Abstract
The ability of states to exploit private resources at an international level is an increasingly salient political issue. In explaining the mechanisms of this shift, the framework of Weaponized Interdependence has quickly risen to prominence, arguing that those states that are centrally placed in global networks can exploit their centrality given the appropriate domestic institutions. Building on this framework, I suggest that the relationship between states and the private corporations holding the resources states seek to exploit is more dynamic and contested than assumed. Drawing on developments in the industry for constructing and operating submarine cables, I find that a paradigm shift in the market has significantly limited the authority of states vis-à-vis key market players. The contribution of this finding is to expand Weaponized Interdependence as a framework, paying closer attention to the relationship between private companies and states. This expansion allows for the utilization of Weaponized Interdependence as a framework for a broader set of cases, explaining not only when a network is prone to weaponization but also the limitations states face when they seek to do so.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 See the Federal Communications Commission: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-20-369A1.pdf
2 An anonymized table of interviewees is included in the appendix
3 Licenses available at https://fcc.report/IBFS/Filing-List/SCL-LIC.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Lars Gjesvik
Lars Gjesvik is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the University of Oslo. He studies the ability of states to weaponize and secure digital technologies, and the role non-state actors play in enabling or constraining those efforts.