Reason and sentiments: review of Emma Rothschild's Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment

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* A review article of Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments. Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment, Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. ix + 353, ISBN 0-674-00489-2.

Unless otherwise indicated, all references and page numbers are to the book under review. To avoid burdening the reader with too heavy a reference system, all citations from authors other than Emma Rothschild but quoted in her book are connected to page numbers from Economic Sentiments.

What is Enlightenment? (1784).

Among which Forbes, Hirschman, Hont and Winch are the most distinguished.

Revolutionary freedom being clearly understood for Smith, the ‘gradualist’, as an opposition to the old feudal system, not as an anticipation of post-1792 French political upheavals.

Typically, Condorcet's approach is closer to modern game theory and interactive probabilistic choice theory than from deterministic general economic equilibrium.

A.L. Macfie (1971)is Emma Rothschild's main punching ball. Curiously, the recent articles specifically devoted to the invisible hand by Ingrao (1998) and Grampp (2000) are not mentioned.

The main references are to Hayek, Arrow, Hahn and Tobin.

The full quotation is on page 456 of volume I of the Glasgow edition (1976).

See however Viner (1972) and Raphael and Macfie (Introduction to Smith 1976).

The History of Astronomy was only published posthumously in 1795.

The space constraint precludes the reviewers from commenting on the author's critical discussion of Hayek's interpretation of Smith. Her argument revolves mainly around what she sees as Hayek's all-knowing and all-seeing social theorist full of disregard for the individual participant in social processes.

See the most brilliant analytical chapter of the Wealth of Nations, entitled ‘Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodities’, in which Adam Smith is the first to apply systematically this methodology to the theory of prices.

To which one could easily add moral sentiments, the arithmetic of passions, justice, the order of society and historical evolution.

With his opposition between logical and non-logical actions, Pareto is among the few marginalist economists to have seriously reflected on this dichotomy.

In particular, and based on the conviction that ‘individual opinions and desires are diverse, uncertain, changing, and often erroneous’ (p. 182), Condorcet anticipates numerous critiques that have been addressed to modern general equilibrium since its inception in the 1870s. How could one for example describe general economic interdependence without depicting individuals as machines who calculate, or, worse, as components of a ‘huge hydraulic machine’? (Tableau général de la science, OC, 1:567).

It is unfortunate that the author does not mention in the course of her argument the massive volume by Bru and Crépel (1994) which collects rare and unpublished Condorcet's manuscripts and correspondence on “political arithmetick”.

In that respect, Condorcet anticipates in many ways post-Walrasian research (notably by Pareto and Winiarski) on the relationships between two gigantic systems of interdependent political and economic choice (Winiarski's so-called ‘mécanique sociale’). Within the economic system, individuals choose what to sell, to buy, to invest, and how they want to compete (whether to compete by economic means (reducing prices), or by political means (influencing regulation) to use Condorcet's expressions). Within the political system, individuals choose economic policies, and how to choose economic policies. To borrow Emma Rothschild's wordings, the ‘system of economic freedom is juxtaposed to and completed by a similarly monumental system of political freedom’ (p. 188).

The three possible economic policies used to illustrate the impossibility of finding a ‘winner’ are: 1° ‘Any restriction placed on commerce is an injustice’, 2° ‘Only those restrictions placed through general laws can be just’ or 3° ‘Restrictions placed by particular orders can be just’ (p. 181).

An idea borrowed from Turgot (p. 20).

See Hollander (1979: 652 – 55).

For example, Quesnay was probably both a ‘social reformer’ and a political conservative while Ricardo was certainly more of a ‘social reformer’ than a political conservative.

The Physiocrats' call for spreading in schools the teachings behind the Tableau is an earlier and good example of the importance of education for Enlightenment economists.

One should not forget en passant that Enlightenment philosophy is much more than rational philosophy. After all, Voltaire's Candide, Diderot's Neveu de Rameau and Rousseau's Confessions are also major contributions to the birth of modernity.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christophe Salvat

* A review article of Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments. Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment, Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. ix + 353, ISBN 0-674-00489-2.