ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are grateful to the Center for Law Policy and Finance and the Global Economic Governnace Initiative at Boston University for hosting a workshop on shadow banking that led to this special issue. They would also like to thank Daniel Mugge, Kevin Gallagher and Mark Blyth for intellectual inspiration with ethe early phases of the project. Finally, their thanks go to Wesley Widmeier for brilliant comments on earlier versions of this editorial introduction.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. McCulley (Citation2009) referenced his untitled speech at the 2007 Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers.
2. Financial collateral is traded in repo markets. Repos or repurchase agreements are securities financing transactions for the sale and repurchase of an asset (collateral). In this special section Daniela Gabor provides a useful illustration: ‘A bank can fund its portfolio of government bonds by selling these in a repo transaction, with a promise to buy them back. For the duration of the repo, the bank remains the economic owner of those government bonds, being exposed to their risk and returns. Furthermore, repos are core to short selling, allowing financial institutions to borrow securities before selling.’
3. This finding echoes the insights of the corresponding research on conventional banking regulation (Baker Citation2013; Moschella and Tsingou, 2013).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Cornel Ban
Cornel Ban is assistant professor of political economy at the Frederick S. Pardee School for Global Studies at Boston University.
Daniela Gabor
Daniela Gabor is associate professor of economics at UWE Bristol.