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ABSTRACT
New powers, such as China, India and Brazil, are challenging the traditional dominance of the US in the governance of the global economy. It is generally taken for granted that the rise of new powers is simply a reflection of their growing economic might. In this article, however, I challenge this assumption by drawing on the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to show that the forces driving the rise of new powers are more heterogeneous and complex than suggested by a simple economic determinism. I argue that these countries have in fact taken different paths to power: while China's rise has been more closely tied to its growing economic might, the rise of Brazil and India has been driven primarily by their mobilization and leadership of developing country coalitions, which enabled them to exercise influence above their economic weight. One important result is that Brazil and India have assumed a more aggressive and activist position in WTO negotiations than China and played a greater role in shaping the agenda of the Doha Round. Thus, although the new powers are frequently grouped together (as the ‘BRICs’, for example), this masks considerable variation in their sources of power and behaviour in global economic governance.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was supported by the US National Science Foundation (Grant No. 0927598), the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant No. 75220060755), and a Fulbright Fellowship.
Notes
1. While quota reforms of the IMF agreed in 2008 became effective in March 2011, further reforms agreed in 2010 have yet to be ratified by the US.
2. In the literature on rising powers, the line between the analytical and the normative at times appears blurred, such that the distinction between assessing the rise of new powers and making a case for their greater inclusion in global economic governance is not always clear. Thus, in some instances, attempts to measure and catalogue the material resources of the rising powers may be more a question of arguing for their inclusion, rather than accepting military or economic capabilities as the sole measure of their power or influence. The point remains, however, that discussions of the emerging powers have overwhelmingly focused on their material power capabilities.
3. IMF and WTO 2012.
4. The interviews not directly quoted in the paper were used for background information, to triangulate among different sources in order to accurately reconstruct events at the WTO, and to substantiate the selected quotes presented in the paper. To protect the confidentiality of interview respondents in the diplomatic community surrounding the WTO, names and other identifying information have been removed.
5. For Brazil, see: Armijo and Kearney, 2008; Hopewell, 2013; Veiga, 2007; India: Dhar and Kallummal, Citation2007; Sinha, 2007; China: Feng, 2006; Jiang, 2010; Zeng, 2007.
6. Since Russia – the fourth ‘BRIC’ – did not become a member of the WTO until 2012 and was therefore not part of the power shift within the institution, it is not included in the analysis presented here.
7. I use the term veto in the informal, practical sense of having the power to block an initiative or agreement; no state has formal, legal veto power at the WTO.
8. I refer to the coalition of developing countries at the WTO as the G20-Trade (G20-T) to avoid confusion with the G20 Leaders Summit.
9. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
10. Interview, Geneva, March 2009.
11. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
12. In Brazil, the primacy accorded to expanding its agribusiness exports has been strongly opposed by a variety of other actors (including social movements, NGOs, trade unions, small farmers and peasants, and many manufacturing sectors). Yet, in shaping Brazilian trade policy, agribusiness has largely won out over opposing social forces (see Hopewell, 2013).
13. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
14. Ibid..
15. Ibid..
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid..
18. Ibid.
19. Interview, New Delhi, March 2010.
20. Interviews with Indian negotiators, Geneva, September 2008–June 2009.
21. Interview, Geneva, March 2009.
22. Interviews with trade officials, Brasilia, May 2010.
23. Interview with negotiator, Geneva, March 2009.
24. Interview, Geneva, April 2009.
25. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
26. Interviews, Geneva, March and May 2009.
27. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
28. Multiple interviews, Geneva, September 2008–June 2009.
29. Interview with NGO representative, Geneva, May 2009.
30. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
31. Interview with Secretariat official, Geneva, March 2009.
32. Interview with Secretariat official, Geneva, March 2009.
33. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
34. Interview, Geneva, April 2009.
35. Interview, Geneva, May 2009.
36. For discussion of the difficulties in concluding the Doha Round see Gallagher, 2008; Margulis, 2013; Wilkinson, 2009.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Kristen Hopewell
Kristen Hopewell is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of British Columbia, Okanagan, Canada.
