Toward Nuclear Stability in South Asia

Abstract

Contrary to the arguments of proliferation pessimists, this article contends that the overt nuclearization of South Asia has contributed to stability in the region. To that end this article carefully examines two recent crises in Indo-Pakistani relations and concludes that in the absence of nuclear weapons they would have culminated in full-scale war. Accordingly, while Indo-Pakistani relations may remain fraught with tension, the likelihood of major war in the region has dramatically diminished.

Notes

An earlier version of this article appeared as ‘Nuclear Stability in South Asia’, International Security, 33(2), 2008, pp. 45–70.

1. On their respective pathways to the nuclear tests, see Sumit Ganguly, ‘India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Sources and Prospects of India's Nuclear Weapons Program’, International Security, 23(4), 1999, pp. 148–177; and Samina Ahmed, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices’, International Security, 23(4), 1999, pp. 178–204.

2. On the concept of ‘opacity’ see Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications, Frank Cass and Company, London, 1991.

3. On this subject, see S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007; also see Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 2006; Mario E. Carranza, ‘Avoiding a Nuclear Catastrophe: Arms Control after the 2002 India-Pakistan Crisis’, International Politics, 40(3), 2003, pp. 313–339.

4. For arguments about nuclear stability, see Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2005; also see John Arquilla, ‘Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: More May be Manageable’, Comparative Strategy, 16(1), 1997, pp. 13–31; David J. Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’, International Security, 21(3), 1996–1997, pp. 87–119.

5. For a contrary formulation, see Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and Indian Nuclear Security, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2006.

6. The classic statement remains: Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Debate, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 2002.

7. Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, International Security, 18(4), 1994, pp. 66–107.

8. Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia’, Asian Survey, 41(6), 2001, pp. 1064–1086.

9. Timothy D. Hoyt, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia’, Asian Survey, 41(6), 2003, pp. 956–977.

10. Michael Krepon, ‘The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception and Escalation Control in South Asia’, in Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (eds.), Prospects for Peace in South Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2005.

11. S. Paul Kapur, n. 4.

12. See, for example, Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power, Harper Collins Publishers, New Delhi, 2000; on Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons, see Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, Croom Helm, London, 1987.

13. For a crisp summary of Pakistani military and political motivations in launching the Kargil operation, see Prasun K. Sengupta, ‘Mountain Warfare: The Kargil Experience’, Asian Defence Journal, 10, 1999, pp. 42–46.

14. For a discussion of the concept of a ‘fait accompli’ strategy, see Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Columbia University Press, New York, 1974; for an Indian perspective on the Siachen Glacier dispute, see Anand K. Verma, ‘Siachen: An Episode to Remember’, Indian Defence Review, 22(3), 2007, at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2007/08/siachen-an-episode-to-remember.html (Accessed March 9, 2009); for a Pakistani perspective, see Humera Niazi, ‘The Siachen Glacier: 1984 to 1988’, Defence Journal, January 1999, at http://www.defencejournal.com/jan99/glacier.htm (Accessed March 9, 2008).

15. Further details about the military dimensions of the initial intrusions can be found in Major-General Ashok Krishna, ‘The Kargil War’, in Major-General Ashok Krishna, AVSM, and P.R. Chari (eds.), Kargil: The Tables Turned, Manohar, New Delhi, 2001.

16. Manoj Joshi, ‘The Kargil War: The Fourth Round’, in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy, Har Anand, New Delhi, 2001.

17. Marcus P. Acosta, ‘The Kargil Conflict: Waging War in the Himalayas’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18(3), 2007, pp. 397–415.

18. Agence France Presse, ‘India Retakes Two Key Peaks in Kashmir’, The Straits Times (Singapore), June 16, 1999.

19. Associated Press, ‘India Reports Major Highway Recaptured From Rebels’, The New York Times, June 21, 1999, p. A7.

20. Farhan Bokhari and Mary Louise Kazmin, ‘US General Presses Pakistan on Kashmir’, The Financial Times, June 25, 1999.

21. C. Raja Mohan, ‘Pak Must Pull Out Troops’, The Hindu, June 28, 1999.

22. See ‘Joint Statement By President Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan’, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 4, 1999.

