Thoreau's economic philosophy

Abstract

This paper provides an encompassing portrayal of Thoreau's economic thought. It is analyzed against the background of the history of economic thought and the economic thinking of his time. Thoreau's economic thought is an extensive examination of the ideas of classical political economy, and particularly of Jean-Baptiste Say, and it is a fundamental critique thereof. Thoreau recognizes that some aspects and foundations of the modern conception of the economy lead to an alienation of the human being from itself as well as to an alienation from nature. I demonstrate that this critique is a result of Thoreau's specific approach to the economy, which, based on his particular understanding of the human being and his philosophy of nature, seeks the meaning of the economy for human life and for nature. In this philosophical approach, which I characterize as an economic philosophy, Thoreau's deeper defiance of classical political economy and his original place within the history of economic thought are grounded. It leads Thoreau to an alternative conception of an economy of moderation, which is identified and described in detail. I conclude with considerations on the potential meaning of Thoreau's thought for current economic research.

Keywords:

• Economic philosophy
• economics and literature
• history of economic thought
• philosophy of nature
• Romanticism
• Say
• Thoreau

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Maximilian Mihm, Malte Faber, Kirsten Hertel, and two anonymous reviewers of the EJHET for discussion and helpful comments; and thanks Matthias Becker, Maximilian Mihm and Annika Sterrenberg for assistance with language and style. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG (German research foundation) and the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

 1 This holds particularly for Walden. Here, the first and longest chapter is named ‘Economy’, and the issue is prominent throughout the whole book.

 2 For general considerations on this issue see, for example, Stoller (1957), Gilmore (1985), Richardson (1986), and Neufeldt (1989).

 3 See, for example, Gross (1982) and McGregor (1997: chapter 1). For general information on the historical economic background see Gates (1962), and Engerman and Gallman (2000: chapters 6–7).

 4 See Neufeldt (1989) and Schulz (1997).

 5 See Stull (1984), Bodily (1986), Norton (1991), Teichgraeber (1993), and Walker (1998).

 6 See Smith (1977), Dillman (1979), Richardson (1986: 166–8), and Birch and Metting (1992).

 7 Thoreau mentioned Smith, Ricardo and Say explicitly in Walden (see Thoreau 1992b[1854]: 35).

 8 According to Sattelmeyer (1988: 265), Thoreau owned the following translation: Say (1834). In this paper, I therefore solely refer to this edition.

 9 I particularly disagree with Dillman (1979: 24), who regards Thoreau's economic thought as a ‘philosophy composed of ideas compatible with the main elements of Jean-Baptiste Say's economic theory and a philosophy which lies within the tradition of classical economists’. See also Smith (1977) and Birch and Metting (1992) on this issue.

10 See also Eggert (1992: 40) who calls Thoreau an ‘economic philosopher’.

11 For excellent general reflections on the relation between literature and economics see Watts (2003), which provides an encompassing anthology of literary passages addressing economic issues.

12 Gilmore (1985: 36) regards this ‘antimarket attitude’ as being ‘at the heart of Thoreau's dissent from modernity’. Note, however, that there are also some positive statements by Thoreau on trade, in which he for example maintains its function of connection and interchange (see, for example, Thoreau 1992b[1854]: 80–1). For Thoreau's ambiguous remarks on the market see also Teichgraeber (1993).

13 Say (1834: 65) also addresses this aspect in his economic considerations. In the sphere of the economy, the value of something is the result of the intercourse between one's own estimation and that of others: ‘The value of a specific article is always vague and arbitrary, so long as it remains unacknowledged. Its owner is not a jot the richer, by setting a higher ratio upon it in his own estimation. But the moment that other persons are willing, for the purpose of obtaining it, to give in exchange a certain quantity of other articles, likewise bearing value, the other may then be said to be worth, or to be of equal value with, the other’.

14 Walker (1998) focuses essentially on labor as the central aspect of Thoreau's economic thought. He recognizes the ‘political import’ (ibid.: 845) of Walden, in which ‘employment is the enframing theme’ (ibid.: 846). It is ‘a carefully constructed study of the tensions between liberty and employment in times of economic change’ (ibid.: 845).

