Discriminative Assumptions of Utilitarian Bioethics Regarding Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities

Abstract

'Bioutilitarianism', which is a position presented by the well-known utilitarian philosophers Helga Kuhse, James Rachels and Peter Singer, views the potential existence of infants with intellectual disabilities as less valuable than the existence of 'normal' infants. I will argue that their arguments are based on misleading and biased information about the characteristics of individuals with intellectual disabilities and their quality of life. By ignoring the social constructionist dimension of disability the bioutilitarians make questionable moral conclusions. Also, the underlying assumption of their position is an 'intelligist' intuition, namely that intellectually 'normal' human beings are morally more valuable than human beings with intellectual disabilities. I contend that there is no reasonable basis for viewing infants with intellectual disabilities as being less entitled to life than 'normal' infants or for considering people with intellectual disabilities as less valuable than 'normal' people.