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Abstract
Recent work by emerging “vulnerability theorists” has imbued the concept of vulnerability with new meaning that promises novel theoretical and social insights; however, these insights remain threatened by the innate ambiguity of the notion of vulnerability. The negative connotation of this term, namely the propensity to experience wounding, pain and marginalization, coexists with its positive connotation of an openness to love, care and the creation of solidarity. In this paper, we argue that this ambiguity calls for a clarification in order for the newly established positivity to be properly channeled to imagining new forms of inter-human relations. Specifically, we adopt the phenomenological lens of “exposedness,” drawn from Emmanuel Levinas, placing the notion of vulnerability at the horizon of the relatedness and dynamics among the triad of the “I,” the other, and the third. My vulnerability to the other as an exposedness to excessive responsibility is the pre-original signifyingness of inter-human relations, that is, as “for the other” before “for oneself.” The vulnerability of the other in the form of the relation of Eros will be differentiated from the vulnerability of the other as immediacy. The vulnerability of the third will be discussed from a socio-political perspective, where we will engage with Martha Fineman’s idea of universal vulnerability as a tool for social-political criticism, and further show how a Levinasian perspective on the third can address potential problems with Fineman’s proposals.
disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Alison Assiter, “Kierkegaard and Vulnerability” in Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics, eds. Martha Fineman and Anna Grear (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) 30.
2 Ann Murphy, Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary (Albany: State U of New York P, 2012) 86.
3 Pamela Sue Anderson, “Arguing for ‘Ethical’ Vulnerability: Towards a Politics of Care?” in Exploring Vulnerability, eds. Günter Thomas and Heike Springhart (Göttingen and Bristol, CT: Vandenhoeck, 2017) 147–62 (158).
4 Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998) 87.
5 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Kluwer, 1998) 183.
6 Ibid.
7 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1969) 34.
8 Ibid.
9 Michael Purcell, “The Mystery of Death Alterity and Affectivity in Levinas,” New Blackfriars 76.899 (1995): 524–34 (530).
10 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind xv.
11 Levinas, Totality and Infinity 298.
12 Ibid. 299.
13 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 6.
14 Ibid. 14.
15 Ibid. xx.
16 Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987) 128.
17 Levinas, Otherwise than Being xxiv.
18 Tina Chanter, “Introduction” in Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2001) 1–27 (22).
19 Levinas, Otherwise than Being xxvii.
20 Jennifer Rosato, “Woman as Vulnerable Self: The Trope of Maternity in Levinas’s ‘Otherwise than Being,’” Hypatia 27.2 (2012): 348–65 (352).
21 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 55.
22 Ibid. 49.
23 Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers 68.
24 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 128.
25 Ibid. 157.
26 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind 88.
27 Ibid. 60.
28 Ibid. 89.
29 Ibid. 9.
30 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 161.
31 Ibid.
32 Claire Katz, “Levinas between Agape and Eros,” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 11.2 (2007): 333–50 (333).
33 Mayra Rivera, “Ethical Desires: Toward a Theology of Relational Transcendence” in Toward a Theology of Eros: Transfiguring Passion at the Limits of Discipline, eds. Virginia Burrus and Catherine Keller (New York: Fordham UP, 2006) 255–70 (258).
34 Levinas, Totality and Infinity 256.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. 260.
38 Ibid. 257.
39 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 192.
40 Ibid. 86.
41 Ibid. 88.
42 Ibid. 74.
43 Ibid. 90.
44 Ibid.
45 Martha Fineman and Ann Grear, “Introduction” in Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics 2.
46 Ibid. 24.
47 Martha Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 20.1 (2008): 1–23 (19).
48 Fineman, “Equality, Autonomy and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics” in Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics 20.
49 Morgan Cloud, “More than Utopia” in Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics 93.
50 Levinas, Totality and Infinity 213.
51 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 16.
52 Ibid. xli.
53 Ibid. 160.
54 Emmanuel Levinas, Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Lévinas, ed. Jill Robbins (Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 2016) 9.
55 William Paul Simmons, “The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move from An-archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25.6 (1999): 83–104 (84).
56 Levinas, Totality and Infinity 72.
57 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 160.
58 Ibid. 159.
59 Ibid.
60 Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics and Politics” in The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 289–97 (294).
61 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 161.