Conventional War in the Presence of Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversary's nuclear thresholds and to calibrate one's own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response. This article examines the Indian experience in this regard on the basis of Kargil, 1999. It concludes that limited war – with precise, clearly articulated objectives, calibrated use of military force, and astute use of politico-diplomatic space – offers scope for conduct of conventional war in the presence of nuclear weapons.

Notes

1. First articulated by Liddell Hart in 1954, the concept was further fleshed out by Glenn Snyder in 1965 in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis in ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, in Paul Seabury (ed.), The Balance of Power, Chandler, San Francisco, 1965, pp. 185–201.

2. The issue of inequality of nations is interesting because much of the Cold War literature was predicated on both sides being roughly comparable in nuclear war fighting capabilities. This prompted analysts such as Herman Kahn to identify not less than 44 steps in the escalation ladder. He opined that both sides could exchange blows of equal intensity at each step of the ladder as they steadily climbed up to higher levels of destruction. This situation obviously does not apply to India and Pakistan.

3. Pakistan's strategy of fomenting cross-border terrorism has been variously described as ‘proxy war’, ‘asymmetric warfare’, or ‘low intensity conflict’. While these are co-terminus, this article, however, uses ‘sub-conventional conflict’ because the author considers this term best describes the gravity of the activity. It is a kind of warfare that uses asymmetric means and proxy players, but is certainly not low intensity given the number of casualties it has caused to the Indian armed forces. Yet, it is pitched below the level of regular, conventional warfare and hence is sub-conventional. By the same logic, India's ‘limited war’ is above sub-conventional conflict, but still below conventional warfare. Some arguments expressed in this article on the linkages between sub-conventional and nuclear warfare draw upon the chapter ‘The Shadow Dance’ written by the author for her forthcoming book Nuclear Strategy: India's March Towards Credible Deterrence, Knowledge World, New Delhi (forthcoming).

4. Yossef Bodansky, Pakistan's Nuclear Brinkmanship, Freeman Centre for Strategic Studies, Israel, at http://www.freeman.org.

5. Ihtasham ul Haque, ‘Peace Linked to Kashmir Solution’, Dawn Weekly Wire Service, June 26, 1999. As cited in Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2000, pp. 248–249. The section on Kargil, 1999 is a revised version of the author's earlier published paper entitled ‘Nuclear Deterrence and Conventional War: A Test of India's Nuclear Strategy’, Air Power Journal, 3(3), Monsoon 2008, pp. 99–118.

6. Quoted in Zahid Hussain, ‘On the Brink’, Newsline, June 1999, pp. 24–25. It is a different matter that in 2007, Lieutenant General (Retd.) Asad Durrani admitted at an international conference that despite having nuclear weapons in 1999, Pakistan withdrew from Kargil because in crisis ‘countries are self deterred because caution and fear of consequences take over’. As quoted in Bharat Karnad, India's Nuclear Policy, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2008, p. 131.

7. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press, London, 1960. For more on Pakistan's nuclear strategy see Manpreet Sethi, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy’, Air Power Journal, 2(3), Monsoon 2007.

8. These are the words of Benazir Bhutto who has stated that the Army had shared the plan with her when she was Prime Minister, but that she had vetoed it even though she had sensed that the army chief was taken in with the ‘brilliance of military strategy’. See Samina Ahmed, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Kargil Crisis’, in Lowell Dittmer (ed.), South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China, East Gate, London, 2005, pp. 137–149.

9. Bharat Karnad, n. 6, p. 110.

10. There has been a war of words between Pakistan's political and military leadership of the time, with each blaming the other for the Kargil debacle. General Musharraf has never tired of recounting the ‘political mishandling’ of the situation and their attempts to ‘spin the events disingenuously’. See Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Free Press, New York, 2006, pp. 95–98. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif has maintained that he was never briefed on the military operations in Kargil.

11. George Fernandes, ‘The Challenges of Limited War: Parameters and Options’, inaugural address at the National Seminar organized by IDSA, January 5, 2000.

12. Marin van Creveld, On Future War, Brassey's, London, 1991, p. 194. (emphasis added).

13. For a detailed analysis of the many factors that are leading the trend to limited wars, see Jasjit Singh, ‘The Dynamics of Limited War’, Strategic Analysis, 24(7), 2000, pp. 1205–1220.

14. These were stated in an interview to Paulo Cotta Ramusino and M. Martinelli, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan, report by Landau Network, Centro Volta, January 21, 2002.

15. As cited by Gaurav Kampani, Placing the Indo-Pakistani Standoff in Perspective, Monterrey Institute of International Studies, California, 2002.

16. Jehangir Karamat, ‘Missile Acquisition by Pakistan: Military Strategic Imperatives’, South Asian Survey, 11(2), 2004, pp. 169–176.

17. Jasjit Singh, n. 13. The 2007 Israel–Lebanon war presents a good illustration of this point.

18. Bharat Karnad, n. 6, p. 115.

19. Ibid., p. 126.

20. G.V. Vaidyanatha, ‘Conventional War in the Nuclear Age’, at http://www.members.tripod.com/jnu-matrix/conv-war.html (emphasis added).

21. Henry Kissinger, ‘Limited War: Nuclear or Conventional? A Reappraisal’, in Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, George Braziller, Inc., New York, 1961, p. 146. Italics in original.