Economic theory and philosophical anthropology: Marx, Gramsci, Sraffa and the study of human nature

Abstract

In the present paper, we ask whether in the “new” Classical political economy as reproposed by Sraffa there is a satisfying theory of human behaviour and social change. To discuss this issue, we try to show a possible pathway to integrate the analytical part of his work with the historical analysis based on the materialist philosophical anthropology proposed by Marx. We will examine first the joint vision of Garegnani and Andrea Ginzburg to trace a compatibility between Sraffa’s thought and Marx’s thought, then we put forward some hints for a non-deterministic theory through Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis.

Keywords:

• Gramsci
• Individualism
• Marxian anthropology
• Sraffa
• Surplus Approach

JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES:

• B00
• B14
• B24
• B51

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their comments, criticisms and suggestions without which the publication of this paper would not have been possible. Moreover, I would like to thank Attilio Trezzini, Manfredi Alberti, Ragip Ege, Rebeca Gomez Betancourt, Richard Arena and André Lapidus. Usual caveats apply.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Not all the scholars agree on this possibility. See, for example, Hodgson (1991, 174): “[…] The Sraffian approach does not offer a theory of human agency and interaction. It simply suggests that the long-period positions will somehow reflect and affect the expectations and actions of agents. […] [T]his lack is a serious weakness. In consequence it cannot be claimed that Sraffian analysis provides a completely adequate or entirely appropriate foundation for post-Keynesian theory”.

2 As is known, the phenomena of reswitching and reverse capital deepening show that, in general, we cannot safely assume well behaved schedules on the market of goods and productive factors (Sraffa 1960, cap. VI; Garegnani 1979, 45).

3 On this point see Dobb (1973) and again Bharadwaj (2017).

4 See, for a detailed summary, Roncaglia (2009).

5 See Marcuzzo and Rosselli (2011), Fratini (2018) and Cesaratto and Di Bucchianico (2021).

6 See Gehrke and Kurz (2006).

7 See Kurz and Salvadori (2021).

8 See Sen (2003).

9 Just to mention few more, Sraffa also studied Jules Henri Poincaré and L. L. Whyte, see, Kurz and Salvadori (2005).

10 See Arena (2013; 2015; 2015; 2020)

11 See Bellino and Nerozzi (2021, 151).

12 This is the well-known original definition of the method: “If one were to start with population, it would be a chaotic conception of the whole, and through closer definition one would arrive analytically at increasingly simple concepts; from the imagined concrete, one would move to more and more tenuous abstractions until one arrived at the simplest determinations. From there it would be necessary to make a return journey until one finally arrived once more at population, which this time would be not a chaotic conception of a whole, but a rich totality of many determinations and relations” (Marx and Engels CW 28, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58 Introduction, 37–45).

13 Gramsci observes: “Critical economics has sought a fair balance between the deductive and inductive methods, i.e., to construct abstract hypotheses […] on the effectual reality, “historical description”, which gives the real premise to construct scientific hypotheses, i.e., to abstract the economic element or those aspects of the economic element to exercise the scientific examination” (Gramsci 1975, 335, our translation). “L’economia critica ha cercato un giusto contemperamento tra il metodo deduttivo e il metodo induttivo, cioè di costruire ipotesi astratte […] sulla realtà effettuale, “descrizione storica”, che dà la premessa reale per costruire ipotesi scientifiche, cioè per astrarre l’elemento economico o quelli tra gli aspetti dell’elemento economico su cui si vuole attrarre l’attenzione ed esercitare l’esame scientifico”.

14 In the specific case of Robert Liefmann, the principle is hedonism; he thought that the profit motive is the essential and unique element for the economic organization in the society.

15 Gramsci (2007, 186): “[…] “human nature” is the “ensemble of social relations”; this is the most satisfying answer, because it includes the idea of “becoming” – man becomes, he changes continuously with the changing of social relations – and because it negates “man in general””.

16 On this point, Antonio Labriola writes: “[…] The whole course of human events is a sum, a succession of series of conditions that men have made and laid down for themselves through the experience accumulated in their changing social life; but it represents neither the tendency to realize a predetermined end, nor the deviation of first principles from perfection and fecundity” (Labriola 1966, 123).

17 (Regolarità e necessità, in Gramsci 1992, 410–414). See, about the role played by Ricardo, the letters to Sraffa in Gramsci and Schucht (1997).

18 See, also, Potier (2020) who describes Sraffa’s doubts on Gramsci’s interpretation of Classical political economy.

19 For a thorough discussion about this topic, see Ege (2018).

20 We can read in the third Thesis on Feuerbach: “the materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated” (Marx and Engels CW 5, 3).

21 See Liguori (2004, 131–150).

22 See Ginzburg (2015, 60). For the complete notes in the English translation see Kurz (2012, 1557–1558). This note has not a title and according to Pierangelo Garegnani, these notes were gathered by Sraffa in preparation for a work subsequent to PMCM.

23 See Gramsci and Schucht (1997).