15 For an excellent treatise on Locke's theory of labor, see Brocker (1992).

16 See also Schulz (1997: 44–8) for Thoreau's considerations on necessary and superfluous labor.

17 I therefore disagree with Herbert Smith (1977: 121), who regards Thoreau's economic thought as a critique from ‘within the tradition of classical economists’, and also with Birch and Metting (1992: 594–6), who claim that Thoreau and Adam Smith have a common philosophical basis. I rather see a fundamental philosophical difference concerning the essence of human life and the meaning of the economy for it.

18 This is not the case for Adam Smith, who had developed a rather complex and differentiated idea of the human being (Manstetten 2000). Afterwards, however, the human being has been reduced to a homo oeconomicus in several economic conceptions, in particular by utilitarian thinkers (Manstetten 2000). In modern (neoclassical) economics, the human being essentially appears as homo oeconomicus, characterized as a selfish, rational utility-maximizer. In addition, it is assumed that it wishes to have more of at least one good; that is, that it is non-satiated (Manstetten 2000).

19 In contrast to other classical economists, Say does not reflect much on the limits of economic growth, a subject prominently analyzed by Thomas Robert Malthus (1976[1798]) (see Say 1834: 61, 122).

20 For the interpretation that Thoreau provides a variation of Adam Smith's value theory, see Smith (1977) and Birch and Metting (1992). See also earlier Section 2.1, and note 13, for the influence of Say's value theory on Thoreau – a theory that clearly differs from that of Adam Smith.

21 Thoreau's statement therefore also seems somehow ironical, because the question of what life actually is, is a qualitative and not a quantitative one: there is not a numerical ‘amount’ of life that could be exchanged.

22 In this context, for Thoreau, the encounter with nature is of fundamental importance. However, for the sake of clarity of the argument, this aspect will be discussed later in Section 4.

23 For this aspect see also Gilmore (1985: 38–9).

24 Similar refutations of Mandeville's view have also been made by other classical political economists, for example by Adam Smith (see, for example, Smith 2000[1776]: II.iii).

25 See also Gilmore (1985: 39).

26 A similar philosophical approach to the economy can be found in William Wordsworth's Prelude (1805) and Excursion (1814), in which he reflects on the meaning of the modern economy for humankind and nature. For him, the modern conception of the economy causes an alienation of humankind from nature and a loss of orientation for human creativity. This ultimately results in an unlimited and senseless production, as well as in a degradation of nature. See Becker et al. (2005) for a detailed analysis of Wordsworth's thought on economy, humankind and nature, and its comparison with the ideas of his contemporary Thomas Robert Malthus.

27 For the issue of Thoreau's place in American Transcendentalism see Buell (1973), Packer (1995) and Schulz (1997). For his relation to Romanticism see Miller (1961).

28 Within the scope of this paper I have to restrict myself to a short outline of Thoreau's natural philosophy; for a more detailed analysis see Becker (2003: 181–202). For further research on Thoreau's understanding of nature see also the well established literature on this issue; for example, McIntosh (1974), Cameron (1985), Buell (1995), or McKusick (2000).

29 Thoreau's claim that the form of the leaf is a general principle of shaping has something in common with the considerations of Goethe, who recognizes the form of the leaf as a fundamental principle for all plants and their development (Goethe 1989 Vol. 11: 323–4, 375, Vol. 13: 64ff). Thoreau, however, extends this idea to all nature. There are also some parallels between the epistemological fundaments of both: like Thoreau, Goethe is convinced that one can get an insight into such general spiritual principles of nature by empirical (sensorial) observation (see, for example, Goethe 1989 Vol. 10: 540–1). For the affinity between Goethe's and Thoreau's approach to nature see also McIntosh (1974: 69–90).

30 This approach to nature can be interpreted as a concrete and practical version of the concept of ‘Nature as a You’ of the early German Romantic Novalis (1772–1801). For Novalis, nature is not a mere object of human reason and action – a nonself– but rather another self with a spiritual dimension. Thus, a kind of dialogue with nature should be possible, in which nature is encountered with respect and attentiveness. For a more detailed analysis of Novalis’ natural philosophy see Becker and Manstetten (2004).

31 See also Gilmore (1985: 37).

32 See also Gilmore (1985: 38).

33 A similar critique of private property was also provided by Novalis (see Becker and Manstetten 2004).

34 Say (1834: 67–8) regards this view as being between the views of Adam Smith and the Physiocrats, which he both considers to be biased. In his view, Smith has overestimated labor as source of value, while the Physiocrats have overestimated nature.