23. For the classic statement on the subject, see Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1991.

24. Joanna Slater, ‘A Tremor at the Fault Line’, The Far Eastern Economic Review, December 27, 2001–January 3, 2002, pp. 22–23.

25. Celia Dugger, ‘Pakistan's Arrest of Militant is a “Step Forward” India Says’, New York Times, December 22, 2001.

26. For a discussion of Pakistan's involvement with terrorist groups, see Jessica Stern, ‘Pakistan's Jihad Culture’, Foreign Affairs, 79(6), 2000, pp. 115–126; and Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terror, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

27. Celia W. Dugger, ‘Suicide Raid in New Delhi; Attackers among 12 Dead Parliament Members Safe after Wild Fight’, The New York Times, December 15, 2001.

28. The Economist Global Agenda, ‘Terror in India’, December 19, 2001, at http://www.economist.com (Accessed January 21, 2002).

29. John F. Burns, ‘Pakistan Moves Against Groups Named by India’, The New York Times, December 28, 2001, p. A5.

30. John F. Burns and Celia W. Dugger, ‘India Builds up Forces as Bush Urges Calm’, The New York Times, December 30, 2001.

31. Pervez Musharraf, text of speech, January 12, 2000, at http://www.outlookindia.com.

32. Todd S. Purdum and Celia W. Dugger, ‘Powell Now “Very Encouraged” on Kashmir’, The New York Times, January 19, 2002, p. A5.

33. Edward Luce and Farhan Bokhari, ‘Bombers Kill 33 in Kashmir as US Envoy Visits India’, Financial Times, May 15, 2002, p. 4.

34. Reuters, ‘Indian PM Calls for a “Decisive Fight”’, May 22, 2002.

35. Josy Joseph, ‘The Mood is for War’, India Abroad, May 31, 2002, p. 3.

36. Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, ‘Bush Presses Pakistan on Kashmir and Orders Rumsfeld to the Region’, The New York Times, May 31, 2001, p. 3.

37. Raymond Bonner, “India Believes Pakistan Restrains Militants’, The New York Times, June 6, 2002, p. A12.

38. Josy Joseph, ‘India Removes Overflight Ban on Pakistani Aircraft’, India Abroad, June 21, 2001, p. 15.

39. For a discussion of the limitations of Indian capabilities, see Rahul Bedi, ‘The Military Dynamics’, Frontline (Chennai), June 21, 2001; also see V. Sudarshan and Ajith Pillai, ‘Game of Patience’, Outlook (New Delhi), May 27, 2002, pp. 35–39.

40. See Walter Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine’, International Security, 32(3), 2007/2008, pp. 158–190; alsosee V.R. Raghavan, ‘Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia’, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall–Winter 2001, pp. 1–18.

41. For evidence of Pakistani complicity in directing the mujahideen towards Kashmir, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 1, 2001, Penguin, New York, 2004.

42. Sumit Ganguly, n. 2.

43. For a reasonably comprehensive list of these jihadi groups, see K. Santhanam, Sreedhar, Sudhir Saxena and Manish, Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery, Sage, New Delhi, 2003.

44. On this subject, see J.N. Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, Books Today, New Delhi, 2002, p. 55.

45. Personal interviews with mid-level Indian Air Force personnel, Washington, DC, December 1999.

46. On the Indian military debacle of 1962, see Steven Hoffman, India and the China Crisis, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990.

47. For details about the Indo-Pakistani military balance in 1965, see Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict, Pall Mall, London, 1968.

48. On the decline of Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force, see Kanti Bajpai, ‘India: Modified Structuralism’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practices: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998; also see Sumit Ganguly, ‘India's Foreign Policy Grows Up’, World Policy Journal, 20(4), 2003–2004, pp. 41–47.

49. Personal interview with General Ved Prakash Malik, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, San Francisco, California.

50. On this subject, see H.V. Hodson, Great Divide; Britain, India, Pakistan, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997; also see the rather self-serving account of Major-General Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, Pak Publishers, Karachi, 1970.

51. Russell Brines, n. 48.

52. The best discussion of Pakistani decision-making can be found in Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990.

53. On the war-proneness of weak democratic regimes, see Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005.

54. Rajesh Basrur, n. 6.