimena Hurtado Prieto

I wish to thank Professor Arnaud Berthoud, Raphaël Dépinoy and Sara Garbagnoli as well as all the participants to the PHARE Doctoral Seminar for their comments and questions. A first version of this paper was presented at the Ph. D. Seminar held at the sixteenth Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought, University of Crete, Rethymno, Crete, 14 March, 2002. My thanks go to Professor Gianni Vaggi, my discussant, and Professor Erich B. Streissler for their insightful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to the two referees for their suggestions. All responsibility for remaining errors is mine. The author is a Ph.D. student at the University of Paris X Nanterre working on the origin of the concept of “economic agent” through the work of Adam Smith, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham.